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Foreword
I am pleased to introduce the OTA assessment of Civilian Space Stations and the
U.S. Future in Space. This study was requested by the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation and the House Committee on Science and Technology,
and the request was endorsed by the Senate Committee on Appropriations and the
House Committee on the Budget.
The study was designed to cover not only the essential technical issues surrounding the selection and acquisition of infrastructure in space, but to enable Congress to
look beyond these matters to the larger context; the direction of our efforts. Given
the vast capability and promise available to the country and the world because of the
sophisticated space technology we now possess, equally sophisticated and thoughtful
decisions must be made about where the U.S. space program is going, and for what
purposes.
The Advisory Panel for this study played a role of unusual importance in helping
to generate a set of possible space goals and objectives that demonstrate the diverse
opportunities open to us at this time, and OTA thanks them for their productive commitment of time and energy. Their participation does not necessarily constitute consensus or endorsement of the content of the report, for which OTA bears sole responsibility.
It often happens that information generated during the course of an OTA study
can be used as legislation moves through Congress. A number of statements presented
in Senate and House hearings by OTA and a technical memorandum drawn from the
analysis have already contributed to the course of the debate. This report, the culmination of the OTA process, is now a resource for both Congress and the National Commission on Space, which Congress has created in order to give full and fundamental
review to the basic questions of charting our course. It is OTA’S hope that the publication of the study will also expand the circle of those who can effectively engage in
the debate and contribute to the decision process.
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Chapter 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION: RELATION OF A “SPACE STATION”
(I. E., SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE) TO THE U.S. FUTURE IN SPACE
Atter the expenditure of some $200 billion
(1984$) since the launch of its first spacecraft in
early 19 58, the United States has obtained the
scientific knowledge and developed the technoIogical capability and professional expertise to
succeed i n virtualIy any theoreticalIy possible civilian space venture that it may choose to undertake, But America’s second quarter-century of
space activities promises to differ markedIy from
the first, almost wholly exploratory, era. If space

is to be successfully developed in roughly the
same fashion as have other, more familiar naturalI resources and environments, the next stage
will be characterized by establishing and secu ring the capabilities to support routine, operational
activities there. I n this report, OTA refers to the

range of in-space facilities and services that would
support such activities as “infrastructure. ”
Important steps in the considered development
of space have already been taken. By any standard, the satellite communications industry is a
great success; its revenues have reached the multibillion-dollar per year level and are growing at
an annual rate of 15 percent. Massive Iaunch facilities, expendable launch vehicles, and the
space Shuttle now provide routine access to
much of near-Earth space; used in conjunction
with a global communications network and surface data processing facilities, they provide a sophisticated, though limited, range of services to
their users.

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

A large, inhabited “space station” in low-Earth-orbit is one approach to the establishment of a long-term infrastructure
in space. The concept shown here (being visited by the space Shuttle)
designed and built model used for
illustration throughout early 1984.
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Another sign of strength is the maturity of the
U.S. aerospace industry. This sector is now beginning to position itself to provide space assets
and services independently, and now anticipates
conducting some in-space investigations and
commercial-industrial activities, privately financed, either on its own or in combination with
other business concerns. And other countries
now have capabilities to do many things in space—
capabilities that continue to grow rapidly.
For years, leaders of the U.S. civilian space
community have advanced the view that the next
major logical step in space should be the acquisition of specific, permanent in-space infrastructure: a civilian “space station. ”
In this context, Congress, in July of 1982, asked
OTA to undertake an assessment of “Civilian
Space Stations”; this report is the product of that
request. The OTA assessment was requested originally by the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, later (in October
1982) by the House Committee on Science and
Technology. The assessment was endorsed in
August 1982 by the House Committee on the
Budget and the Senate Committee on Appropriations. The various committee interests were stated
as follows:
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation: assess the need for a permanent orbiting facility; examine the major
technological alternatives and their related
costs and benefits; focus on the different
space station designs and orbits, the range
of feasible applications for the project, the
benefits and drawbacks of utilizing existing
concepts, the estimated costs for potential
missions and design options, and prospective private sector and international involvement.
Ž House Committee on Science and Technology: undertake an independent, rigorous,
balanced study of the need for a space sta-

●

●

●

tion; address “the hard questions”; not only
look at what a station can do that cannot be
done better some other way, but also evaluate alternatives to a space station. “In short,
the assessment should address and document the real forces driving us to build a
space station. ”
House Committee on the Budget: estimate
the effect of a space station’s cost on the
NASA budget and the overall Federal budget; and consider the roles of the Department
of Defense, the international community,
and the private sector in the development,
production, and operation of an inhabitable
space station.
Senate Committee on Appropriations: estimate the relative merits-of in-habitable and
u nonhabitable space platforms; estimate the
role automation/robotics can be expected to
play in the construction and eventual use of
space platforms; and estimate the costs associated with the range of design options.

This assessment has attempted to be responsive
to the entire range of congressional interest, with
the exception of the interest of the House Committee on the Budget in the role of the Department of Defense.
The report has examined the range of technology required of permanent space infrastructure
as well as the broader policy questions arising
from NASA’s proposal of a particular constellation of infrastructure elements. Overall, the considered development of space through the paced
acquisition of appropriate elements of space infrastructure is a key to maintaining America’s
leadership in space. However, because the Nation
does not have clearly formulated long-range goals
and objectives for its civilian space activities, proceeding to realize the present NASA “space station” concept is not likely to result in the facility
most appropriate for advancing U.S. interests into
the second quarter-century of the Space Age.

RATIONALE FOR SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE
Several countries are competent in the conduct
of space investigations and the development and
use of space technology. These countries are now

providing growing economic competition for the
United States through development, acquisition,
and operation of their own elements of infrastruc-

Ch. l—Executive Summary
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ture. The Soviet Union has made a commitment
to the permanent occupancy of space, has operated orbital stations with human work crews for
over a decade, and is showing interest in providing competitive space services. Thus, if the United
States is to continue as the leader in civilian space
activities, Congress must give serious thought to
the kind of space infrastructure to be developed,
the long-term goals that that infrastructure is to
serve, and the public-private and international arrangements that will take best advantage of it.
Future development of more sophisticated
space science and applications capabilities—e.g.,
staging of planetary exploration missions or assembly of large communications platforms—
wouId be markedly facilitated by the existence
of appropriate elements of space infrastructure.
It is assumed in this report that, whatever decisions are made regarding space infrastructure,
publicly supported space science and space applications will continue at roughly their present
level of appropriations (over $1 billion per year,
as measured in constant dollars).
Although the United States already has acquired some initial elements of space infrastructure, these are insufficient to undertake a number of desirable activities in an efficient and
effective manner. The acquisition of some additional permanent in-space infrastructure elements
WOU Id :
allow sophisticated experiments in life and
materials sciences to be conducted;
● permit fuel to be stored and supplies to be
warehoused in low-Earth-orbit;
● initiate more efficient staging of voyages to
high orbits, the Moon, planets, and asteroids;
● allow the initial trial of new instruments, activities, and procedures; and
● allow the repair and maintenance of increasingly complex and specialized satellites and
common carrier platforms.
●

The ability to undertake these activities, all of
which would support space science and applications, constitutes a persuasive rationale for acquiring appropriate elements of permanent space infrastructure. At present, the more appropriate
would be those which allowed the satisfactory
conduct of: 1) life and materials sciences experi-

ments, and 2) satellite servicing. However, by the
same token, sufficient resources to ensure that
these science and applications activities actually
are undertaken must be assured; otherwise, the
rationale for the infrastructure vanishes.
A persuasive case can also be made for seeing
that some of these permanent infrastructure elements allow an on-board human work force. This
case rests on the fact that automated facilities,
whether relatively autonomous or teleoperated,
capable of supporting all of the activities listed
above will not be available before 2000, even if
a large automation R&D program is begun immediately. (This does not argue against such an
R&D program. Indeed, there is good reason to
expect that sophisticated automation will be necessary for the future development of space as well
as for non-space-related Earth applications. It
might well be appropriate, therefore, to initiate
such a program now. Later, with the results of

6
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this program in hand, informed judgments could
be made about the most sophisticated mix of
human and machine workers.)
As the Shuttle development program comes to
a close, thousands of in-house engineers and
technical support staff and, in principle, as much
as $2 billion (1984$) per year in contract funds
under its present $7 billion (1984$) “budget envelope” will be freed up to be applied to one or
more new programs. If NASA is to maintain its
current size—a size that NASA leaders judge to
be acceptable to the general public–the combination of people and funds that could soon be-

come available suggests, strongly, that any new
programs must include development and acquisition of a great deal of new technology, preferably related to having people in space; large numbers of technologists would be gainfully
employed both in NASA and in the space industry under contract to NASA.
In addition, many believe that NASA might not
long survive in its present form without a single,
large, “people-in-space” program upon which
a majority of its energies are focused. If a number of smaller programs were initiated instead,
each of them, it is thought, could be terminated

Ch. l—Executive Summary

without widespread objections arising i n the political process.
Finally, NASA may have thought it prudent to

propose a ‘‘space station’ program rather than
some other large endeavor(s) (e. g., a return of
Americans to the Moon, or sending people on

an expedition to Mars, etc.), both because the
former had been carefully studied over the years,
representing, i n NASA’s view, a natural complement to the Shuttle, and because alternative large
programs seemed too grandiose, have not recently been discussed with the general public, and,
therefore, were less likely to enlist the required
support, both with in and without the administ ration.
All of these considerations, taken together, are
clear incentives for the space technology leaders, both Government and industry, to opt for a
combination of a Shuttle-like “methods and
means’ activity, rather than to accept the posi -

●

7

t ion of a much smaller Federal agency or to fight
for approval of one or more large, new space
“end” programs.
But while the case to be made for acquiring
some long-term, inhabitable infrastructure in lowEarth-orbit is persuasive, OTA concludes that there
is no compelling, objective, external case either
for obtaining all of the particular array of elements
that NASA now describes under the rubric of “The
Space Station, ” or for obtaining this or any other
array in the general manner that NASA is now expected to pursue, or for paying the particular public cost that NASA now estimates is required. As
the infrastructure would be of a broadly generalpurpose nature, to be used to support over 100
conceptual uses (few of which have been sharply
defined or have gained wide acceptance as important objectives of the space program), there is no
necessity for obtaining all of this particular array
soon.

INFRASTRUCTURE OPTIONS
The fact that the United States has already developed a wide variety of space capabi Iities
means that it has genuine choices–both of what
infrastructure elements it places in orbit and of
how these elements are to be acquired and used.
It is around these choices that the difficuIt issues
lie; by andi large, the technology is either in hand
or can be readily developed.

Technology Options
It must be emphasized that the particular constellation of space infrastructure elements that
NASA currently aspires to develop, construct,
deploy, and operate is only one alternative in
a wide range of options. Simply put, there is no
such thing as “the space station. ” What is under
discussion is a variety of sets of infrastructure
elements, ranging from modest extensions of
current capabilities to more sophisticated, capable, and costly ensembles than NASA is now
suggesting.

As one way of presenting the variety of techno logy options available, OTA has prepared
tables 1 and
2.}

There is one fundamental infrastructure option
that requires particular mention: should the elements be wholly automated or shou Id they house
‘] human crew? Conceptually, useful space infrastructure couId be designed either to include a
human work crew or to depend on sophisticated
machines unattended in space or operated via
communication links with the surface. Despite
the fact that the relative efficiency and/or effectiveness of these two quite different approaches
have been extensively debated for years, no general consensus has emerged. However, if sophisticated new space activities are to be supported
by in-space infra structure as soon as the early
1990s, there will have to be a human presence.
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Table I.—Comparison of Some Options’ for Low-Earth-Orbit Independently Operating Infrastructure

Date available
(assuming start in 1985)

,

-Infrastructure
.

Shuttle
Orbiter

Extended
Duration
Orbiter:
Phase I

Extended
Duration
Orbiter:
Phase II

Free-flying
spacelab
(developed
as permanent
infrastructure)

Now

1988

1990

1990

None

0.2

0.5

2-3

8

20

7
60

7
60

100

6

80
200

200
300

8
Orbital
maneuvering
vehicle plus
two free-flying
unpressurized
platforms

20
Reusable
orbital
transfer
vehicle plus
several more
platforms

Unlimited
(60-90 day
resupply)

Unlimited
(90 day
resupply)

(90 day
resupply)

NASA

aspirations
Initial
Mature,
fully
operational
capability
developed
1992

1996-2000

b

COST

(billions of fiscal year 1984 dollars)
Characteristics
Power to users (kW)
Pressurized volume (m3)
Nominal crew size
Miscellaneous

Capabilities c
Time on Orbit

Laboratories for:
Life sciences
Space science/applications
Materials science
Technology development
Observatories
Data/communication node
Servicing of satellites
Manufacturing facility (materials
processing)
Large structure assembly
Transportation node
Fuel and supply depot

20

6
Can accept
Spacelab

5
No new
technology

10 days

20 days

100

(with Spacelab
habitat)
5
3
New technology
-. Modest crew
required;
accommodations
modest
laboratory
space
50 days

Unlimited

Moderate
Modest
Some
Modest
No
No
Modest
No

Moderate
Modest
Some
Modest
Modest
No
Modest
No

Considerable
Modest
Moderate
Some
Modest
No
Modest
Modest

Extensive
Modest
Moderate
Moderate
Modest
No
Modest
Modest

Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Considerable
Considerable
Considerable

Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive

No
No
No

No

No
No
No

Modest
No
No

Moderate
Moderate
No

Extensive
Extensived
Considerable

Modest

Modest

Considerable

Extensive

Modest
Modest

Modest
Considerable

Considerable
Extensive

Extensive
Extensive

Modest

Modest

Modest

Modest

Moderate
Modest

Moderate
Considerable

Moderate
Considerable

Moderate
Considerable

No

Modest

Extensive

Extensive

No

Modest

Unclear

Unclear

Modest

Modest

Considerable

Considerable

No
No

Response to reasons advanced for
space infrastructure
Modest
No
Maintain U.S. space leadership and
technology capability
Modest
No
Respond to U.S.S.R. space activities
Modest
No
Enable long-term human presence
in space
Modest
No
Attention-getting heroic public
spectacle
Modest
Modest
Extended international cooperation
Modest
Modest
Promote U.S. commercialization of
space
No
Maintain vigorous NASA
No
engineering capability
No
Enhance national security, broadly
No
defined
Modest
Modest
Space travel for non-technicians
aLi~.ed ~ption~ are illustrative examples; the list is not exhaustive.
bcosts include design, development, and ~r~uction; launch and ~perational
ment; others were provided to OTA.
cClearly judgmental.
dlnclud~ng launch to the Moon, Mars, and some asta:otis.

costs are not included, some costs are estimated by the office

Of Technology Assess.
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Table 2.—Space Infrastructure Platforms a That Could Be Serviced by Shuttle or an Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle
Unpressurized coorbiting platforms
(serviced by means of extravehicular activity)

Date available
(now, or approximate, assuming
start in 1985)

SPAS

MESA

LEAS ECRAFT

EURECA

Space
Industries’
Platform

Now

Now

1986

1987

Late 1980’s

1989

0.005

0.01

0.2

0.2

0.3

0.6

0.6
None
None

0.1
None
None

6
None
None

2
None
None

6
3,000
3

3,000 lb
Payload

200 lb
Payload

20,000 lb
Payload

2,000 lb
Payload

20
2,500
1-3 only
when
docked
25,000 lb
Payload

20,000 lb
Payload

10 days

8 months

Unlimited

6 months

3-6 months

Unlimited

No
Modest
Modest
No
No
No
No
No

No
Modest
No
No
No
No
No
No

Modest
Modest
Modest
Modest
Modest
No
No
Considerable

Modest
Modest
Modest
Modest
Modest
No
No
Modest

Modest
No
Moderate
Moderate
Modest
No
No
Extensive

Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Modest
Moderate
No
No
Considerable

No
No

No
No

No
No

No
No

No
No

No
No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Costb
(billions of fiscal year 1984 dollars)
Characteristics
Power to users (kW)
Pressurized volume (f?)
Nominal crew size

Miscellaneous
Capabilitiesc
Time on orbit
Laboratories for:
Life sciences
Space science/applications
Materials science
Technology development
Observatories
Data/communication node
Servicing of satellites
Manufacturing facility (materials
processing)
Large structure assembly
Transportation node (assembly,
checkout, and launch)
Fuel and supply depot

Pressurized platforms
(serviced internally while docked)
European
Modified
Spacelab

Response to reasons advanced for
space infrastructure
Modest
No
No
Modest
Maintain U.S. space leadership
No
No
and technology capability
Modest
Modest
Modest
Respond to U.S.S.R. space activities
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Enable long-term human presence
No
No
in space
No
No
No
Attention-getting heroic public
No
No
No
spectacle
Unclear
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Extended international cooperation
No
Modest
Considerable
No
Considerable
Unclear
Promote U.S. commercialization of
space
No
No
No
No
Maintain vigorous NASA
No
No
engineering capability
No
No
Enhance national security, broadly
No
No
No
No
defined
Space travel for non-technicians
No
No
No
No
No
No
aListed ~latforms are illustrative examples; the list k not exhaustive.
bcogtg include degi~n, development, and pr~uctlon; launch and operational costs are not included. SOme costs are estimated by the Office of Techno@y Assessment; others were provided to OTA.
cClearly judgmental.
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Procurement Options
Inasmuch as there is an affirmative answer
to the question of whether to acquire some longterm, in-space infrastructure, the decision of
how it is to be acquired must be faced. In many
respects, this second decision is just as important as the first. The mode of acquiring new,
long-term, in-space assets and services should
be influenced by a clear understanding of the
context in which space activities are expected
to be carried on. And the decision as to how to
acquire these assets and services will have a significant impact on future space activities.

●

A significantly different acquisition approach–
another option—would have the following
elements:
●

There are four main factors that could heavily
influence procurement choices:
Several foreign countries are now capable
of producing and operating substantial elements of space infrastructure.
Using its own resources, the U.S. private sector is now capable of producing much of the
infrastructure currently envisioned and offering it for sale or lease to the Government
or the private sector.
NASA would prefer to acquire the infrastructure under its own aegis and in the same general way that it has acquired other large
space systems (except for Spacelab).
Other large and sophisticated civilian space
programs-can be easily imagined that would
require professional skills and funds of the
kind and magnitude now envisioned for a
“space station. ”
Congress and the President have approved
NASA’s request to initiate a “space station” program, and NASA appears to be moving to acquire
such infrastructure in much the same fashion that
it acquired the Shuttle:
●

●

●

A great deal of new technology would be developed, acquired, and used, essentially all
of which would be publicly funded.
NASA would arrive at and issue detailed engineering specifications for, and exercise
close management control over, the technology to be acquired.
This infrastructure would be procured by
NASA with Federal funds. The U.S. private
sector would not be prompted to use its own

resources to provide a substantial portion of
the infrastructure.
The international role would be limited.
NASA would not seek the kind of close collaboration that would result in shared authority, even if doing so might result in substantial capital cost reduction for the United
States.

●

●

●

As much as is reasonably possible, already
developed, tested, and paid-for technology
would be used to achieve an adequate initial operating capability, with development
of new technology undertaken only where
demonstrably required to lower overall cost
of ownership.
NASA would prompt our private commercial-industrial-financial sectors to develop
and produce, with their own resources and
on a genuinely competitive basis, as many
of the Government-required civilian “space
stat ion’ assets and services as they can;
NASA would facilitate their efforts to do so;
and they could be offered to NASA on a sale,
lease or payment-for-service basis.
NASA, in obtaining the elements not provided by the private sector, would emphasize management methods specifically designed to take the best advantage of the now
quite sophisticated U.S. space industry.
NASA would negotiate collaborative agreements with other cooperating countries that
wouId see all partners share in the benefits
of such an initial operating capability at a reduced acquisition cost to the U.S. Government for its share.

This second approach would imply that NASA
would hand off much (perhaps most) of the more
mundane “space station” work by paying the private sector to do it, thereby conserving its skills
and resources so that they could be focused on
more challenging space goals and objectives, including development of the very advanced technology (e. g., bipropellant engines, a reusable orbital transfer vehicle, etc.) required to address
them—an activity which, for the most part, the
private sector cannot justify.

Ch. l—Executive Summary

These two options are at opposite ends of a
spectrum of approaches to the acquisition of
long-term space infrastructure. In determining
which approaches from this spectrum are most
likely to influence the evolution of space activities in a desirable direction, Congress may wish
to consider the following questions:
●

Should the Government be allocating its professional skills and experience to the development of (a) incremental or (b) fundamental advances in technology?
Which approach is most likely to stimulate
the “commercialization of space?”
What level of international collaboration is
really desirable?
What other large and important space ends
should be addressed in the next decade in
addition to the acquisition of in-space infrastructure methods and means?

Congress may also wish to keep in mind that
the choice of approach to infrastructure acquisition will also affect its eventual cost to the taxpayer. Beyond the observation that, in some general fashion, the cost will increase with the
capabiIity and sophistication of the infrastructure,
accurate cost estimates are very difficult to make. 2
However, the following are important cost
factors:
1. the total capability acquired–which, as suggested by the examples listed in the tables
of infrastructure options, can encompass a
considerable range;
2. the extent to which already developed,
tested, and paid-for technology is used, v.
a focus on new technology with its higher
development cost and greater risk of cost
overruns;
3. the substitution, where feasible, of automated systems for the accomplishment of
tasks previously undertaken only by human
beings;
4. the manner by which the infrastructure is acquired–i.e., the extent to which NASA puts
the engineering challenge on the space industry by issuing performance specifications,
rather than continuing to issue detailed engi-

5.

6.

7.

8

9.
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neeri ng specifications and managing the acquisition process in detail;
the effectiveness of NASA’s efforts to persuade our private sector to develop infrastructure assets and services “on their own, ”
and to provide them to the Government at
purchase, lease, or payment-for-service
prices lower than those achievable by the
Government;
the effectiveness of NASA’s efforts to effect
eventual private sector operation of the infrastructure and its related activities;
the extent to which large and rapid expansion of military space research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) activities increases costs in the civilian space
sector also;3
the extent to which any “Christmas-tree effect” takes place within NASA, whereby the
infrastructure acquisition management is
persuaded by the NASA Centers to allow the
cost of desirable but nonessential RDT&E
activities to be included in the acquisition
program; and
the effectiveness of NASA’s efforts to arrive
at large-scale collaboration and related costsharing arrangements with other countries.

These points address only the initial capital cost
of this infrastructure—to this cost must be added
its ongoing operation and maintenance costs; the
cost of instruments and equipment needed for
scientific experimentation in association with its
use; and the interest cost of any money borrowed
to fund the acquisition program. And it must be
remembered, too, that the infrastructure will
eventually become obsolete or wear out.
It is clear that there are many opportunities to
reduce infrastructure net cost that could be
grasped by a vigorous, imaginative, and determined NASA management.4
These considerations suggest that, over the next
year or two, at least as much attention should be
given to identifying the best ways by which the
country should set about the permanent development of space as there is given to any technologi-

‘ClasSit’Ied m.lterldl M ,~~ not used I n prep.1 rl ng th IS report.
4Cost red u ct 10 n me,~su rw are d ISC u ssed I n .1 pp. D of t h I \ report
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cal advances and operational capabilities that are
to be obtained.

Funding Rate Options
Another way of thinking about space infrastructure is to estimate how much of it could
be obtained if different annual funding rates
were established. Thus, to provide an independent basis of comparison with the civilian “space
station” program now apparently favored by
NASA, OTA has estimated what new space capabilities could be provided, by when, for various
annual average Government funding rates. No
changes to present NASA acquisition procedures
or NASA anticipated acquisition costs are assumed. Arbitrary annual average funding levels
of $0.1, $0.3, $1, and $3 billion per year (1984$)
were chosen to illustrate the number and kind
of space infrastructure elements that could be acquired over periods of 5, 10, or 15 years.

The results of these 12 funding scenarios are
given in table 3, which shows the funding rate,
number of years, total expenditure, and kinds of
infrastructure elements acquired. s The elements
are divided into those that can operate independently (e.g., the Shuttle Orbiter and a “space station” central base) and those that depend on being serviced or maintained from one of the
independent elements (i.e., by an orbital maneuvering vehicle, a local in-space transportation system operated from a “space station” central element, or directly by the Shuttle).
Table 3 lists the following (among other) elements of space infrastructure that could be acquired over various acquisition intervals:
1. At $0.1 billion per year: probably no “permanently manned” facility could be obsAdditional discussion of funding rate options can be found in
ch. 4 of this report.

Table 3.—Some Illustrative Space infrastructure Acquisitions Possibie at Various Annuai Average Federai
Funding Rates (all amounts in billions of 1984 dollars)
Space acquisition~
Dependent elements
Funding
rate
($&r)

0.1e
0.3

Number
of
years

5

10

Total
expenditures
($)

0.5

1

15

1.5

5
10

1.5
3

15

4.5

5

5

10

10

15

15

10

5

15
30

15

45

Unpressurized
platforms

Pressurized platform#

2
3
3

—
—
1

—
—
—

—
—
—

EDO II (50 days, 6 crew)
3
Free-flying Spaceiab modules’
1
(permanent, 3 crew)
2 free-flying Spacelab modules in both 2
28 degree and polar orbits (3 crew each)

1
1

—
OMV

—
—

1

OMV

—

Space transportation center (4 crew) –
NASA initial operating capability
2
“space station”g (8 crew)
NASA growth “space station”g (12 crew) 3

—
1

OMV; ROTV
OMV; ROTV

—
—

1

OMV;ROTV

—

NASA growth “space station”g (12 crew) 3
NASA mature “space statlon”g (16 crew) 3
Shuttle-Derived Cargo Vehicle (SDV)
NASA mature “space station”g
5
(18 crew, SDV)

1
2

—
OMV; ROTV
OMV;ROTV Lunar capable
staffed Lunar
OMV; ROTV Lunar capable
staffed Lunar
Mars voyage

Independent infrastructure
element+
EDO If (20 days, 5 crew)
EDO II (50 days, 6 crew)
EDO II (50 days, 6 crew)

3

Space-based Beyond geostationary
orbit spacecraft
transport
vehicles
elements

ROTV;
facility
ROTV;
facility;

aTaEle8 1 and 2 pre~nt charactorlatlcs and capabllltles of Infrastructure element8 In detail.
b~tend~ Duratl~ Omltem (EOO) am limited In their etays on orbit; other Independent elements am IOnO-term.
cplatfms of the LEABECRA~/EURECA type.
dplatfoma of t~ m~lfl~ f~.flylm SWcela~pa~ lndugtrl~ ty~ With theirown electrical power and pressurization SY8WIIS.
eA~ * 1 b~~llonfyr, no Iong.tefm, staffed Infrastructure elements are -Ible.
f ~~ i ~=teti ~mtlon o~lter, phaae I) and t~ Spacelab modules have Ilmkd electrical Wwer (abut 7 k~.
bhe NASA “space etatlon” elements are expected to operate as transportation and aewiclng centera ae well as laboratories. They would have sufficient power for
exten81ve materlale processing.
hA Slgniflcant pan of the cost of a human vieit to Mara couid b provided in thle ca~.
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tained even by the year 2000. Further extension of capabilities of the Shuttle system and
unpressurized platform developments could
be obtained. The acquisitions could be: a development of the Extended Duration Orbiter
(EDO) Phase 1, for 20-day orbit stays, over
a 5-year period; or EDO Phase II, for 50-day
orbit stays, over 10 years or longer, plus two
or three free-flying unpressurized platforms
such as EURECA, LEASECRAFT, and/or the
Space Industries’ platform (assuming that the
Government would make an outright purchase of such platforms).
2 At $0.3 billion per year: within 5 years, the
acquisitions could be an EDO II plus several
(perhaps pressurized) platforms. Over 10
years, there could be acquired: 1) the first
permanently orbiting, Spacelab-derived habitable modules in 28.5° LEO that could support three people; 2) an orbital maneuvering vehicle (OMV) (enabling servicing of
nearby satellites); and 3) a few free-flying
platforms. in 15 years, there could be obtained either: 1) two free-flying Spacelabs,
one in polar orbit, one at 28.5° LEO; or 2)
much more capable permanent infrastructure at 28.5° than that which could be acquired in 10 years.
3 For $1 billion per year: within 5 years, there
could be acquired: 1 ) a permanent LEO facility operating as a transportation node; 2)
an OMV; and 3) a reusable orbit transfer vehicle capable of transporting spacecraft to
and from higher, including geostationary, orbit. In 10 years the initial operating capability (IOC) infrastructure now favored by
NASA could be acquired. In 15 years, nearly

●
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all of the infrastructure now seriously considered by NASA could be acquired.
4. At $3 billion per year (assuming that only
funds, not technology or other factors,
would be the pacing program factor):
NASA’s fully developed “space station”
could become available in somewhat more
than 5 years. In 10 years, this infrastructure
plus a geostationary platform, plus a Shuttlederived cargo vehicle for lower cost fuel and
cargo transfer to LEO, plus a lunar facility
ready for occupancy and continuing operation would become possible. In 15 years,
NASA’s complete infrastructure aspirations
and a lunar settlement could be in hand and,
perhaps also, plans for seeing a human crew
travel to the vicinity of Mars and back could
be well advanced.
These projections are for infrastructure acquisition only; operational costs are not included.
Also, there is a basic difference between the costs
associated with Shuttle-type vehicles and permanently orbiting facilities. The use of an EDO to
conduct extended science or development activities with a crew would involve launch costs each
time it went into orbit; use of a permanent facility would require resupply several times per year,
but the cost for each flight could be shared with
other payloads. For example, if 12 dedicated 30day EDO flights were conducted per year, about
$1 billion (1984$) in annual transportation costs
would be involved; in comparison, the cost of
4 partial-load Shuttle launches per year to resupply a permanent facility would total $100 million
to $400 million (1 984$).

NEED FOR GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
In view of the variety of possible ensembles of
infrastructure, the different methods of acquiring
them, and the range of funding rates at which
they could be acquired, how are the choices to
be made? In general, these choices should not be
made without prior agreement on the future direction of the civilian space activities of the United
States; however, the infrastructure elements for

which identifiable, serious users have “hard” requirements might well be acquired within the next
decade. In the meantime, the most effective way
to determine our direction in space would be a
national discussion of, and eventual agreement
on, a set of long-range goals which the United
States expects its civilian space activities to
address.
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Photo credit”

Aeronautics and Space Administration

One alternative to the development of new technology is to use the space Shuttle for many advanced operations in
low-Earth-orbit. Shown here: (A) servicing satellite in April 1984; (B) assembly of a large structure in orbit—
here simulated in water; and (C) a deployable antenna.
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Today, unfortunately, there is general agreement neither on such a set of long-range goals

nor on a set of specific objectives which, as they
are addressed, would serve as milestones of progress toward those goals. If future civilian spacerelated goals and objectives are to be effective
i n providing direction to U.S. space efforts, they
should be such as to command widespread attention; have inherent humanitarian and scientific interest; foster development of new technology; have relevance to global issues; prompt
international cooperation; and involve major participation of our private sector.

Such a set of goals and objectives would allow
a clear determination of the basic characteristics
of the infrastructure elements actually needed,
and of the means and rate whereby these elements should be acquired. In the absence of such
goals and objectives, and with the great uncertainties in the estimate of any infrastructure cost to
the public, OTA concludes that it is impossible to
judge, objectively, whether or not most of the infrastructure elements proposed to date—and, in
particular, many of the set currently proposed by
NASA—are truly appropriate and worth their substantial cost.

SOME POSSIBLE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
I n order to prompt the formulation and subsequent discussion of future space goals and objectives, OTA has prepared a list of possible longrange goals and a set of nearer-term objectives
designed to address those goals. Although OTA
does not recommend either this particular set of
goals or its supporting family of objectives, they
are intended to exemplify the kind of goals and
objectives around which consensus might well
be formed so as to provide sensible guidance for
the Nation’s future space activities. The Advisory
Panel of this assessment has taken an unusually
active role in helping to formulate these goals and
objectives. It is the panel’s judgment that the
goals and objectives proposed for discussion are
reasonable and important.
The national goals proposed for discussion are
as follows:
●

●

●

●

●

●

to increase the efficiency of space activities
and reduce their net cost to the general
public;
to involve the public directly in space activities, both on Earth and in space;
to derive scientific, economic, social, and
political benefits;
to increase international cooperation and
collaboration in and regarding space;
to study and explore the Earth, the solar system, and the greater physical universe; and
to spread life, in a responsible fashion,
throughout the solar system.

OTA has also formulated, as milestones to mark
progress toward these goals, the following family
of 10 objectives. Table 4 relates these objectives
to the six goals. Some of the objectives are readily
achievable; others may not be, but still represent
legitimate targets.6 They are not rank-ordered.
1. A space-related, global system/service
could be established to provide timely and
useful information regarding potentially
hazardous natural circumstances found in
the Earth’s space and atmosphere, and at
and below its surface.
2 A transportation service could be established to and from the Earth’s Moon, and
a modest human presence established
there, for scientific and other cultural and
economic purposes.
3. Space probes could be used to obtain the
information and experience specifically required to plan for further exploration of the
planet Mars and some asteroids.
4. Medical studies of direct interest to the general public, including study of the human
aging process, could be conducted through
scientific experiments that compare physiological, emotional, and social experience
in the absence of gravity with experience
gained in the conduct of related surface
stud ies.
‘A full dl~cussion of the objectik es appear~ [n ch, 6 of this report.
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Table 4.—Possible Goals and Objectives
Goals

Derive
economic
benefits

Derive
scientific,
political,
and social
benefits

Increase
international
cooperation

Study and
explore the
physical
universe

Bring life
to the
physical
universe

N

P

Y

Y

N

N

Y

P

P

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

N

N

Y

Y

Y

N

N

N

P

Y

P

N

N

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

N

P

P

Y

Y

N

N

N

Y

P

Y

Y

N

N

N

N

Y

P

Y

N

N

Y

N

Y

Y

N

N

N

Y

N

Y

N

N

N

N

Increase
space activities’
efficiency;
reduce their
net cost
Objectives:
1. Establish a global information system/
service re natural hazards
2. Establish lower cost reusable
transportation service to the Moon and
establish human presence there
3. Use space probes to obtain information
re Mars and some asteroids prior to
early human exploration
4. Conduct medical research of direct
interest to the general public
5. Bring at least hundreds of the general
public per year into space for short
visits
6. Establish a global, direct, audio broadcasting, common-user system/sewice
7. Make essentially all data generated by
civilian satellites and spacecraft
directly available to the general public
8. Exploit radio/optical free space
electromagnetic propagation for longdistance energy distribution
9. Reduce the unit cost of space transportation and space activities
10. Increase space-related private sector
sale&
aThlg w~ld advance the proapects

Involve the
general
public
directly

N

of successfully addressing aii other “9~is.”

Y: Yes; N: No; P: Perhaps; depends on how carried out.

5. At least hundreds of members of the general public per year, from the United States
and abroad, could be selected on an equitable basis and brought into space for short
visits there.
6. A direct audio broadcasting, common-user
system/service could be established that
would be available to all of the countries
of the world on an economical and equitable basis.
7. In general, all of the nonclassified and nonprivate communications from, and nonproprietary data generated by, all Government-supported spacecraft and satellites
could be made widely available to the general public and our educational institutions
in near-real-time and at modest cost.
8. Radio and optical free-space electromagnetic propagation techniques could be exploited in an attempt to allow reliable and
economic long-distance transmission of
large amounts of electrical energy, both
into space for use there, and from space,

lunar, and remote Earth locations for distribution throughout the world.
9. The unit cost of space transportation, for
people and equipment, between the
Earth’s surface and low-, geosynchronous-,
and lunar-Earth orbit could be sharply
reduced.
10. Space-related commercial-industrial sales
in our private sector could be stimulated
to increase at a rate comparable to that of
other high-technology sectors, and our
public expenditures on civilian space assets
and activities could reflect this revenue
growth.
Congress and the President have now agreed on
legislation that will establish a National Commission on Space. This commission will be well-positioned to initiate and sponsor a national debate
on the future direction of U.S. space activities. The
goals and objectives suggested here may provide
a substantial starting point for further discussion.
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INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIRED BY THE PROPOSED GOALS
AND OBJECTIVES
Technology
Some of these objectives, if they are to be
achieved, will require certain elements of inspace infrastructure; others, depending on how
they would be carried out, may or may not require such elements; still others will require none.
The manner in which the United States obtains
any of this infrastructure should reflect, as much
as possible, our already great investment in space
technology and operations; whenever reasonably
possible, it should be obtained at the lowest capital, and operations and maintenance, cost to the
public purse.
If the Government’s large capital costs for development and production are to be minimized
and the private sector strengthened, then serious
consideration might well be given to encouraging the private sector to provide infrastructure elements that meet Government performance specifications, rather than detailed engineering specifications. These elements could be provided to
others as well as to the Government through sale,
long-term leases, or on the basis of charges for
actual service use.

would address objectives (1), (2), (3), (6), (9),
and possibly (8)]; and
d. a storage facility in LEO would allow use of
full Shuttle loads, helping objective (9), and
staffed LEO laboratory facilities could promote (1 O).
Of course, if such infrastructure elements were
available for the specific purposes that justify their
acquisition, they could be used for additional purposes also.
Note that, in essence, provision of the infrastructure needed to pursue two of the larger-scale
objectives [(2) and (4)] could accommodate most
of the needs of all of the other eight. In what follows, therefore, the cost of this infrastructure is
included under these two objectives.
And note that no Government development of
free-flying platform infrastructure elements is
called for; these elements (e.g., MESA, SPAS,
EURECA, LEASECRAFT, the Space Industries platform, etc.) could and probably would be designed, developed, and installed by our private

The main elements of longer term space infrastructure called for in pursuing the family of 10
objectives are:’
a. an LEO capability to assemble and check
out the large and sophisticated satellites and
space structures needed to provide both the
hazard-prevention and the direct audio
broadcast global system/service [objectives
(1) and (6)];
b. an LEO human residential and working
space to be used for medical research [objective (4)], and possibly for space visits [objective (5)];
c. a transport staging facility to support efficient travel to geostationary orbit, the
Moon, and beyond, using reusable orbital
transfer vehicles or other vehicles. [this
Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

7

N 0 additional space infrastructure elements are needed to
achieve objective (7).

Free-flying platforms such as the one depicted in this
artist’s concept offer one option for relatively low-cost
space infrastructure elements.
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sector, and/or other countries, and offered to the
civilian space community—both Government
and private interests—under appropriate sale or
lease arrangements, where they could be used
for remote sensing, the conduct of scientific research, or the production of various materials
under microgravity conditions.
Finally, note that very large amounts of very
costly electrical power in LEO (with an initial capital cost of as much as $10,000 per watt) are not
called for; some 20 kilowatts would appear to be
sufficient. Larger amounts appear to be needed
only for any eventual commercial-industriaI materials processing, and could then be provided
and financed by the private sector in anticipation
that such processing will prove to be profitable.

cost
Attaining all of the proposed objectives would,
overall, cost a great deal of money. In the accompanying table S, rough estimates are made for the
cost of each of them, and the length of time over
which each would be pursued to completion. It
is a fundamental assumption that maximum use
will be made of: 1 ) already developed and paidfor technology, 2) the most truly competitive procurement methods, and 3) the most modern and
least burdensome acquisition strategies and procedures.
A first rough estimate of the total cost8 of attaining all 10 of the proposed objectives is no less
BApp. F of this report discusses costs in detail.

Table 5.—Cost and Schedule to Satisfy Objectives Suggested for Discussion
Total costa
(billions, 1984 dollars)

Objectives

1. Establish a global information system/service
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

re natural hazards
Establish lower cost reusable transportation
service to the Moon and establish human
presence ther#
Use space probes to obtain information re
Mars and some asteroids prior to early human
exploration
Conduct medical research of direct interest to
the general public
Bring at least hundreds of the general
public per year into space for short visitsg
Establish a global, direct, audio broadcasting,
common-user system/service
Make essentially all data generated by
civilian satellites and spacecraft directly
available to the general public
Exploit radio/optical free-space electromagnetic propagation for long-distance
energy distribution
Reduce the unit cost of space transportation
and space activitiesg’h
Increase space-related private sector salesh

Duration
(years)

2

10

20

15, 25

2

15

6

5, 25

0.5

5, 25

2

10

0

25

0.5

10

5

15

0.5

25

-$401
acO~t~ are for

@VelOprnent and acqulsltlorr. o~ratlona

and

maintenance costs are nOt included, excePt for some iaunch and

Oparationa costs noted for objectives 2, 3, and 4.
b 15 ~eam t. eatabliah t~ settlement, and 3 visits/year at $0.1 billion each

(pius tMSiC Shuttle launch costs) over the followin9

c~~~~~maverage, one pro~ eveV 3 yeara and S0.4 billion each.
d~ billion over 5 Yearn t. establish a iife sciences laboratory in LEO, and $0.2

billionhear thereafter to oPerate it. This
laboratory could also be used for materials science and other research.
e5 years t. establish a LEO “ldgts-habitat,)’ and its continuin9 use thereafter.
f $OU billion/year in addition to DOD expenditures.
g~.3 billion~ear for a l~year t~hnolqy development efforf to reduce space transportation Unit COStS.
%his would also help efforts directed toward the other objectives.
i The actual cost couid ~ as high as $80 billion (1984 dollars), if costs exceed initial pr~ictions by WO/O
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than $4o billion and perhaps considerably more
(as much as $60 billion [1 984$]) over the next 25
years. Table 5 itemizes the estimated costs for all
the objectives. Given that these estimates are
made at an early stage, there cannot be great confidence in their detailed accuracy, but such accuracy is unnecessary for the illustrative purposes
being served here.
If work were to commence on all of them now,
the bulk of the cost would occur over the next
15 years.
Space transportation costs are not included in
these estimates, except for an additional $0.1 billion (1984$) or so for each flight from lowEarth-orbit to lunar orbit. Rather, it is assumed
that some 10 Shuttle surface-LEO flights per year
at an average cost of about $0.1 billion (1 984$)
each by early in the next decade would be budgeted for all Government-sponsored civilian R&D
purposes, including those considered here.

Financing
There are many matters that must be given
carefuI consideration before a national commitment to undertake such large, lengthy, and costly
public activities could be made. Certainly among
the most important are the sources and magnitude of funds that can be reasonably expected
to be available.
If the funding previously spent on Shuttle development (approximately $2 billion per year) is
continued but reallocated towards the initial objectives, and if the NASA appropriation (approximately $7 billion per year) is augmented by a
real growth of 1 percent per year, and if truly collaborative cost-sharing international agreements
could be reached whereby other friendly countries would contribute, say, an additional amount
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equal to one-third of this subtotal, we could look
forward to approximately the following amounts
being available for the initial 10 objectives:
Reprogramming of the Shuttle
development effort fund level
of $2 billion per year for 25
years
– $ 50 billion
1 percent per year “real
growth” over 25 years applied
– $ 25 billion
to these objectives
Cost-sharing by other countries – $ 25 billion
Total – $100 billion
Amounts spent for related space research, development, test, and evaluation by the U.S. private
sector would be added to this total.
As these figures are considered, it should be
kept in mind that space is a high-technology domain. Increasing private sector interest in exploiting the economic potential of space invites comparison of growth rates in other high-technology
sectors. If private sector space-related sales continue at a rate of 10 percent per year (a conservative estimate for high-technology sectors), the
tax revenues derived therefrom would, over the
next quarter-century, be quite substantial. And
to the extent that public funding of Government
space activities is understood as “offset” by these
tax revenues (as they sometimes are in the aeronautics area) the net cost to the public for such
space activities would be substantially reduced. g
Clearly, under such circumstances, funding limitations would not prevent the United States from
undertaking an ambitious publicly supported civilian space program throughout the next quarter of a century.

9App. F of this report discusses these prospects at length.

SHAPE OF THE SPACE FUTURE
There are important changes under way in how
space activities are carried on. The number of important players is increasing as space expertise
and experience spreads, economic considerations are becoming more important, and secu-

rity considerations are already the subject of
widespread debate. If the United States is to
maintain its leadership role in civilian space activities, it must be prepared to make fundamental
shifts i n policy and practice.
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Communications satellites in geosynchronous orbit (such as Webster Vl, shown here)
can provide continuous coverage of large
of the Earth’s surface for relay of radio,
television, and telephone signals.

International

‘

International space activities will continue to
expand, both in numbers of countries involved
and in absolute magnitude of their capabilities.
There is every reason to expect that the spacefaring nations of the world will find it in their interest to participate in the considered development
of near-Earth space, and perhaps all countries
would like to engage in civilian space activities
to some extent. The OTA report on International
Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space
Activities 10 addresses a wide range of issues arising in this area, and appendix C of this report discusses the variety of ways in which the United
and Competition in Civilian Space
Activities, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress,
in press.

States and other friendly countries might, in concert, develop, operate, and use long-term in-orbit
infrastructure.

Private Sector
To date, private sector interest in space has
been confined primarily to the successful satellite communications business and the support of
Government activities. However, there is tangible evidence that a number of private concerns
will soon begin to offer assets and services on a
fee-for-service or lease basis, both to the Government and to other private interests. The projected
needs of space science and space applications,
for example, constitute a ready market for providers of various future infrastructure system/
services.
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New Role for NASA
In view of the significant changes in the way
that space activities will be carried on in the future, NASA may well have to make certain fundamental shifts of attitude and operation. I n the
past, it has been NASA’s responsibility to meet
any given national space objective by itself; in
the future, it should be NASA’s responsibility to
see that the objective is met. That is, NASA should
now aspire to the much broader role of seeing
that others in our private sector and throughout

the world do much more of what it does today.
In the simplest of terms: if NASA is to rise successfully to the challenges now emerging in the
national and international space arena, it should
place relatively less emphasis on accomplishing
by itself those things that our private sector or
other friendly nations can satisfactorily do, either
alone or with NASA assistance. It can succeed
in this only by continuing to cooperate with both,
and by broadening this cooperation so as to
prompt and assist both to extend their space-re-
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lated capacities, confidence, and commitment.
And it could emphasize such cooperation in the
acquisition of in-space infrastructure—i. e., a
“space station .“
Released from its present relatively near-term
focus, NASA could concentrate more of its own
professional activities on the most important and
exciting of everything else in and concerning
space, the things that no one else can or will do:
the very best of space-related science; the cutting
edge of space-related technology development;
the boldest of space-related explorations and developments.
Finally, NASA and other space-related offices
i n the executive branch shouId see that their activities continue to be conducted, and the results
thereof continue to be used, not only to increase
knowledge and to address important social and
political goals, but now also to enable our private space sector to increase its non-Government
sales—the sales that generate the taxes that help
to pay for Government space activities.
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Chapter 2

ISSUES AND FINDINGS
GENERAL
NASA’s

Circumstances

A general and most important conclusion of
this assessment, one that touches on all its other
findings, is that any serious discussion of the
Nation’s future civilian space aspirations and
activities, both publicly funded and privately
sponsored, must be carried on with a full appreciation of the present and near-term circumstances of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA).
Since soon after NASA’s inception, its space
programs have had two major components: 1)
a core of continuing space science and space exploration activities, later joined by space applications activities, and the development of that
technology specifically required to conduct
them; and 2) singular major technological forays, centering on people in space. It is worth
noting that while the core science and exploration activities were mandated in NASA’s founding
charter, the National Aeronautics and Space Act
of 1958, as amended, the succession of big programs seems to continue as a matter of tradition–
with the explicit approval of the President and
Congress.
Such major undertakings as Mercury, Gemini,
Apollo, Skylab, and Shuttle take years, even a
decade, to complete, involve a large fraction of
NASA’s engineering staff, and cost billions or tens
of billions of dollars. Because the magnitude of
NASA’s commitment to these undertakings is so
complete, other, smaller programs—including the
core science and exploration activities—are always at some risk of seeing part of their funding
delayed or transferred to cover overruns in the
big programs. A small percentage overrun in a
major program component can represent the
whole of a smaller, but perhaps equally important science or application program.
For the most part, it is this spectacular kind
of activity that takes most of NASA’s attention
and resources, is of most interest to the general

public, here and abroad, and serves the important national objective of projecting the civilian technological prowess of the United States
on the world stage.
From the viewpoint of the technologists who
make up most of the continuing leadership of the
U.S. publicly funded space effort, these major
NASA programs serve several important objectives:
●

●

●

●

●

●

they keep NASA in the public eye in a particularly gratifying fashion;
they attract the services and loyalty of outstanding space engineers both within NASA
and the closely related sections of the U.S.
private space industry;
they allow the development of a great deal
of new technology otherwise difficult to
justify on a piecemeal basis–technology that
allows further space advances subsequently;
they are more difficult to interrupt or cancel
than smaller and/or less generally appreciated space activities;
once approved, they require relatively little
further engagement by engineers in “political justification” activities for some time; and
they provide perhaps the most visible and
apparently effective civilian response to the
widely publicized in-space activities of Soviet cosmonauts.

And to date, it is this kind of activity that has
obtained the most attention, and approval, of the
president and Congress. But these large programs
also have another, rather troubling set of characteristics. Because they are primarily technological in nature, they are inherently difficult to explain satisfactorily to those who are not
professionals or not particularly interested. They
are initiated by Government technologists and
their supporters who are convinced of their value,
rather than being initiated in response to large
segments of the general public’s specifically calling on NASA to provide them. ’ Perhaps most im‘The implication here is not that there is no public support for
the civilian space program in general or the big technological spec-
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Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Dramatic manned space missions such as the Apollo 11 lunar landing have generated public support for NASA,

portant, the completion of any one of the large,
high-technology, “manned” programs faces
NASA’s management either with making a fundamental move toward a more equal distribution of agency funds among all its R&D programs, or with creating and securing support for
another program of the same general character and size.

confronting this problem again. Within a relatively few years thereafter, either another large
new program would have to begin, or a number
of relatively small existing programs would have
to be considerably enlarged (or new ones initiated)—or else as many as one-quarter of NASA’s
professional staff and approximately $2 billion per
year would be lost.

Thus, the first successful flight of a Shuttle orbiter in early 1981 found the NASA management

Without an internal or external mandate to
achieve a more nearly equal distribution of funds
among all its R&D programs, NASA leaders opted
to pursue another large, high-technology,
“manned” program. The particular program
chosen has been the subject of study and discussion within the civilian space community for
decades: “the space station” program. After

in particular, but that this support might be broadened if
wide public discussion were encouraged. One need only compare
the extent to which the public, to date, interests itself in space issues
with the extent to which it interests itself in education, health services delivery, housing, defense, transportation, etc.
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detailed engineering study, the public acquisition
of in-space infrastructure under this program
would proceed for several years at an average
rate of some $2 billion per year. It would involve
the development of high technology, much of
which would address the problems attendant on
seeing people reside and work in space in a permanent fashion under safe and sanitary conditions. Its buildup could be phased to match the
reduction in the Shuttle development program
so that, overall, NASA’s present and anticipated
“budget envelope” could be maintained, and the
Shuttle program’s professional skill mix could be
satisfactorily reassigned.
Given, first, its institutional end of maintaining its current size and, second, its choice of a
space infrastructure program as means to attain
that end, NASA has been somewhat reluctant
to consider new modes of acquiring the infrastructure envisioned. For example, NASA could
choose to employ a great deal of already devel-
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oped, space-qualified, and already paid-for technology. It could prompt the U.S. private space
industry to come forward with proposals to provide major infrastructure elements to NASA in an
economical fashion, elements that the private
sector, using its own resources (including private
funds), would design to the Government’s performance specifications (rather than to detailed
design specifications under contract). lt could
seek international collaborative arrangements
under which foreign partners would bear a substantial fraction of the present $8 billion estimate, 2
thereby significantly reducing the cost to U.S. taxpayers. However, with the two givens, these new
approaches could result in an insufficient program base to maintain the agency’s present size
and, perhaps, even its present character as an independent, civilian, national resource.
In view of NASA’s internal circumstances and
the many other external desiderata which its resources could alternatively address, the question
arises: is a “space station” program the best way
for NASA to spend the foreseeably available $2
billion per year3 to serve the needs of the Nation—and the world? The President and Congress
have just approved a “space station” program
in principle, and allocated $150 million to commence engineering studies—studies now expected to take 2 years. Decisions as to the character, magnitude, and pace of this program
would be made after the completion of these
studies, and any others that Congress might
request.
If: 1) NASA’S basic decision not to move
toward a more nearly equal distribution of funds
among all its R&D programs remains unchanged,
2) its overall aspirations for its “space station”
program are not realized, and 3) no adequate
substitutes appear and are approved within the
next 2 years, then the basic character of the
present U.S. publicly funded civilian space prozlt is imw~ant to appreciate that this $8 billion figure covers only
the initial capital outlay, not the continuing operations and maintenance costs or subsequent capital outlays to acquire additional
capabilities.
JThe $2 billion per Year figure is predicated upon two Projections: that NASA’s overall budget will remain level in constant
(1984$) dollars at somewhat over $7 billion per year, and that the
roughly $2 billion per year currently spent for Shuttle development
will be made available for space infrastructure acquisition.
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gram itself could be placed in question. If
NASA’s professionals were convinced that they
could not see a reasonable future for the exercise of the skills they so successfully displayed in
the Shuttle program, they would soon begin to
explore employment alternatives—and the more
accomplished, more imaginative, and more independent employees, which any outstanding R&D
organization simply must retain, would be the
ones most likely to do so. One of the clear alternatives would be to work on what now appears
to be another rapidly growing high-technology
space program area—that of the space elements
of the new military Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI), a program now headed by a former associate administrator of NASA who was responsible for the Shuttle development program.
If large numbers of professionals left NASA, and
if their leaving the civilian space R&D area were
accompanied by similar departures from that part
of the private space industry long associated with
NASA, an already significant and increasing imbalance between our military and civilian publicly funded space programs would be magnified.
A vigorous, independent NASA has served the
Nation well; any trend toward reducing it to mere
adjunct status cannot be viewed, in the overall
national security context, without concern.
Thus, the NASA management may have “bet
the company” on the successful outcome of a
campaign to obtain approval for one more large,
new, high-technology, publicly funded civilian
space program. Unfortunately, even if approval
is received, such a program could foreclose, perhaps for 5 to 10 years, the possibility of NASA’s
undertaking other, more desirable options or its
effecting any fundamental changes either in its
major program mix or in the way it acquires
space technology. Yet, in OTA’S judgment, serious consideration must be given, now, to preserving these options and making these changes,
if NASA is to maintain U.S. space leadership.
For fundamental shifts in other national and international circumstances that will importantly
affect the conduct of future space activities are
already under way.
Just as unfortunately, because the Shuttle development program is expected to be essentially
complete within 2 years, any moves to effect large

and desirable changes in the NASA program mix
and/or acquisition processes and/or international
collaboration policies must also be made within
that time. Making such moves effectively would
call for a high degree of institutional imagination
and political statesmanship by both branches,
and NASA particularly.
Whatever else the executive branch and Congress decide to do at this decision point, they
should resolve that they will not be required to
face such circumstances again. The publicly
funded civilian space program of the United
States is too important, and the scientists and
technologists heading the program too competent and responsible, to continue to be treated
with the form of “benign neglect” that has been
the rule since the successful completion of the
grand Apollo program.

Transitions
Transitions are under way. And they are so
fundamental, and moving so rapidly, that we
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should not be surprised to see them have significant, although presently unpredictable in
detail, impacts on any “space station” program,
even in the next few years. The key institutional
question is this: will U.S. leaders see to it that
NASA meets these transitions head-on and
moves out smartly to “lead the parade” by orchestrating the growing and increasingly varied
foreign and domestic space interests?
For nearly a quarter of a century, the United
States and the Soviet Union were the only major players in the civilian space arena.4 Except for
satellite communications, all of the U.S. civilian
space activities were formally conceived, funded,
and managed by the Federal Government, primarily NASA.
Similarly, during this interval, NASA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), and the National Weather Service decided, with regard to the weather and climate
area, what space-related scientific, technologydevelopment, and infrastructure-acquisition programs should be conducted; developed their
characteristics in some detail; mounted almost
always successful campaigns with the President
and Congress to receive direction, legal permission, and Federal funds for their conduct; and
then conducted them using large numbers of inhouse scientists and engineers and contracting
with their counterparts in universities and the
space industry.
NASA has frequently been willing to consider
international cooperation in science with other
countries, and has reached cooperative agreements with many countries—agreements that saw
other countries spend significant amounts of
money to support their space professionals and
to provide them with equipment in order to effect such cooperation. But there has yet to be any
major cooperative agreement reached that would
see truly significant equipment jointly designed
and produced by the United States and one or
more other countries that would result either in
4

Since the adoption of the 1958 National Aeronautics and Space
Act, the United States has maintained identifiably separate civilian
and military space programs, though there has always been cooperation between the two. The extent to which one can make a similar distinction with respect to Soviet space activities remains a vexing
question.
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important technology sharing, in U.S. program
risk sharing, or in large savings to the public
purses The Department of Defense (DOD) often
does so within NATO and elsewhere, as do major aerospace companies in order to reduce their
own financial, technological, and market risk exposure in large complex programs. NASA officials
are making overtures to other countries regarding their participation in any “space station” program, but it remains to be seen whether these
overtures will result in the kind of collaboration
that would realize major cost savings to the
United States.
With a single recent exception,b there has been
no important instance in which our private sector has set out to develop major items of spacerelated technology of acknowledged central importance to NASA programs on its own, using its
own resources—including financing—to do so.
All such critical elements are still procured by the
Government, with Government funds and some
considerable Government oversight in the process.
However, over the past few years, international
civilian space circumstances, the circumstances
of our own space-related private sector, and the
attitude of our Government toward the civilian
space area have begun to undergo fundamental
shifts-shifts that, in the next few years, cannot
but have great impact on what our publicly
funded civilian space program does and how it
does it.
As a result of the sustained and generous assistance of the United States, and by working in close
concert with NASA and the U.S. space industry
over the past few years, several other countries
have conceived of, developed, produced, installed, and used substantial space and spacerelated equipment. Such equipment, some of it
designed primarily for scientific research, some
!$Spacelab is the exception that proves the rule. NOAA, on the
other hand, is moving to obtain further contributions of spacerelated technology through the Economic Summit process, and is
pursuing the development of international polar-orbiting meteorological satellites; both of these initiatives could result in important
cost savings to the U.S. public program.
6The exception is the agreement, on an ‘upper stage, between
NASA and the Orbital Science Corp. of Vienna, VA. McDonnell
Douglas upgraded the Delta and developed the Payload Assist
Module (PAM) using its own funds, and other private groups are
now developing expendable boosters of various kinds.
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primarily for commercial applications, is of a sophistication that often matches that of U.S. equipment, and of a sales magnitude that, in some instances, now clearly offers serious competition
to the generally acknowledged preeminence of
the United States (cf. Spacelab; Ariane; the Canadian Remote Manipulator System; DBS spacecraft; etc.).7 These countries now have sufficient
confidence in their own skills and experience to
encourage them to ask for a much closer kind
of cooperation with the United States. It will not
be long before they can and probably will insist
on it, for they will have the ability and the motivation to “go it alone” if they cannot see that their
basic interests would be adequately served by the
kind of cooperation extended to them by the
United States.
Similarly, one of NASA’s outstanding successes
(shared with DOD) has been that of shepherding
the aircraft, electronics, chemical, and other hightechnology areas of our private sector into the
civilian space business. This is now a very sophisticated and confident part of our overall national
commercial-industrial capability. But significant
segments of the private space sector are increasingly restless with the prospect of having to produce high-technology space items under what
they perceive to be the no-longer-necessary, and
wasteful, “close control” of NASA managers.8
Also, the past few years have seen a growing
number of entrepreneurs beginning to enter the
civilian space area. These “newcomers” are not
limited to those who would use the assets and
services that NASA expects to acquire; some
would provide such assets and services to both
the Government and others in the private sector on what they believe to be inviting financial
terms. Both the President and Congress are clearly determined to see that the private sector plays
a much more prominent role in the civilian space
area generally, that it is encouraged to make major investments therein, and that the country
7

For a thorough discussion of this issue, see the OTA report /international Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activities, in press,
6At least some in the private sector believe that they can do as
good work on space hardware generally as they do on commercial air transportation and communications satellites, and they are
willing to assume the financial responsibility of doing so and to risk
grave financial penalties if they fail.

finally begin to reap the large and direct economic benefits so long hoped for by civilian space
leaders.
Finally, the great, persistent, and projected deficits in our Federal budget now require Congress
to take an even more careful look at deferrable
expenditures, especially “new starts. ” Indeed,
the central issue of the President’s request for
congressional approval of the first phase of a
“space station” program is that of its capital cost,
even though NASA now estimates the size of the
initial portion of the program (in constant 1984
dollars) to be less than one-half that of the Shuttle program, and not much more than 10 percent
of the Apollo program, and its acquisition schedule would seemingly not require NASA’s budget
to be increased over today’s amount.g
These new national and international circumstances have begun to command the attention
of the executive branch, and important first
steps toward addressing them have been taken.
However, although many of the leaders of the
U.S. publicly funded space program are convinced of the importance of these circumstances, few of them have the professional and
business experience required to ensure an effective response. Furthermore, it appears that
most of those beneath the top management levels as yet have little enthusiasm for making indicated changes. And, indeed, it is not clear that
leaders of the executive branch have thought
out, clearly, just how far they are willing to see
innovative arrangements arrived at that would
carry NASA and NOAA into much closer collaboration with other countries and with our
own private sector.

National Commission on Space
In July 1984, Congress enacted, and the President signed into Iaw, lo the National Aeronautics
and Space Act of 1985. Title II of this Act estabgHowever, consider the following: “In recent decades the average overrun on major programs, in constant dollars and constant
quantities, has been slightly over 50 percent. The average schedule
milestone has been missed by a third of the time initially projected.
The average time to develop new systems has, until recently, been
increasing at the rate of 3 months per year . . . each year. ” Norman R. Augustine, “The Aerospace Professional . . . and High-Tech
Management,” Aerospace America, March 1984, p. 5.
lopublic Law 98-36I.
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Iished a National Commission on Space. The deliberations of the National Commission can be
expected to have a fundamental impact on the
entire civilian space future, including the future
course of any civilian “space station” program.
This conclusion is based on the assumption that
the Commission will provide an appropriate mix
of prestige, broad concern for the national interest, technical expertise, and diverse outlook.
There are great opportunities now perceptible
in the civilian space area, but the rapidly changing circumstances that make their achievement
possible have raised difficult issues and created
institutional inconsistencies. If the new opportunities are to be realized, these issues must be
faced and the inconsistencies resolved. OTA has
earlier expressed the view that many of these
issues and inconsistencies cannot now be dealt
with adequately by the annual authorization
process and that, therefore, some more fundamental mechanism, such as a Presidential Commission, should be created. The newly authorized
Commission is the first opportunity in a generation for Congress—and the Nation—to set a truly
fresh course in space. It is critically important to
the Nation generally, and to a successful U.S.
future in civilian space activities specifically, that
the Commission be successful.

NASA now plans to spend the next 2 years
making studies of a fairly specific low-Earth-orbit
(LEO) infrastructure complex that it would acquire, operate, and use in a manner similar to
the Shuttle. This plan was set in motion some
years ago. Over the next year and a half, the
deliberations and eventual findings of the National Commission could offer NASA, and
others seriously interested in the space future,
the opportunity to develop new program options, and to compare these new options, new
methods, and new attitudes with the civilian
“space station” program as currently defined.
Afresh, basic and uninhibited review of policy
issues might well result in a fundamental change
of NASA views on the following matters:
●

●

●

●

the appropriate character of the “space station” program;
the character and mix of its various large,
long-range programs;
the ways in which it might orchestrate the civilian space interests of all friendly countries;
and
the ways in which it could act to prompt
greatly increased private sector investment in
space.

CIVILIAN “SPACE STATIONS”
The Case for Infrastructure in
Low-Earth-Orbit
on balance, a persuasive case can be made
for acquiring some long-term infrastructure in
near-Earth space, some of which would allow
a human work force to be retained there for extended periods.11 This case rests primarily on
tangible rather than intangible considerations.
The persuasive tangible reasons are that the
United States would then be able to explore the
possibility of more efficient transport staging beI I [t is of course assumed that the character and location of the
infrastructure elements would be chosen to meet the specific, important expressed needs of those expected to use the services that
these elements would be expected to provide—i.e., not chosen by
the technologists who would design, produce, and install them.

tween LEO and geostationary orbit (GEO), the
Moon, and beyond; to commence certain important life science12 and materials science experiments early in the next decade, the conduct of
which would otherwise border on the impossible; to warehouse space assets and consumables,
so as to improve the efficiency of very costly
surface-LEO transportation; to aspire to much
more ambitious and dependable servicing of ever
larger and more sophisticated, and therefore
more costly and complex, space assets, thereby containing their total life-cycle costs and increasing their effectiveness; and to undertake new
12Life ~ience r-arch could include studies of long-term response
to in-space conditions (in preparation for possible staffed expeditions to the Moon, Mars, or the asteroids) as well as studies relevant to the general human population on Earth.
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and innovative space activities with confident
freedom.
These reasons reflect not only the many years
of conceptual studies of infrastructure arrays that
could support space activities but, as well, a general consensus as to the value of space infrastructure elements gained with actual experience in
Skylab, the Shuttle Orbiter, the Soviet Salyut,
Soyuz, and Progress, the Tracking and Data Relay
Satellite System (TDRSS), Spacelab, the Manned
Maneuvering Unit (MMU), the West German
SPAS platform, the Canadian Remote Manipulator System (RMS), etc.
Indeed, it seems likely that, in retrospect-some
two decades hence—at Ieast a large portion, perhaps all, of the space infrastructure capabilities
now advanced by NASA as necessary will be seen
to have been so. But this eventuality gives no
guidance as to how and when the various elements should be acquired.
Another reason advanced is that, eventually,
there may be important economic payoffs from
materials processing in space that would require
the use of space infrastructure. What is now required is a great deal of imaginative and sound
in-space basic and applied research in the materials science area.
The intangible reasons for acquiring such infrastructure—reasons of maintaining space leadership generally, of creating further heroic role
models, of exhibiting our capacity for hightechnology development, of enhancing national
security, of maintaining a strong NASA, etc.—
are much less compelling. “Space buffs” and perhaps some in the private sector (those who have
called for a long-term Government commitment
to provide R&D facilities in space before they
would consider investing there themselves) argue
that general-purpose space infrastructure (i.e., a
“space station”) would address such great and
intangible purposes. But there is no evidence that
large segments of the general public agree with
this assessment, and they have not been offered
the opportunity to express their views on other
major space ventures that might more forcefully
address such intangibles. A number of alternative intangible goals have already been put forth;

undoubtedly, more will be articulated in the
future.

The Concerns About Low-Earth-Orbit
Infrastructure
But while the case to be made for acquiring
some long-term, habitable, LEO infrastructure is
persuasive, there is no compelling, objective, external case either for obtaining all of the particular array of elements that NASA now describes under the rubric of “the space station,”
or for obtaining this or any other array in the
general manner that NASA is now expected to
pursue, nor for paying the particular public cost
that it now estimates is required to do so.13 (The
important internal case for proceeding with a
large, early “space station” program is discussed
above.) As the infrastructure would be of a very
general-purpose nature, to be used to support
myriads of conceptual uses, few of which have
been sharply defined or have gained wide acceptance as important objectives of our publicly
funded space program, there is no necessity for
obtaining all of it soon. And, under these circumstances its value to the space program is quite
difficult to estimate objectively.
Three groups are particularly concerned about
a nearly $10 billion (1984$) commitment to a
“space station” program:
●

●

those, particularly space scientists, who fear
that such a relatively large commitment
would represent a hazard to their own space
interests;
those space professionals who would prefer
NASA to take a more measured, evolving,
learn-as-we-go approach; and

13Some contend that the substantial and growing U.S.S.R. space
infrastructure (including Salyut, Soyuz, Progress, and Cosmos 1443-

class modules) constitutes a valid, and important, justification for
the United States to mount a comparable, if not more capable, program. This report does not address this contention. However, even
if keeping up with the Soviets or beating them at their own game
were to become the motivation for a major civilian space infrastructure acquisition program, it does not follow that such a program
would resemble that which NASA has described. Indeed, it might
be quite different. See the OTA Technical Memorandum, Sa/yut:
Soviet Steps Toward Permanent Human Presence in Space, OTATM-STI-14, December 1983.

.
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●

those particularly concerned with the commencement of any new and costly Federal
initiative who are sensitive to its impact on
the Federal budget even if it falls within
NASA’s present, and hoped-for, “budget
envelope” of some $7 billion per year.

Of course, if the projected capital cost were
well less than the near $10 billion (1 984$) now
estimated for the initial operating capability (IOC)
(i.e., the initial phase of the infrastructure acquisition program that NASA has in mind; the full
cost of the program would approximate $20 billion [1984$] by the year 2000), the concerns of
these groups would be significantly lessened.

The Cost of Low-Earth-Orbit
Infrastructure
The eventual cost of any in-space infrastructure
depends on the chosen size, capability, degree
of new technology involved, and method of acquisition. It is not now possible to make another
estimate of the IOC cost that is significantly different from that made by NASA for what it describes as “the space station” in which one would
have greater confidence. There simply are too
many large potential “cost drivers, ” the significance of which cannot be judged under today’s
rapidly changing circumstances.
All of the experience with the acquisition,
over a relatively long time, of large amounts of
space technology, much of it to be newly developed, suggests that the $8 billion (1984$) figure will eventually be seen to have been a floor,
not a ceiling, on cost. In spite of, or rather because of, this experience, NASA is determined
that it will not be repeated. 14
There are several options available relating to
acquisition practices, international collaboration,
and the more imaginative use of the U.S. private
sector that, if effectively grasped, could reduce
the cost impact on the Federal budget. Acquisition of in-space infrastructure is inherently different from the acquisition of a Shuttle or a commitment to develop and deploy those resources
required to send a person on a safe round-trip
to the Moon. To use NASA’s own earlier, corlasee Augustine, op. Cit.

●
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rect, and quite illuminating expression, space infrastructure can be bought “by the yard.”15
One thing is clear: NASA, if it wished, or were
persuaded, could opt for obtaining now a
“core” fraction of the total infrastructure capability that it believes that the country will need
over the long term— a core fraction that would
allow many useful scientific studies to be made
and infrastructure support operations to be explored and evaluated, at a net U.S. capital cost
of one-quarter to one-third of the $8 billion that
it now seeks. To this core fraction other elements could be added incrementally as experience is gained in its use and as requirements become sufficiently persuasive.
The technological and programmatic options
exist for doing so. There is clearly a great variety
of U. S., other Government, and private in-space
infrastructure (some already in hand, some in development, some that is receiving detailed study)
from which selections could be made to provide
various kinds and amounts of in-space assets and
support services—assets and services that would
be expected to allow some new activities to be
undertaken, and to increase the efficiency and
effectiveness of others.
Properly encouraged by NASA, private sector
firms are almost certain to come forward in the
next few years with proposals that would provide
some of the desired infrastructure elements and/
or support services now thought to require Government development and acquisition. Some
such developments are already under way.16

Alternatives
Some large sophisticated civilian space ventures such as the Space Telescope are pushing
at the frontiers of technology. This is not (or, at
least, need not be) the case for in-space infrastructure. Indeed, there is little doubt that, with approls’’Space stations are the kind of development that you can buy
by the yard.” James Beggs, NASA Administrator; Committee Report of Hearings before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space (Senator Gorton, Chairman) of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Mar. 8, 9, and
15, 1983, p. 51.
IGTheSe developments are discussed in some detail in ch. 3 of
this report.
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priate congressional approval and funding, the
Nation could see the capabilities described by
NASA in place and operating satisfactorily well
before the middle of the next decade. Because,
in OTA’S view, technology development for
space infrastructure envisioned in the near-term
should present no significant problem, it has not
been given central attention in this assessment.
However, some general observations on technology matters may be useful here.
• Three basic kinds of in-space infrastructure
elements are worthy of separate, but related,
attention:
1. one or more relatively large central complexes, with work crews as required–
complexes where the bulk of the relatively
innovative work could be carried on;
2. normally unattended “free-flying” platforms, nearby or remote from such complexes, where various equipment could
carry on activities precluded by the orbital locations, micro-gravitational circumstances, or effluents associated with a central complex; and
3 .transportation between the surface and
such a complex, and between the complex and the platforms, and between the
complex and much higher orbits or even
out to solar system distances.
● OTA is not persuaded that all of the particular capabilities now being emphasized by
NASA, when measured against alternatives,
are the ones that have the greatest value to
the Nation’s publicly funded civilian space
program. NASA’s present selection of the initial set of infrastructure elements and their
location in space would provide many of the
desired support capabilities. But they would
not serve the interests of those attempting
to service remote-sensing platforms of importance to weather and climate from low, nearpolar orbits, or from geostationary orbits, nor
the interests of those in the private sector
whose communications, and perhaps navigation/position-fixing, satellites are located
in much higher, including geostationary, orbits, nor the interests of those who would
like to see less costly transportation provided
between the Earth and GEO, and the Moon,
Mars, and asteroids.

●

●

●

Providing safe, sanitary, and suitable infrastructure elements ‘for long stays by
human crews will be costly. But however
much some may be interested in exploiting
unattended sophisticated machinery in LEO,
the state of the art is not yet capable of providing the wide range of functions and confidence that human workers can provide until well after the early 1990s. However, given
the substantial emphasis that, to date, NASA
has placed on human work crews in space,
it would be the prudent course, now, to raise
the level of support for the development of
in-space automation and remote operation
from Earth. Emphasis on R&D for spacerelated automation and remote operation
could also be expected to have a salutary influence on automation R&D for applications
here on Earth, U.S. industrial competitiveness, and its introduction into commercialindustrial activities.
There are two quite different reasons that can
be advanced for the development of new
technology to be employed in space infrastructure. One reason is to provide capabilities there that present technology cannot;
the other is to reduce the life-cycle costs of
its ownership—i.e., to reduce O&M costs
and extend its useful lifetime. Both are
laudable objectives. But they must be
balanced against the simple fact that “there
is no such thing as enough money,” and any
decision to provide anything more (or less)
than the vitally needed capabilities, and to
do so at an earlier than necessary date, and
any decision to try to predict the far future
so as to provide for all possible uses of such
capabilities, will simply result in at least the
unwarranted, and perhaps wasteful, use of
funds. OTA is not convinced that a good
enough balance has been struck between
the competing demands for funds for infrastructure and funds for other space activities.
Diligent and imaginative exploitation of the
Shuttle fleet, along with use of free-flying
platforms and local in-space transportation
systems for individuals (all already under
way), could provide much useful information and experience that would be of great
value in making later decisions about the
characteristics and operational employment
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of long-term in-space infrastructure. Over
time, this broadening experience will increase the confidence with which eventual
infrastructure selection decisions are made.
● Significant extensions of the time that an Orbiter could remain usefully on-orbit (to, say,
double or triple today’s 7 to 10 days) would
provide many of the capabilities desired for
work crews in permanent infrastructure, and
provide them sooner and at relatively modest cost, thereby relaxing the cost and schedule requirements associated with the latter.

Space lab’s operational characteristics also
could be amplified at relatively modest cost,
with the same helpful consequences.
● Private sector development of large in-space
electrical power supplies, occasionally attended platforms, and other infrastructure
elements could be successfully completed
before the end of the decade. If done with
imagination and economy they could offer
attractive alternatives to Government development and acquisition of these capabilities.

●

OUR FUTURE IN SPACE
Long-Term Space Goals and
Objectives
The United States can now make major strides
in the civilian space area, but it is not adequately
prepared to do so.
We need to “re-visit” the substance of the
1958 Space Act, reaffirm those of its policy principles that are judged to be still valid, add others
as appropriate, and lay out a set of new goals
that are responsive to contemporary and foreseeable circumstances, interests and values. An
initial family of end objectives also should be
identified that would address those goals over
the next years and decades.

velopment of the technology needed to conduct
all three. The family was generated to encourage
much greater and more direct involvement of interested segments of the general public in civilian space activities, and to strive for economic,
political, and cultural ends in addition to the scientific, exploration, and technology-development
ends of today. And the family contains some elements that are simply “bold. ”
The national goals OTA proposes for discussion
are:
●

●

U.S. civilian space activities should be designed
to protect, ease, challenge, and improve the human condition, In addressing its long-term goals,
the Nation should strive to move its space interests and activities closer to the mainstream of
public interests and concerns, maintain space
leadership, enhance national security, and position its civilian space activities to respond to finding the unexpected in the cosmos.
For the purpose of prompting public discussion,
OTA has developed an initial set of such goals,
and a family of initial objectives to address these
goals. Chapter 6 of the assessment treats these
in some detail. The objectives are suggested for
consideration as additions to, not substitutes for,
the continuing “core” programs of space science
and exploration, space applications, and the de-

●

●

●

●

to increase the efficiency of space activities
and reduce their net cost to the general
public;
to involve the general public directly in space
activities, both on Earth and in space;
to derive scientific, economic, social, and
political benefits;
to increase international cooperation and
collaboration in and for space;
to study and explore the Earth, the solar system, and the greater physical universe; and
to spread life, in a responsible fashion,
throughout the solar system.

Brief descriptions of the national objectives suggested to prompt public discussion follow; they
are not rank-ordered.
●

A space-related, global system/service could
be established to provide timely and useful
information regarding all potentially hazardous natural circumstances found in the
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Earth’s space and atmosphere, as well as at
and below its surface.
A transportation service could be established
to and from the Earth’s Moon, and a modest human presence established there, for
scientific and other cultural and economic
purposes.
Space probes could be used to obtain the
information and experience specifically required to plan for further exploration of the
planet Mars and some asteroids.
Medical studies of direct interest to the general public, including study of the human
aging process, could be conducted through
scientific experiments that compare physiological, emotional, and social experience in
the absence of gravity with experience
gained in the conduct of related surface
studies.
At least hundreds of members of the general
public per year, from the United States and
abroad, could be selected on an equitable
basis and brought into space for short visits
there.
A direct audio broadcasting, common-user
system/service could be established that
would be available to all of the countries of
the world on an economical and equitable
basis.
In general, all of the nonclassified and nonprivate communications from, and nonproprietary data generated by, all Governmentsupported spacecraft and satellites could be
made widely available to the general public and our educational institutions in nearreal-time and at modest cost.
Radio and optical free-space electromagnetic
propagation techniques could be exploited
in an attempt to allow reliable and economic
long-distance transmission of large amounts
of electrical energy, both into space for use
there, and from space, lunar and remote
Earth locations for distribution throughout
the world.
The unit cost of space transportation, for
people and equipment, between the Earth’s
surface and low-, geosynchronous-, and
lunar-Earth orbit could be sharply reduced.
Space-related commercial-industrial sales in

our private sector could be stimulated to increase at a rate comparable to that of other
high-technology sectors, and our public expenditures on civilian space assets and activities could reflect this revenue growth.
Under present circumstances, the infrastructure
that NASA would acquire in its “space station”
program is best described as general-purpose,
i.e., designed to support well over 100 in-space
activities. As a consequence, it must contain a
large number of sophisticated and costly elements, and there is considerable difficulty in setting objective acquisition priorities among them
and acquisition schedules for all of them.
Were a specific family of space end objectives
established, it would then be much less difficult to establish which are the more important
in-space support assets and services that are required, and the time by which they would need
to become available.
A rough estimate of the cost of meeting this
family of objectives over the next quarter of a century amounts to some $40 billion to $60 billion.
To put this cost into perspective, it should be
noted that:
●

●

●

●

completion of the Shuttle development program would reduce NASA expenditures by
$2 billion per year, or $50 billion over this
interval;
if the 1 percent per year “real-growth” principle is accepted and is extended indefinitely, another $25 billion would thereby be
provided;
collaboration with other countries could provide the equivalent of perhaps another $25
billion; and
the private sector should be able to reduce
costs and make direct space R&D investments that, together, could amount to the
equivalent of billions of dollars.

Clearly, under such circumstances, funding
limitations would not prevent the United States
from undertaking an ambitious publicly supported civilian space program throughout the
next quarter of a century.
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Long-Term Space Strategies
If Congress and the President together reestablish a formal set of basic civilian space
goals, they—and the general public—could turn
their attention to identifying a family of specific
objectives to address them. Then, on a year-toyear basis, as these plans were completed to the
satisfaction of both branches, Congress could
decide which one(s), if any, to pursue as technological, financial, political, and other circumstances suggest and allow.
In the case of each objective, detailed program
plans could be laid out for attaining it. Such plans
could:
identify required technological developments and space infrastructure support capabilities;
identify operational and/or political concerns;
reflect circumstances in the civilian space
area generally, both here and abroad;
estimate the schedules and costs to accomplish each;
judge who would be expected to be the major participants in their conduct;
judge what the most likely end results of their
successful completion would be;
identify who would benefit from their successful completion, and what sources of
funds should be looked to to meet both initial capital costs and any ongoing O&M costs;
and
suggest who would have the responsibility
for any long-term ownership, operation,
maintenance, and use of assets produced in
the program.
Every 5 years or so, a review of the progress
of programs addressing the initial list of objectives could be conducted as at the outset, and
a new family established. In this fashion, Congress
would always have before it well-thought-out civilian space activity and investment options—options to which a great deal of professional study
and general discussion had already been given
before any decisions to proceed were required.
In this general fashion the two vital questions
of “can we do it?” and “should we do it?” would
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be separated, and the latter could be taken up
by our political process in a more paced, thoughtful, and confident manner.
It is helpful to remember that broad, public,
national debates on other important and complex issues–on housing policy, for instance, and
defense policy–take place regularly. While it is
true that, historically, there has been little or no
national debate on civilian space issues, that is
because the Nation’s space capabilities are only
now coming of age—in the sense that after 25
years real options, worthy of discussion, finally
exist.

Cost Reduction
However else the publicly funded space activities of the United States might be described,
they certainly would have to be characterized
as being very, very costly. Today, the kind and
number of space activities is no longer hindered
by ignorance of the physical characteristics of
the Earth’s space domain, by concern about the
reliable in-space lifetime of well engineered and
tested equipment, or by fear that men and women going into and remaining in space for as long
as weeks at a time would be harmed. The unit
cost of these activities is the greatest inhibition
to our development and use of space. If these
costs were lowered by 10 to 100 times, many
individuals and organizations would be attracted to doing things in and concerning space
that today are not seriously considered or even
thought of.
Consequently, if space is ever to be widely
used, a fundamental thrust must be to reduce
these unit costs sharply and across the board—
and particularly the cost of space transportation.
The Shuttle is an outstanding technological and
operational success, but achieving the objective
of a much lower dollar per pound cost for passenger and cargo transportation between the
Earth’s surface and LEO, GEO, and beyond still
remains to be accomplished.
Some elements of space infrastructure now
under consideration by NASA for the first (IOC)
and second (full-capability) phases of its “space
station” program could improve the efficiency
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of Shuttle use and offer the promise of lowering
the unit cost of LEO/G EO/Lunar trips, and these
elements should be singled out for early and specific attention. But cost reduction is such a fundamental matter that it should receive major support by NASA, and by the Department of
Transportation, and by our private sector generally, and this support should call out for technological, operational, and institutional innovation,
and the objective, tough-minded, pursuit of any
such innovations that show significant promise.
There are many opportunities open to NASA
for reducing unit costs in its own acquisition processes, and these are spoken to in some detail in
appendix D.

The Private Sector
Both the President and Congress have expressed their determination to see the private
sector play a much more prominent role in our
civilian space area, and NASA and NOAA must
pay this determination particular heed. But it
is OTA’S view that, as yet, this serious matter
is not receiving all the attention within the executive branch that it warrants, except perhaps
at the highest levels. ” This lack of attention
seems to result from the fact that most of the
space engineers and scientists in the Government
simply do not have the professional and business
experience required to work closely and imaginatively with the private sector. Perhaps even
more important, their long-term experience within the Government “space club” has not provided them with the perspective to appreciate
how important it is to the future of the publicly
funded space program that the private sector
assume this more prominent role.
In general, most NASA and NOAA scientists
and engineers can appreciate that successful private sector investment in the civilian space area
(as well as any other area, for that matter) will
result in increased employment opportunities, the
production of needed and desired capital goods
and commercial services, the strengthening of our
economy generally and our international trade
‘The July 20, 1984, issuance by the White House of a “National
Policy on the Commercial Use of Space” fact sheet is an encouraging development.

position particularly, etc., and do express the general sense that these are laudable national objectives. Yet almost all are still more interested in
addressing their own internal science and engineering agendas.
There is another aspect of the successful interjection of large-scale private sector activity into
the civilian space area that is perhaps most important to the long-term prospects of the publicly
funded portion of these activities: they could increase the tax base and increase tax revenues.
Today, U.S. private sector space sales amount
to some $2 billion per year, are increasing at an
average annual rate of some 15 percent per year,
compounded, and are probably generating a total
of some $½ billion in taxes of all kinds. It appears
to be a reasonable conclusion that such an average annual rate of increase could well be maintained for at least the next decade or two.
Such a rate of commercial and industrial spacerelated sales- and tax-revenue increase could figure most importantly in the future of the publicly
funded civilian space program. Already, today,
while the Federal outlays for this program cost
some $7 billion per year, private sector space
sales return some $1/2 billion annually in the form
of taxes. Were the 15 percent per year, compounded, rate to continue throughout the end
of this century (and setting aside consideration
of any negative impact that this growth could
have on other segments of our economy), the resulting tax revenues could approach half of our
public cost for supporting a civilian space program of today’s magnitude. indeed, in 20 years
these growing tax revenues could equal the cost
of such a public program. And, by then, private
sector space-related R&D activities also could be
funded at a level of billions of dollars per year.
The funds now being spent on NASA and NOAA
programs are “discretionary” not “entitlement”
funds. At some time in the future, our national
financial circumstances could prompt serious
questions to be raised about the continuance of
such large, deferrable, expenditures. Of course,
there are arguments that can be, have been, and
would be advanced for not reducing the present
level of such public expenditures, but these levels
have been sharply curtailed in the past. To the
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extent that objective evidence of the direct importance of the R&D and other activities of NASA
and NOAA to this kind of economic growth is
in hand, it is an argument for the continuation
of these activities.
OTA concludes that two important, perhaps
the most important, activities that NASA could
undertake today, and for the indefinite future,
would be to reduce the unit cost to the private
sector of their conducting activities in space, and
to be of assistance to them in their making productive investments in space.
Developing methods of truly useful and acceptable assistance could well be a thorny matter,
inasmuch as in many commercial-industrialfinancial areas there is a somewhat adversarial
relationship between the Government and the
private sector. And for some time the Government will continue to be the largest purchaser
of any private sector space goods and services.
Consequently, just as in, say, the supercomputer
and nuclear energy areas, the space area will
have to see the appropriate roles of the Government and the private sector sorted out to ensure
that the interests and responsibilities of each are
clear, so as to best serve both—and the Nation.
Finally, it can be anticipated that the private
sector’s particular concern for cost reduction will
eventually result in lowered costs in public space
activities also.

International Space Cooperation
For most of the space age, there has been considerable cooperation in space activities between the United States (by NASA, NOAA and
DOD) and several other friendly countries—effective and useful cooperation. The changing
circumstances of the civilian space area call for
a reappraisal of the kind and magnitude of
cooperation that now should be sought.
The OTA report International/ Cooperation
and Competition in Civilian Space Activities,
studies this area in some considerable detail;
here we will confine our conclusions to two:
1. The European Space Agency (ESA), several
of its major member countries, Japan, and
Canada have evidenced interest in working

closely with the United States on a “space
station” program. Now may be the time to
inquire as to whether our best interests, and
the interests of at least some of these countries, would be best served by moving
beyond yesterday’s and today’s kind of
cooperation, and to attempt more direct collaboration or even joint venturing with them
on any such program.
As yet, NASA appears to be giving insufficient thought to establishing the kind of multi-national, interleaved, development and
production program of the type often entered into by the Department of Defense in
NATO and elsewhere, and by some of our
large private sector organizations and their
analogs in other countries.
In the DOD case, considerations of military security, the additional complexity of
working on programs involving other countries, the hazards of undue technology transfer, and eventual commercial “spinoffs,”
have oftentimes been resolved, to mutual
advantage, in favor of sharing costs and important professional skills. There may be, indeed, similar, legitimate concerns about
technology transfer arising in any future international civilian infrastructure development program. However, the technology developed in such a civilian program would,
in the main, be general-purpose, and the
cost-sharing incentives would remain.
The general economic circumstances of
many of these countries are basically sound;
they desire to work with us on civilian space
matters in general, and any “space station”
program in particular; they have exhibited
technological prowess in Spacelab, the Canadian Remote Manipulator System, Ariane,
and various communications satellites provided to INTELSAT. They were willing to
trust the good offices of the United States
and NASA in going ahead with the $1 billion European Spacelab program–a program that could be rendered valueless at any
time that the United States were to withdraw
the opportunity of their employing it with
the Shuttle.
Given all of these circumstances, it is not
beyond imagination that a major international collaborative civilian “space station” pro-
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gram could be negotiated that, among its
other virtues, could lighten the total burden
on our public purse perhaps by as much as
$2 billion to $3 billion. This is not the approach to dealing with other countries on
any “space station” program that is now being taken by NASA. The present approach
is one of asking other countries to add funds
to the United States’ estimated and anticipated $8 billion commitment. The alternative approach has not been debated in the
United States outside of NASA.
The alternative approach is being explored
by NOAA: NOAA is soliciting important
cost-sharing, perhaps as much as one-half,
on the part of other countries who share the
U.S. interest in maintaining, and improving,
weather-related space sensing systems. This
alternative approach to working on a “space
station” program with other countries is
worthy of careful consideration by Congress.
For no reasonable way of reducing the Federal debt burden by billions of dollars should
be passed by unless Congress convinces
itself that it is not in the Nation’s interest to
do SO.
2. Except, perhaps, for the smallest and poorest
countries, all of the countries in the world
must have at least some interest in space:
the devices and people that orbit above
them, the activities that go on there, and
how they all could affect their own interests.
But only about one-tenth of the world’s
countries play an active role in space today.
Here is an extraordinary opportunity for
the United States!
Our determination to exhibit “space leadership” need not and probably should not
be confined to dealing with the richest and/
or most technologically advanced countries.
We could broaden our approach to “international cooperation” by taking as an explicit goal the incorporation of the space interests and activities of any other country in the
world into our program, if that country
would be at all inclined to participate in
space ventures along with us, Of course,
such an initiative would require hard work,
patience, imagination, and generosity on the
part of the United States. But these charac-

teristics are not usually in short supply in the
United States generally, and certainly not
among the professionals in NASA and the
Department of State. Indeed, it was the combination of just these national characteristics in the U.S. approach to working with a
few countries in the past that enabled them
to begin to work in space.
Recall that INTELSAT now has over 100
member countries, joined in a common interest to see space used to improve communications. The United States could now
begin to use any in-space infrastructure program to start orchestrating the interests of all
of the countries in the world that would be
willing to work with us in reasonable ways
to see space developed and used for any and
all peacefu I purposes “for the benefit of all
man kind.”

Space as an Arena of
Peaceful Cooperation
Even now, when discourse between the United
States and the Soviet Union is modest in the extreme, and the practical possibilities of effecting
cooperative space-related activities between the
superpowers are severely limited, 18 many cannot
but hope that the two countries will find ways
to initiate important cooperative civilian space
endeavors in the future.
To date, most visions of such cooperation form
around scientific activities. They are important,
and they should continue to be given serious and
thoughtful attention.
Together, the United States and the Soviet
Union have some 600 million people and a gross
national product of some $5 trillion between
them, and both have global interests and power.
Therefore, possible joint cooperative space
activities need not be confined to science; indeed, a broad range of space-related activity
IBU,S..U.S,S.R. Coowration in space-related activities has not entirely vanished. The SARSAT search-and-rescue program, a joint
U.S.-Canadian-French undertaking, continues to interoperate successfully with the parallel Soviet COSPAS system. Both the United
States and the Soviet Union are members of INMARSAT, the
maritime equivalent of INTELSAT, and both are cooperating, along
with Europe and Japan, in the International Halley Watch program.
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NASA has had agreements with more than 100 countries for cooperation in space activities. The pinnacle of international
cooperation in space to date was the
Test Project
in 1975 (shown here), in which a U.S. Apollo
spacecraft docked with a Soviet Soyuz spacecraft for several days of joint manned operations. However, no international
cooperative agreement (including
has yet involved significant sharing of technology or saving of costs.

areas might well be explored, imaginatively and
determinedly.

to see that it, and its contractors, did essentially
all that was done in the civilian space area.

OTA plans to report on some of the issues in
this area in the fall of 1984.

Throughout most of this time, and probably
without conscious reflection on NASA’s part, or
the part of anyone else, it has simply been assumed that once our country decided that something was to be done in or for civilian space,
NASA was to do it. That is, the responsibility for
seeing that something got done in the civilian
space area was equated with NASA’s doing it
itself.

NASA’S Changing Role
Until a few years ago, and except for the satellite communications area, NASA has, since its inception, organized, staffed, and managed itself
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But the changing circumstances of the past few
years now clearly suggest a fundamental reappraisal of NASA’s responsibilities and role in the
development and further study, exploration, and
use of space.
Although this study of civilian “space stations”
and the U.S. “future in space” has brought these
changing circumstances into clear, at times painfully clear, focus, it has not attempted to search
out what NASA’s new role should be in detail.
It is to be noted, however, that the Nation’s interests now are becoming much broader than
those of NASA and, indeed, in some instances,
may lead to conflicts with what NASA may perceive to be its own interests.
NASA could and, in OTA’S view, might well
now give increased attention to making some
fundamental shifts of attitude and operation.
In the past, it has been NASA’S responsibility
to meet any given national space objective; in
the future, it could be NASA’s responsibility to
see that the objective is met. That is, NASA could
now aspire to the much broader role of encouraging others in the private sector and throughout the world to do much more of what it does
today.
If NASA is to rise successfully to the challenges
now emerging in the national and international
space arena, it must place relatively less emphasis on accomplishing by itself those things that
our private sector or other friendly nations can
satisfactorily do, either alone or with NASA assistance. it can succeed in this only by continuing
to cooperate with both, and by broadening this
cooperation so as to prompt and assist both to
extend their space-related capacities, confidence,
and commitment. And it could emphasize such
cooperation in the acquisition of in-space infrastructure, i.e., a “space station. ”
Released from its relatively near-term focus,
NASA could concentrate more of its own professional activities on the most important and exciting of questions regarding space, the things that
no one else can or will do: the very best of spacerelated science; the cutting edge of space-related
technology development; the boldest of spacerelated explorations and developments.

Finally, NASA could see that its activities continue to be conducted, and the results continue
to be used, not only to increase knowledge and
to address important social and political goals,
but also to enable our private space sector to increase its non-Government sales—the sales that
generate the taxes that help to pay for NASA’s
activities.

Non-Government Policy Studies
It is inherently difficult for the Government
to make some kinds of policy studies and, indeed, it is potentially hazardous to have all such
studies made by the Government in areas of important national concern.
Particularly in areas where Federal programs
take a long time to develop and carry out (say,
a decade: cf. Apollo, Shuttle, Landsat, “space
station”) vested interests are naturally created
within the Government and closely related sections of the private aerospace industry. Later
these interests can present serious problems
of resource re-allocation on the program’s approaching completion unless new avenues for
their employment have been carefully explored
and publicly agreed on beforehand.
Our free, and increasingly educated, mobile,
diverse, rich society is bound to generate ideas,
desires, value judgments, and activities about
which the Government simply has difficulty in
keeping well informed, particularly if the ideas
are quite different from those with which the
Government has been dealing for some time and
are generated and pursued by persons and organizations that are “new to the scene. ”
Civilian space activities continue to be of importance to the United States in many intangible ways, and they are now beginning to be
appreciated as offering tangible and growing private sector economic prospects as well. “Space
commercialization” has become a popular topic.
But in the absence of a “bottom line” and competitive economic forces, the Government has
a more difficult time than does our private sector in sharply reducing unit costs. And Government offices only rarely, by themselves, originate
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large innovative and challenging programs and
carry them out to satisfactory completion.
In the area of the physical sciences, for instance, U.S. leaders can look to several policy
study centers for independent guidance on issues
of broad national concern, In the space area,
however, there are only a few dedicated individuals who can provide similar guidance.
In view of the increasing importance of civilian space activities to the American public generally, it might well be desirable to establish one
or more independent space policy centers whose
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professional staff would not be required to respond to the contemporary institutional concerns of the space community. Such centers
would control their research agendas and
allocate resources as they believed best, rather
than simply responding to directives. An example of this type would be a university-based institute with several funding sources. The continuing study efforts of such centers could
provide the American public a better opportunity to consider, and to help initiate, space activities that would address important cultural, economic, social, and political ends.

POSSIBLE LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES
In the context of the circumstances and issues
discussed in this assessment and the conclusions
reached therein, Congress could now give consideration to taking a number of initiatives.
Some of these suggested initiatives are directly
related to “the civilian space stations” area;
others are related to broader areas that are of general importance to “our future in space. ”

a year or two hence the acquisition of the
general kind of infrastructure elements that
NASA is now focusing on; or
3. specifically identify any major space services
to be provided, ask NASA to present various
estimates of costs, schedules, and procurement strategies that would be involved in
providing them and, subsequently, select
from these estimates the elements and strategies to be approved; or

Strategies for Acquiring Any New
In-Space Civilian Infrastructure
The response of Congress to the President’s formal request for the commencement of a “space
station” program should take account of the general circumstances discussed in this study and the
existence of options beyond those proposed by
NASA. Given these general circumstances and
the variety of options, Congress could adopt one
of four positions:
1. decide that it is premature and/or inadvisable
to set out, soon, to obtain any large amount
of new long-term in-space infrastructure, and
refuse to accede to an executive branch request to do so a year or two hence; or
2. at least by implication simply agree, in principle, to provide the kind and number of inspace assets and services that NASA judges
to be necessary and, accepting its $8 billion
cost and 7 to 8-year schedule estimate as
working numbers, be prepared to approve

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Free-flying platforms such as the one depicted in this
artist’s concept offer one option for relatively low-cost
space infrastructure elements.

44 ● Civilian Space

Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

4. for the acquisition of any in-space infrastructure, simply approve an average annual expenditure rate for its acquisition and allow
NASA to select the elements, acquisition
schedules, and procurement strategies in the
light of NASA’s judgment regarding their relative cost and value.
Congress need not imagine that it is required
to commit itself to accepting any of these positions at this time, inasmuch as the President’s
fiscal year 1985 request was restricted to the first
year of a 2-year study activity that would cost a
relatively modest amount (some 5 percent of the
projected total acquisition cost) for such a major implied space activity. But there is a sufficiently persuasive case for our obtaining some
additional space infrastructure so that thoughtful
and comprehensive study of what it should be
and how it should be obtained is now warranted.
Therefore (setting aside the very important matter of our Federal budget’s present and projected
circumstances and the implications thereof for
any deferrable “new starts”) Congress could use
the next year and a half to become better informed about the options available to it and the
implications of selecting particular ones from
among them. And it could task the executive
branch to make additional, broader, studies than
it now has in mind—studies that could assist Congress in arriving at its crucial judgments a year
or so hence.
The House Committee on Science and Technology has taken an important step in the direction of raising such broader issues in requesting
a study by NASA that will look into “space station” program management and procurement
matters. 19 A report of this study, to be provided
by NASA to the committee by December 15,
1984, is expected to speak to both “ . . . [the]
Space Station development management plan
and procurement strategies with a description of
the alternatives available and the basis for the
[NASA] choices taken.”
Similarly, Congress could request the executive
branch to inform it regarding:20
Igsee Committee report of Mar. 21, 1984.
qt shou Id be noted that this assessment makes the assumption
that NASA’s overall funding level will remain relatively constant
as it has in recent years.
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The priorities it places on the various services and assets that it sees as generally desirable. That is, if Congress were to allocate
more or less than the $2 billion per year now
being discussed for the acquisition of IOC
elements of space infrastructure, what are
the most important services to be made available and elements to be selected?
The ways that are available to keep the U.S.
public cost to a minimum, and the bases for
the executive branch’s pursuit or rejection
of them. That is, there are two important opportunities for reducing the public cost of
any space infrastructure, but it is not clear
that NASA—with its institutional interest in
retaining present personnel force and appropriation levels—has incentives to pursue
either with sufficient imagination and vigor.
These opportunities are:
1, Other countries could collaborate closely
with the United States so as to produce
any agreed infrastructure in a fashion that
would see their financial contributions reduce the demands on our public purse to
well below the $8 billion figure, rather
than simply producing additional, perhaps
essentially duplicative, infrastructure elements at no savings to the United States.
2. Our private sector could be encouraged
to use its own resources to develop, produce, and install as much of any agreed
infrastructure as would meet the Government’s performance specifications at a
cost lower than the Government’s present
procurement practices allow, rather than
have Government funds used to purchase
all of it and Government personnel used
to manage the process in detail.
Other important space initiatives that NASA
could undertake. That is, if Congress were
to decide that the acquisition of any infrastructure should proceed at an average
annual public expenditure rate appreciably
less than $2 billion per year, what other important programs could be mounted with the
remaining professional staff and the difference in dollars?21

*1 Ibid.
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Conceptual programs of cooperation with
the Soviet Union in civilian space activities.
That is, while a case can be made for mounting large and continuing, technologically
challenging, U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperative civilian space programs, essentially nothing of
this nature is now being seriously considered
because of the low state of political accommodation. In anticipation that today’s tensions may abate someday, it is important that
conceptual programs now be identified and
described that would: 1 ) be of little inherent
political sensitivity, 2) offer little prospect of
significant technology transfer, 3) allow for
important involvement of other space-experienced countries as well, and 4) offer the
promise of important cost savings to any
country that, otherwise, would pursue any
of them alone. The conduct of some such
programs could well require some related
elements of in-space infrastructure.
These broader studies would be carried on
at the same time, and for a small fraction of
the cost of, the “space-station” engineering
studies that NASA is now beginning to conduct, and the conclusions of their satisfactory completion would clearly be of importance to Congress 1 ½ years hence.

Civilian Space Policies, Goals,
Objectives, and Strategies
Except for a few changes in the basic space law,
Congress has been satisfied to deal with evolving circumstances through specific year-to-year
changes in NASA’s authorization bills. But these
circumstances are now so greatly changed, and
our space assets and experience are now so great,
that it has become clear that Congress could reassess our civilian space laws’ goals, objectives,
institutions, policies, and plans with great profit.
For instance, Congress and the general public
should not find themselves in the position of having to decide on large, complex, and very costly
items of space infrastructure such as a “space station” without having a much clearer understanding of what these items will all be used for over
the long term, and without being confident that
their character, the uses to which they will be put,

how they are to be acquired, owned, operated,
and paid for, have all been carefully considered
and conclusions reached that most would accept
as reflecting our broadest national interests—not
primarily the interests of the space community.
Congress is now moving to effect some important changes in space law and policy. Legislation
has already been enacted in 1984 by Congress
and accepted by the President that makes an important change in the Space Act.22 The act now
declares “ . . . that [NASA should] seek and encourage, to the maximum extent possible, the
fullest commercial use of space.”
Although a sufficient, and sufficiently broad,
base of thought, analysis, and discussion of fundamental considerations is not yet in hand to
allow Congress to proceed to make other fundamental changes in our national civilian space posture with great confidence, the National Commission on Space authorized for in Title I I of this
year’s legislation,23 and its subsequent activities,
couId go far toward calling widespread attention
to our civilian space problems and opportunities.
The Commission is expected to give the first
broad consideration to our national space interests in a generation—consideration that would
encompass interests in addition to those of science and technology that receive by far most of
the attention today. It is the kind of consideration that would guard against our continuing to
be caught up in either fascination with or the details of exotic space technology, and would focus
instead on sensible and generally acceptable
methods whereby we can proceed with the development of space, meet human needs in so doing, and fashion new ways of paying for it as we
go. And it could identify new policies, goals, objectives, and strategies, and structural changes
that, put in place, would increase the likelihood
that the great promises of the next quarter-century of the space age would, in fact, be realized.
All of those within and without the Government who are truly and seriously interested in
furthering our prospects in space should be prepared to assist this Commission.
zzpublic
ZJlbid.

Law

98-361.
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The Creation of Space Policy
Study Centers
The number of professionals engaged in space
policy analysis is extremely small. The President’s
science advisor spoke to this lack of independent expertise in testifying before a House subcommittee in February 1984.
And in March the House Committee on Science and Technology24 spoke to “ . . . the changing character of national and international space
activity [that] translates into issues and policy considerations of increasing breadth and complexity, ” and went on to say that “[d]uring the next
Wjee

committee

KpOrt

Of Mar. 21 f 1984.

year the Committee intends to look in greater
depth at the elements and character of the current institutional apparatus for setting space policy [and] examining the process by which decisions and policies are reached on civil space
issues. ”
In these circumstances, Congress could consider prompting the establishment of one or more
modestly sized, policy-related, study centers outside of the Government. Provided with sufficiently broad charters, and funded in such a fashion
as to assure both independence in, and long-term
support of, truly challenging studies, professionals
would be attracted to conduct the kinds of broad
inquiry and analysis that the civilian space area
now so badly needs.
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Chapter 3

SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE
SUMMARY
Since 1957 various spacefaring nations have
launched hundreds of spacecraft, many of which
remain today in Earth orbit or on itineraries within
the solar system or beyond. Many of these spacecraft, and some of those to be launched in the
future including any “space station” elements
and associated launch and transportation systems, are elements of space infrastructure, enabling humans at the surface and in space to carry
out activities outside of Earth’s atmosphere. This
chapter begins with a discussion of the space
environment, orbits, and the technical aspects of
space infrastructure. NASA’s specific aspirations
for a “space station” and the functions that NASA
expects it to provide are listed in detail. The projected uses of such a facility are summarized,
taken from the response of a number of major
aerospace contractors to NASA’s Mission Analysis Studies. The reaction of the National Research Council’s Space Science Board and the

Space Applications Board to NASA’s “space station” aspirations are then discussed. The remainder of chapter 3 lists and describes alternatives to NASA’s aspirations for space infrastructure,
including a number of currently existing platforms
and other infrastructure elements, and some that
are under development or in the planning stage. 1
A “USA Salyut” concept is presented as an option that could provide in-space infrastructure
that is roughly comparable to the Soviet Union’s
current Salyut 7.
‘Among the sources for the material presented in this chapter
are background repcrts prepared for OTA by Dr. Jerry Grey,
aerospace consultant (on space systems and transportation) and
by Teledyne-Brown Engineering on alternatives to wholly new technology in-space infrastructure. Additional material on existing or
proposed space platforms and spacecraft was furnished by individual aerospace companies. Also available were results of an OTA
workshop on lower cost alternatives to a space station; workshop
participants included aerospace industry and international representatives.

INTRODUCTION
The United States is currently pursuing a wide
variety of civilian space activities. The argument
is being forcefully advanced that additional inspace infrastructure would permit scientific, technology-development and commercial activities
to be performed more easily or economically
than at present, and might allow new types of
activities in space. Plans for a civilian “space station, ” i.e., space infrastructure, were included
in the ambitious U.S. publicly supported space
effort which commenced immediately after the
launch of the first Sputnik over a quarter century
ago. NASA undertook preliminary designs for

such “space stations” in the early sixties.2 In the
early seventies, astronauts were successfully supported for long durations aboard Skylab, the first
U.S. space laboratory. Now, at the beginning of
the second-quarter century of the space age, U.S.
space infrastructure that would support long-duration human activities in space is again under
consideration.
‘The first realistic design initiative for a space station appears to
have been taken prior to the NASA efforts by the Lockheed Corp.
Missiles and Space Division in the late 1950s (S. B. Kramer and R.
A. Byers, “Assembly of a Multi-Manned Satellite, ” LMSD Report
No. 48347, December 1958).
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CONSIDERATIONS FOR ANY SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE
The space environment is quite different from
that on and near the Earth’s surface. There are
a number of orbital, environmental, and technical factors that must be considered to ensure safe
and successful operations in space.

Figure 1
Representative Uses
●

Near-polar
orbit

Earth observation
(land, ocean, atmosphere)

Orbits
Infrastructure elements could be located in
one, or several, of a wide range of orbits. Most
communications satellites and some meteorological and Earth observation satellites utilize locations in geostationary orbits, 35,800 km above
the Equator, as fixed vantage points from which
to transmit and receive signals or to observe the
Earth’s surface and its atmosphere. It has been
frequently suggested that on-orbit servicing of
geostationary satellites, their orbital transfer propulsion systems, and inter-orbit transportation
vehicles, could be done more efficiently from infrastructure located in low-Earth-orbit (LEO) with
a low inclination relative to the Equator. An orbital inclination of 28.5° (see fig. 1) would be reasonable for this infrastructure, because launches
over the Atlantic Ocean from Cape Canaveral
into orbits of this inclination consume the least
energy.
These two functions–servicing geostationary
satellites and launching into the lowest energy
orbit from Cape Canaveral—are reasonably compatible, because the additional energy needed
per unit mass at great altitudes to transfer a
payload into geostationary orbit from 28.5° is
relatively small.
However, full repetitive coverage of the Earth
for low-altitude meteorological and other Earthviewing satellites requires near-polar orbits (such
as the near-900 inclination illustrated in fig. 1).
Such satellites are therefore launched from the
Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, which
offers a safe launch trajectory to the south, over
the Pacific Ocean. A Sun-synchronous near-polar
orbit that follows the dawn-dusk line is possible;
it avoids Earth shadowing of solar-powered or
solar-viewing instruments, but does not accommodate Earth-viewing instruments that require illumination of the Earth’s surface by the Sun.

I
b

Materials
processing
Life sciences
Astrophysics/solar

When repetitive but not full coverage of the
Earth is essential, a lower inclination can be used;
an orbit inclination of 57o is favored because it
is the maximum practical inclination obtainable
with a Cape Canaveral launch. It may be desirable to use infrastructure elements in several orbital planes, or perhaps to develop and employ
a reusable orbital transfer vehicle (ROTV) for
transportation between orbits having various inclinations, although this would be expensive.
Orbital altitudes are also related to several physical characteristics of space. One of these is the
“solar wind,” a radiation flux of high-energy particles from the Sun, that can present a threat to
human beings and equipment. However, the region from 200 to 600 km in altitude (LEO) is
shielded by the Earth’s magnetosphere and the
radiation there is almost negligible compared with
the radiation in and beyond the Van Allen belts,
which extend to 50,000 km in altitude. The magnetic field is less effective in shielding against ra-
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Diagram showing Earth’s magnetosphere and other near-Earth phenomena.

diation approaching the Earth near its magnetic
poles, including that associated with solar flares.
Thus, high-altitude orbits and near-polar orbits
are much less hospitable than low-Earth-orbits of
low inclination.
Orbit altitude also affects the amount of global
Earth coverage available to viewing instruments.
If a sensor is required to provide daily global coverage, for example, the physical limitations on
the angular swath width impose a minimum satellite altitude much higher than 500 km.
Aerodynamic drag becomes an important consideration for lower altitude orbits. Aerodynamic
drag decreases for higher orbits; at 400 km, the
drag is two orders of magnitude less than at 200
km. The minimum economical, long-term altitude for large semipermanent infrastructure elements that would be serviced using the Shuttle
ordinarily would be above 300 km, and it will
likely be below 600 km because of the rapid decrease in Shuttle payload capacity with greater
altitude.
Since locations in LEO are above most of the
atmosphere, astronomical observations of all sorts
are favored there. As well, one revolution around
the Earth in a typical circular LEO takes 90 minutes, allowing vast areas of Earth’s surface to be
observed in continuous succession and on a frequently repeated basis. However, higher orbits
provide a broader field of view for remote sensing of Earth.

Another consideration is the energy that must
be expended to take material to a sufficient altitude to obtain a relatively low drag, long-life orbit. To reach LEO requires more than half of the
energy required either to reach geostationary orbit or to escape the Earth’s gravitational field
altogether. This is the physical basis for some of
the projected cost savings of a permanently orbiting infrastructure base: large launch costs would
be paid only once when infrastructure components are carried into orbit and left there, avoiding additional, repetitive, launch costs for heavy
equipment that would be frequently used in
space. Of course, resupply launches would still
be needed and would offset some of this cost saving.3
Low-Earth-Orbit

Environment

Four characteristics of the LEO physical environment are of particular interest: microgravity,
high vacuum, periodic high-intensity sunlight,
and the combination of solar exposure and shadowing that makes thermal control possible. For
any infrastructure elements located beyond the
Van Allen belts, a fifth environmental parameter
is high-energy radiation,

3
The number of resupply launches required would depend on
the types and levels of activities carried out, the presence or absense
of people, etc.
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Above the minimum practical orbital altitude
of a permanent space facility, the presence of
microgravity and vacuum are essentially independent of orbital inclination and altitude. In particular, the exploitation of microgravity or near
“weightIessness, ” which occurs when gravitational and orbital acceleration counteract one
another, shows promise for the processing of materials under such unique conditions. Energy generation depends on radiation from the Sun, and
thermal control depends on radiating waste heat
out into deep space. For most orbits, the Sun is
eclipsed nearly half of the time by the Earth, but
this effect can be tolerated if energy storage systems are used; batteries charged from solar photovoltaic arrays can be used to supply electric
power during times that sunlight is blocked by
the Earth.
Of course, for many human beings, simply being in orbit, and being able to view the Earth and
heavens from this perspective, are the outstanding characteristics of space.

Technical Considerations
The design of infrastructure components and
systems will depend heavily on a number of
technical considerations. While a considerable
amount of workable “space station” technology
exists, as demonstrated by the success of Skylab,
SPAS, MESA, and the Shuttle itself, the development of new technology may be desirable to obtain a long, and particularly useful and efficient
lifetime for space infrastructure.
Data Management.– Space infrastructure elements would use an extensive data handling network both on-board and on the ground. The network would serve orbiting elements including the
Shuttle, communication, navigation and remote
sensing satellites, orbital transfer vehicles, crew
members on spacewalks, tended free flyers, and
support staff and scientific researchers on Earth.
Cost, program control, and reliability prompt consideration of a wide variety of hardware and software technologies just now coming into being.
For example, faster processors, laser disk storage,
and flat display terminals will provide large increases in capacity at lower unit cost and weight.

Communications.—A number of communication links would be desirable using frequencies
throughout the electromagnetic spectrum and encompassing a wide variety of distances, information content, and line-of-sight propagation directions. Space communications must be designed
to avoid interference with established groundbased systems and to take privacy, cost, capacity, and reliability into account. Another consideration is the location of communications and
data processing nodes. The various space infrastructure elements could require a large number
of antennas and lenses (the Shuttle has 23) that,
altogether, would cover a wide field of view.
Phased-array antennas, whose radiation patterns
can be “pointed” electronically rather than mechanically, could be widely used.
Systems for locating and tracking natural and
manmade debris, loose tools, and approaching
spacecraft is also necessary. System concepts for
this purpose include radar with beacons or passive reflectors, radio transponders, interferometry,
the Global Positioning System, ground-based radar, or Iidar (laser radar),
Although space communications can rely initially on current technology, millimeter and optical wavelengths may be desirable for use in
space. The development of systems in these parts
of the spectrum would offer significant technological challenge.
Electromagnetic Interference (EMl).–This is
a significant problem that can occur in space, particularly when high-power microwave sources
and sensitive detectors are involved. It is difficult
to protect some electronic circuits from this “pickup” problem. In some cases EM I could force the
use of a constellation of individual platforms separated rather widely from each other rather than
a single large structure.
Attitude Control and Stabilization .–Although
space infrastructure elements do not have to contend with gravity, wind, earthquakes, precipitation, and other problems encountered on Earth,
they must deal with quite different problems such
as the absence of both a “firm footing” and the
‘‘stiffening” influence of gravity. Of particular
concern is the control and stabilization of large,
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flexible, evolving, structural assemblies and modules. Elaborate control systems for each module
(sensors, actuators, computers, , . .) that are coordinated by a single “supervisory” controller
may have to be employed.
Power.–Solar photovoltaic power generators
with nickel-cadmium battery storage are commonly used in space. Systems employing them
today cost at least several thousands of dollars
per watt and have useful lifetimes of 10 years or
less in orbit. One alternative is a nuclear power
reactor, perhaps of the type now being explored
in the Space Power Advanced Reactor program,
but development time and hazards to human beings (and perhaps cost) may well preclude the
use of nuclear reactors for inhabited infrastructure in the near future.
Significant cost reduction in photovoltaic arrays
has been achieved using optical focusing devices
that concentrate sunlight on the photocells, but
considerable effort would be needed to develop
and demonstrate practical arrays of this type for
use in space. Coupled with this technique could
be the use of more efficient solar cells, such as
gallium-arsenide, in place of silicon cells. Efforts
to increase the lifetime and reduce the mass of
batteries could also lead to cost reduction. One
promising replacement for present nickel-cadmium devices is the nickel-hydrogen battery.
Another, at an earlier stage of development, is
the regenerative fuel cell/electrolysis method, in
which a fuel cell produces electricity and water
when in the Earth’s shadow and splits water into
hydrogen and oxygen when in sunlight.
Thermal Energy Management.–For infrastructure composed of connected modules, it may not
be practical to use individual thermal control systems for each module. Although individual systems would offer maximum flexibility, such an
approach would prevent heat thrown off from
one module from being used by another, and
each module’s radiator, which is by far the biggest and most exposed component of the thermal system, would impose its own orientation
and location constraints on the overall structure.
Hence, a centralized, automated system may be
needed both to minimize total mass and to optimize radiator orientation (i.e., edge to Sun).
38-798
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However, such a system would require both a
large, massive single radiator and considerable
transfer of energy among the various modules via
a heat-transport medium. Therefore, the tradeoffs between centralized and modular thermal rejection systems need to be examined in detail.
The centralized system might utilize a gimbaled
radiator maintained in an edge-to-Sun orientation, not only maximizing heat dissipation and
thereby requiring perhaps a 60-percent smaller
area than a fixed radiator, but also minimizing
solar-wind degradation of its thermal coating.
A conventional separate-tube radiator, similar
to that used in the Shuttle, would be extremely
complex and massive because of the need for
redundant piping, valving, and other plumbing
components. For a typical 100-kW heat rejection
system, a Shuttle-type radiator would require
almost 6,000 meters (almost 4 miles) of tubing
in over 1,500 individual pumped fluid tubes,
more than 50 fluid manifolds, and more than 75
isolation valves, fluid swivels or flexible line
segments. Hence, a heat pipe radiator may be
a better choice. Heat pipes transfer heat by boiling a fluid such as ammonia at one end of a
sealed tube and condensing it at the other. The
liquid is then returned to the hot end by capillary
(surface-tension) forces in a specially designed
wick which forms part of the tube. The heat pipe
has no moving parts, and each pipe is self-contained. Single pipes have demonstrated heat rejection rates up to 2 kW; hence, as few as 50
could handle 100 kW of power in space, While
the technology is relatively well known, considerable development is called for to evolve a practical, reliable, long-life, heat pipe radiator at this
power level.
Another technological challenge would be an
inter-module system that transfers thermal energy
to a radiator. Shuttle-type pumped-loop systems
using Freon 21 would consume large amounts
of power (up to 5 kW for a 100-kW system), and
would also require the development of large,
costly, space-rated pumps and their attendant repair and maintenance. A two-phase heat transport system using the same principle as the heat
pipe would consume only about one-tenth as
much power. Hence, it may be worth the cost
of its development.
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The use of passive cryogenic coolers for electrooptical detectors will present a difficult technical challenge. Active cryogenic systems are probably not satisfactory for long-term operation. Passive coolers require exposure to dark space and
an environment that is free from effluents that
would condense on the cooler’s cold patch.
Propulsion.— Infrastructure elements require
propulsion systems for attitude control, orbit
change, station-keeping, and acceleration control. Propulsion systems currently use storable liquid mono- and bi-propellant pressure-fed thrusters. Near-future plans include cryogenic oxygen/
hydrogen propulsion systems. Longer term prospects are electromagnetic thrusters including ion
rocket (ions can be accelerated to much higher
exhaust velocities than those provided by chemical rockets) and mass drivers (“buckets” of heavy
materials can be accelerated, very rapidly by electrical motors rather than by conventional chemical combustion).
A principal challenge will be the creation of a
storage and transfer system for handling liquid
fuels in space. Specific needs are leak-proof fluid
couplings and leak-detection techniques, fluidquantity gauges that operate with acceptable accuracy in microgravity where conventional liquidIevel sensors are not suitable, reusable, low-mass,
nontoxic, long-life insulation for cryogenic storage and transport, and the liquefaction and refrigeration systems needed for long-term cryogenic
storage. Improvements in cryogenic refueling
procedures now used on the surface for Shuttle
operations would be necessary—preferably procedures that would use automation—to obviate
the need for a large technical staff that would be
very expensive to accommodate in space.
Life Support Systems.–Some of the materials
necessary for the support of humans in space
would be supplied from Earth, others would be
recovered in orbit from metabolic byproducts.
With the exception of food, recovery technology
demonstrated since 1967 can provide for oxygen,
carbon dioxide scrubbing, and water for both
drinking and washing. Such a “partially closed”
system accommodating an eight-person crew,
each drinking about 3.5 kg of water and using
about a liter of wash water per day, would have

to be resupplied every 90 days and would have
a 30-day contingency supply. Compared with the
Shuttle system, which does not use recovery,
almost 7,OOO kg per resupply launch could be
saved. If reclaimed water were also used for
showers, and for washing utensils and clothes,
thereby replacing “wet wipes,” disposable clothes,
and disposable food service utensils, another
5,000 kg could be saved for each launch. Therefore, the development cost of such a system
could be offset by associated transportation savings of over $100 million per year.
Food supply technology will also require some
development, including improvements in packaging, preservation, bulk storage, reconstitution,
and on-board preparation. Proper sanitation to
reduce the incidence of debilitating illness in the
completely closed environment of a “space station” will require waste disposal, contamination
containment, disease-prevention measures, and
heakh-maintenance facilities unique to microgravity environments to be developed and used.
Some of this technology has already been developed for the long-duration Skylab project, but improvements are needed. Particular attention
should be given to the proper design of residential, exercise, and recreational facilities if people
are to remain in orbit for periods of much longer
than several weeks.

Space Transportation
Vehicles will be needed for transportation between Earth and LEO, between various LEO orbits, between LEO and higher, including geostationary, orbits, and beyond to the Moon and
perhaps to other planets and some asteroids. In
the near future, supply for a “space station” from
Earth would rely primarily on the present Shuttle and possibly its derivatives. Local checkout
and maintenance services requiring people working directly in space could be conducted by
tethered or free-flying spacesuited astronauts,
sometimes augmented by the existing manned
maneuvering units (MMUs). Servicing of more
distant spacecraft could be accomplished with a
planned orbital maneuvering vehicle (OMV), possibly in combination with either the Shuttle or a
planned space-based ROTV, or by an ROTV (or
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the Shuttle) carrying an astronaut equipped with
an MMU.
Launching spacecraft into higher orbits or on
Earth-escape trajectories requires the use of an
upper stage rocket, which could be automatic,
teleoperated, or used with a crew, plus kick
stages or planetary landing stages, depending on
the project. ROTVS, either teleoperated or employing crews, could be used to service satellites
in orbits of significantly different altitude and
somewhat different inclination.
Shuttle.-The Shuttle (fig. 2) meets most of the
current needs for transportation between the

Earth’s surface and LEO at any Inclination. The
Shuttle can deliver 30,000 kg to a 200-km (120mile) orbit inclined at 28.5° to the Equator. Any
increase in orbit altitude or change from this orbit inclination reduces the payload capacity.
However, most payloads are volume-limited by
the cargo bay’s 18-meter length and 4.6-meter
diameter rather than weight-limited. By the early
1990s, the earliest date considered practical for
obtaining a “space station,” NASA projects a total
of some 24 to 30 Shuttle flights per year, and
some 50 per year by the year 2000. The Shuttle’s cargo bay could be used to carry infrastructure- elements

Figure 2.—Diagram of Shuttle Mission Profile
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its crew of up to seven persons could be used
to assist with any assembly and checkout. The
Shuttle could also resupply expendable, ferry
personnel, and serve for emergency rescue.
Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU).–The
MMU is a backpack equipped with a computeroperated propulsion system that permits an astronaut to “free fly, ” thereby projecting his senses,
his strength and dexterity, and his judgment beyond the confines of the Shuttle or other habitable infrastructure out to a few hundred meters.
It is a general-purpose device that can be used
for inspection, servicing and deployment or retrieval of equipment, for construction and assembly operations, for crew rescue, for emergency
repairs, etc. A Shuttle-based MMU was successfully demonstrated on two flights in early 1984.
Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV).-Local
transportation in LEO would be provided by the
OMV. It would be operated remotely from the
Shuttle, other space infrastructure, or possibly
from Earth. It would be designed to have a sixdegree of freedom propulsion system that would
allow satellite or platform servicing operations at
distances well beyond the MMU’S few-hundredmeter limit. One version of the OMV would be
able to make altitude changes of 1,000 km or
more above its initial LEO and orbit plane changes
of up to 8°, depending on payload weight.
Basic OMV equipment includes propulsion
units and propellent tanks; television cameras and
lights for inspection and operator guidance; communications; control systems for remote operations; electric power; thermal control; and various
manipulators and docking attachments. Current
NASA plans are to have such a new-technology
vehicle developed and operating in time to be
useful in the deployment and assembly of a
“space station.”
Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV)-Up to November 1982, all payloads launched into space
were carried there by ELVS. There are now three
basic U.S. families of ELVS: the Delta, Atlas-Centaur, and Titan III. The European Space Agency
has its Ariane family of boosters, Japan has its
N-2 (derived from the U.S. Delta) and is developing others, the People’s Republic of China has
launched a geostationary satellite using its FB-3

“Long March” rocket, and the Soviet Union is
offering to make its Proton launcher commercially available. In addition, several private corporations in the United States and Germany have announced plans to develop ELVS. Many of these
vehicles and possibly others may be available
commercially throughout the next decade. However, it is not likely that they will be suitable for
launching spacecraft that carry people, although
they could launch supply spacecraft as the Soviet Proton boosts the Progress into orbit.
Expendable launch vehicles that can launch to
high orbits, or to Earth-escape trajectories, use
either their own upper stages or uniquely compatible orbital transfer vehicles (OTVS). The payload itself carries the “kick stage” or other propulsion needed to move from high, inclined,
elliptical orbits to geostationary orbits.
Reusable Orbital Transfer Vehicle (ROTV).-A
reusable, high-performance, liquid propellant
“space tug” could provide transportation between LEO and geostationary and lunar orbits,
or between Earth orbits of various inclination and
altitude. Reusability and space-basing give promise of economic benefit for the use of an ROTV
in launching and servicing communications and
other satellites that utilize the geostationary orbit. An ROTV could be piloted by a crew or remotely operated.
Development of an “Advanced Space Engine”
suitable to power an ROTV has yet to be started.
Space-basing implies reusability, of course, as
well as flexibility of thrust and duration of rocket
burn, and the ability to refuel and perform maintenance in space. Thus, space-basing requires
some form of orbital logistics system, including
tanks, pumps, controls, and other equipment for
refueling, people or teleoperator devices to check
out the ROTV, refurbish it as needed, and reset
its operating systems for each new trip, and perhaps crew quarters.
Space-basing also requires docking, servicing,
and storage facilities in space to make ROTV operation possible. Moreover, as fuel for the ROTV
must always be brought from the surface to LEO,
alternative ways of transporting it are under consideration. More efficient delivery systems than
the Shuttle, such as a Shuttle-derived tanker vehi-
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cle, are being looked at. Scavenging left-over fuel
from the Shuttle external tank is being given consideration. Considerable development time and
expense would be involved in any of these efforts.
A prospect which offers an opportunity for considerable propellant savings is to dissipate the
ROTV’S excess kinetic energy, on return from
high altitudes to LEO, by allowing it to dip into
the upper reaches of the Earth’s atmosphere, a
maneuver called “aerobraking.” The return flight
would consist of a brief de-orbit burn that would
place the ROTV into an elliptical transfer orbit

that intersects the top of the atmosphere. If the
ROTV could dissipate enough energy to decrease
its velocity by 2,400 meters per second, it would
have just enough energy left to raise it to a “space
station’s” (typical) 300-km orbit. There, it could
deliver its return payload (if any) and refuel for
its next trip. This aerobraking concept promises
a saving of over half of the propellant needed
(compared to an all-propulsive ROTV) for a return trip with payload from geostationary Earth
orbit.

NASA’S APPROACH TO SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE
“Mission Analysis Studies” Summary
In 1982, as part of NASA’s planning to acquire
long-term inhabited infrastructure, i.e., a civilian
“space station, ” the agency authorized “mission
analysis studies” in the United States, and reached
an agreement with foreign countries for parallel
studies, of the desires or needs for, and characteristics of, such infrastructure. The results of
these studies appear in appendix A.
The “mission analysis studies” started with the
supposition that the United States would build
a civilian “space station, ” and did not require the
potential user to address either justification of the
basic “space station” concept or its funding. The
studies were simply to identify uses that either
would require or would materially benefit from
the availability of a “space station” and to suggest some of its fundamental characteristics.
Of the several hundred potential activities in
science, commercialization, and technology development identified by the U.S. companies (primarily aerospace) conducting the studies, the
selection was narrowed by NASA to a set of about
100 time-phased missions for the first 10 years
of “station” operation, 70 percent of which could
be accomplished from a central base facility located in a 28,5° inclination in LEO. Free-flying
platforms, either co-orbiting or in polar orbit,
could accommodate most of the others.

The contractors viewed activities such as equipment servicing, research (especially in the life
sciences and materials processing), and assembly
and modification of large space systems as areas
in which presence of a human crew would be
particularly beneficial. They recommended architectural concepts involving several types of modules for the initial central complex: a command/
habitability module with accommodations for a
crew of four; an electrical power system providing about 25 kW to the users; logistics modules
for periodic resupply; airlocks, docking ports, and
pallets to enable mounting of equipment and laboratory modules. Subsequent development and
growth of the facility over a 10-year period and
incorporation of an ROTV and several free-flying
platforms were anticipated.
Estimation of acquisition costs ranged from approximately $4 billion to $5 billion (1984$) for
the initial facility, to about $12 billion for an
evolved complex envisioned as being completed
6 to 8 years after the system first became operational. Other than the performance and social
benefits of such a “space station,” they estimated
that economic benefits from servicing satellites
in orbit, transfer of satellites to higher orbits by
an ROTV, and human-tended long-term research
activities would be considerable. The increased
ability to launch planetary probes, establish a
lunar settlement, and undertake human explora-
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tion of Mars was considered of great significance
in terms of long-range goals.
The foreign mission analysis studies paralleled
those of the U.S. contractors and defined a similar set of space activities appropriate for infrastructure use. All participating agencies from Europe,
Canada, and Japan expressed great interest in taking part both in providing elements of space infrastructure and in actively participating as partners in its use. Many of them look upon it as
fundamental to their future role in space and
therefore want long-term understandings and
agreements with the United States on participation.
NASA assembled the United States and foreign
mission analysis reports and held a workshop in
May 1983 to synthesize the results. The workshop
established a minimum time-phased “mission
set” (for the initial decade of use) of 107 specific
space activities, plus four generic commercial-

industrial service activities (e. g., satellite servicing). Of the total set, 48 were categorized under
science and applications, 28 under commercial,
and 31 under technology-development.
In parallel with the contractor studies, NASA
hired two consulting firms to communicate with
a variety of non-aerospace companies to identify and encourage interest in the use of in-space
facilities for commercial purposes. The consultants discussed prospects with approximately sO
companies, and more than 30 expressed active
interest in using a “space station” if it were available. Most of the companies moving toward
agreements with NASA to become active in space
are well-known U.S. industrial firms (one with an
announced agreement is the 3M Co.), but several are from the small business sector or Europe.
Interest is concentrated on the possible production of particular chemicals, metals, glass, communications, and crystals. Among the half dozen
companies now actively investigating the possi-
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bility of sponsoring space experiments, most are
more interested in crew-tended operations rather
than automated procedures. Further details of the
consulting firms’ studies are discussed in the final
section of appendix A.

Infrastructure Functions
The NASA planning process has depended
heavily on the “Mission Analysis Studies” of U.S.
and foreign aerospace contractors and foreign
space agencies. From the views assembled therein, functions were identified for any space infrastructure (“space station”) that could provide
efficient and effective assets and services to support the projected space activities.
NASA’s aspirations for a “space station” were
most recently presented to the Senate Committee on Appropriations in March 1984. The infrastructure envisioned in their plans would provide the following:
1. an on-orbit laboratory supporting research
on a wide range of life, materials, and other
science topics, and the development of new
technology (e.g., studies of biology, cosmic
rays, processing methods for pharmaceuticals and semiconductors, testing of space
materials, and advanced communications
technology);
2. permanent observatories for astronomy and
Earth remote sensing (e.g., a solar optical telescope to examine the surface of the Sun,
a starlab to study the structure of galaxies,
and Iidar equipment to probe the atmosphere);
3. a facility for microgravity materials processing and manufacture of products (e.g., pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, glasses, and
metals);
4. servicing of satellites and platforms (e.g., the
maintenance or replacement of components, replenishment of consumables, and
exchange of equipment);
5. a transportation hub to assemble, check out,

and launch vehicles (e.g., those carrying
communications satellites) to geostationary
or other high orbits, and as automated interplanetary probes (e.g., a Mars orbiter or
an asteroid rendezvous vehicle;
6. an assembly facility for large space structures
(e.g., antennas for advanced satellite communications systems);
7. a storage depot for spare parts, fuel, and supplies for use as needed by satellites, platforms, vehicles, and people; and
8. a staging base for more ambitious future
projects-and travel (e.g., a lunar settlement
or a human voyage to Mars).
Questions such as the following must be asked
relative to the corresponding functions listed
above:
1. How much of an investment do these (and
other) capabilities warrant?
2. Is use of a “space station” the optimum way
to accomplish these missions?
3. When will the need for a microgravity production facility be demonstrated, and how
much of its cost should its users pay for?
4. What kinds of satellites will be repaired,
why, and who will bear the cost?
5. When will the transportation hub be ready
and why is it needed then?
6. What is the purpose of the assembly facility
for the large space structures–and of the
large space structures themselves?
7. What is the justification for a storage depot
in space?
8. When will a staging base be required for a
lunar settlement or a manned Mars expedition?
And, underlying all of these specific questions
is the hazard that too great a commitment to the
acquisition of in-space infrastructure, and the resulting long-term operations and management expenditures, might preempt the adequate support
of other important civilian space activities.
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REACTIONS OF NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL BOARDS
Other science and engineering organizations
have participated in the study of space infrastructure acquisition. NASA invited the National Research Council (NRC) to review its possible utilization for space science and applications. (The
NRC is a private organization of distinguished
scientists and engineers operating within the charter of the National Academy of Sciences to act
as an advisor to the U.S. Government (and others)
on science and technology issues. It works
through its committees, boards, and institutes,
two of which, the Space Science Board (SSB) and
the Space Applications Board (SAB), studied these
issues in workshops during the summer of 1982.)
The Space Science Board concluded that almost all of the space science research projects
forecast for the next 20 years (a forecast made
without giving great attention to the possible use
of sophisticated in-space infrastructure) could be
carried out without the use of a “space station”
as then characterized by NASA. These projects
could be carried out by using Shuttle/Spacelab,
satellites, interplanetary probes launched with expendable launch vehicles, or contemplated upper stages compatible with the Shuttle. The SSB
stated it was not opposed to a “space station, ”
that a decision on it should be made for reasons
beyond science uses, and that some science interests would make use of it if it were available.
But the SSB expressed concern that any delays
in launching science payloads that might be imposed as a consequence of waiting for completion of any “space station” could harm science
programs unnecessarily, as the SSB believes happened during the development of the Shuttle
(when several programs used up funds for employee salaries and other program costs during
such delays),
The Space Applications Board expressed guarded
support for use of a “space station .“ It indicated
interest in applications made possible, or made
more efficient, through use of appropriate infrastructure, such as servicing of free-flying platforms, launching of geostationary satellites, repairing LEO satellites, and serving as a materials
processing laboratory. Communications experi-

mentation, especially for large antennas, was
another likely use in their estimation. The presence of a human crew was deemed desirable,
particularly for materials science experiments and
for modification and repair of instruments. The
SAB also concluded that a platform in near-polar
orbit would be an important infrastructure component, to be used for Earth remote sensing of
resources, Earth environmental studies, and
ocean observations. The capability of the platform to merge and process a variety of data prior
to transmission to the ground would be an advantage compared to independent, unprocessed
transmissions from individual satellites. The SAB
cautioned that sufficient resources must be made
available to develop instruments and payloads for
use on any “space station. ”
Another body examining the role of expanded
space infrastructure was the NASA Solar System
Exploration Committee (SSEC). The SSEC is a
group of the Nation’s outstanding planetary scientists directly advising NASA on planetary research.
The SSEC, which spent 2 years defining a new
U.S. planetary space strategy, looked at the
usefulness of any new infrastructure for planetary
exploration. It concluded that, in the near term,
the facility could be used beneficially as an
assembly and launch base for deep space probes
with potentially important advantages for planetary spacecraft requiring large internal propulsion
systems. In the longer term, this could greatly facilitate the return of samples from Mars by providing a fully loaded booster such as a Centaur
rocket. A “space station” could also serve as a
holding facility for returned samples to alleviate
concerns of their possible contamination of the
Earth.
In January 1984, NASA created a 15-member
advisory panel of academic space scientists that,
over a 2-year interval, is expected to give NASA
advice on suitable research projects for long-term,
habitable, space infrastructure.
Of related interest to NASA programs, the NRC’s
Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board (ASEB)
conducted a workshop during 1983 on NASA’s
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Space Research and Technology Program. While
not directly addressing “space station” issues,
their report noted the high payoff uses of space
in the communications and meteorology fields,
the present speculative nature of manufacturing
in space, the high cost of space transportation
and systems as an inhibiting factor in the commercial use of space, and that, in the face of
foreign competition, the United States should
continue to explore and stimulate potential uses
of space.

The ASEB urged NASA to provide access to
space for experimental purposes as a natural extension of national aerospace facilities on the
Earth’s surface. Overall, the report recommended
that NASA devote a significant portion of its efforts to develop technology that would reduce
the cost of spacecraft subsystems, payloads, transportation, and operations.

ALTERNATIVE INFRASTRUCTURE
Because of the large public costs associated
with the NASA plans for acquiring in-space infrastructure, and considering the view of the
Space Science Board (and others) regarding the
NASA plans, it is important to explore alternative approaches for providing the desired capabilities of such infrastructure. OTA has identified
several alternatives that could provide various capabilities, at various times, and at various initial
costs to the Government. These alternatives include system components that currently exist or
are currently under development. OTA has also
considered a gradual approach to infrastructure
acquisition with various average annual funding
rates; lower cost alternatives could be used as
early steps in an evolutionary development leading to increasingly sophisticated and capable arrays of infrastructure. Each of these approaches
has different implications for initial Government
cost, life-cycle costs, pace of commercial development, and the pace for carrying out human
activities in space.

Uninhabitable Platforms
Regardless of the outcome of the debate over
the need for infrastructure that includes and/or
supports a long-term human presence in space,
there is a significant community of users who
would benefit from having uninhabited space facilities and services available to them. A number
of so-called free-flying automated platform alternatives now exist, are in development, or have
been conceived, that could take advantage of the

Shuttle or expendable vehicles for launch and
service.
The Shuttle can be used to launch to, and return equipment or other materials from, LEO. This
ability allows for the use of space platforms offering electric power, heat rejection, communications, attitude control, and other services to a
number of users. Some time after insertion into
orbit (typically several months to a year), the Shuttle or an ROTV would rendezvous with such a
platform, and servicing intervals for platformmounted instruments would be coordinated with
the rendezvous schedule, keeping costs in mind.
Payloads could be exchanged, attitude control,
fuel and other expendable replenished, batteries
charged, or the platforms could be returned to
an LEO base or to Earth. Platforms could avoid
contamination and stability problems associated
with inhabited infrastructure. The cost of the
common platform facilities could be amortized
over a long lifetime and a large number of activities.
Fairchild LEASECRAFT.-The Fairchild LEASECRAFT (fig. 4) is designed to support equipment
that can be exchanged on orbit. This design approach anticipates that the costs (special equipment, crew training, etc.) and risks associated
with performing maintenance and payload modifications and substitutions on orbit are outweighed
by the saving in transportation cost and improvement in spacecraft utilization, which avoids frequent launch and return of the platform.
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Figure 4.—An Artist’s Conception of a LEASECRAFT Enroute to Orbital Altitude With Payload Attached

LEASECRAFT was inspired by the Multimission
Modular Spacecraft (MMS) system on which the
Landsat D and Solar Maximum Mission spacecraft
are based. It can provide up to 6 kW of power
and other services to user payloads, and is intended to serve LEO space projects that include
data acquisition/transmission and materials processing.

altitude of 480 km. Later it can be returned to
the Shuttle orbit for rendezvous. The total weight
of the LEASECRAFT bus is expected to be 6,400
kg (including the initial charge of propellant).

Data acquisition activities generally require fine
pointing and high data rates but relatively modest power levels. Materials processing projects,
on the other hand, require high power but low
data rates and relatively coarse pointing. The
LEASECRAFT could be converted from one configuration to the other on orbit from the Shuttle
or from other inhabited infrastructure.

The power and other services provided by the
LEASECRAFT are dependent on the number and
type of its modules. Details of how module and
payload changes will be handled will depend on
lessons learned from the Solar Max repair. Possibilities include the manipulation of tools by the
Remote Manipulator System (RMS), spacewalking outside the Shuttle cargo bay by payload
specialists, and retrieval of the LEASECRAFT by
the RMS to a position in the cargo bay where
payload specialists would perform the work
needed.

The LEASECRAFT design includes a centrally
mounted propulsion module that contains 2,700
kg of hydrazine for transfer from the standard
Shuttle orbit of about 300 km to an operating

An automated electrophoresis payload being
developed by McDonnell Douglas is frequently
mentioned in conjunction with the LEASECRAFT.
It will consist of an electrophoretic processing fa-

.
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cility and a separate supply module having a combined weight of some 10,000 kg. The processing unit will use 3.5 kW of power and will require
an acceleration environment of less than 0.1 percent of gravity on Earth.

Ariane structural interface on its top side, which
enables it to share a launch by fitting between
the Ariane and the primary payload. This use of
residual launch capacity can reduce the cost of
transportation to orbit.

Another prospective payload for the LEASECRAFT system is NASA’s Advanced X-Ray Astronomy Facility (AXAF). AXAF is a 9,000-kg telescope
that will operate in a 500-km orbit, require 1.2
kW of power, and periodic change of imaging
and spectrographic instruments.

The total mass of the MESA/Viking platform is
some 500 kg. The design of the platform provides
for attitude control and propulsion. Once the Viking separates from the main satellite after launch,
the propulsion unit can boost the Viking into its
operational orbit. The spacecraft is spin stabilized
at 3 rpm, and Earth/Sun sensors and magnetic
torquers are elements of the attitude control system. A combination of solar arrays and a battery
provide 60 W of average power with a peak power of 120 W.

The LEASECRAFT’s ability to accommodate
specific payloads is very similar to that of the high
power version of EURECA (see below), with one
important exception: the higher data handling
ability of LEASECRAFT would allow it to accommodate most science and applications instruments. It would not accommodate some instrument projects that are very large, or those that
require human involvement.
The initial LEASECRAFT reportedly will cost at
least $150 million (1984$) apiece to purchase.
Users may also purchase partial services of
LEASECRAFT or lease an entire platform from
Fairchild for $20 million to $40 million (1984$)
per year. Transportation costs will include initial
launch of the LEASECRAFT and its payload and
other payloads that, subsequently, are taken to
it for exchange.
Boeing MESA.–The Modular Experimental
Platform for Science and Applications (MESA) is
a low-cost satellite system designed by Boeing for
launch on the Ariane. The MESA design follows
from Boeing small spacecraft designs and production of the last decade. This includes three spacecraft known as S-3 for the Department of Defense, two Applications Explorer Modules (AEMs)
for NASA, and the Viking Spacecraft being produced today for the Swedish Space Corp.
The MESA program utilizes existing hardware
and previous experience to achieve a low-cost
platform for modest payloads that do not require
recovery, and for special cases that do require
recovery.
An interesting feature of the MESA system in
its Viking configuration is that it duplicates the

Limited changes can be made in solar array size
and power output. The overall diameter of the
MESA with payload cannot exceed the 2.95-meter internal diameter of the Ariane’s payload compartment. The central core of the platform is designed to accommodate both platform (420 kg)
and payload weights (0o kg for the design reference) and up to nearly 2,OOO kg of host satellite
weight during Ariane launch. The available volume for the payload is 1.6 cubic meters (m J).
Should the solid-propellant rocket motor not be
required, an additional internal volume of approximately 0.6 m3 would be available for payload use.
MESA is limited in its applicability because of
its small size, limited resources, the use of spin
stabilization, and the intention to have the payload integrated within the structure. This makes
it best suited to small, scanning or nonviewing,
dedicated activities. While suited for some space
plasma physics or cosmic ray investigations, the
spin stabilization is not appropriate for microgravity activities. MESA will accommodate only a
small fraction of the science and applications
projects identified in NASA’s Mission Analysis
Studies.
MESA is reported to cost $10 million (1984$).
Transportation charges on the Ariane are uncertain since it can share a launch with another payload. If it is carried in the Shuttle, it should qualify
for the minimum charge of $12.5 million (1984$).
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Shuttle Payload Support Structure (SPSS).–
An example of a structure supporting payloads
that remain attached within the Shuttle cargo bay
is the SPSS that has been developed for NASA.
Teledyne Brown expects to commercialize SPSS
during 1985. It will provide a mount, electrical
power, data handling, and environmental control for payloads weighing up to 1,400 kg.
Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF).–A
platform housing 57 experiments, many of them
seeking to record how manmade materials hold
up in the LEO environment, was released from
the Shuttle in April 1984. The 10,000 kg-satellite,
called the Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF),
will be retrieved by the Shuttle in 1985. The LDEF,
basically a free-flying support structure for scientific experiments, cost $14 million (1 984$), not
including launch and retrieval.
Pleiades Concept.–A concept to expand the
use of platforms for space science research has
been proposed by students in a 1983 systems engineering course at Stanford University. In this
concept (called “pleiades”), a platform located
in the Shuttle cargo bay would provide data processing and other support for several co-orbiting
free flyers equipped for long-term astrophysics
research. Periodic servicing would be feasible
from the Shuttle. If developed, it might become
a permanent space infrastructure element.
Space Industries’ Platform.-A free-flying permanent industrial space facility (lSF), designed primarily for materials processing, has been proposed by a new commercial space company,
Space Industries, Inc. (fig. 5). An automated platform suited for production purposes, it could be
placed in LEO by the Shuttle and serviced several times a year by it and/or any eventual longterm space infrastructure. The ISF would include
a pressurized volume where equipment could be
serviced by a crew during resupply periods; the
facility, however, would provide no life support
functions when occupied other than a suitable
atmosphere compatible with the Shuttle or ROTV,
to which it is expected to be attached during
these periods.
Assuming successful financing, the facility could
be placed in operation in the late 1980s. No cost
figures have been made public, but some indus-

try sources estimate that it would cost some hundreds of millions of dollars to develop and construct.
MBB SPAS.–The concept of a Shuttle-tended
platform was tested, to a limited degree, with the
Space Pallet Satellite (SPAS) payloads during two
Shuttle flights. SPAS was developed at the initiative of the German company Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB). Its structure is constructed out
of graphite epoxy tubes to form a modular truss
bridge that spans the Shuttle cargo bay in width
and fits that length dimension for which a minimum launch charge is made by NASA. The structure provides mounting points for subsystem and
experiment hardware and includes a grapple fixture for handling by the Remote Manipulator System, i.e., the Shuttle arm. The SPAS is designed
to operate in either a Shuttle-attached mode or
as a free-flying platform, and it was released during the seventh Shuttle flight to operate in the latter mode for about 10 hours before retrieval. In
that operation it provided the first opportunity
to demonstrate the Shuttle’s ability both to deploy and retrieve a satellite. The SPAS payload
remained in the cargo bay during the 10th Shuttle flight, where it successfully handled equipment for several commercial users.
Having only battery power and compressed gas
thrusters, the initial SPAS is designed for shortIifetime projects (7 to 15 days), but subsequent
versions could undoubtedly extend the lifetime
by incorporating solar photovoltaic arrays and
propellant-type thrusters, and maybe even a kick
motor to achieve a wider range of orbits and/or
to be able to return to a Shuttle-compatible orbit for rendezvous. In its present form, SPAS will
only accommodate relatively small, low-power
instruments used for short periods of time.
The basic SPAS platforms costs less than $1 million (1984$); subsystem equipment required by
specific payloads is not included. SPAS is designed to qualify for the minimum Shuttle launch
charge of $12.5 million (1984$) but, with a large
payload, it may exceed this qualification.
EURECA.–The European Space Agency (ESA)
is developing a small unmanned platform carrier
that would be released from the Shuttle and retrieved after free flights in space of 6 to 9 months.

.—
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Figure 5.—A Free-Flying Permanent Industrial Space Facility
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Shuttle. The ability to fly from the Shuttle to a
useful orbit and back for rendezvous with the
Shuttle is typical of most space platform concepts.
The EURECA will have a payload capacity of
about 1,100 kg with the combined carrier and
payload weighing approximately 3,500 kg. The
total length of the carrier/platform, plus its
payloads, in the Shuttle’s cargo bay will be 2.3
meters, with an option for a shorter length of 1.6
meters if desired.
Energy for EURECA will be provided by deployable and retractable solar arrays that will initially
deliver 5.4 kW of power at 28 volts. Of this output, 1 kW will be available to the payload on a
continuous basis, while much of the balance will
be required to charge the batteries that supply
power when sunlight is not available.4 The power
supply for EURECA and its payload will be cooled
using a fluid loop connected to a radiator.
EURECA payload and housekeeping data will
be relayed to Europe via circuits employing the
L-Sat communications satellite as a test. The
telemetry system will normally use ground stations in Europe, but it will also be compatible with
the Shuttle. The maximum data rate that can be
processed on the ground by the proposed system is 2.5 kbps, although the on board system will
be capable of transmitting up to 1 Mbps.
Size, mass, capacity, and data handling ability
are the most stringent EURECA design constraints.
If the data rate is restricted to 2.5 kbps, only film
cameras can be accommodated. But if the full
1 Mbps data rate can be utilized, many science
and applications instruments can be accommodated. However, large, high power, or high data
rate payloads, such as telescopes, radars, Iidars,
multispectral scanners, or a combination of these
or other instrument payloads cannot be accommodated. Increasing the available power level
alone does not significantly improve the ability
to accommodate such payloads, since science
and applications instruments that require high
power (e.g., remote sensing radars) also tend to
have high data rate requirements (tens to hundreds of Mbps).
4

More power would be available for payload use if it proves possible to operate the platform in a Sun-synchronous dawn-dusk orbit where it does not enter the Earth’s shadow.
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The cost of EURECA has not been clearly stated,
although ESA has referred to a program cost of
$170 million (1984$) that appears to include some
payload costs.
Plans are also being developed for EURECA 11,
an advanced version having increased power and
payload capacity. The new design will allow
space-basing and equipment exchange on-orbit,
using the Shuttle or a yet-to-be-developed Ariane
automatic docking system.
SOLARIS.-This French concept includes preliminary designs for an automated platform. It
would be unmanned, located in LEO, and would
use furnaces, a robot manipulator arm, solar
power, and other subsystems. Ariane 4 would
launch a transfer and supply stage, and a ballistic
reentry capsule will bring processed materials
back to Earth.
The first generation facility would have the following major elements:
The Orbital Service Module (OSM), which
is a user-shared platform with docking ports
for payloads and transport vehicles.
● An in-orbit Transport Modular Vehicle (TMV)
for resupply, transport, and servicing of
space payloads.
● A Data Relay Satellite Communications
System for control and high data rate transmissions.
. The Ariane 4 launcher.
●

The intent is to fly the OSM in a circular “Sunsynchronous” orbit following a path over the twilight line, thus avoiding the Earth’s shadow and
thereby achieving a relatively high 10 kW of continuous power output for its users. Activities such
as materials processing, microwave Earth observation, and assembly and check-out of large vehicles in orbit are envisioned. The orbit altitude
could be adjusted from 600 to 1,000 km. Two
docking ports would be available for TMV berthing, with five ports for payloads. Data transmission rates would not exceed 400 Mbps. The entire OSM weight would be 4,500 kg (excluding
propellant).
The function of the TMV is to provide transportation service between the Ariane delivery orbit
and the OSM, and to permit the return of a lim-
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ited amount of equipment and products to Earth.
The TMV will consist of an expendable module
with propulsion, attitude and trajectory control,
and the ability to rendezvous and dock.
The TMV can be used in either one-way or
round-trip service. For one-way service the payload would be attached directly to the TMV module, and both would be placed inside the fairing
of the Ariane 4 for launch. A 5,000-kg payload
could be accommodated in this manner.
Round-trip service requires the use of a reentry vehicle similar to the Apollo reentry module.
The TMV module is attached to the reentry body
for launch in a manner similar to the arrangement
for a one-way payload, and the two are separated
during reentry. About 2,500 kg and 15 m3 of payload could be accommodated within the reentry vehicle; it could touch down on either land
or water and is designed for reuse.
The first generation SOLARIS concept is functionally similar to the science and applications
space platform studied by NASA, except that
SOLARIS specifies a dawn-dusk Sun-synchronous
orbit. This orbit restricts its usefulness for many
Earth-viewing projects that require lighting from
the Sun. However, radars, Iidars, and some microwave instruments can “see” in the dark and
would not be affected, while solar-viewing instruments wouId gain the advantage of continuous visibility of the Sun. The ability of SOLARIS
to support large, multiple instrument facilities
should allow for accommodation of most of the
solar physics payloads. However, a continuous
full Sun orbit would be a problem for many celestial-viewing instruments that depend on Earth
shadow to eliminate scattered light from the Sun.
All automated life science activities and all
materials processing, except for those requiring
human presence, could be accommodated.
The orbit of SOLARIS is not suited to launch,
retrieval, or servicing of low inclination satellites
(including geostationary satellites), since a large
orbit plane change is required. And, since most
Sun-synchronous satellites are not in dawn-dusk
orbits, a “latitude drift” would be required to
service them. Some studies consider satellite
assembly and service to be a major role for a

“space station”; SOLARIS would be able to accommodate only a small fraction of this market.
Costs of the evolutionary SOLARIS program
have not been defined, but they likely would be
several billions of dollars (1984$) if the entire concept is developed.

Habitable Infrastructure
Although uninhabited platforms can be used
to support many experiments and commercial
processes that do not require human presence,
and some activities require a stability that would
be difficult to achieve if humans were present,
other activities require or can be greatly aided
by human presence. These include life science
studies of humans in space, which are necessary
to prepare for long duration human travel in
space, and interactive experimentation in materials processing (e.g., pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, crystals), which is required in order to
explore the commercial potential of materials
processing.
A number of infrastructure elements other than
the proposed NASA “space station” are available
that can support humans in space.
Extended Duration Orbiter (EDO).–A major
constraint on the duration of the on-orbit time
for the Shuttle is the availability of electrical
power. The current Shuttle power system uses
three fuel cell powerplants fed by cryogenically
stored hydrogen and oxygen, and delivers 21 kW
on a continuous basis, of which 14 kW is allocated to the Shuttle itself and 7 kW is available
for payloads. The fuel cells are fed from tank sets
(one hydrogen and one oxygen tank in each set)
located under the floor lining in the Shuttle cargo
bay. Three tank sets are considered standard
equipment. Two additional sets (for a total of five)
can be installed with no volume penalty to payloads, but with a combined weight penalty (fully
fueled) of 1,500 kg. The full complement of five
tanks will provide a stay time of 8 days if the full
7-kW payload allocation is drawn upon continuously. Where little payload power is drawn, as
might be the case for satellite repair or remote
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sensing activities, the stay time could be as much
as 12 days.
One obvious approach to extending the stay
time is to add more tank sets. One such concept
results in a stay time of 15 to 22 days, again
depending on power consumption, by loading
a four-tank-set carrier into the cargo bay. Such
a carrier would shorten the usable length of the
cargo bay by some 2 meters out of 18, and result in a 3,700-kg decrease in payload capacity.
Extension of this approach to even longer durations has a practical limit because of the volume
and weight capacity lost, and the limited storage
lifetime of cryogens.
A 20-day stay time with 7 kW of power consumed by the payload, or up to 26 days if less
power is consumed, can be achieved by using
a solar array in conjunction with the five standard cryogenic tank sets. In one concept, the solar
array would deliver 18 kW in sunlight, and the
fuel cells would deliver 3 kW makeup power for
a total 21 kW. During orbital eclipse of the solar
array, the fuel cells would supply the full 21 kw.
The RMS could deploy the array underneath the
Shuttle, to avoid interference with the power system heat radiator and the field of view from the
cargo bay. A previously proposed Power Extension Package (PEP) was identical in concept but
was sized to provide 15 kw, instead of the normal 7 kw to payloads. The payload weight penalty for these concepts, including tank sets, is estimated at 2,300 to 2,700 kg. The cost to modify
one Shuttle was estimated to be $100 million to
$200 million (1984$). Spacelab would have been
the principal beneficiary of the PEP, but the
planned flights of Spacelab were judged to be not
frequent enough to justify the expenditure.
To achieve stay times well beyond 20 days requires some radical changes in the power system,
but the Shuttle could be designed for essentially
limitless duration as far as power is concerned.
Batteries would be used for power during Shuttle eclipse, and operation of the existing fuel cells
would be limited to launch, reentry, or emergencies. The fuel cell reactants would be stored at
ambient temperature and high pressure, thereby
eliminating the storage lifetime constraint associated with cryogens. A 48-kW solar array would
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be required to provide power to recharge the batteries in sunlight; this power would be in addition
to the basic 21 kW needed for Shuttle and payload power. The weight penalty for such a power
subsystem is estimated to be about 3,200 kg.
Modifications are required in other areas as
well. Flash evaporators that are currently used
to supplement radiator heat rejection require
large amounts of water in some attitudes, and to
minimize reliance on them it would be necessary to increase the capacity of the radiators. With
regard to habitability, water tanks must be added
to compensate for water that is no longer generated by fuel cells and a regenerative CO 2 system
would be required. Furthermore, for 15- to 30day durations, the Shuttle habitable volume is
only adequate to marginal for a crew of four. A
reconfiguration of the mid-deck, recommended
for 30- to 60-day durations on orbit, includes
moving the airlock to the cargo bay. A Spacelab
module would also be added to provide such
crew amenities as a shower and an exercise and
off-duty area as well as increased work area.
Among the activities which an EDO would be
expected to support is satellite servicing. The
Shuttle can reach a wide range of orbit inclinations and LEO altitudes, and the cargo bay, with
its RMS and space for supplies and other support
equipment, seems well suited for this type of activity. The technical feasibility of repairing satellites from the Shuttle was demonstrated on the
Solar Maximum Mission Satellite in April 1984.
With the Shuttle launch charges alone projected
to be as much as $100 million for a dedicated
flight before the end of the decade, the prospect
of sharing a launch for this purpose along with
other payloads and/or activities is a significant factor in the economic viability of such an operation.
In theory, with on-orbit infrastructure serving
as an operations and distribution center, a Shuttle destined for it could carry not only supplies
and equipment for the operation at hand but
could be loaded with payloads and supplies to
be left in space. Subsequent transfers to freeflyers, for instance, could then be accomplished
with a lighter, more energy-efficient proximityoperations vehicle in contrast to the relatively
massive Shuttle. The premise is that the saving
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to be realized by utilizing the launch capacity of
the Shuttle more effectively would, over time,
more than offset the cost of the on-orbit infrastructure specifically designed to handle equipment and supplies. It is not clear to what extent
the on-orbit infrastructure operations costs (both
on-orbit and ground-support) are included in
analyses of such operations. It is also not clear
how total costs (facilities and operations) would
be allocated among all users of a shared “space
station” to establish the economic viability of any
particular activity such as satellite repair and
servicing.
Finally, an EDO could function as an observatory and a laboratory. There are adequate accommodations in the aft flight deck to control and
monitor an observing payload such as one containing a large telescope. The Shuttle has no provision for laboratory operations beyond the accommodations available in the mid-deck lockers
and, on some early flights, the main galley area.
However, a Spacelab module, discussed in the
following section, could be added to provide a
shirt-sleeve working environment in the cargo
bay. One drawback is that Spacelab consumes
nearly half of the available 7 kW of payload power. Thus, electrical power for experiments would
require careful management, and a more capable power system would be desirable for an EDO.
An EDO is estimated to cost about $2 billion
(1984$) for the basic Shuttle, $300 million (1984$)
for an upgraded habitation module similar to
Spacelab, and $200 million (1984$) for the PEP.
The full Shuttle launch cost would be incurred
for each flight.
Spacelab.–The Shuttle carried Spacelab into
orbit for its maiden flight in November 1983.
Spacelab is a set of hardware that converts the
cargo bay into a general-purpose laboratory for
conducting science, applications, and technology investigations. It was financed and built
jointly by ESA in close cooperation with NASA,
providing a convenient means for working with
a collection of experiments in a shirt-sleeve LEO
laboratory environment. It augments the Shuttle
services for powering, pointing, cooling, and con-

trolling experiment hardware and for data handling and transmission to Earth.
Spaceiab is composed of two primary building
blocks: modules and pallets. The module is a canIike pressure vessel approximately 4 meters in
diameter that provides a shirt-sleeve working
environment for the crew and rack accommodations for experiment hardware. The module consists of two end cones and one or two center sections (each 2.7 meters long). It may be used in
either its long form (7.0 meters) or short form (4.3
meters) and may be flown alone or in combination with one or more pallets. The pallets are Ushaped structures 3 meters long that span the cargo bay and provide mounting for instruments that
are to be exposed to the space environment. pallets may be flown individually or tied together
in trains. For pallet-only projects, the computers
and other subsystem elements normally carried
in the module are housed in an “igloo” that can
be attached to the forward pallet, The Spacelab
hardware set also includes an Instrument Pointing Subsystem (IPS) capable of high-accuracy
pointing for clusters of small instruments or a
large telescope.
While both pallets and modules can be considered for use as independent space infrastructure,
in its present form Spacelab is totally dependent
on the Shuttle for its resources. Specifically, the
Shuttle provides 7 to 12 kW of electrical power,
8 to 12 kW of cooling, data handling and data
communication at rates of up to 50 megabits per
second. Further, the Shuttle provides oxygen replenishment, and serves as both a crew residence
and a safe haven under emergency conditions.
Spacelab depends on these resources to provide
a safe, stable laboratory environment.
Several stages in the evolution of the SpaceIab module beyond the current generation have
been studied, moving from complete dependence on, and attachment to, outside support elements, to relatively independent operation as a
free-flyer that is resupplied every 6 months or so
by the Shuttle or an OMV.
Spacelab With an EDO.–One version of the
Spacelab that would be carried by an EDO utilizing a PEP, was studied by ESA in collaboration
with NASA, The electrical and heat rejection sys-
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Figure 6.— Major Spacelab Elements
MODULE

terns would be modified to handle increased
power, and the command and data management
system wouId be modernized. Since two SpaceIab modules are now owned by NASA, additional
costs would involve only the modifications and
launch costs.
Spacelab as an Attached Module.–Another
version would see the Spacelab used as a laboratory component of a “space station.” The module
would be lengthened to provide a greater shirtsleeve volume for more experiments and people,
but in this case other connected infrastructure
elements would replace the Shuttle as a support
system. Either an existing NASA Spacelab module
could be used for this purpose, or an additional
module could be provided at a cost of $300 million (1984$).
Spacelab as a Free-Flyer.–A third version is
that of Spacelab as an inhabited free-flyer. This
would require the development of a dedicated
service module that would provide the types of
resources currently provided by the Shuttle.

For attitude control, there are a number of possible candidate systems which could be adopted.
In Europe, for example, there is the ESA Modular
Attitude Control (MAC) system, which is designed
for general satellite application. This subsystem
is in prototype form, and hardware tests are u rider
way at present. Electrical power and cooling provisions would be required, as part of the dedicated services module, in the form of solar arrays, batteries, and a heat radiator with a cooling
fluid loop. It is possible that the increased-capacity (12 kW) solar arrays under development by
ESA, together with the ESA radiator, would be
suitable. Command and data handling could be
satisfied by commercial computer technology.
Oxygen supply for the free-flying Spacelab could
be handled by using the nitrogen tanks that are
already available in Spacelab. However, for long
durations on orbit, additional provision for oxygen supply would be necessary, which might
possibly take the form of a water electrolysis system (as yet undeveloped). For crew habitation,
the developed Spacelab free-flying module would
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Figure 7.–Shuttle-Spacelab Flight Profile
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need to be based on a two-segment-long module
as a minimum (7.0 meters), or preferably a threesegment-long module (1 O meters), in order to
provide the necessary volume for sleeping, food
preparation and consumption, waste disposal, exercise and recreational equipment, and commodity stowage. Crew-supported experiment and laboratory activities could be accommodated in a
Spacelab-derived two-segment module, connected to the habitation moduIe by an airlock;
it would contain the necessary laboratory equipment and Spacelab-derived racks. The use of two
modules connected via an airlock would provide
the basis for a necessary safe haven in the event
of a major failure in, or of, either module.
The use of two Spacelab-derived modules,
combined with the associated dedicated service

module, could provide long-duration infrastructure for human and automatic operations in
space. An intermediate step in this direction
would be the development of a two-segment
Spacelab-derived module, coupled with a dedicated service module. The cost of such a development (designed for Shuttle resupply every 90
days) could be some $400 million (1984$). The
two-module development costs would be considerably greater than for a one-moduIe configuration, perhaps approaching $800 million (1984$).
To put the size of a Spacelab-derived free-flyer
into perspective, it is interesting to compare the
facilities described above to the Skylab facility
which was orbited 10 years ago. A three-segment
Spacelab module has roughly the same external
dimensions as the Apollo Command and Serv-
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ice Module’s propulsion/resource system plus
reentry vehicle, that part of the Apollo transportation system that rendezvoused with Skylab. The
Skylab Orbital Workshop (OWS) provided primary habitation and work space 6.7 meters in diameter by 8.2 meters long or about 280 m 3 of
volume. Thus, the volumes enclosed by the twoand three-segment-long modules contain 25 and
40 percent, respectively, of the habitable volume
of the OWS, and together would total just 70 percent of the OWS volume. In addition to the OWS,
some Skylab control and utility functions were
housed in the airlock module and the Multiple
Docking Adapter. Because of the dimensions of
the Shuttle cargo bay, a number of Shuttle
Launches would be required to build up a SpaceIab-based infrastructure on a scale equal to
Skylab.
The free-flying Spacelab could accommodate
any payload currently envisaged for the Space lab
module on the Shuttle. Some life science facility
concepts now being studied use a dedicated
Spacelab module as their basic structure. All life
sciences studies could probably be performed;
high-temperature furnaces for material processing may require higher power and cooling that
could, if necessary, be provided by additional
power modules. Commercial production facilities
are not yet clearly defined, but if such production proves to be desirable, additional power and
Spacelab modules could be added, if necessary,
to accommodate it. A small fraction of the Earth
or celestial-viewing instruments could utilize the
scientific airlock or window of Spacelab, but this
is a cumbersome way to handle such instruments.
The only advantage of the Spacelab window or
scientific airlock over a permanent external mounting position is easier access to the instrument,
while the disadvantages include limited space,
restricted field of view, and the necessity to handle the instrument whenever it is installed. However, viewing instruments could be installed and
operated on one or more co-orbiting platforms.
Spacelab could serve as an operations control
center for other space activities. Properly equipped,
it could accommodate 100 percent of this function, although, depending on the number of
activities conducted, more than one Spacelab
module might be needed. The characteristics of,
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and the problems associated with, exchanging
equipment in the Spacelab module indicate that
its best use might be as a dedicated life and/or
materials science laboratory, or as an in-space
control center.
The idea of developing and using. existing
Spacelab hardware for long duration human
activities in space remains attractive in view of
the maturity of the system building blocks. Limitations of the free-flying Spacelab concept, however, may be significant. As an example, it would
be difficult to develop an efficient closed-loop life
support system.
Spacelab as free-flyer, including a utilities
module based on EURECA, has been estimated
to cost $1 billion (1984$). Transportation costs
would include an initial full Shuttle launch and
subsequent supply and transport services via the
Shuttle. An automatic docking service could be
developed for resupply by expendable launch
vehicles, but the cost of such a development is
uncertain.
Columbus.–The Germans and Italians have
proposed to ESA that the Columbus project, using
Spacelab modules as components of a more extensive infrastructure, should become the ESA
contribution to the U.S. “space station” program.
The plan, including three steps or phases, begins with a Spacelab module attached to a U.S.
“space station, ” providing laboratory workspace
and deriving life support, power, attitude control, and other services from the parent “station. ”
A second step (fig. 8) is an independent free-flying
Spacelab with power, attitude control, and modest life support supplied by a service module fashioned after the EURECA platform. It would require direct resupply by the Shuttle or an OMV,
provide laboratory workspace, and allow tending
by a crew for up to 8 hours at a time. A third step
would add another Spacelab one-segment moduIe, with propulsion, to be used as a crew transport and servicing vehicle which might also be
able to accommodate a small crew for short periods at the laboratory. By servicing the free-flyer,
it would enable the Columbus module to operate autonomously for a few months at a time. This
last phase is projected in Columbus program literature for possible implementation near the end
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Figure 8.—An Artist’s Conception of a Free-Flying Pressurized Module With
an Attached Resource Module (second phase of Columbus concept)
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of this century. Cost estimates for a Columbus
project are not yet available.
NASA Minimum Cost “Space Station. ”-A
study regarding a “space station” that would minimize costs by using Spacelab modules was performed at the NASA Marshall Space Center and
was reported in 1982. It would provide sound
and useful infrastructure, but would be of relatively modest dimensions in comparison with
NASA’s present aspirations. It would include a
habitat module, a separate safe haven for emergencies, and a support systems module. It would
be launched by the Shuttle and would have 1 kw
of power and a scientific workspace. Later,
another support system module and a docking
adaptor would be attached, providing for the
long-term support of three persons, an experiment module, pressurized and unpressurized experiment ports, gyroscopic attitude control, communications and data handling, and 6 kw of
nominal user power. According to the NASA
study, the cost of this facility would be $2 billion
to $2.5 billion (1984$), assuming the use of an
existing Spacelab module already in the inventory.
Shuttle as permanent Infrastructure. -In the
discussion of the EDO, it was shown how relatively modest changes to the existing Shuttle vehicle could result in 20- to 25-day on-orbit stay
times while more extensive modifications could
make 30- to 60-day stay times attainable. A concept has been proposed by one Mission Analysis Study contractor group that would have major Shuttle and its external tank assemblies carried
into orbit together to form permanent infrastructure. The basic Shuttle would be stretched to add
30 feet to the cargo bay and would be utilized
without the wings, tail, and thermal protection
subsystem. The main engines and the OMS engines
would remain in place. The crew compartment
would be stripped to make room for a control
module. A command module would be located
in the cargo bay. Major external tank modifications would include a power module with solar
arrays which would mount on the nose, and a
wraparound radiator for thermal control.
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The Shuttle and its external tank also would use
the Shuttle solid rocket boosters for launching as
is the case for the conventional Shuttle. Upon its
reaching orbit, the solar arrays would be deployed, the cargo bay doors would be opened,
and the command module would be rotated into
an upright position, thereby freeing the cargo bay
for use in servicing and staging operations. A
subsequent Shuttle launch could deliver a habitability module, logistics module, and crew.
The use of a basic Shuttle in this fashion would
allow the very rapid acquisition of infrastructure
able to serve as a habitable “space station” for
a relatively low development cost.
Shuttle External Tank (ET) .-Application of the
ET as an infrastructure element is intriguing because of its large size, because it achieves a nearorbital velocity during normal Shuttle launch
operations, and because it “comes free of extra
cost” to orbit. As a result, several aerospace companies have studied the ET for possible use on
orbit.
The ET has an interior pressurized volume of
some 2,OOO m 3 in the form of two separate
tanks—one for hydrogen, the other for oxygen.
In present Shuttle launch operations, the ET
separates from the Shuttle and reenters the atmosphere after main engine cutoff. On average, at
separation from the Shuttle, the ET still contains
about 4,500 kg of liquid O2 and H2. The challenge is to identify practical methods of salvaging the tank and scavenging these residual propellants.
The ET in orbit, initially viewed as a construction shed and distribution center, might serve as
a mounting structure for telescopes, large antennas, large solar power collectors, and experiment
pallets, or it could be used as a component of
inhabited infrastructure, in which case it would
need windows and entry hatches. The most obvious use for the ET is for on-orbit fuel storage.
This requires the least on-orbit modification,
but assumes that the techniques and equipment
needed to scavenge leftover fuel from the Shuttle and to store it for long periods in space are

.
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The addition of a free-flyi~g’SPAS platform, at a ctwt of $(h~ b@i~n {1,~$) would increase the
science/applications uses by three. Other platforms suc!h a~ k4ESAj lXA3ECRAFf or EURECA could also
be added. For example, the use of three EURECAS, wh[dhcould be purchased at a cost of $0.6 billion
(1984$) or leased annually at a fraction of this cost, would increase science/applications uses by lo.
(In addition, while the system as described here would rtot serve as an assembly/launch platform, 9
out of 10 projected solar system probes could be designed ~ be launched with upper stages from the
., , “,,,
Shuttle.)
in summav, a “USA Salyut” that approximates the, S@i~ SaIyut 7 could be assembled using e=ntially existing or currently underdevelopment technol~g Iie;;,Spacelab modths and a service module
composed of EURECA or LEASECRAFT-type power ad at!t\t@&”ccmttol% With the added cost of several free-flying platforms, it could support most of the ‘Wiend@~~d applications experiments and about
one-third of the commercial and technology developwnt-adities’ now described by NASA as requiring long-term space infrastructure. Anwhg the sciene~ a@@@ it cdt)ld not support are what NASA
describes as the Latge Deployable Reflector, Mars %~@h:@!tum, I!atth Wiences Research Platform,
and Experimental Geosynchronous Communications l%t@i!ti. Operationally, the size, power, and port
capabilities of the infrastructure would mean the pace@ rg#@%h And ckwelopment work would necessarily be less than half as rapid as with the NASA”pro#m@~@ swce infr=tructure. [f sta~ed in 1985,
it could be operational by about 1990 # a -t of rw~ly, $2 biilion (1984$).
..
Of course, any design aimed speclft~liy t@yard CjJr#@-~&@I e@ivalence with the Salyut 7 may
miss the mark by the time it becomes op@fitiondlfi wati~ %wiet space infrastr~cture could be quite
different by 1990. However, the general”-c~mparkon of Capability and cost is illuminating.
..4. , .
.,
‘Described in detail in the OTA Technical Mernorarrdum Sa/yut-Sot4tH StepS 7%ard
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Presence in Space,
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1993.

developed. Use as an uninhabited warehouse or
unpressurized, sheltered workshop in space only
requires that the tank be purged of residual fuel,
since several access openings (larger than 1 meter diameter) already exist.

carriers, would be available for habitation and
pressurized workspace. Rotation of the wheel
would provide artificial gravity in the spinning
part of the facility and gyroscopic action for attitude control.

A concept to use ETs as components of habitable infrastructure has been developed by the
Hughes Aircraft Co. In this concept, four ETs
would be taken separately into orbit and then
joined to form the spokes of a large wheel-like
structure. Solar panels would be mounted on a
rim connected to the outer ends of the ET spokes,
providing 150 kW of power. The wheel would
rotate, and a “despun“ module at the hub of the
wheel would provide zero gravity workspace.
The basic feasibility of this “dual-spin” system has
been demonstrated on a much smaller scale in
over 100 successful communications satellites
built by Hughes. Modules attached to the outer
ends of the ETs, carried into space as aft cargo

This innovative concept has several obvious advantages. There is no doubt that many human
activities, such as eating, drinking, food preparation, showering, and dealing with human waste,
would be much easier to carry on in the artificial gravity environment provided by this system.
And possible health problems associated with
long-term living in microgravity, such as decalcification of bones and atrophy of muscle and connective tissue, could be avoided. In general, the
presence of spin and a choice of gravity regimes,
ranging from microgravity to artificial gravity
simulating what we are used to on Earth, shouId
prove to be useful in solving a number of human,
scientific, and engineering problems.
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Figure 9.— External Tank Structure
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Figure IO.— Possible Uses of External Tank
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Figure 11 .—Concept of Infrastructure Utilizing Four External Tanks
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Chapter 4

A BUYER’S GUIDE TO SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE
SUMMARY
If the United States decides to acquire a substantial amount of long-term space infrastructure,
there are various ways to proceed that should be
carefully considered, including the degree to
which new technology would be used, whether
NASA should set design or performance specifications, and the roles of the private sector and
international partners. The costs and capabilities
of a number of possible infrastructure options are
compared in a table format. The cost drivers associated with the listed options and OTA’s approach to cost estimation are discussed. The next
section examines a number of tradeoffs that
should be considered regarding the use of automation and people in a “space station. ” Buyers

may reasonably decide to acquire space infrastructure using an average annual funding rate
rather than a “lump sum” approach. Possible infrastructure that could be obtained using average annual funding rates of $0.1, $0.3, $1, and
$3 billion (1 984$) are presented. The functions
that NASA intends to provide in a “space station”
are listed, and alternative infrastructures that
could provide those functions are indicated. ’

1 In addition to the two OTA workshops mentioned specifically
in the following text, sources of information for ch. 4 include the
same references noted in ch. 3 for possible infrastructure elements
and their estimated acquisition costs.

PROCUREMENT OPTIONS
If there is an affirmative answer to the questions of whether to acquire long-term in-space
infrastructure (and, if so, how much, of what
kind, and when), there yet remains the decision
of how it is to be acquired. In many respects, this
second decision is just as important as the first.
The mode of acquiring new, long-term, in-space
assets and services should be influenced by a
clear understanding of the contemporary context
in which space activities are carried on. And the
decision as to how to acquire these assets and
services will have a significant impact on the
future of space activities.
The pioneering, generous, and effective efforts
of the U.S. Government, and of NASA in particular, have resulted in the spread of civilian space
capabilities and expertise throughout much of the
world, to the point where they are now essentially beyond the power of the United States to
control even if it is of a mind to do so. Many of
the nations of Europe, and Japan, Canada, India,
BraziI, and the People’s Republic of China as well,
are increasingly positioning themselves to pursue their own interests in space, independent of
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what the United States might desire. Other countries’ evident success with Spacelab, with Ariane
and its launch complex, and in the field of satellite communications has given them great confidence in their abilities to work in full collaboration with the United States on major space programs
and, before long, to undertake such programs
without the United States, should they then deem
that to be appropriate.
The U.S. private space industry is also fully capable of developing all or most of the ensemble
of low-Earth-orbit (LEO) infrastructure elements
needed to provide a more-than-adequate initial
operating capability (IOC) of the type now being studied by NASA. With the important exception of satellite communications, our industry in
the past has undertaken work exclusively under
contract to the Government. However, the past
several years has seen the beginning of important space activities undertaken wholly on private initiative.
Some of these private sector activities and some
of those undertaken by other countries will be
85
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in direct competition with what many in NASA
now perceive to be their own important institutional interests.
With the completion of the Shuttle development program now in sight, the United States
faces a major decision as to whether–and, if so,
how–to redeploy a large fraction of NASA’s
resources. Under present circumstances, NASA,
as in the past, would prefer to undertake another
large technological program, similar to the Shuttle, to serve as the major agency focus, rather
than to spread its efforts over a number of activities that could be more demanding and more
useful. Of the various candidate activities, NASA
has chosen to concentrate on the acquisition of
a great deal of long-term, habitable LEO infrastructure.
Congress and the President have approved
NASA’s request to initiate a “space station” program, and NASA appears to be moving to acquire
such infrastructure in much the same fashion that
it acquired the Shuttle:
●

●

●

●

A great deal of new technology would be developed, acquired, and used, essentially all
of which would be publicly funded.
NASA would arrive at and issue detailed
engineering specifications for, and exercise
close management control over, the technology to be acquired.
This infrastructure would be procured by
NASA with Federal funds. The U.S. private
sector would not be prompted to use its own
resources to provide a substantial portion of
the infrastructure.
The international role would be limited.
NASA would not seek the kind of close collaboration that would result in shared authority, even if it might provide substantial capital cost reduction for the United States.

A significantly different acquisition approach
would - have the following elements:
●

As far as is reasonably possible, already developed, tested, and paid-for technology
would be used to achieve an adequate IOC,
with development of new technology under-

●

●

●

taken only where demonstrably required to
lower overall cost of ownership.
NASA would prompt our private commercial-industrial-financial sectors to develop
and produce, with their own resources and
on a genuinely competitive basis, as many
of the Government-required civilian “space
station’ assets and services as they can;
NASA would facilitate their efforts to do so;
and they could be offered to NASA on a sale,
lease, or payment-for-service-provided basis.
NASA, in obtaining the elements not provided by the private sector, would emphasize management methods specifically designed to take the best advantage of the now
quite sophisticated U.S. space industry (see
app. D, “Synopsis of the OTA Workshop on
Cost Containment of Civilian Space infrastructure [Civilian “Space Station”] Elements).
NASA would negotiate collaborative agreements with other cooperating countries that
would see all partners share in the benefits
of such an IOC at a reduced acquisition cost
to the U.S. Government for its share.

This second approach would imply that NASA
would hand off much (perhaps most) of the more
mundane “space station” work by paying the private sector to do it, thereby conserving its skills
and resources so that they could be focused on
more challenging space goals and objectives, including the development of the very advanced
technology (e.g., bipropellant engines, a reusable
orbital transfer vehicle, . . .) required, an activity which, for the most part, the private sector
cannot justify.
These two options are at opposite ends of a
spectrum of approaches to the acquisition of
long-term space infrastructure. in determining
which approaches from this spectrum are most
likely to influence the evolution of space activities in a desirable direction, Congress may wish
to consider the following questions:
●

Should the Government be allocating its professional skills and experience to the development of: 1 ) incremental or 2) fundamental advances in technology?
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Which approach is most likely to stimulate
the “commercialization of space”?
● What level of international collaboration is
really desirable?
●

●
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• What other large and important space ends
should be addressed in the next decade or
two in addition to the acquisition of in-space
infrastructure methods and means?

A CATALOG OF SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE
The fact that the United States has already developed a wide variety of space capabilities
means that it has genuine choices—both of what
infrastructure elements it places in orbit and of
how these elements are to be acquired and used.
It is around these choices that the difficult issues
lie; by and large, the technology is either in hand
or can be readily developed.
It must be emphasized that the particular
constellation of space infrastructure elements
which NASA currently aspires to develop, construct, deploy, and operate is only one alternative in a wide range of options. Simply put, there
is no such thing as “the space station. ” What is
under discussion is a variety of sets of infrastructure elements, ranging from modest extensions
of current capabilities to vastly more sophisticated, capable, and costly ensembles than NASA
is now suggesting.
As one way of presenting the variety of technology options available, OTA has prepared
tables 6 and 7.2
tables were prepared in response to the congressional
committees which requested this assessment,
3 discusses infrastructure options in detail.

Photo credit: Natlonal Aeronautics and Space Administration

One option for modestly increased length of stay in
space is a Shuttle Orbiter modified for extended
flight—the Extended Duration Orbiter, or EDO. Such
a configuration might involve large solar panels for
extended electrical power, as shown here.
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Table 6.—Comparison of Some Optionsa for "Low Earth” Orbit Independently Operating Infrastructure

Shuttle
Orbiter

Extended
Duration
Orbiter:
Phase I

Extended
Duration
Orbiter:
Phase II

Free-flying
spacelab
(developed
as permanent
infrastructure)

Date available
(assuming start in 1985)

Now

1988

1990

1990

Costb
(billions of fiscal year 1984 dollars)

None

0.2

0.5

2-3

8

20

20

6
100

200

60

200
300

8
Orbital
maneuvering
vehicle plus
two free-flying
unpressurized
platforms

20
Reusable
orbital
transfer
vehicle plus
several more
platforms

Characteristics
Power to users (kW)
Pressurized volume (m3)
Nominal crew size
Miscellaneous

Capabilities c
Time on Orbit
Laboratories for:
Life sciences
Space science/applications
Materials science
Technology development
Observatories
Data/communication node
Servicing of satellites
Manufacturing facility (materials
processing)
Large structure assembly
Transportation node
Fuel and supply depot

7
60

(with spacelab
habitat)
5
3
New technology
Modest crew
required;
accommodations
modest
laboratory
space

NASA infrastructure
aspirations
Initial
Mature,
fully
operational
capability
developed
1992

1996-2000

6
Can accept
Spacelab

5
No new
technology

10 days

20 days

50 days

Unlimited
(60-90 day
resupply)

Unlimited
(90 day
resupply)

Unlimited
(90 day
resupply)

Moderate
Modest
Some
Modest
No
No
Modest
No

Moderate
Modest
Some
Modest
Modest
No
Modest
No

Considerable
Modest
Moderate
Some
Modest
No
Modest
Modest

Extensive
Modest
Moderate
Moderate
Modest
No
Modest
Modest

Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Considerable
Considerable
Considerable

Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive
Extensive

No
No
No

No
No
No

No
No
No

Modest
No
No

Moderate
Moderate
No

Extensive
Extensive
Considerable

Response to reasons advanced for
space infrastructure
Considerable
Extensive
No
Modest
Modest
Modest
Maintain U.S. space leadership and
technology capability
Modest
Considerable
Extensive
No
Modest
Modest
Respond to U.S.S.R. space activities
Modest
Extensive
Considerable
Extensive
No
Modest
Enable long-term human presence
in space
No
Modest
Modest
Modest
Modest
Modest
Attention-getting heroic public
spectacle
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Modest
Modest
Extended international cooperation
Modest
Considerable
Considerable
Considerable
Modest
Modest
Promote U.S. commercialization of
space
Extensive
No
No
Modest
Maintain vigorous NASA
Extensive
No
engineering capability
No
No
Unclear
Unclear
Enhance national security, broadly
No
Modest
defined
Modest
Modest
Modest
Considerable
Modest
Space travel for non-technicians
Considerable
aLiated options are illustrative examples; the list la not exhaustive.
bco~ts include de@~n, development, and pr~uct’on; launch and operational costs are not included. Some costs are estimated by the Office of Technology Assessment; others were provided to OTA.
cClearly judgmental.
dlncluding launch to the Moon, Mars, and aome esteroids.

Examples of habitable infrastructure are shown
in table 1. First, the present Shuttle Orbiter and
its possible modifications for somewhat extended
(but not permanent) stays on orbit (i.e., a socalled Extended Duration Orbiter—EDO) are

listed, followed by one version of Space lab developed into a free-flying inhabited facility.
Finally, the present NASA-envisioned space station” concept is given, including both the IOC
version with an estimated completion in 1992,
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Table 7.—Space Infrastructure Platformsa That Could Be Semiced by Shuttle or an Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle
Unpressurized coorbiting platforms
(serviced by means of extravehicular activity)

Pressurized platforms
(serviced internally while docked)

SPAS

MESA

LEASECRAFT

EURECA

Space
Industries’
Platform

Date available
(now, or approximate, assuming
start in 1985)

Now

Now

1986

1987

Late 1980’s

1989

cod’
(billions of fiscal year 1984 dollars)

0.005

0.01

0.2

0.2

0.3

0.6

Characteristics
Power to users (kW)
Pressurized volume (ft3)
Nominal crew size

0.6

0.1

6

2

None
None

None
None

None
None

None
None

20
2,500

3,000 lb
Payload

200 lb
Payload

20,000 lb
Payload

2,000 lb
Payload

1-3 only
when
docked
25,000 lb
Payload

10 days

8 months

Unlimited

6 months

3-6 months

Unlimited

No
Modest
Modest
No
No
No
No
No

No
Modest
No
No
No
No
No
No

Modest
Modest
Modest
Modest
Modest
No
No
Considerable

Modest
Modest
Modest
Modest
Modest
No
No
Modest

Modest
No
Moderate
Moderate
Modest
No
No
Extensive

Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Modest
Moderate
No
No
Considerable

No
No

No
No

No
No

No
No

No
No

No
No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Modest

No

Modest

No

No
No

No
No

Modest
No

No
No

Modest
No

Modest
No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes
Unclear

No
Modest

No
Considerable

Yes
No

No
Considerable

Unclear
No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Miscellaneous
Capabilities c
Time on orbit
Laboratories for:
Life sciences
Space science/applications
Materials science
Technology development
Observatories
Data/communication node
Servicing of satellites
Manufacturing facility (materials
processing)
Large structure assembly
Transportation node (assembly,
checkout, and launch)
Fuel and supply depot
Response to reasons advanced for
space infrastructure
Maintain U.S. space leadership
and technology capability
Respond to U.S.S.R. space activities
Enable long-term human presence
in space
Attention-getting heroic public
spectacle
Extended international cooperation
Promote U.S. commercialization of
space
Maintain vigorous NASA
engineering capability
Enhance national security, broadly
defined
Space travel for non-technicians

European
Modified
Spacelab

6

3,000
3
20,000

lb
Payload

examples; the list Is not ‘Xhaustlve.
btists include ~esian, ~evelopment, and ~r~uction; launch a~ o~ratl~nal costs are not included. Some costs are estimated by the office of Technology As~ss-

aLi~t~ ~latformg

are illustrative

ment; others were ~rovlded to OTA.
cClearly judgmental.

and a mature, fully developed facility (19962000).
The parameters for each option that may be
used for rough comparative purposes are:
. Approximate date of availability—assuming
that an acquisition (in contrast to a study)
“go-ahead” were included in the fiscal year
1987 budget.

●

Cost (in fiscal year 1984 dollars)–to produce
the capabilities shown. The estimates are
based on sources such as industry reviews,
company publications and meeting presentations, aerospace periodicals, and NASA information releases. Inasmuch as some options utilize existing hardware, the costs do
not reflect similar proportions of development and production efforts for the various
options.
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Characteristics–several design parameters
and sizing factors that provide the bases for

infrastructure capabilities.
Capabilities—the types of functional activities that the listed infrastructure could support, and the degree to which these activities might be accomplished.
Responsiveness of a given infrastructure-to
the various reasons put forward for having
a civi I ian n “space station, ” including any
long-term presence of human beings in
space .

If great and long-range space activities (for instance, the establishment of a lunar human settlement or the return of materials from the asteroids
or Mars) come under consideration, they wouId
appear to be achievable using a sophisticated
reusable orbit transfer vehicle (ROTV) coupled
with on-orbit assembly, check-out, launch, and
recovery. The one option listed in table I that
could provide these capabilities is the NASA fully
developed infrastructure.
Examples of uninhabitable “free-flying’ space
platforms are shown in table 2. These platforms,

or others, could be used in conjunction with, and

serviced by, any of the options listed in table 1.
In this way, additional capabilities could be added
to the infrastructures given in table 1, SPAS and
MESA are currently existing commercial platforms
that were financecj and developed by the private
sector. LEAS ECRAFT is also a private venture now
under development.
Some cautions should be noted in the interpretation of this information. General descriptions
of the various options are given, an estimates
of their capabilities. These capabilities can be expected to change in some cases. Most of the capabilities have been described by qualitative adjectives. Quantitative estimates are rounded off
to one figure. In the fifth section of the tables,
“Response to the Reasons Advanced for Space
Infrastructure, ” the comparisons clearly must be
qualitative and judgmental in nature and are presented simply to bring these factors to the attention of the reader. For instance, as a particular
item the Spacelab option of table 2 is only one
of several that have been put forward; one by
European Space Agency (ESA) countries could
definitely augment international cooperation if
it were implemented.
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COST DRIVERS
Beyond the observation that, in some general
fashion, the cost will increase with the capability and sophistication of the infrastructure acquired, it is difficult to estimate the eventual cost
of this capability to the Government. At least all
of the following factors could have an important
influence on this cost:
1. the total capability acquired–which, as suggested by the examples listed in the tables
of infrastructure options, can encompass a
considerable range;
2. the extent to which already developed,
tested, and paid-for technology is used, v.
a focus on new technology with its higher
development cost and greater risk of cost
overruns;
3. the substitution, where feasible, of automated systems for the accomplishment of
tasks previously undertaken only by human
beings;
4. the manner by which the infrastructure is acquired, i.e., the extent to which NASA puts
the engineering challenge on the space industry by issuing performance specifications,
rather than continuing to issue detailed engineering specifications and managing the acquisition process in detail;
5. the effectiveness of NASA’s efforts to persuade our private sector to develop infrastructure assets and services “on their own, ”
and to provide them to the Government at
purchase, lease, or service-payment prices
lower than those achievable by the Government;
6. the effectiveness of NASA’s efforts to effect
eventual private sector operation of the infrastructure and its related activities;
7. the extent to which large and rapid expansion of military space research, develop-

ment, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) activities increases costs in the civilian space
sector also;3
8. the extent to which any “Christmas-tree effect” takes place within NASA, whereby the
infrastructure acquisition management is
persuaded by the NASA Centers to allow the
cost of desirable but nonessential RDT&E
activities to be included in the acquisition;
and
9. the effectiveness of NASA’s efforts to arrive
at large-scale collaboration and related costsharing arrangements with other countries.
These points address only the initial capital cost
of this infrastructure—to this cost must be added
its ongoing operation and maintenance costs; the
cost of instruments, furnaces, etc., needed for
scientific experimentation in association with its
use; and the interest cost of any money borrowed
to fund the acquisition program. And it must be
remembered, too, that the infrastructure will
eventually become obsolete or wear out.
It is clear that there are many opportunities to
reduce infrastructure net cost that could be
grasped by a vigorous, imaginative, and determined NASA management.4
These considerations suggest that, over the next
year or two, at least as much attention should be
given to identifying the best ways by which the
country should set about the permanent development of space as there is given to any technological advances and operational capabilities that
are to be obtained.

3Classified material was not used in preparing this report.
4Cost reduction measures are discussed i n app, D of this report.

structure issues is that of the proper mix of sophisticated people and sophisticated machines
(automation) to be employed in work activities
in spaces
Sln arriving at judgments on various “man/machine” issues OTA,
in close concert with senior congressional staff members, designed
and convened a workshop which brought together many of the
Nation’s experts in “smart machine” development from the Government, industry, and academic communities with OTA and congressional staff professionals.

1. If specifically designed to do so, any civilian “space station” program could effectively serve as a high-visibility focus for promoting research and development in all
disciplines in the field of automation. important advances in terrestrial applications
of automation could be expected to follow
from a vigorous space automation program.
2. However, there is a firm consensus among
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scientists and engineers in the various automation disciplines that current automated
equipment could not accomplish many of
the functions envisioned by NASA for an
early 1990s “space station. ” This situation
results, in part, because NASA has invested
relatively few resources to develop automated capabilities specifically for generalpurpose infrastructure-support (in contrast
with special-purpose scientific) space activities. In addition, the academic and industrial advanced automation research community numbers only a few hundred.
3. Therefore, if the kind of overall operational
“space station” now envisioned by NASA
is to be functioning by the early 1990s, it
will have to include people. Conversely, if
it is to be wholly or mostly automated, it
could not become operational until 5 to 10
years thereafter, even with a major automation R&D effort. However, if any of the
aspirations of those now conducting research and development in the space materials processing area are realized, and one or
more processes are found suitable for longterm production, then elements of the infrastructure that would be devoted to such production, such as platforms co-orbiting near
any central complex, could be singled out
for early, specific, sophisticated-machine
R&D focus.
4. Conceptually, space infrastructure could be
designed either to include a human work
crew or to depend on unattended sophisticated machines. Despite the fact that the
relative efficiency and/or effectiveness of
these two quite different approaches have
been extensively debated for years, no consensus has emerged. This absence of consensus results from a number of factors: the
state-of-the-art for sophisticated machines;
the amount of experience we have had to
date in the actual conduct of space support
operations is quite small; and, in such operations, NASA has placed more emphasis on
human beings than on machines;

For the foreseeable future, therefore,
only a general continuum of conclusions
can be outlined:
machines generally will be unable to anticipate and deal with genuinely unknown
circumstances and surprises;
people will need the assistance of machines to gain speed, strength, and memory; to improve their sensory capabilities
and their mobility; and to provide them
with artificial senses via radar, Iidar, radiation detection, etc.;
machines employed for ongoing R&D and
commercial-industrial operations will require human oversight and assistance; and
machines, maintained by people or not,
as circumstances suggest,” should do all
hazardous and very-long-term repetitive
work.
5. In the matter of relative cost of automated
and space facilities including people, the
expense of developing and providing safe,
sanitary, and suitable living and working facilities for human beings has to be weighed
against the costs of providing analogous
automated capabilities. The former will certainly be relatively expensive; the latter may
well cost more than some advocates imagine, especially if as much capability is expected of the machines as of a professional
human work crew. With respect to doing
useful work in space, human beings represent in-hand technology. Cost alone does
not provide sufficient ground for choosing
between automated and manned facilities.
6. However, there are three reasons advanced
for having men and women in space, only
one of which is to do useful work. The
other reasons are: to serve as subjects for
scientific study and to engage in any other
kind of human activity. With respect to the
second and third reasons, the question of
humans or machines does not even arise.
Only the purpose of doing useful work has
been extensively studied and, as indicated
in the preceding
points, no clear and gen,
“

,
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eral present advantage for having people or
sophisticated machines there has emerged.
If the Nation decides, as a matter of policy,
to have some of its people remain away from
Earth for long periods, then staffed space facilities, allowing for the study of human

physiology, psychology, and social behavior, must be acquired. If, similarly, the Nation decides, as a matter of policy, to enable
people to pursue in space a variety of cultural activities other than work then, again,
only their presence there will suffice.

ALTERNATIVE FUNDING RATES
Chapters 5 and 6 discuss a space infrastructure
acquisition program that would involve an initial decision on the purposes of, and the objectives to be achieved in, the civilian space area,
followed by the design of that infrastructure with
appropriate functional capabilities to support the
attainment of these objectives. An estimate of the
cost and schedule associated with the attainment
of these objectives, along with the acquisition of
such infrastructure, is also presented.
An alternative approach could simply establish
annual expenditure levels for in-space infrastructure acquisition. Thus, to provide an independent basis of comparison with the civilian “space
station” program now favored by NASA, OTA has
estimated what new space capabilities could be
acquired, by when, if various annual average
Government funding rates were established to do
so. No changes to present NASA acquisition procedures or NASA anticipated acquisition costs are
assumed. Arbitrary annual average funding levels
of $0,1, $0.3, $1, and $3 billion per year (1984$)
were chosen to illustrate the number and kind
of space infrastructure elements that could be acquired over periods of 5, 10, or 15 years.
The results of these 12 funding scenarios are
given in table 8, which shows the funding rate,
number of years, total expenditure, and kinds of
infrastructure elements acquired. The elements
are divided into those that can operate independently (e. g., the Shuttle Orbiter and a “space station” central base) and those that depend on being serviced or maintained from one of the
independent elements (i.e., by an orbital maneuvering vehicle (OMV), a local in-space transportation system operated from a “space station”
control element, or directly by the Shuttle).

Table 8 lists the following (among other) elements of space infrastructure that could be acquired over various acquisition intervals:
●

●

●

For $0.1 billion per year: probably no “permanently manned” facility could be obtained even by the year 2000. Further extension of capabilities of the Shuttle system and
unpressurized platform developments could
be obtained. The acquisitions could be: a development of the EDO Phase 1, for 20-day
orbit stays, over a 5-year period; or EDO
Phase 11, for 50-day orbit stays, over 10 years
or longer, plus two or three free-flying unpressurized platforms such as EURECA,
LEASECRAFT, and/or the Space Industries’
platform (assuming that the Government
would make an outright purchase of such
platforms).
At $0.3 billion per year: within 5 years, the
acquisitions could be an EDO I I plus several
(perhaps pressurized) platforms. Over 10
years, there could be acquired: 1) the first
permanently orbiting, Spacelab-derived habitable modules in 28.5° orbit that could support three people, 2) an OMV (enabling servicing of nearby satellites), and 3) a few freeflying platforms. In 15 years, there could be
obtained either: 1 ) two free-flying Spacelabs,
one in polar orbit, one at 28.5°, or 2) much
more capable permanent infrastructure at
28.5° than that which could be acquired in
10 years.
For $1 billion per year: within 5 years, there
could be acquired: 1) a permanent LEO
facility operating as a transportation node
(obtained as a new design by NASA), 2) an
OMV, 3) an ROTV capable of transporting
spacecraft to and from geostationary and

—
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Table 8.—Some Illustrative Space Infrastructure Acquisitions Possible at Various Annual Average Federal
Funding Rates (all amounts in billions of 1984 dollars)
Space acquisitions a
Dependent elements
Funding
rate

Number
of
years

Total
expenditures

O.1e

5
10
15

0.5
1

0.3

5
10

1.5
3

15

4.5

5
10

5
10

15

15

5
10

15
30

15

45

Unpressurized
platforms

Independent infrastructure
elements b
EDO If (20 days, 5 crew)
EDO II (50 days, 6 crew)
EDO II (50 days, 6 crew)

1.5

2
3
3

3
EDO II (50 days, 6 crew)
1
Free-flying Spacelab modules’
(permanent, 3 crew)
2 free-flying Spacelab modules in both 2
28 degree and polar orbits (3 crew each
Space transportation center (4 crew) —
2
NASA initial operating capability
“space station”g (8 crew)
g
NASA growth “space station” (12 crew) 3
NASA growth “space station”g (12 crew) 3
NASA mature “space station”g (16 crew) 3
Shuttle-Derived Cargo Vehicle (SDV)
5
NASA mature “space station”g
(18 crew, SDV)

Pressurized platform#

Space-based Beyond geostationary
orbit spacecraft
transport
elements
vehicles

OMV

1

OMV

—
1

OMV; ROTV
OMV; ROTV

—
—

OMV;ROTV

—
—

1
1

—
—
—
—

—
—
—
—
—

—
—
1
1
1

2

OMV; ROTV
OMV:ROTV

3

OMV: ROTV

Lunar capable ROTV;
staffed Lunar facility
Lunar capable ROTV;
staffed Lunar facility;
Mars voyageh

p~e~erlt characteristics and

aTables 1 and 2
capabilities of infrastructure elements In detail.
b=tended D“ratlon Orbitem (EDO) are IImited In their stays on orbit; other independent elements are lonO-term.
cplatforms of the L E A S E C R A F T / E U R E C A tYPe
dplatfoma of t~ m~ifi~ free.flylng
power and pressurization SyStemS.
eAt $fJ 1 billion&r, no long.te~, staffed infrastructure ebments are Wssible.
f Em i (~tend~ Duration o~lter, phaae 1) and the
have limited eleCtriCa~ pOWer (about 7 kw).

spa~elab~pa~e lndu~trles type with their Own electrical
spacelab modules

gThe NASA “’space station” elements are expected to operate as transpodatlon and servicing centers as well as laboratories. They would have sufficient power for
hextensive materials procesalng.
A slgnlflcant part of the cost of a human visit to Mars could be provided in this case.

other higher orbits, and 4) the capability to
support the kind of vehicles that could be
developed later to travel to and from the
Moon. In 10 years, the IOC infrastructure
now favored by NASA could be acquired.
In 15 years, nearly all of the infrastructure
now seriously considered by NASA could be
acquired.
At $3 billion per year (assuming that only
funds, not technology or other factors, would
be the pacing program factor): NASA’s fully
developed “space station” could become
available in somewhat more than 5 years. In
10 years, this infrastructure plus a geostationary platform, plus a Shuttle-derived cargo
vehicle (SDV) for lower cost transfer of fuel
and cargo to LEO, plus a lunar facility ready
for occupancy and continuing operation
would become possible. In 15 years, NASA’s
complete infrastructure aspirations and a
lunar settlement could be in hand and, perhaps also, plans for seeing a human crew

travel to the vicinity of Mars and back could
be well advanced.
These projections are for infrastructure acquisition only; operational costs are not included.
In general, more extensive infrastructure would
require larger operational costs. Also, there is a
basic difference between the costs associated
with using Shuttle-type vehicles and permanently
orbiting facilities. The use of an EDO to conduct
extended science or development activities with
a crew would involve launch costs each time it
went into orbit; use of a permanent facility would
require resupply loads several times per year, but
the cost of each flight could be shared with other
payloads. For example, if 12 dedicated 30-day
EDO flights were conducted per year about $1
billion (1984$) in annual transportation costs
would be involved; in comparison, cost of four
partial-load Shuttle launches per year to resupply a permanent facility would total $100 million
to $400 million (1984$), depending on the weight
of supplies carried in each flight.
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CONCLUSIONS
The general conclusion of a great deal of study
by the civilian space community (Government,
industry, and university) is that some additional
long-term in-space LEO infrastructure could be
used to improve the efficiency and effectiveness
of a number of present and anticipated space
activities. However, our space experience to
date, and science, engineering, and space operations considerations alone, are not now sufficient, by themselves, to determine the character and amount of the in-space infrastructure
to be acquired soon. And in the absence of any
objective external demand for its prompt acquisition, these considerations cannot determine
the rate at which it should be acquired.
There are a wide variety of infrastructure options that could be chosen from to provide various kinds and amounts of in-space support assets
and services. Some infrastructure options currently exist, others could be developed using current technology, and some would require new
technology. The cost to the Government of acquiring this infrastructure could be reduced, substantially, if our private sector were to offer to pro-

vide lower unit cost portions thereof, and other
portions were provided by other countries in collaborative programs within the United States.
it is clear that a number of important support
assets and services could be provided with infrastructure other than that defined as “The NASA
Space Station.” Therefore, in considering how
much of what kind of in-space infrastructure
should be provided by when, reasonable ways
for Congress to proceed might be:
to select those specific support assets and
services that they judge to be important, ask
NASA to price them, and specify a date by
which they should become available; or
● to set an annual average funding rate for the
acquisition of in-space infrastructure, and
allow NASA to select the assets and services
to be provided and the dates of their acquisition.

●

And Congress could decide to what extent
NASA should emphasize the acquisition of any
infrastructure by our private sector and by other

countries in order either to relieve the burden
on the Government’s budget generally, or to increase the amount, or hasten the time, by which
space infrastructure would be acquired and/or
other space activities were conducted.6
Using the first approach, Congress initially
might select functions similar to those provided
by the Soviet Salyut 7 (operational since 1982).
Such a semi-permanent LEO laboratory could be
developed using Spacelab-like modules connected to a power and support module patterned
after current platform designs. It would support
several crewmembers and one-third of the science,
commercial, and technology development activities that NASA now suggests would be handled
by their IOC. NASA’s estimate is some $2 billion
(1984$) for such a development.
Or, in another example, the conduct of ROTV
operations might be selected as one of the main
support functions to be supplied by space infrastructure. This would allow servicing and other
activities in virtually all orbits, including polar,
geostationary, and even lunar. In addition, such
infrastructure would support the continued exploration of the solar system, which is one of
NASA’s most important “char ters.” The cost for
an ROTV and its associated LEO infrastructure has
been estimated at $3 billion to $4 billion (1984$).
Of course, another example of the first approach would have Congress simply select the
IOC assets and services identified by NASA and
the aerospace industry that are estimated to cost
$8 billion (1984$) (plus the cost of NASA staff);
or even to spur the infrastructure acquisition
process beyond NASA’s present aspirations, and
begin to move people beyond LEO.
Congress could consider alternative ways of
providing those assets and services in varying
degrees. For instance:
●

an on-orbit laboratory supporting research
on a wide range of life, materials, and other
science topics, and new technology devel-

‘A conceptual possibility would be for NASA to provide a core
facility to which private industry could attach docking and fuel storage equipment for commercial ROTV operations.

——
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opments (Shuttle, EDO, Spacelab, Columbus, NASA minimum cost “space station,”
Space Industries platform);
permanent observatories for astronomy, and
Earth remote sensing (Shuttle, EDO, SpaceIab, Space Industries, SPAS, MESA, EURECA,
Landsat, LEASECRAFT, Space Telescope,
IRAS, 0S0 satellites, Solar Max, and other
existing or planned observatories);
a facility for microgravity materials processing including the manufacturing of such
products as pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, glasses, and metals (Shuttle, EDO,
Spacelab, LEASECRAFT, the Space Industries
platform, SPAS, Columbus, EURECA, MESA);
servicing of satellites and platforms, including the maintenance or replacement of components, replenishment of consumables, and
exchange of equipment (Shuttle, EDO, ELVs,
as well as OMVs and ROTVs operated from
the Shuttle);
a transportation node to assemble, check
out, and launch vehicles to geosynchronous
and other high orbits, and on interplanetary
trips {Shuttle, EDO, Columbus, NASA minimum-cost “space station”);
an assembly facility for large space structures
such as antennas for advanced satellite communications systems (Shuttle, EDO, Columbus, NASA minimum-cost “space station”);

●

●

a storage depot for spare parts, fuel, and supplies for use as needed by satellites, platforms, vehicles, and people (ETs, Columbus,
LEASECRAFT, the Space Industries platform,
NASA minimum-cost “space station”); and
a staging base for later, more ambitious
exploration and travel (Columbus, NASA
minimum-cost “space station”).

If Congress were to select an average annual
funding rate, some examples of the approximate
kind and amount of infrastructure that could be
obtained over a period of some 10 years (in 1984
dollars) are, for instance:
$0.1 billion per year: an EDO (20-day stay
on-orbit) plus some free-flying platforms; or
$0.3 billion per year: an EDO (50-day stay
on-orbit), plus free-flying, pressurized infrastructure supporting several crewmembers,
plus some free-flying platforms; or
$1 billion per year: most of the NASA IOC
plus an ROTV; or
$3 billion per year: all of the NASA IOC, plus
its extensions, plus an ROTV, plus a Shuttlederived cargo vehicle, plus a “geostationary
platform, plus an operating lunar settlement
program.
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Photo credit Natlonal Aeronautics and Space Administration

One alternative to the development of new technology is to use the Space Shuttle for many advanced operations in
low-Earth-orbit. Shown here are: (A) satellite servicing satellite in April 1984; (B) assembly of a large structure in orbit—
here simulated in water; and (C) a deployable antenna.
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Chapter 5

BROADENING THE DEBATE
SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE AS METHODS AND MEANS
Even the most informed ardent supporters of
a U.S. civilian “space station” program agree that
any such facility would be a means to various
ends, rather than an end in itself. The ends proposed may be grouped into four categories: industrial (e.g., manufacturing materials); commercial (e.g., servicing satellites); scientific (e. g.,
conducting experiments in the life sciences); and
national security (e. g., maintaining a permanent
U.S. manned presence). These ends, despite their
diversity, have in common a presumption that
space activities will in future become more routine and more clearly operational, less experimental, and less tentative. This presumption in
turn derives from an important change in the way
that we are now beginning to view space.
Twenty-five years into the Space Age, we are
in a position to view near-Earth space much as
we would a vast tract of undeveloped raw land
on the Earth’s surface:
We have identified at least some of the desirable locations (particular orbits).
. We have established an initial legal framework for their beneficial occupancy (the Outer Space Treaty).
● We have reliable transportation for people
and machinery to and from these remote
areas, from selected locations on the Earth’s
surface (via the Shuttle).
Ž We can maintain reliable communications
●

with these remote areas (via NASA’s satellite communications system).

These capabilities are prompting us to undertake
the considered development of near-Earth space—
with, therefore, the long-term implications for use
and support of any assets and people placed
there.
indeed, the terms “space station” or “space
transportation node” are most accurately understood as identifying elements of long-term, perhaps permanent, space infrastructure, concentrated initially, for the most part, in low-Earth
orbits. These elements would provide in-space

structure, electrical power, thermal control, warehousing, stability (as to location, attitude, and
temperature), communications, fuel, associated
docking and air lock capabilities, local transportation, LEO-GEO transportation, and, if staffed by
men and women, life support and residential and
working space, Because it is expected to be sophisticated, and useful for periods of several decades, this space infrastructure could provide a
new and qualitatively different regime of space
assets, allow the provision of new space services,
and support the conduct of space activities in a
new and presumably more efficient and effective
manner.
Four major decisions have marked the U.S. civilian space program: the establishment of NASA
in the National Aeronautics and Space Act of
1958, the initiation of the Apollo program in
1961, the establishment of COMSAT in the Comsat Act of 1962, and the initiation of the Shuttle
program in 1972. But, despite the growing importance of the Nation’s publicly supported space
activities, the pattern of decision making over the
past 20 years has seldom proceeded in the light
of broad public discussion. Until very recently,
the discussion of whether to undertake a “space
station” program and, if so, what elements it
should contain, had also been confined principally to engineers and scientists within NASA, and
within NASA-supported university programs and
aerospace contracting firms. Consideration of the
views and interests of these communities has, to
a very great extent, determined the kind of “space
station” program now suggested by NASA.
As NASA’s Shuttle development program comes
to a close, thousands of its in-house engineers
and technical support staff and, in principle, as
much as $2 billion per year in contract funds,
u rider its present “budget envelope, ” would be
freed up to be applied to one or more new programs. Given the agency’s natural desire not only
to maintain its current size (a size NASA leaders
judge to have the support of the general public),
103
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but to grow at 1 percent per year1–a desire supported by the Reagan Administration–this combination of people and funds that could soon become available suggests, strongly, that any new
programs must include the development and acquisition of a great deal of new technology,
preferably related to having people in space; large
numbers of technologists would be gainfully
employed both in NASA and in the space industry under contract to NASA. NASA’s plans could
well have been further influenced by the fundamental political belief that the agency might
not long survive in its present form without a
single, large, “people-in-space” program upon
which a majority of its energies are focused. If
a number of smaller programs were initiated instead, each of them, it is thought, could be terminated without widespread objections arising
in the political process. Finally, NASA may have
thought it prudent to propose a “space station”
program rather than some other large endeavor(s)
(e.g., a return of Americans to the Moon, sending people on an expedition to Mars, etc.) both
because the former had been carefully studied
over the years, representing, in NASA’s view, a
natural complement to the Shuttle, and because
alternative large programs seemed too grandiose,
have not recently been discussed with the general public, and, therefore, were less likely to
enlist the required support, both within and without the administration.
Once the decision had been made to begin defining a “space station” program to be proposed
for congressional approval, NASA began canvassing possible user communities to learn what characteristics they would like it to incorporate in
order to meet their needs. This process would

I NASA management has a strong commitment to its own institutional future. NASA Headquarters material, NASA HQ MF 832275(1 ), prepared for a presentation to its internal Policy Review
Committee in mid-1983, and subsequently presented to a Board
of the National Research Council, lists eight “Agency Goals. ” The
first goal is: “Provide for our people a creative environment and
the best of facilities, support services, and management support
so they can perform with excellence NASA research, development,
mission, and operational responsibilities. ”
The second goal speaks to the space transportation system (the
Shuttle), and the third to the establishment of a permanent manned
presence in space.
App. B shows that, in previous years, this commitment has also
been strong.

ensure that the actual infrastructure, when built,
served as many constituencies as possible, and
also might moderate potential opposition from
groups who might view any large project as a
threat to the budgets of their relatively smaller
activities.
The groups canvassed included the various
NASA Centers, the National Research Council
(the Space Science Board and the Space Applications Board), the space industry, various potential foreign providers and users of space technology (the European Space Agency, Canada, and
Japan), and, in general, any groups that had
worked on previous “space station” studies. The
essential form of NASA’s questions to these various groups was: if there were a permanent and
permanently staffed “space station, ” what activities might it reasonably support, how would
these activities influence its design, and of what
value would those support activities be? Eight aerospace groups, placed under contract to NASA
in the fall of 1982, undertook parallel “mission
analysis studies”2 in order to determine a set of
activities for the first 10 years of the “space station’s” operation, the fundamental characteristics suitable for accomplishing these activities,
and the presumed value to be associated with
obtaining and using them. These contractor groups
soon formed similar judgments regarding the
amount of money that (NASA hoped) would be
made available, a desirable acquisition schedule,
and NASA’s preferences on such matters as the
employment of people in space and the use of
new v. already space-qualified technology. Also,
using standard industry cost estimating practices,
they suggested the likely acquisition costs of the
infrastructure elements to the Government,
The process by which users were canvassed
was essentially open-ended: no potential use that
either required or would materially benefit from
a “permanently manned space station” was rejected out of hand. Given NASA’s internal circumstances, this open-ended character was certainly unexceptionable: the more—and the more
varied—the identified uses, the more capable, sophisticated, and large the supporting infrastruc-

2

The resu Its of these studies are summarized in app. A.
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ture would have to be. The greater the resulting
capability and sophistication, the more engineers
would be required to design, develop, and produce it–and the greater its cost. Increased costs,
in turn, wouId imply more Government contracting—and understandably generate greater interest in and support for the program by the space
industry.
In general, the greater the number of potential users and potential suppliers, the greater the
influence that could be brought to bear on Government decision makers to approve any “space
station” program. In any event, essentially all important space industry groups were represented
in the eight aerospace groups of companies, and
the number of potential uses recommended for
inclusion totaled well over 100.
If there were any important potential uses left
out of account, either because the supporting
technology would be too costly or could not be
obtained in time, or because NASA judged their
discussion to be inappropriate for the time be-

ing, they could still be provided for later, not in
the initial operational capability (IOC) “station,”
but in the subsequent full capability “space station” program, which could continue to the end
of this century.
it is important to appreciate that the form in
which NASA put its original questions to the eight
aerospace groups largely determined the approach
taken to potential acquisition of a civilian “space
station.” And this approach, in turn, largely determined the result—a “Christmas-tree” proposal in
which there was something for all identifiable po-
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tential users, with little attempt either to weigh
the seriousness of their intentions to use the facility, or to gauge their willingness to see funds
that they would employ otherwise used instead
to develop it. A different, and perhaps more
appropriate question, wouId have been: in view
of the maturing capabilities and increasing numbers of the spacefaring nations of the world,3 what
elements of long-term, in-orbit infrastructure
would be appropriate to facilitate the considered
development of near-Earth space? This question
would not have required initial assumptions that
the facilities would be permanent and permanently manned, that the size of the eventual program would have to be geared to maintaining
NASA’s size and form, and that all possible users
should be accommodated.
But even with the large number of uses that
were identified, little doubt remains that the
kind of “space station” which NASA prefers
cannot now be fully justified on scientific, economic, or military grounds,4 or combinations
thereof. Rather, a decision to approve it will
rest, finally, on a political judgment that will reflect many intangible factors as well.
31deally, one should add: “ and in wew of the goals and objectives of our civilian space program. ” However, as argued
throughout thts report, there is no publicly accepted agenda of such
goals and objectives,
‘It must also be noted that, since the cancellation of the Manned
Orbiting Laboratory Program in 1968, the U.S. military has been
consistent in its public position that there is no military requirement for a “manned space station. ” This position IS still publicly
malntal ned and remains i n force, even in the context of the President’s call, in March 1983, for development of advanced ballistic
missile defense systems that could see large amounts of very sophisticated and costly military technology deployed in space.

NEED FOR GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
This entire panoply of relatively narrowly
focused and nearer term ends provide, in OTA’s
judgment, insufficient justification for a major,
new U.S. civilian space effort. Moreover, there
is general agreement neither on a set of longrange goals which the U.S. civilian space program
now is expected to achieve nor on a set of specific objectives which, as they are addressed,
would serve as milestones of progress toward
those goals. And without such a set of goals and
objectives the Nation cannot make a clear deter-

mination of the basic characteristics of the infrastructure elements actually needed, of their
acquisition schedule and cost, or of the means
whereby they should be acquired.
If future U.S. space-related goals and objectives
are to be effective in providing direction to future
U.S. space efforts, they should be such as to command widespread attention; have great inherent
humanitarian and scientific interest; foster the development of new technology; have relevance
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to global issues; prompt international cooperation; and involve major participation of our pri-

vate sector so as to advance our economic
prospects.

THE POLICY BACKGROUND
The overall end of U.S. space activities was first
stated as a preamble to the National Aeronautics
and Space (NAS) Act of 1958, as amended (sec.
102 (a)): “The congress hereby declares that it
is the policy of the United States that activities
in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes
for the benefit of all mankind.” Six policy principles, forming the core of the NAS Act, give substance to that overall end. These six have provided the framework in accordance with which
the civilian space program has evolved to the
present day. These principles may be stated as
follows:
●

●

●
●

●

●

that U.S. preeminence in space science, exploration and applications be maintained;
that economic, political, and social benefits
be derived;
that knowledge be increased;
that civilian and military activities be separated (though they are to be coordinated and
are not to duplicate one another unnecessarily);
that NASA, the civilian agency, be limited
largely to research; and
that international cooperation be fostered.

Thus, the NAS Act articulated the policy principles for overall guidance of the U.S. civilian
space program, but the act alone has not provided (and cannot be expected to provide) the
particular goals for civilian space activities. Lacking such guidance, the space program has instead
been directed by political and budgetary pressures not always relevant to a logically ordered
exploration, development, and use of space. At
the same time, none of the policymaking bodies
successively established in the executive branch
nor any of the committees of Congress have been
able to ensure that a long-range plan of particular policies and programs would be pursued. s

Over the years, a number of specific goals and
objectives have been proposed. Significantly,
however, none of them has arisen as a result of
widespread public discussion. With the maturity
of U.S. space capabilities (and the capabilities of
several other countries and our own private sector as well) on the one hand and the straitened
financial circumstances of the Government on
the other, this situation is in need of fundamental change. That is, if the United States is to maintain a strong commitment to a continuing civilian space program, then an informed national
agreement on the goals and objectives of such
a program is most important.
At the beginning of the Nixon Administration,
the Apollo program was rapidly coming to a successful close, but no clear definition of a postApollo space program had emerged. Early planning efforts had failed to yield a consensus, and
space program budgets had decreased dramatically, presenting the new administration with
growing unemployment in the aerospace industry as well as a major technological agency that
did not have clear signals regarding its future. In
order to address these problems, the Presidential Space Task Group (STG) was established
under the chairmanship of the Vice President.
The STG review was the first comprehensive interagency planning effort that was carried out
with respect to the civilian space program.
In its final report,6 the STG recommended commitment to a balanced publicly funded program
that included science, applications, and technology-development objectives, but no immediate
commitment to expeditions to the planets. They
suggested no change in the institutional structure
nor an operations role for NASA, but did emphasize the desirability of expanding international
cooperation. The major technological development that the STG suggested was the reusable

5

For a fu II discussion of these policy principles and their implications, see Civilian Space Policy and Applications, O T A - S T I - 1 7 7
(Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
June 1982).
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Task Group Report to the President, September 1969.
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space Shuttle system that couId support an eventual “space station. ” The clear priority was for
Shuttle development first, with a “space station”
as a potential future development. Support for
exploratory expeditions to the planets was retained as a long-range option for the Government’s civilian space program, with a “manned
Mars mission before the end of this century as
a first target. ”
In 1976, almost two decades after the adoption of the NAS Act, NASA issued its own “Outlook for Space” report. This document addressed
the cultural goal of better scientific understanding of the physical universe and the social/economic goal of further exploration and exploitation of the solar system, The report suggests four
goals reflective of basic human physical needs:
1. improving food production and distribution;
2. developing new energy sources;
3. meeting new challenges to the environment;
and
4. predicting and dealing with natural and manmade disasters.

In October 1978, President Carter released a
space policy statement that summarized the important aspects of an administration review of
space policy and provided guidance regarding
the President’s view of national objectives in the
publicly supported civilian space program over
the next several years. This statement reaffirmed
endorsement of a balanced space program and
committed the administration to the continued
development of the space Shuttle system and its
use during the coming decade. However, the
statement made no new program commitments
and specifically rejected any major new technological development. No goals were set to provide a focus for the program and the general philosophy was best characterized by the statement
that “activities will be pursued in space when it
appears that national objectives can most efficiently be met through space activities. ” Overall, the policy statement left many questions unanswered. It made several statements about what
the United States would not do in space, but remained very general regarding the nature of what
it would do. In addition, it became clear that fiscal
constraints were likely to continue, and, as a con-
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sequence, commitments to specific multiyear
Government programs would be made only with
great care. This announcement was received with
some dismay by the congressional leaders involved with the space program and by the aerospace community. This concern spawned a number of hearings and proposed legislative approaches
to a more vigorous space policy for the United
States, and led to the request for the OTA assessment of Civilian Space Policy and Applications.
Then on July 4, 1982, President Reagan announced the issuance of his National Space Policy Statement “. . . to provide a general direction
for our future [space] efforts . . .,” asserting that
//
. . . our goals for space are ambitious, yet
achievable. ” This statement “. . . establishes the
basic goals of United States policy which are to:
1. strengthen the security of the United States;
2. maintain U.S. space leadership;
3. obtain economic and scientific benefits
through the exploitation of space;
4. expand U.S. private sector investment and
involvement in civil space and space-related
activities;
5. promote international cooperative activities
in the national interest; and
6. cooperate with other nations in maintaining
the freedom of space for activities which en:
hance the security and welfare of man kind.”
On June 27, 1983, the Science Advisor to the
President “. . . challenged] the aerospace community to do some bold thinking about the future
[concerning space],” and went on to observe that
//
. . . the real issue is how we can fashion a space
program that addresses today’s national aspirations and needs . . . and . . . re-ignite[s] the spirit
of adventure that captured America in the past
. . . . “ He questioned “. . . why don’t we let the
American people share the grand vision of the
future of space?”
But the articulated goals, particularly in the absence of specific objectives designed to address
them, fall well short of what the United States,
today, might expect of its publicly supported civilian space activities.
They do not speak at all of such fundamental
matters as having human beings in space; of hav-
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ing the general public directly involved in spacerelated matters; or of ameliorating the great inhibition that the present cost of space assets and
activities has on the development and use of
space. And there is little in these words to suggest the imaginative, the exciting, the challenging
or the adventurous or, to use the Science Advisor’s word: the “bold. ”
Finally, behind all of this there are the growing

accomplishments,

competence,

and

inde-

pendence of the Western European countries and
Canada, Japan, Brazil, the People’s Republic of
China, india, and others, as well as the large and
constantly expanding U.S.S.R, space program
that, in its nonmilitary aspects, commands the attention and respect of our civilian space Ieaders. 7
7See Salyut—Soviet Steps Toward Permanent Human Presence
Technical Memorandum, OTA-TM-STI-14 (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, December 1983).
in Space—A

TODAY’S TOO NARROW DEBATE
As the important matter of defining and articulating such national goals and objectives is addressed, it should not be taken as implied here
that such definition and articulation are not now
going on. What should be understood is that, for
all practical purposes (including that of obtaining any civilian “space station”), this activity is
being conducted by space-related scientists, engineers, and program managers—almost all within
the Government, within university offices supported by the Government, or within the Government-supported aerospace industry, At best,
then, the goals and objectives that would be expected to result from this kind of consideration
might, understandably, represent viewpoints that
are narrow relative to the wide spectrum of our
national interests and opportunities in the civilian space area today. It is likely that an expression of goals, and especially specific objectives,
arrived at in this fashion will reflect, perhaps unduly, the interests of their originators. And finally,
the U.S. political system oftentimes places as

much weight on the process by which a national
decision is reached as on the substance of this
decision; therefore, the better course for the Government in the longer run is to encourage as
many of our citizens who are interested in space
to participate in the pre-decision debate.
It was quite appropriate that, for most of the
past quarter of a century, our national space goals
and objectives primarily reflected those of the science and technology communities alone. These
communities have done their work well. Consequently, our space activities now can, and should,
be broadened to reflect both the maturity of our
space knowledge and skills, and the general public’s broader interests and concerns.
The matter of describing a new and clarified
set of long-term civilian space goals, and laying
out specific civilian space activity objectives, is
made more urgent by the recent increase of military interest in space—an increase that may well
soon accelerate.

RECENT PROPOSALS
Recently, there have been a number of calls
to formulate a set of broadly based, contemporary national goals and objectives in the civilian
space area.
For instance, Simon Ramo observes in his new
book What’s Wrong With Our Technological Society and How to Fix /t (pp. 175-1 76):
After twenty-five years it is still true of the entire commercial use of space in the united States

that the government and the private sector have
not yet worked out their best permanent roles.
Less forgivable is something else. With space so
clearly an arena of powerful economic and [na-

tional] security interest for the nation, we have
been approaching plans and policies about
space for well over a decade on an intermittent,
t-top-and-jump short-range political basis. NASA
has many hopes and plans, of course, but the
nation does not have a plan for the next two decades. A real plan would describe both goals and
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stantial return on past and current investments
in space through clear . . . benefits to the society
on earth in the form of greatly expanded services and direct contributions to solution of earthbound problems. ”9

anticipated budgets. It would have recognition,
acceptance, and stature with all the power centers influencing advances and applications in
space, namely, the government’s Executive
Branch, Congress, industry, and the scientific
and technological fraternity. A real plan would
be one to which all these forces were committed
long-term, in the same way that at the start of
the 1960s we were committed to landing a man
on the moon before the end of the decade. . . .
[And while] the possibilities of space warfare
[and] economic constraints [must be considered]
none of these factors should prevent the United
States from having sound long-range space goals
as a guide to the government’s budgeting process. . . . Less-than-adequate attention has been
given to setting priorities and long-range goals
and allocating missions to each sector.
in a recent report prepared by the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications and transmitted to the Committee on Science and Technology of the U.S. House of Representatives,
Representative Ronnie Flippo, then Chairman of
the Subcommittee, stated that: “. . . there is a
lack of long-range goals for our space program.”
The report noted that 7 years earlier it had also
addressed “Future Space Programs” and then
emphasized that NASA should “. . . focus on an
over-arching concept [that] should represent one
or more mind-expanding endeavors which challenge the imagination and capability of the country [the] key element of [which] should be sub8

~Future Space Programs: 1981, Subcommittee on Space Science
and Applications, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S.
House of Representatives, May 1982, p. 1.

The “NASA Advisory Council Study of the Mission of NASA” (released on Oct. 12, 1983) suggests activities that, in some cases, could be considered goals or objectives: explore the solar
system, pursue scientific research in space, exploit space for public and commercial purposes,
and expand human presence in space. And
NASA awarded a near $1 million contract to a
private organization (Ecosystems) to provide it
with suggestions on “. . . long-term research
goals and the technology it should work on to
meet those goals. ”
The President’s Private-Sector Survey on Cost
Control, in commenting on the “. . . Federal
expenditure on R&D [of] about $48 billion a year
. . . faults the major science agencies for failing
to have clearly defined goals and plans for meeting them. ”10 And an editorial in the Christian
Science Monitor pointedly observes that “. . . it
is most important that the U.S. develop a consensus on manned-space-flight goals. None now
exists . . . Until consensus exists no specific space
station concept can be usefully approved.’” 11

9

1 bid., p. 3.
l~sclence, No. 222, NO V. 2 5 , 1983, p. 903.
I I The Chrjgjan Science Monitor, Dec. 12, 1983, p. 23.

PRESIDENT REAGAN’S CALL FOR A “SPACE STATION”
In 1984, the future of the Nation’s activities in
space was placed squarely on the congressional
agenda. In his State of the Union Address, President Reagan spoke at considerable length about
the space area and what he judges should be the
Nation’s aspirations in regard to it. And he devoted his radio address during the same week to
space. He directed NASA to commence the development of permanent, low-Earth-orbit infrastructure that would support human beings in
space, and to obtain it within the next decade.
And he asked Congress to authorize and appro-

priate Federal funds to begin studies of this proposed infrastructure.

Of particular relevance here is the president’s
assertion that: “[one of] our great goal[s] is to build
on America’s pioneer spirit and develop our next
frontier . . . : space.”; “America has always been
greatest when we dared to be great. . . . We can
follow our dreams to distant stars.” And in developing the infrastructure (i. e., a civilian “space station”) he called for international participation so
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as to: “. . . expand freedom for all who share our
goals. ”
In his radio talk, he spoke to the: “. . . challenge
[of] reaching for exciting goals in space , . . ,“ while
explaining that, as well, “Our space goals will chart
a path of progress toward creating a better life for
all people” [and he emphasized that]: “a , . . space
station [should be seen as] a stepping stone for [ad-

In effect, the President’s speeches have now
prompted, and indeed his specific request for Federal law and funds for a major new initiative in the
publicly funded civilian space program essentially
requires, the conduct of a national debate over the
next year or two regarding our national interests,
goals and objectives in the civilian space area.

dressing] further goals.” Emphasis added.

STEPS TOWARD BROADER PARTICIPATION
Interestingly enough, the circumstances discussed above have resulted in only one important change to the basic 1958 Act—the explicit
emphasis on space commercialization that was
added this summer. Indeed, it was only in the
fall of 1983 that Congress began to hold hearings
that might lay a basis for such changes. Scores
of billions of public dollars have been appropriated to pay for our public civilian space program
since we reached the Moon, and almost surely
scores of billions more will be appropriated during the next few decades, but, to date, without
the kind of thoughtful and fundamental reappraisal of our contemporary national interests and
activities in space that many are coming to believe
the issues now demand. Our publicly supported
civiIian space area has seemed to suffer from a
form of benign neglect.
However, the debate is quickening. Congress
has taken an extraordinary step regarding the articulation of national goals and objectives in the
civilian space area. In passing the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1985, Congress, among
other things, found and declared that “. . . the
identification of long-range goals and policy options for the United States civilian space program
through a high-level, representational public
forum will assist the President and the Congress
in formulating future policies for the . . . program . . . “; and they called for the establishment

of a “National Commission on Space” that will
assist the United States “ . . . to define the longrange needs of the Nation that may be fulfilled
through the peaceful uses of outer space “12
With the President’s signature to Public Law 98361, there has been put into motion the first formal and fundamental reexamination of the Nation’s civilian space aspirations, objectives and
institutions since the passage of the NAS Act in
1958.
From the outset of this assessment, the need
for identifying a far-sighted set of generally acceptable civilian space goals and objectives that reflect today’s circumstances has been apparent.
Most notably, the assessment’s Advisory Panel
has strongly urged that an initial set of such goals
and objectives be identified and proposed for
broad study and discussion so as to lay a more
rational basis for the consideration of any large
and costly space civilian “space station. ”
In response to that call, and with the intention
of providing a sound and useful starting point for
a national debate on the scope and direction of
the Nation’s space activities, the next chapter of
this report provides an ensemble of interrelated
goals and objectives for consideration by Congress and the American public.
IZpubllc Law 98-36I, Title Ii.
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Chapter 6

TOWARD A GOAL-ORIENTED
CIVILIAN SPACE PROGRAM
POSSIBLE CIVILIAN SPACE GOALS
If the civilian space activities of the United
States are to maintain widespread and enthusiastic public support, they should aspire to protect, ease, challenge, and/or improve the human
condition. Such aspirations can and should be
articulated in the form of long-range goals that
would guide the conduct of the Nation’s space
activities in general and a decision regarding possible acquisition of any “space station” in particular.
In order to prompt the formulation and subsequent discussion of future space goals and objectives, OTA has prepared a list of possible longrange goals and a set of nearer term objectives
designed to address those goals. Although OTA
does not recommend either this particular set of
goals or its supporting family of objectives, they
are intended to exemplify the kind of goals and
objectives around which consensus might well
be formed so as to provide sensible guidance for
the Nation’s future space activities. The Advisory
Panel for this assessment has taken an unusually
active role in helping to formulate these goals and
objectives. It is the Panel’s judgment that the
goals and objectives proposed for discussion are
reasonable and important.
The set of possible goals follows. (They should
be read with reference to the six basic principles
spoken to in the 1958 Space Act and discussed
in the previous chapter. ) Some of these can be
defined in fairly specific terms, but others–no less

significant—can be stated only in a more general
and open-ended way:
●

●

●

●

Ž

●

to increase the efficiency of space activities
and reduce their net cost to the general
public;
to involve the general public directly in space
activities, both on Earth and in space;
to derive scientific, economic, social, and
political benefits;
to increase international cooperation and
collaboration in and re space;
to study and to explore the Earth, the solar
system, and the greater physical universe;
and
to spread life, in a responsible fashion,
throughout the solar system. ’

These goals (some new, some already wellaccepted) have been chosen so as to move U.S.
space interests and activities closer to the mainstream of public interest and concern, while at
the same time maintaining space leadership,
enhancing national security, and developing new
capabilities to respond to finding the unexpected
in the cosmos.

I Undertaking this goal responsibly would entail preserving the
pristine environments of other worlds for future study and appreciation. For example, there are bodies such as Europa and Titan, which
have not yet been explored, where life may already exist. And there
remains some residual controversy even about the possibility of
microbes on Mars.

POSSIBLE CIVILIAN SPACE OBJECTIVES
In order to illustrate how the six basic civilian
space goals suggested in the previous section
could be addressed, this section identifies 10 specific objectives that the United States (in coop-

eration with other countries, in most cases) could
attain within the second quarter-century of the
space age. The particular objectives suggested
here for further study and discussion are chosen
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to have a great impact and, taken as a group, to
respond to a broad spectrum of public, private,
professional, and international interests.
Of course, discussion of any of these conceptual objectives should actually be undertaken
only with surface-based alternative and complementary activities clearly in mind. Some elements
of a few are already under way in a modest fashion, but not in the sharply focused fashion suggested here. Some may turn out not to be feasible for technological, economic, or other reasons,
Some could be attained in a very short time, but
others will take many years. Some respond to objective needs, some respond to conceptual opportunities. Broad consensus on some should be
rather easily reached, but others can be expected
to provoke serious argument and perhaps even
disagreement. They range in cost from near-zero
to tens of billions of dollars. Some are chosen particularly because, in addition to the importance
of their being achieved, they also invite the active and important partnership of other countries
and the U.S. private sector.
These objectives are proposed under the assumption that the U.S. Government would still be
expected to carry on, as today, a “core” spacerelated basic research program at the level of at
least $1 billion annually (in constant dollars). Pure
scientific research should continue to encompass
such diverse space-related areas as astronomy,
cosmology, life sciences, materials sciences, geodesy, magnetism, relativity, plasma physics, meteorology, atmospheric composition and dynamics, and programs of preparing for human Iunar,
asteroid, and planetary exploration and settlement. The basic research program would be expected to continue solar system exploration generally, including the planets, their moons, the
Sun, comets and asteroids, and to improve the
methods and means of transporting equipment
and people in space. And it would be expected
to develop, deploy, and use those “cutting edge”
space technologies—large and sophisticated telescopes and interferometers that span the electromagnetic spectrum, microgravity furnaces, sophisticated and powerful Earth-oriented remote
sensors, sophisticated space probes, etc.—that are
required to make early and fundamental advances
in these fields in a highly productive fashion.

The results of these basic research activities, of
course, will be many and varied. In both the
shorter and longer term they can have important
public policy implications and, in general, they
can eventually influence the cultural, economic,
and national security interests of the country in
many, and oftentimes unexpected, ways. As the
roles and capabilities expected of our in-space
infrastructure for the next two or three decades
are considered, basic research activities should
receive a high priority. 2 Continuing success in
fundamental space research may be expected to
facilitate the accomplishment of the objectives
proposed here.
The titles of the 10 civilian space objectives follow. They are not rank-ordered:
1. Global Disaster Avoidance and Minimization.
2. Human Presence and Activities on the
Moon.
3. Exploration of Mars and Some Asteroids.
4. Medical Research of Direct Interest to the
General Public.
5. People, Drawn From the General Public,
in Space.
6. Modernizing and Expanding International
Short-Wave Broadcasting.
7. Providing Space Data Directly to the General Public.
8. Using Space and Space Technology for the
Transmission of Electrical Energy.
90 Reducing the Cost of Space Operations, Especially Transportation.
10. lncreasing Commercial-Industrial Space
Sales.
The eventual acceptance of any or all of these
objectives (along with their related costs) as actual national objectives would leave the priority
among them, and the rate of public expenditure
in addressing them, completely open. Each and
all would be undertaken, if at all, only as the
funds become available to do so.
Table 9 relates these 10 specific objectives to
the broader goals.
A brief elaboration of each of the 10 follows.
‘See the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (Public Law
98-361 ).
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Table 9.—Possible Goals and Objectives
Goals
Increase
space activities’
efficiency;
reduce their
net cost
Objectives:
1.- Establish a global information system/
service re natural hazards
2. Establish lower cost reusable
transportation service to the Moon and
establish human presence there
3. Use space probes to obtain information
re Mars and some asteroids prior to
early human exploration
4. Conduct medical research of direct
interest to the general public
5. Bring at least hundreds of the general
public per year into space for short
visits
6. Establish a global, direct, audio broadcasting, common-user system/service
7. Make essentially all data generated by
civilian satellites and spacecraft
directly available to the general public
8. Exploit radio/optical free space
electromagnetic propagation for longdistance energy distribution
9. Reduce the unit cost of space transportation and space activitiesa
10. Increase space-related private sector
sale#
aThls ~~u~d advance the

proSpeC&

Derive
economic
benefits

Derive
scientific,
political,
and social
benefits

Increase
international
cooperation

Study and
explore the
physical
universe

Bring life
to the
physical
universe

N

P

Y

Y

N

N

Y

P

P
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Y

Y

Y
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Y
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P
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N

Y

N

Y

N

N

N

N

Involve the
general
public
directly

N

of successfully addressing all other ‘Qoals.”

Y: Yes; N: No; P: Perhaps; depends on how carded out.

1. Global Disaster Avoidance and Minimization.—ln cooperation with the other countries of
the world, our Government and our scientific and
enginering communities could be set to the task
of beginning to provide a global, space-related,
Earth-monitoring system/service which would
provide fundamental information to the world’s
political leaders, organizations, and institutions
to assist them in dealing, satisfactorily, with
macroscopic “life-and-death” problems in such
areas as weather, climate, air and water purity,
food production, seismology, and resource conservation. It would be designed to complement
related surface-based system/services, taking specific advantage of the in-situ measurement and
monitoring perspectives that only appropriate
sensors located in space could offer. Attention
could be concentrated on earthquakes, tsunamis,
ozonosphere perturbations, severe storms, environmental pollution, the carbon dioxide “greenhouse” effect, volcanic effluvia, etc. Well before
the year 2000 this operational global system/service could be in place, monitoring and studying

the Earth’s space and atmosphere, and surface
and subsurface, for characteristics and changes
relevant to such problems, and supplying both
immediate and longer term “warning” information promptly, directly, and in a form useful
to nontechnicians.
These are problems that have inherent multinational elements of potentially grave hazard. And
this type of space-related system/service could be
developed, installed, and used in such a fashion
as to obviate the serious concerns raised by some
countries over what they consider to be undue
surveillance of a military-political nature, or the
kind of monitoring that could provide an undue
economic advantage to some countries. The
original elements of this system/service could be
continually improved on as new scientific knowledge is obtained, new space-related measurement techniques are perfected, and experience
is gained in the reliability, utility, and cost of
space-related services in comparison with analogous services that could be provided at the sur-

—
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face. It could, of course, draw heavily on any
“global habitability” scientific studies. And it
could provide information that would be usefuI
in furthering study of “nuclear winter. ”
2. Human Presence and Activities on the Moon.
–Our Government and our scientific and engineering communities in government, universities,
and the private sector, could be given the task
of establishing a modest, permanent, habitable
facility on our Earth’s Moon. Such a facility would
allow physical, chemical, geological, and cosmological studies to begin there in earnest–with the
entire activity involving as many countries as possible. The U.S. private sector in concert with the
Government could also be challenged to provide
facilities and services there that would open up
the Moon to travel, recreation, sports and other
cultural, commercial, and industrial pursuits.
Three important elements of this program could
be: 1 ) the development of a relatively low-cost,
human transportation system/service between
low-Earth-orbit and the Moon [see objective (9)];
2) consideration of producing oxygen on the
Moon from lunar materials as a source of rocket
oxidant for return trips and for life support (i. e.,
using solar energy to release oxygen from Moon
rocks); and 3) a search for abundant supplies of
water/ice in the cold-traps at the lunar poles.
A primary cost-driver for human settlement on
the Moon, and other celestial objects, will be the
reliability and efficiency of the technology which
would enable such settlements to provide livable
atmospheres, grow their own food, and build effective and durable habitats using local materials.
3. Obtaining Information Required for Eventual
Human Exploration of Mars and Some Asteroids.
—The Soviet Union has stated that it expects to
explore, and have some of its people establish
a presence on, the planet Mars. The United States
could also aspire to do so when the technology
is in hand to allow it to be done at relatively low
cost, when adequate Mars-related data and information are also in hand, and when our experience in settling on the Moon gives us the confidence that we can do so successfully and efficiently [see objective (2)]. Early programs to develop and use lower cost transportation, housing, and people-related services in establishing
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low-Earth-orbit and lunar residential and work
places could all keep analogous Mars objectives
specifically in mind. Over the next 10 to 20 years,
crewless space probes, with characteristics specifically reflective of our intention to have some
of our men and women visit the surface of Mars
early in the next century, could be sent there.
Specific plans could see a human exploration program commence on the satisfactory completion
of our initial settlement on the Moon, provided
the cost of doing so is then seen to be acceptable.
Of course, the space probes could, as well,
search for information of importance to a better
understanding of our own terrestrial circumstances and processes. And consideration could
be given to exploring a few of the asteroids as
wel I.
4. Medical Research of Direct Interest to the
General Public.– For over 20 years, the space programs of both the United States and the Soviet
Union have been concerned with the ability of
men and women to survive and function well in
space. Space provides a special environment,
marked particularly by the near absence of gravity, within which several diseases and related
human physiological processes might now begin
to be profitably investigated. Important topics
relevant not only to future space dwellers, but
also to the Earth population as well, could include
research on hypertension, osteoporosis (a disorder involving loss of bone mass highly prevalent
in older women), osteoarthritis (which affects
over 16 million Americans), weight control, energy metabolism, digestive function, and body
fluid balance.
To elaborate on one such opportunity: experimental evidence, gathered from both animals
and humans in space and in certain Earth-based
simulations of some of the conditions of space
flight, suggests that there may bean analogy between some of the physiological changes that occur in the absence of gravity and those changes
which take place during the normal aging process. For example, as cosmonauts and astronauts
adapt to longer duration living in essentiaJJy
weightless conditions in space, they experience
atrophied muscles, brittle bones, and decreased
cardiovascular and respiratory capacity, i.e.,

118 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

physiological conditions similar to those which
accompany senescence. Further experimental
studies in research programs carried on at the
Earth’s surface and on the Shuttle-Spacelab may
confirm that, inasmuch as the human aging process evolved under conditions of constant gravity here on Earth, removal of this force over long
periods of time in space results in changes in the
aging process and its rate—changes that could be
studied in weightlessness with an explicit intention of relating any findings to the general population. Given the importance of scientific studies
of aging to all of the world’s people as individuals,
and the effects of an aging population on many
economic, social, and political institutions, if surface and Shuttle-Spacelab “space station” studies
are encouraging, the United States could inaugurate a major international research program
in the fields of gerontology and geriatrics that
would encompass related experimentation both
in space and on the Earth’s surface.
5. People, Drawn From the General public, in
Space.—The Government is now moving to expand human use of the Shuttle to include a very
few nontechnician “communicators” per year on
Earth-space flights. Within the next decade, we
could have space “Lodge/Habitats” established
in low-Earth-orbit, with the Shuttle being used to
see hundreds of persons per year, the great majority of whom would be representative of various
professional and cultural sectors and the general
public (i.e., nonastronauts and nonspace technician workers) drawn from the United States and
rest of the entire world’s population, being transported there to spend a short time in space. The
entire activity could be operated as a sound,
albeit innovative, commercial enterprise carried
on in cooperation with the U.S. Government;
there should be little or no net out-of-pocket cost
to the Government as a consequence of this cooperation. The enterprise could be conducted so
as not to favor the rich—all of our citizens should
have some opportunity to visit there. And such
“Lodge/Habitats,” and the activities that they,
and the Shuttle, could allow to commence in
space, could be used to help the world celebrate
the next “Millennium” in an extraordinary fashion.
Only when a large number of our citizens, representative of a broad cross-section of our society,

begin to experience the “space adventure” directly, will the space domain and space activities gradually begin to move into the mainstream
of our national interests and concerns.
~his objective and objective (7) have in common the aim of making the space domain, and
space science and technology, much more accessible to the general public.]
6. Modernizing and Expanding International
Short-Wave Broadcasting.–Hundreds of millions
of people, world-wide, regularly listen to speech
and music programs broadcast via shortwave by
more than 100 countries. Because of the inherent
characteristics of the ionosphere which influence
the way by which the broadcast signals are propagated, this service is limited at best and oftentimes is of poor quality, reliability, and coverage.
Also, shortwave broadcasting has become a matter of growing international political contention
because of its dominance by the major countries
and the growing interference to reception caused
by increasing use of the sharply limited useful
radio-wave spectrum by very powerful surface
transmitters. A cooperative U.S. Governmentprivate sector initiative could lead an international
effort to establish a global system, employing sophisticated and powerful direct broadcast satellites, that could replace most of today’s individual country shortwave stations well within a
decade. Developed as an international commonuser system, use of its services could allow broadcasters throughout the world, regardless of their
size, location, or political persuasion, to reach
audiences in other countries clearly and reliably,
and at relatively modest cost. Such a service
could go far toward meeting a standard of nationto-nation broadcasting equitability simply not
physically possible under today’s surface-based
shortwave broadcasting circumstances. Briefly,
it would be a more efficient, effective, and fair
way of accomplishing the kind of shortwave
broadcasting now done from the Earth’s surface.
And, as well, the prospect of wholly new kinds
of international programming and international
marketing services could be opened.
7. Providing Space Data Directly to the General
Public.—’’The wholesale introduction of computers into [the home and especially] into class-
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rooms since 1980 amounts to a quiet revolution
that will help meet the demands of scientific and
technological change as well as economic computation in world markets.” Nearly 80 percent
of our junior and senior high schools now have
computers and it is expected that the number in
our public schools will reach 600,000 by next
year. A computer network now interconnects 200
university sites, and the number of terminals is
expected to reach 150,000 soon.
3

A high school teacher in the United Kingdom
has attained international attention by having his
students ‘‘tune in” to signals from Soviet spacecraft and deduce information about the crafts’
characteristics and activities. The cultural, social,
and economic implications of having a large and
growing segment of our population using increasingly sophisticated computers in their homes,
businesses, grade and high schools, universities,
etc., promise to be enormous. Many of these individuals and organizations could now be supplied, in near-real-time and at modest cost, with
the nonclassified and nonproprietary data generated by payloads of public satellites and spacecraft generally, by designing them to allow direct
readout of the space signals transmitted from
them and/or by providing the data promptly and
generally from central collection points. For instance, a recent Shuttle/Spacelab flight resulted
in the generation of 20 million video frames, 900
frames of film, and 2 trillion bits of data. Hundreds of thousands of people have already taken
the opportunity simply to listen in, passively, to
surface-space voice communications—and made
modest payments to do so. Making data available
on the atmosphere, surface and subsurface characteristics of the bodies in our solar system, including the planet Earth, and spacecraft operating data as well—all directly, while they were
being generated–could allow and prompt a
much greater direct public involvement, both
here and abroad, in the publicly supported U.S.
civilian space program. As well, it could increase,
by orders of magnitude, today’s study and appreciation of these space data, spacecraft technology, and space activities generally, especially
by our younger people. In time, the market could
well prompt the creation of “service-added” or‘Christian Science Monitor,
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ganizations that could prepare various educational packages with a wide variety of users in mind:
students of various ages and interests and many
of the general public with home TV receivers,
video recorders, and computers.
8. Using Space and Space Technology for the
Transmission of Electrical Energy. -In effect, any
radio communication involves the transmission
of energy through the Earth’s atmosphere and/or
space—albeit at miniscule power levels. A few
years ago, tens of thousands of watts of continuous microwave power were transmitted in free
space with very high efficiency and reliability, and
multi hundred million dollars per year Defense
programs are now anticipated that would see at
least 10 megawatts transmitted through the atmosphere and/or space via collimated and directed
microwave and optical electromagnetic beams.
Use of such methods and means might allow
electricity to be distributed usefully across space.
Energy sources could be located in geostationary
orbit and/or on the lunar surface and the energy
transmitted to the Earth’s surface. Or energy
could be supplied from the Earth’s surface, as
needed, to geosynchronous orbit and to a million miles or more beyond, at any desired power
level. Given that the cost of electricity is very
much higher in orbit (where it is provided by solar
cell/battery combinations) than at the Earth’s surface, the latter might be able to be done competitively at an earlier date.
The ready availability of such electrical energy
in space could allow a complete rethinking of the
design and use of space assets and activities in
such space-related areas as communications, navigation, position-fixing, remote sensing, and even
transportation. This is because systems designers
could anticipate having tens of megawatts (or
more) of electrical power available in space,
whereas they now have only kilowatts and still
only tens of kilowatts by the middle of the next
decade, and system operators would have to pay
only for the amounts of power that the systems
would actually consume, just as at the surface.
In addition, many areas of the world have enormous renewable energy potentials (especially
hydro, but solar as well when the conversion
process becomes economically attractive), but
they are located too far from other areas which

120 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

need such energy. A reliable, cost-competitive
and efficient solution to the very long-distance
(several thousands of miles, and intercontinental)
transmission problem could allow surface-generated (N. B., in this case not in-space generated,
as in the Solar Power Satellite concept) electricity to be distributed via space. Most importantly,
electricity generated by renewable sources could
be treated as an exportable commodity, and international and intercontinental distribution and
load-shedding could become a global possibility—to great economic, social, and political advantage.
And, of course, when such technology is reliably and economically in hand, it could be used
to supply electrical “fuel” to spacecraft on voyages to and from the Moon, and farther.
9. Reducing the Cost of Space Transportation.
—Whatever other measures are used to characterize civilian space activities, that of the enormous cost of in-orbit assets and activities is certain to be listed. The primary “cost-driver” is that
of space transportation for people and physical
assets. For the predictable future, it will cost well
over $1 ,000/lb (1984$) to place human and equipment payloads into 200-mile high-Earth orbit, in
an era when, near the Earth’s surface, they can
be transported by aircraft over 10 times the distance at one-thousandth of this cost. Such a great
cost differential continues to be one of the greatest inhibitions, perhaps the greatest inhibition, to
our investment in, and use of, our Earth’s space.
We could now begin to look well beyond the
Shuttle, and the specific technologies, fuels,
payloads, and operations basic to its design and
use. We could mount large-scale, advanced technology development programs that would address promising methods and means of providing reliable space transportation at much lower
unit cost, giving full consideration to the future
circumstance of the much greater space traffic
volumes that such lower costs could engender.
An initial objective could be to reduce the cost
per pound for transport between the Earth’s surface and low-Earth-orbit by an order of magnitude.

10. Increasing Commercial-industrial Space
Sales.–The United States has spent well over
$200 billion (1984$-adjusted) to learn how to enter space, to survive and function in it, and to
use it. In doing so, the Nation has accrued an
enormous reserve of space knowledge, assets,
and experience, and created a sophisticated
high-technology space industry administered and
managed by Government and non-Government
professionals in essential harmony with many
other professionals in our university community.
With one important exception, the entire civilian space effort has continued to be supported
from the public purse. The time has now been
reached when our private sector—commercialindustrial-financial—could begin to assume an increasing responsibility for the conduct of our civilian space activities. The one exception, the private satellite communications business, has already
reached sales of some $2 billion per year and
continues to grow at an average 15 percent per
year rate, compounded. Government organizations, policies, activities, and leadership could
now be structured not only to see that the growth
in this one economically successful space field
is maintained, but that other space fields (navigation, position-fixing, tourism, remote sensing, and
materials processing) are likewise explicitly encouraged to grow and prosper. The President has
announced a space strategy “to encourage American industry to move quickly and decisively intc
space. Obstacles to private sector space activities will be removed, and we’ll take appropriate
steps to spur private enterprise in space, ” And
the Space Act has now been changed so as to
require NASA to “seek and encourage . . . the
fullest commercial use of space.” New businesses, increased employment, increased sales
here and abroad, the introduction of new and
useful public and private services, and larger Federal, State, and local tax revenues all lie in prospect, once the present private sector learns how
to moderate its dependence on the Government’s largess and its slow-paced, structured way
of doing business, and new private, competitive,
entrepreneurial activities are formed and grow.
One of the most important civilian space objec-
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tives now could be that of seeing that procurement of more and more of our space assets, and
the conduct of more and more of our space activities, become commercialized, so that: 1 ) the net
burden of space activities on the public purse is
sharply reduced, and 2) the Government can apply
its resources to the achievement of objectives that
either are not appropriate to the private sector
or lie beyond its capabilities.
As these economic benefits grow, they could
be looked at as offsetting, at least to some extent,
the cost of our publicly supported space program.
Social benefits also must be kept in mind, since
a fundamental purpose of government is that of
meeting important public needs that the private
sector inherently cannot.
Of course, a number of other objectives could
also be entertained. These could include: increased emphasis on a solar system exploration
program, augmenting the expected wide-ranging
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core solar system exploration program mentioned
earlier; a global person-to-person satellite communications system/service; an in-space “sophisticated-machine” experimental and demonstration program; etc. It is clear that when truly
imaginative minds become impressed with the
broad dimensions of the space domain–not only
its physical magnitude and character but the opportunity for innovative uses–there is little apparent limit to the number and kinds of concepts
for exploring and using it for earthly benefit.
Underlying a decision to pursue any or all of
these objectives would be a concern for the basic
welfare of our own and indeed all of the world’s
people; a challenge to international cooperation
in large, exciting, and peaceful activities; a challenge to the basic innovativeness and cost consciousness of our private sector; a commitment
to the permanent human investiture and considered development of both our Earth’s space and
our Moon; and a general sense of “spirit-lifting.”

122

●

Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

After careful study, and the weighing of costs and
alternatives, it seems reasonable to observe that
any decision to pursue them could be taken as

reflective of enlightened U.S. leadership in the
thoughtful, bold, imaginative, and purposeful development and use of space.

INDICATED INFRASTRUCTURE
Some of these objectives, if they are to be
achieved, would require certain elements of inspace infrastructure; others, depending on how
they would be carried out, may or may not require such elements; still others would require
none. The manner in which the United States obtains any of this infrastructure should reflect, to
the maximum, our already great investment in
space technology and operations; whenever reasonably possible, it should be obtained at the
lowest capital, and operations and maintenance,
cost to the public purse. It would embrace the
views of NASA’s chief scientist: “[n assembling
the necessary hardware, the watchword is ‘inheritance’ . . . projects and spacecraft are to
make maximum use of what has been done be-

fore . . . and use much common or hand-medown technology, as much as possible rather
than build custom hardware. . . .“4
If the Government’s large capital costs for development and production are to be minimized
and the private sector strengthened, then serious
consideration should be given to encouraging the
private sector to provide infrastructure elements,
through sales, long-term leases, or on the basis
of charges for actual service use, that meet Government performance specifications.

4
Dr. Frank McDonald, quoted in
Dec. 28, 1983, p. 14.

Christian

Monitor,
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Obtaining space infrastructure in this fashion
is not only a reasonable and effective use of U.S.
space assets, but it could reduce the difficulty of
obtaining public funds for the scientists, engineers, managers, and equipment needed to pursue more, and more important, space ends.
The main elements of longer term space infrastructure called for in pursuing the 10 objectives
are:5
●

an LEO capability to assemble and check out
the large and sophisticated satellites and
space structures needed to provide both the
hazard-prevention and the direct audio
broadcast global system/service [objectives
(1) and (6)];

JNo additional space infrastructure elements are needed to
achieve objective (7).

●
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●

an LEO human residential and working
space to be used for medical research [objective (4)];

●

a transport staging facility to support efficient
travel to geostationary orbit, the Moon, and
beyond, using reusable orbital transfer vehicles or other vehicles. This would address

●

objectives (1), (2), (3), (6), (9), and possibly
(8); and
a storage facility in LEO would allow use of
full Shuttle loads, helping objective (9), and
staffed LEO laboratory facilities could promote objective (1 O).

Of course, if such infrastructure elements were
available for the specific purposes that justify their
acquisition, they could be used for additional purposes also.
Note that, in essence, provision of the infrastructure needed to pursue two of the larger scale
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objectives [(2) and (4)] could accommodate most
of the needs of all of the other eight. In what follows, therefore, the cost of this infrastructure is
included under these two objectives.
And note that no Government development of
free-flying platform infrastructure elements is
called for; they (e.g., MESA, SPAS, LEASECRAFT,
EURECA, and the Space Industries platform)
could and probably would be designed, developed and installed by our private sector, and/or
other countries, and offered to the civilian space
community—both Government and private interests—under appropriate sale or lease arrange-

ments, where they could be used for the conduct
of scientific research or the production of various
materials under microgravity conditions.
Finally, note that large amounts of very costly
electrical power (with initial capital costs as high
as $10,000 per watt) are not called for in LEO;
some 20 kilowatts would appear to be sufficient.
Larger amounts appear to be needed only for any
eventual commercial-industrial materials processing, and could then be provided and financed
by the private sector in anticipation that such
processing will prove to be profitable.

COST AND SCHEDULE
Attaining all of these 10 suggested conceptual
objectives would cost money—overall, a great
deal of money. In table 10, rough estimates are
made for the cost of each of them, and the length
of time over which each would be pursued. in
all cases the cost estimates are rounded off to one
figure. And, again, the maximum use of: 1) already developed and paid-for space technology,
2) the most truly competitive procurement methods, and 3) the most modern and least burdensome acquisition strategies and procedures, are
all fundamental assumptions.
OTA’s first rough estimate of the total cost of
attaining all 10 of the objectives is some $40 billion (1 984$) over the next 25 years. But, seemingly in the nature of things, long-term high
technology development programs such as these
invariably encounter unforeseen difficulties and
experience the pressure of unexpected external
events. Indeed, the total cost should be understood to be no less than $40 billion (1 984$), and
perhaps considerably more–as much as, say, $60
billion (1984$ ).6 Given the early period at which
these estimates are made, there cannot be great
b“ln recent decades the average overrun on major programs, in
constant dollars and constant quantities, has been slightly over 50
percent. The average schedule milestone has been missed by a third
of the time initially projected. The average time to develop new
systems has, until recently been increasing at the rate of three
months per year . , each year. ” Norman R. Augustine, “The
Aerospace Professional . . . and High-Tech Management, ” Aerospace America, March 1984, p. 5.

confidence in their detailed accuracy. But such
accuracy is not needed for the illustrative purposes for which they were developed.
if work were to commence on all of them now,
the bulk of the cost would occur over the next
15 years.
Space transportation costs are not included in
these estimates, except for an additional $0.1 billion (1984$) or so for each LEO-lunar orbit flight.
Rather, it is assumed that some 10 Shuttle surfaceLEO flights per year, at an average cost of about
$0.1 billion (1984$) each, would be budgeted for
all Government-sponsored civilian research and
development purposes, including those considered here.
Clearly, these costs are great in total sum, especially in the face of other important calls upon
Federal tax revenues during an area of multi hundred billion dollar annual deficits in the Federal
budget.
While the total cost of our publicly funded civilian space program will reflect the magnitude
and character of the objectives addressed in the
program, and these will, in turn, reflect political
decisions, the unit costs to acquire and operate
the technology will reflect engineering and management decisions.
Beyond the observation that, in some general
fashion, the cost will increase with the magnitude,
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Table 10.—Cost and Schedule to Satisfy Objectives Suggested for Discussion
Total cost a
(billions, 1984 dollars)

Objectives

1. Establish a global information system/service
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

10.

ab~t~ are for deve[~pment and acqu~sltlon, o~ratfons and

maintenance

10

2

re natural hazards
Establish lower cost reusable transportation
service to the Moon and establish human
presence thereb
Use space probes to obtain information re
Mars and some asteroids prior to early human
exploration
Conduct medical research of direct interest to
the general publicd
Bring at least hundreds of the general
public per year into space for short visitse
Establish a global, direct, audio broadcasting,
common-user system/service
Make essentially all data generated by
civilian satellites and spacecraft directly
available to the general public
Exploit radio/optical free-space electromagnetic propagation for Iong-distance
energy distribution+
Reduce the unit cost of space transportation
and space activitiesh
Increase space-related private sector salesh

Duration
(years)

20

15, 25

2

15

6

5, 25

0.5

5, 25

2

10

0

25

0.5

10

5

15

0.5
- $40i

25

costs are not Included, excePt for some launch and

operations costs noted for objectives 2, 3, and 4.
b 15 years t. establish the settlement, and 3 vlsits&ear at $0.1 billlon each (PIUS basic Shuttle launch costs) over the following
c&{~~r&erage, one pro~ evev 3 years and S0.4 billion each.
d$2 billion over 5 years t. establish a life sciences laboratory in LEO, and $0.2 billionlyear thereafter to oPerate it. This
laborato~ could also be used for materials science and other research.
e5 years t. establish a LEO “lodge-habitat, ” and its continuing use thereafter.
f w ~ bllllon~ear In addition to DOD expenditures.
9w:3 bllllon/year for a 15.year technology development effort to reduce space
%hls would also help efforts directed toward the other objectives.
i The actual cost could ~ as high as ~ billion (1984 dollars), if costs

generality, and sophistication of the space capability acquired, it is difficult–indeed, it is impossible, at this time—to estimate the eventual cost
to the Government of addressing these objectives
and obtaining the required infrastructure. A number of the significant infrastructure “cost-drivers”
are presented in chapter 4. Suffice it to say here
that there are a number of factors that could influence the net cost to the taxpayer for acquiring space infrastructure, and many opportunities
to minimize this net cost that could be grasped
by vigorous and imaginative NASA management.
Appendix D speaks to the matter of cost containment.
To this point, only the initial capital cost of LEO
infrastructure has been considered. To this cost
must be added its ongoing operation and maintenance (O&M) costs (and the O&M costs of lunar

transportation

Urlit COSk3.

exceed Mtial Predictions @ ~0/0

infrastructure also); the cost of instruments, furnaces, etc., needed for scientific experimentation
in association with its use; and the interest cost
of any money borrowed to fund the acquisition
program. 7 We must remember, too, that infrastructure eventually becomes obsolete or wears
out, and, since its support services will come to
be depended on, this implies that some form of
amortization and replacement will be called for.
A consequence of the successful attainment of
any or all of these unit cost reduction objectives—and reduction in the unit cost of space
7
Any such cost is not allocated (if indeed it were possible to allocate it) on a program-by-program basis. But, in the overall, the more
than $100 billion per year now required to be paid on the Federal
debt is a cost of Government that must be considered by Congress,
at least implicitly, in all of its authorization and appropriation
actions—in the space area as for all others.
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transportation generally—would be to attract

and more of its research, development, test, and

more private interest to space activities. NASA,
in turn, would then be able to apply more scien tific, engineering, and management attention,

evaluation funds, to the development of truly
“cutting edge” technology in support of its
science, exploration, and other activities.

CONCLUSIONS
To create a truly modern civilian space program, the United States now might well move to
adopt up-to-date, long-term goals in the civilian
space area, and to initiate work on a first family
of specific space objectives to address over the
next 20 to 25 years, If such goals and objectives
were set, the Nation would have a clearer pic-

ture of the kind of space infrastructure required
to meet the objectives, as well as the cost and
schedule under which this infrastructure could
be obtained.
The United States would also be able to treat
its publicly supported civilian space program
more explicitly as a direct investment of great potential economic importance, in addition to the
other benefits that it provides. This might in turn
ensure that the program’s public costs would be
prudently contained, that its economic benefits
would be substantially and objectively enlarged,
and that it would serve the broadest public interest.
Finally, if an early, paced transfer of management attention, commitment, and resources takes
place away from further major development and/
or production of Shuttle capability, and if there
is a vigorous and innovative pursuit of Government cost sharing with other countries and our
own private sector, then the 10 objectives outlined here–or others analogous to them–could
be aggressively pursued, and probably attained
relatively soon, within the appropriations now expected to be received by NASA. And the attainment of these objectives would entail the acquisition of much of the in-space infrastructure that
NASA now aspires to acquire. Also, if there is a
continuing increase in extra-NASA payments for
use of Shuttle services, and if the private spacerelated sector succeeds in continuing to grow at
anything like its present rate, thereby generating

rapidly increasing tax revenues, these important
“offsetting” incomes could be taken into consideration by Congress when passing on NASA appropriations.
Indeed, a reasonable extrapolation from present funding circumstances would suggest that, by
the end of this century, our publicly supported
space program could be much larger than it is
today.
It must be emphasized that whether or not, as
a matter of public policy, our tax-supported civilian space program should be allowed to grow
to the magnitudes discussed here as possible is
not an issue addressed in this report. Rather, it
is important to appreciate that, under certain conditions, expenditures for this program could be
considered to be offset to a large extent by revenues, thus giving Congress more flexibility in setting expenditure levels than it has today. An important element of public debate about our space
future, therefore, should be about the allocation
of public, economically related investments
therein—for we need no longer consider our public space expenditures as consumption expenditures that underwrite the salaries of astronomers,
the technologies required for exploring the solar
system, and the intangibles of “space leadership. ”
The promising prospects now in view indicate
what agenda items should be emphasized in public policy considerations of our long-term civilian space interests. For if, over the next quartercentury, we modernize our civilian space goals
and lay out a family of objectives for our civilian
space activities much broader than those usually
discussed; if we determine to focus our Government and private sector skills on building, together, a great commercial-i ndustrial-financial private
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sector space business in the face of growing international competition; if we administer and
manage our space activities with vigor, imagination, and statesmanship; and if we take the lead
in orchestrating the space interests and activities
of all of the friendly countries of the world; then
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we can move civiIian space activities into the
mainstream of America ’s- indeed, the world's—
interests, reap great political, sociaI, and economic
benefits, and very soon begin to have our men
and women strike out across the solar system.

Phofo credif /Vaflona/ Aeronauf/cs and Space Adm/n/straf/on

Space technology has opened up the entire
to observation and scientific research. Satellite (I
a joint project
of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, produced dramatic revelations about the characteristics
of other stars in our galaxy.
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FINAL OBSERVATIONS
Congress and the United States will soon have
an unprecedented opportunity to rethink its basic
views and interests in the civilian space area
through the creation, and subsequent endeavors,
of a “National Commission on Space. ” Public
Law 98-361 mandates that such an extraordinary
Commission be formed.
In preparation for doing so, a few observations
should be made about a truly fundamental concern held by many regarding our publicly supported civilian space program–a concern that,
for the most part, goes unvoiced by professionals
associated with this program, but which should
be dealt with in any fundamental reexamination
of it. In so doing, we should keep in mind that
the essential magnitude and character of this program was set a generation ago in response to the
major national security concern raised by the
launch of Sputnik by the U. S. S. R., and subsequent international events and our perceptions
thereof. Thus, the basic nature was set in another
era to serve the needs of that era and, fundamentally, has changed little, even though those needs
have long since been met.
This concern may perhaps best be expressed
in question form: How can the U.S. people and
Government justify, today, continuing to make
such truly great and continuing public expenditures on space related matters perceived by most
of our general public as (however at times interesting, and even exciting) lying well outside of
the mainstream of their personal interests and
concerns, particularly now that our military space
program serves to offset most perceived U.S.S.R.
space-related military “threats,” and during an
extended period of unusual national financial
stringency?
As Congress begins to ponder this question, it
might start by reflecting on an observation made
recently by Freeman Dyson: “ . . . if I look at, say,
Senate hearings and Congressional Committees,
they tend to pay too much attention to scientists.
They’re always talking very much in quantitative
terms and technical details when the problems
really aren’t there. They very seldom ask, ‘Well,

what’s all this good for?’ “ (Emphasis in the
original .)8
In response to this question, many might be
willing, in principle, to give the Government the
“benefit of the doubt” when its leaders point out
(as they have nearly every year for the past dozen,
at least), that eventually such R&D expenditures
will return economic benefits many times over.
While there is a general consensus that, in macroeconomic terms, economic “spinoff” to the private sector has been significant, outside of the
satellite communications area it has not been possible to identify with objective confidence, to
date, that such great economic returns have been
obtained (though there are grounds for hope that
eventually satellite navigation and materials processing in space may also provide significant economic benefits).9 And, of course, the same prospect for economic return could be advanced also
about many other economically related R&D
areas, high technology and not, in which Government expenditures are either essentially zero
or only a very small fraction of today’s annual
$7 billion public civilian space expenditures. So
there is understandable reserve and questioning
about such a response. For most of us, $7 billion
per year is a great deal of money.
Well beyond these kinds of considerations is
the ethical concern of whether or not scientists,
engineers, and managers should be paid so very
well by the public to spend additional large sums
of public funds each year to do such things as
take photographs of distant planets. Many take
the view that, with the immediate, continuing,
and enormous problems faced by hundreds of
millions of people throughout the world, with
millions of U.S. (tax-paying) families having to live
on a truly modest income or, indeed, having to
deal with the lack of employment, with interest
eThe Washington Post, Apr. 9, 1984, P. B-1 1.
9
However difficult it may be to quantify the benefits of space R&D,
one can say with confidence that the use of weather satellites has
saved thousands of lives. In addition, the use of surveillance satellites has resulted in savings to the Government that are on the order of tens to hundreds of billions of dollars.
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payments on our Federal debt now costing us
over $100 billion per year, supporting space research and exploration of this great magnitude
just doesn’t seem to be a sensitive and equitable
use of public funds or even, to some, a particularly decent human avocation.
The more general pro forma response to this
concern, at least in part, is that: “ . . . life is unfair. ” Life is unfair. But most of us would probably agree that we all do have some obligation,
when reasonably possible, to attempt to redress
some of these sobering societal imbalances and
that, at the very least, those who are generously
supported by the public to engage in civilian
space activities should share widely in the discharge of this obligation.
Another general pro forma response is that
most grave and widespread human problems
seemingly cannot be addressed by space-related
activities, any more than they can be by a ballet
production or a walk in a park.
In this assessment the more direct and useful
response is that some of our civilian space program objectives can be purposely selected to see
that space is used, specifically, to make progress
toward important agreed-on societal ends. The

suggested family of 10 conceptual objectives has
been crafted so as to see that some of them speak
directly to a few of the most fundamental human
concerns that space and space technology can
indeed be used to “get at”: better protection from
natural disasters, better communications among
the world’s governments and peoples in our nuclear weapons age, and greater understanding of
physical conditions that affect all of us as we grow
older. They are of such a basic nature as to be
of potential value to “all mankind. ”
And, as well, a basic theme suggested here is
that the publicly supported civilian space program now could be organized and conducted to
a considerable extent as a public investment program in basic science and high technology, and

●

129

that its leaders now could be charged, explicitly,
with overseeing all of our public space activities
with a fundamental view in mind: that these activities lead, in both the shorter and longer run, to
the creation of wholly new commercial-industrialfinancial ventures, and to truly large-scale, rapid,
objectively measurable, national economic growth
—with all that this implies for the delivery of new,
useful, public and private goods and services, increased employment, increased deficit-offsetting
tax revenues, and a more competitive international trading position.
And another basic theme is that the U.S. Government could now endeavor to orchestrate the
interests and capabilities, however diverse and/or
small, of all of the friendly peoples of the world
in cooperative civilian space activities.
If the United States does all of these things, and
does them in a truly efficient and productive manner, then we would see space being used, where
space can sensibly be used, both to protect and
to ease the human condition.
With the creation of such major space-related
programs to address such basic human concerns,
and appreciating that most of us the world over,
much of the time, “do not live by bread alone,”
we can in more reasonable conscience also continue to undertake—and even perhaps enlarge
upon—space-related activities that, as well, challenge the human condition: we can strike out
from the Earth for the Moon, 10 for the planets and
asteroids, and indeed fix our eyes on ‘‘distant
stars.
But only if we pay our ethical dues to our fellow
countrymen and women and to “all mankind”and only if we meet our financial obligations as
we go.
10An

OTA Working paper giving the thoughts of six philosophers

on “The Philosophical Implications of Establishing Permanent
Human Presence in Space” is available from the OTA Science,
Transportation, and Innovation Program office.

POSTSCRIPT
This postscript gives the sense of a meeting of members of the Advisory
Panel held in November 1983 at the Aspen Institute’s Wye Plantation. The document was prepared by E. B. Skolinoff, and carefully reviewed by the participants. Certain exceptions expressed by participants are noted within the text.
The preparation of such a document by an OTA Advisory Panel i S an unusual act ion; Advisory Pane Is are seIected to represent a wide cross cross-section
of informed opinion, and serve only to give guidance and review to an OTA

assessment. In this case, however, the people I i steal below chose to go beyond
the traditional role, and express their own views directly. Panel members have
also been given the opportunity to fulIy review and comment on the fulItext
of the report itself.

REPORT OF THE SECOND ADVISORY PANEL MEETING
Held at Aspen-Wye Plantation in November 1983
by
Professor E.B. Skolnikoff
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Participating Panel Members*
Robert A. Charpie, Chairman
Harvey Brooks
Peter O. Crisp
Freeman Dyson
James B. Farley
Charles E. Fraser
Andrew j. Goodpaster
Charles Hitch
Bernard M. W. Knox
George E. Mueller, Jr.

Carl Sagan
Eugene Skolnikoff
James Spilker
The panel was asked to consider the proposal
for a manned civilian space station in the light
of the development of the Nation’s space activities generally, and of possible future civilian activities and goals in space. The panel approached
this task first as a broad enquiry into future objectives in space and how the proposed space
station relates to those objectives. The results of
that enquiry made it inappropriate for us to er-tgage in a more detailed evaluation of the current
space station proposal.
As background for our conclusions, we need
to note that the panel believes U.S. civilian space
activities are and should be of high value to the
Nation domestically and internationally. The
country has a variety of motivations behind its
space commitments—-political, psychological,
scientific, technological, economic—all of which
have validity and importance. In particular, in
looking to the future, the panel believes it essential that the program should come to represent
again the sense of exploration and adventure, the
energizer of both technological and institutional
innovation, the source of outward-looking na*The participants are [n general agreement with this summ~rv
ot cone [us ions, although some members may not necessarl Iy cn dorw all the details or the phrasing of certain statements.

tional pride that captured our imagination, and
that of others, in its first two decades. Those characteristics can be achieved in different ways, not
necessarily correlated to the magnitude of the
space budget. We also believe there should be
ways that the program can be used more effectively as an instrument for peace and cooperation
in a world in which the environment of space is
threatening to become one more arena for military competition.
Our conclusions are as follows.

I. Current Space Station Proposal*
The panel has major reservations about the current NASA concept for a permanent manned
space station and recommends against commitment to such a project at this time. We are quite
certain that a space station of some kind will
eventually be needed. However, the objectives
underlying the current concept seem diffuse and
imprecise. Approval of the proposal now would
tend to lock the Nation’s civilian space efforts into
a large, expensive program that would likely preempt alternative possibilities and programs.
The panel was most concerned about the absence of studies that evidence a larger vision of
space objectives and opportunities, against which
this, or any future space station proposal, could
be evaluated (see 11). A space station should not
bean end in itself, but rather a step toward other
goals. Those other goals, which need to be carefully developed and publicly debated, should
provide a necessary framework for evaluating the
role and usefulness of any proposed design for
a space station.
The panel recognizes that not all possible activities and payoffs can be anticipated, and that
*George E, Mueller dlsa~rees w Ith thl~ conclusion, which he
regards a$ not ~ onstru[ t iie with resi)ect to direct Ion tor NASA, and
Su[)ptjn i~ [’ of unnecessary study. t+ e does a~ree w Ith the need to
make the i[)acc itatlon a step to a lon~-ra n~e goa 1, and would sup
[mrt ,i\kl n~ NASA to de~lgn a t,Ic I lit} to ~upport such a program
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unexpected opportunities emerge in the course
of developing a new capability. And the panel
accepts the validity of the desire to take advantage of the capabilities offered by the Shuttle. But
some of the immediate functions envisioned for
the proposed space station (exploring near-Earth
applications, for example) can be evaluated without much, or any new infrastructure in space, in
fact, by imaginative uses of the Shuttle; and a
more fully thought-out station keyed to longerrange objectives would be more likely to stimulate innovation and imagination.
Moreover, the station as envisioned would appear to have little payoff either for development
of new technology (see III), or for the politicalpsychological benefits at home and abroad we
have already indicated should be given substantial weight (see also Xl).
The development of a habitable space station
to gain expertise of people in space is an important argument, but also one with little present
basis for evaluation. We have seen no analysis
of the differential costs of a manned v. an unmanned facility, nor an analysis of the opportunity costs of that differential. It is important that
it be understood that the panel does not argue
against man-in-space per se (the Shuttle may provide a good portion of that experience), but rather
that a better rationale than has been provided us
is required for a goal worthy of attainment.

Il. Analysis Capability
The lack of studies analyzing long-term space
goals and opportunities was striking to the panel.
There were not even studies available that laid
out possible alternatives to the current proposal.
Without these, the panel felt it was not possible
to sensibly evaluate the scale, nature, cost or purpose of a manned civilian space station. An initial “goals” paper prepared by OTA staff represented a start toward the kind of studies that are
needed.
The panel believes this situation is deeper in
its significance than simply whether adequate

studies had been conducted before the space station proposal was put forward. NASA has been
positively discouraged by successive administrations from engaging in or sponsoring much for-

ward thinking, presumably to discourage the
emergence of costly ideas or prevent the appearance of lobbying. One result is that apparently
little capability exists within NASA, and essentially
none outside, able to carry out on a continuing
basis the kind of informed, analytical, critical
studies that any major program area ought to
have. The need is acute.
We have considered various options for creating such a locus for the professional study of
public policy questions relating to the civilian
space program and wouId make several observations. Clearly, NASA should have a larger internal capability for long-term analysis, but that
alone would not be adequate for obtaining objective outside views or for establishing public
credibility. The Administrator of NASA could, and
we believe should, serve as a sponsor of such
studies, perhaps working through a broadly based
advisory committee to enhance objectivity and
credibility. We recommend that early consideration be given to a long-term program of support
of studies in the private sector (analytical organizations, commerce, industry and universities)
that would build a community of knowledgeable
analysts of the Nation’s space activities, analogous to that which has been developed in other
areas such as energy and the environment.
Such a program of studies also implies a more
open planning process and the concomitant continuous rethinking of NASA objectives that go
with that openness. This process can provide an
opportunity for more extensive engagement of
the private sector (see Vi), an objective we
believe should be high on NASA’s agenda, and
can engage the interest of constituencies not
already deeply involved in the space area.

Ill. R&D
A major factor in evaluating a proposal for the
next step in the space program should be the contribution that objective will make to the development of new technology. The panel does not
believe the civilian space station as proposed is
likely to have as significant a technology-forcing
effect as should be required from a program that
would be the centerpiece of the space agency’s
activities for close to a decade.
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In fact, the situation is more serious, for advanced technological development has been
severely cut back in the space program since the
early days of the Shuttle program. Key technologies that wouId be necessary for later missions,
such as advanced space propuIsion systems or
machine intelligence and robotics, have not been
adequately (or at all) supported because of fundding limitations. Even technologies to fully exploit
current space applications have been relatively
neglected. The current proposaI for a civiIian
space station would generate little such technology development and, more than likely, would
prevent funds being available for such programs.
Yet, those technologies represent what should be
major payoffs of space activities and the central
features of future space activities
Accordingly, we recommend that NASA engage in the conscious development of seminal.11
technologies that are Iikely to form the bui!ding
blocks for future space goals. This should be carried out in close cooperation with industry, rather
than wholly in-house, with the Government stimuIating private-sector ventures and financing
where possible. The model of the highly successful relations between the National Advisory Com mittee for Aeronautics (NACA) and industry for
aeronautical technology could well be followed
by NASA for space technology development.
IV. Immediate Alternatives to a

Space Station
In recommencing deferral of the proposed
NASA civilian space station commitment, we do
believe other steps should be taken. Two of high
priority are given above: begin analyses of possible long-term space goals, and design a program
of technology development. In addition, some
of the stated purposes of the proposed space station could be explored with the existing Shuttles.
In particular, the possibilities and viability of manufacturing in space, repair of low-Earth-orbit
space satellites, and much scientific research can
and should proceed with present capabilities and,
if indicated, their modest improvements. Such
programs can provide necessary information to
judge more definitively what the real needs are
to carry out those functions on a continuing basis.
It makes little sense to make major commitments
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to an expensive large-scale facility if already existing capabilities remain underexploited because
of shortage of funds,
I n any programs undertaken in the near term,
however, it is important that they not be allowed
to develop a Iife of their own that prevents more
desirable aIternatives, or interteres with other
ongoing programs of great importance, such as
those i n space science.

V. Long-Term Mission Possibilities
The p,inei di~c us~ed w)m~~ ~x)s>i ble Iong-term
a c- t i v i t i es t h (~ t < (~t i \ti (c( ! s o m e ot t h [’ ( r i t ~~ r i a Ji { I
b e l i e v e d t o 1)~’ im~mrt,lnt: lik.~1) to L t)mrm,]n({
~vi(iwpr(~ad altent i( )n, i n ho r(’ r) t S( i (’ n t i ti( I n t e r c’~t,

technolc)g~ t’(lr( I ng r[> I LIL d n( (‘ to XI o I ){1 I i $~ L] t’~,
\u b~td nt i,i I sixn Iti( .l n[{~ to h t] r II.~ n ~)! ( }t>l[’m 5, $11 lta hi I it y for i rlt~’ rn ,lt i u n d I C-[XJI N I r ,tt i f) n ( >~’<’ V I I i ,1 nd
~)rikate-$c~( t~jr [J,irt i{ i~~<itit)n [~[t~ X), L1’~ I Ilcl\ ~’ tlcll
rx[~rn i ned t h[’~~’ i n d(4{l i I, not f 1( ~ Lt [’ ,](ji [x-{ltt’ ,) n}
~Jc] rtlcu Iclr c hoi~ v T h~~>/ ,] r{) \Ll ~}qt~~t I () 11 \ 01” 1 I) L’
kind~ ()( ~\MC [’ ;(~’i li L$ t> l~t~li(i (.) ~h(~u I(I l~t$ ,] n,i ly7ed dnd stu(ji[(l il} (J(~tc]il.
(In<’ c-{]tegor) (Jt ~x~ssii)l~~ gtMl\ L\oLl I{i ini (Jl\ (J
programs (let i~n(~d spvc iticci I 1)’ to cc)rlt ri but(’
knowledge ~]bout ~jres(nt or futur<) pl,~nc’t,ir> ,{nd
h u m a n issuc~s. For cx,~m}]l(~, ~)rogram< [{e>ign~[l
to Iearfl mor[) dbout the global ‘‘~rw>r~hou:)~)’
effect that cou Id resu It from dcc u m u I<it i rl~ C a rkn dioxide in the atmosphere th rou~ll, ,Inl{)ng
ot h(’ r~, intensive examination ot t h e at m osp h [: w
ot VP n us, which has experienced its own m~~s$ive
C02 ‘‘green house.” Another such goal WOUIC{ be
the study of the effects of Iarge-sc.]le fire, ~olcanic
act ion and d u st storms t h rough ta rgeted stud i es
of the Martian en~i ronment, which is rite ~vith
such events.
More directly Earth-oriented, ,1 [)oi~ible organizi ng focus of an i m portal nt se~ment of’ space
activities cou Id be the detaileci nlon it(~ri ng of the
habitability of our planet on the surface and in
the atmosphere. The substantial hazards anci possible catastrophes lying ahead —COl and other
gas accumulation, ozone depletion, soil depletion, deforestation, desertitication, agriculture dis[>.]se \(LJ Iner,]bi I ity, among others—make a major
ciedicatecl program of global monitoring potentially of crucial importance for the future.
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A different kind of goal in space would be to
contribute directly to more generaI research objectives in the life, material, or other sciences. For
example, some of the effects of zero gravity on
the body appear to be similar to the effects of
aging. Are there important contributions that can
be made through space research programs on
aging, an increasingly important social goal for
an expanding global population? Many other
such complementary research targets could undoubtedly be developed and evaluated.
And, of course, there is a long list of possible
scientific goals in space that can be considered:
1. unmanned rendezvous missions to an asteroid or comet to provide early solar system
history;
2. Mars exploration, with unmanned roving
vehicles;
3. landing on the Saturn moon Titan, which has
a nitrogen atmosphere, complex organic matter and strong evidence of a liquid ethane/
methane ocean;
4. solar spacecraft able to penetrate some distance into the Sun while sending back information; and
5. Venus probes.
Longer-term:
6. landing on asteroids, planets or comets with
return of sample material;
7. probes beyond solar system;
8. manned lunar station;
9. manned asteroid station; and
10. manned missions to Mars.
Note, incidentally, that the current space station proposal would not necessarily be the preferred next step for most of these goals.

V1. Private-Sector Involvement
The panel is strongly of the belief that the private sector can be more effectively and extensively engaged in the Nation’s space activities
than it has been to date. For the most part, current involvement has been restricted to a select
group of NASA contractors or subcontractors.
There is need for involvement of a much broader
industrial constituency to elicit new ideas for
space applications and techniques. Not only is
it desirable to engage the innovative and entrepreneurial character of American high-technol-

ogy industry, but also to attempt to bring down
unit costs of space assets and activities over time,
and to involve consumer-oriented industries in
space applications that may be marketable.
To engage the private sector effectively to
achieve these objectives poses several requirements. Consultation with industry should start
with a broad dialogue on a wide range of possible space goals and mission opportunities, not
with the detailed design of an already-determined
space station.
A second requirement is to develop a clarity
of commitment to activities that signals long-term
interest. Such commitment is necessary to encourage industry to invest its resources of manpower and money in the development of technology potentially useful for those activities. Such
a clarity of commitment should be the outcome
of the joint studies and consultation referred to
above,
A third, with regard to space applications, is
to use either public corporations (perhaps of the
Comsat type) or other institutional innovations
to take over commercial development and exploitation of space technology. NASA is not well
suited to the design and marketing of commercial/industrial systems or services—that is not its
purpose—and simply attempting to hand over an
existing developmental system, such as Landsat,
to the private sector for operation is unlikely to
be viable.
It is also possible that the present structure of
NASA is not well suited to prompt a major increase in private-sector space activities because
of the present large commitment to in-house laboratories (see IX) and present technology procurement practices. We cannot make a definitive
judgment on that, but recommend an objective
evaluation by NASA and by Congress.

VIl. International Cooperation
International cooperation has been a goal of
the U.S. space program from the beginning, but
the panel believes much more could be done.
Cooperation is particularly attractive for future
activities for several reasons: technical competence is more widely distributed throughout the
world than in the past, resource limitations are
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more of a constraint on all countries, and many
space activities are relevant to all people, not just
Americans.
It is possible that the costs of space activities
could be reduced by genuine joint programs that
enlisted not only the funds, but also the talents
of other nations. Examples, such as Spacelab,
already exist. But for more extensive cooperation,
there must be a commitment for joint planning
at a very early stage, and reasonable guarantees
of program continuation once a commitment has
been made. Past history of American project cancellations in midstream do not contribute to confidence in the United States as a reliable partner.
Near-Earth space applications are of obvious
interest to other countries from a commercial
perspective, but programs for monitoring the
changes in habitability of our planet would provide other common motivations. And, planetary
probes that would potentially provide information relevant to this planet’s concerns—for example, those goals mentioned earlier of improving
understanding of the CO2 greenhouse effect by
studies of Venus, or gaining knowledge of the effects of fire, volcanoes and dust from study of the
Martian environment—would also provide common foci of interest with other countries.
In fact, the potential benefits for all from space
activities should provide a high incentive target
for cooperation even if the other possible benefits
of resource and talent sharing are less clearly relevant. There are also, of course, difficulties inherent in international cooperation, difficulties that
stem primarily from problems of meshing of
disparate bureaucracies and political systems.
There is also the problem that the structure and
incentives in NASA, and more broadly in the
budgetary and decision process in the U.S. Government, do not lead naturally to seeking international cooperation. This, too, is an issue we
believe deserves separate attention by NASA and
by Congress.
It should be noted that there seems to be considerable interest within Western industrial countries in cooperating on the proposed civilian
space station; European countries, Canada, and
Japan are waiting for the United States to decide
what it intends to do. Cooperation, to be really
meaningful, must involve joint planning and
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study of alternatives before selection is made. We
recommend a more open set of discussions that
ask what we and other interested countries
should be doing together.
Any military overtones to NASA projects (see
Vlll) will likely have a negative effect on possibilities for international cooperation. Though it
may be possible in practice to separate the military from the civilian interests in specific missions,
it is a problem that we cannot afford to ignore.
There are also potential political benefits to be
gained over time through intimate and extensive
cooperation with others. Cooperation with Eastern bloc countries, and especially the Soviet
Union, will not remove the sources of conflict,
but may be used as an instrument to ameliorate
those conflicts and offer alternatives.

Vlll. Effect of Military Programs
and Interests’
The panel is very concerned about the effects
on the civilian space program of a major new and
enlarged focus on military uses of space. Though
there might be some budgetary competition, the
primary problem would be the competition for
scarce technical manpower and industrial resources. The most qualified personnel would
likely be attracted to the rapidly expanding and
technologically exciting defense sector, and
NASA itself might see some of its best people
leaving.
In addition, such a large-scale military commitment would likely serve to give a military image
to our space activities abroad, where the distinction between civilian and military interests may
not be clear.
International cooperation in the civilian program may also be harder to achieve because of
increased concern in the United States over apparent loss of technology assumed to be critical
for national security. Controls over information
could well be sufficiently onerous as to rule out
some forms of otherwise desirable cooperation.

*To avoid the appearance of possible conflict of interest, members of the panel with past and present involvement in military space
activities did not participate in the formulation of this section of
the report.
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IX. NASA

Operations and Organization

The panel did not make any formal evaluation
of NASA’s structure and performance, but a few
observations based on the experience of panel
members and the issues at stake are in order,
some already mentioned.
As has been noted, NASA is not well positioned
for much more extensive cooperation with the
private sector, or with other countries. The specific reasons are different in each case, but the
underlying factors in NASA appear to be: the
pride in past successes achieved by “going it
alone”; the perception of private-sector activities
as competitive with, not complementary to, its
interests; the lack of desire among most scientists and engineers to devote themselves to the
administrative orchestration of multicultural,
multi-political projects; and the large fixed facilities of NASA that inhibit flexibility. All of these
discourage assignment of major responsibilities
outside the organization.
This structure also serves to maintain high fixed
overhead costs in NASA, again discouraging exploration with industry of ways of bringing unit
costs down. It is not clear what cost reductions
would be possible, but it would be difficult to
evaluate the possibilities given the present
structure.
To some extent, the existing structure may also
discourage the development of alternative goal
concepts, and generally inhibit imagination, since
changes in programs may have negative effects
on the present organization.
These observations may be exaggerated, or
should perhaps be balanced by other important
attributes. We urge attention to the issue,
however.
X.

International Economic
Competition

International competition in provision of civilian space services has already emerged, primarily with European countries, and is likely to grow
in the future as Japan becomes more heavily
engaged. To some extent, that competition has
been encouraged by U.S. policies that have not
provided adequate guarantees for the future,

such as launch services, or have not been adequately consumer-oriented in systems design and
development (for example Landsat). However,
competition is inevitable, quite apart from U.S.
policies, for advanced industrial nations with
high-quality technological capabilities are likely
to enter any market with economic potential.
Men and women in orbit, utilizing sophisticated
and costly space assets, may be an important capability for U.S. commercial exploitation of the
economic potential for near-Earth orbits, but we
consider that case as not having been demonstrated as yet. In fact, commitment to such a capability could delay exploitation, by preempting
funding and personnel that might better explore
possibilities with industry through use of the present Shuttle capability or its modest extensions.
It could, in fact, be a massive commitment to the
wrong kind of station, even for economic purposes.
There is another aspect of the economic value
of space activities—the spinoff of new technology to the commercial sector. In this respect, as
we noted before, the proposed space station
would likely hold relatively little interest as a
means of developing new technology—especially
in comparison with other feasible goals.

Xl. Geopolitical Competition
The Soviet Union has been conducting a vigorous manned space station program which, notwithstanding some serious mishaps, is apparently
on track. Beyond the continuing exhibition of
space prowess, presumably of important political value to them, the uses to which their capabilities are intended to be put are not clear–
perhaps this is similar to the American situation—
though Soviet Union scientists have often indicated that the long-range goals for their space
program include manned bases on the Moon or
Mars. Regardless of later goals, they have certainly been gaining useful information about people in a space environment (which they share
quite extensively with the United States).
There is a natural reaction in such circumstances that leads to programs undertaken to
“match” the achievements of the Russians, or to
be concerned about the information or experience they have obtained that is not immediately

—
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available to us. But, for the United States to
undertake a large-scale program not necessary,
or ill-suited, to our needs is more likely to handicap us in the future in geopolitical competition
with the Soviet Union. Especially is this so in this
case in which the civilian space station goal is
not likely to command dramatic attention or to
lead to important new technology.
Civilian space activities are, in fact, an important arena for international political competition.
The panel’s plea is for the United States to aim
for a goal worthy of attainment from this perspective, as well as from others. The international political effects of visible, dramatic nonmilitary accomplishments are important in presenting an
image of a dynamic Nation able to preserve its
vitality in an open, democratic form of government. Many throughout the world find hope and
encouragement in that demonstration; it is important to us as well as to them.
We note again that competition in civilian
space accomplishments need not rule out the
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possibility of some cooperation as well, even with
our primary competitor. The more important the
subject, the greater would be the political significance of cooperation.
We close with reiteration of the panel’s conviction of the importance of the civilian an space
program to the country, and the significance of
the next major steps in space that the Nation
undertakes, Our ideas, our imagination, and our
critical analytical abiIities need to be engaged i n
laying out the alternatives before us just as our
institutions, public and private, need to be appropriately engaged in implementing the decisions
finally made. In the long run, a sustained and effective civilian space program wilt depend on
building a lasting political consensus,a consensus based on informed public debate and understanding of the significant objectives that can be
served by civiIian space activities.

APPENDIXES

Appendix A

RESULTS OF PRINCIPAL NASA STUDIES ON SPACE
STATION USES AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
Early in 1982, NASA established working groups to
prepare for and coordinate a planning program to acquire a long-term in-space inhabited infrastructure,
i.e,, a civilian “space station. ” A Space Station Steering Committee at NASA headquarters led a twopronged effort. A Technology Steering Committee had
the task of assessing the current state of technology
and planning any needed development activities for
the program. At the same time, a Space Station Task
Force became the principal planning group to consider types of activities (user needs/desires) to be carried out with any new long-term infrastructure, system physical characteristics, concept development,
and management organization.
To support the Task Force as well as help clarify
various issues involved, NASA authorized a series of
parallel investigations of the potential desires for, and
characteristics of, such infrastructure. These studies
(costing more than $6 million altogether) were made
by eight U.S. aerospace companies (with their associated subcontractors). In addition, the European
Space Agency, Canada, and Japan funded essentially
parallel user studies of their own. Related investigations of possible nonaerospace industry interest in
space use were made by two consulting firms.

Major Findings of the U.S. Aerospace
Industry “Mission Analysis Studies”
In anticipation that the United States could decide
to build a publicly funded, habitable, permanent civilian “space station”, NASA asked eight aerospace
industry contractor groups to perform independent
“mission analysis” studies to indicate what it could
be used for (the desires and/or needs), what capabilities it should have to meet them (its attributes), what
its fundamental characteristics and components might
be like (its architecture), and what costs and benefits
to the Nation might be expected of such a space program conducted over the remainder of the 20th century. Emphasis was to be on the user communities,
national conceptual uses, and general architectures,
not specific configurations.
in essence, they were asked to answer the questions
“If the United States were to acquire an initial civilI The Department of Defense also participated with NASA in these studies,
and paid 5 percent of their cost. For the most part, the studies related to
national security are classified, and no further reference will be made to them
here.

ian “space station “ complex in low-Earth-orbit (LEO)
in the 1990’s, who could use it, how could they use
it, what attributes, capabilities, and types of components should it therefore have, what would it cost,
when could it become available, and what benefits
could its use provide?”
The contractor groups (in each case a prime contractor, usually with several subcontractors) communicated with the individuals, organizations, and insti tutions that might be expected to make use of such
in-space infrastructure to ascertain the important present and potential desires and/or needs for it, with emphasis on those uses that would require or materially
benefit from it. They then analyzed these various uses
as a sequenced set of activities, so as to identify and
characterize infrastructure attributes and capabilities
that would be necessary in order to meet them. Sufficient study of major components and architectural options was made to provide reasonable indications of
how adequate infrastructure could be provided.
They next provided programmatic and scheduling
plans in order to predict when various portions of the
program could become operational. Finally, costs of
establishing the overall space infrastructure were estimated and the economic benefits projected that they
foresaw through its use. The companies drew conclusions and made recommendations regarding further
developments.
The eight prime contractors performing these studies
were Boeing Aerospace Co., General Dynamics Corp.
(Convair Division), Grumman Aerospace Corp., Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., Martin Marietta Corp.,
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co., Rockwell International, and TRW. About 20 other high-technology
companies were involved as subcontractors. The final
reports were submitted on April 22, 1983. Their results
have been published in a series of volumes entitled
“Space Station Needs, Attributes, and Architectural
Options.”
The major findings of these contractor studies are
outlined below.

Users and Uses
(Mission Requirements)
The aerospace contractors actively sought out the
interests of potential users of LEO infrastructure in order to project what kind and extent of activities its support assets and services should provide. Users were
141
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categorized under the three broad areas of science
and applications, commercialization, and technology
development.
The fields of astrophysics and solar physics, life
sciences, environmental sciences and Earth observation, materials processing, and communications sciences all offered examples of possible uses of an initial complex. Over the longer term, it could be used
as a base for launching lunar, asteroid and interplanetary research spacecraft. Advantages of having a
human crew were seen in instrument and equipment
servicing (predominantly for Earth observation, plasma
physics and astrophysics) and human involvement in
research (predominantly in materials processing, life
sciences and solar physics). Research in most life
sciences, and some materials and astro/solar physics
was deemed impractical without direct human participation; one contractor concluded that 41 of 75
science activities would benefit from a human presence. The servicing of equipment would produce the
side benefit of seeing instrument assets in space accumulated. Long-term operations would be especially
important to some research.
The permanent infrastructure would include “freeflying” tended platforms to ensure isolation (where
needed) from the possible dynamic disturbance or
contamination of various kinds that might be present
in an inhabited location.
Commercial possibilities were suggested for remote
Earth sensing in the fields of petroleum and mineral
prospecting, and agricultural forecasts; for materials
processing; for on-orbit satellite launching of meteorological, navigation, and communications satellites to
higher, even to geostationary Earth orbit (GEO), and
for satellite servicing (although CEO servicing would
not be possible using the initial infrastructure now envisioned by NASA).
Almost all Earth resources observation from space
currently employs satellites without a crew and their
use will continue; however, the contractors found advantages in using people to select surface locations
to be studied, instruments, and observational parameters. Having space infrastructure also would enable
concurrent multidisciplinary observations, and the
crew would add the flexibility to modify the instruments during long-term observation periods.
The economical processing of some materials under
conditions of near-zero gravity is one of the more intriguing possibilities for eventual commercial exploitation, with such materials as pharmaceuticals, alloys,
semiconductors, and optical fibers as products. (Market demand for each of these products is seen by some
of the more optimistic contractor groups as having the

potential to grow to the multibillion-dollar-per-year
level by the year 2000 if they could be made available at acceptable prices).
McDonnell Douglas Corp. has already pioneered
in exploring the use of the electrophoresis process to
produce pharmaceutical materials aboard the Shuttle. Electrophoresis is a separation process in which
electrically charged particles suspended in a solution
migrate through the fluid in the presence of an applied electrical field. If the particles are of microscopic
or larger size, a common process limitation is a sedimentation of the particles under gravitational conditions. The effective absence of gravitational attraction
when conducted in orbit around the Earth permits the
process of separation and purification of such materials as proteins and pharmaceuticals to proceed at
rates 500 to 1,000 times faster than on the surface of
the Earth.
Several other companies are giving serious consideration to studying and manufacturing materials in
space. However, the contractor groups agreed that the
concept-to-market process generally takes many years,
that a space research laboratory is required, that for
at least some of the studies professionals in situ and
continuous operations are very important desiderata,
and that for most production processes, very large
amounts of electrical power (in present space terms)
would be essential.
Satellite communications is already a 20-year-old,
highly successful, world-wide commercial space enterprise. It is seen as a business that should continue to
expand rapidly. The required technology should move
in the direction of large, dynamically controlled, multiantenna subsystems, on-board switching, and high r.f.
power, for which a “space station” may well be seen
by some as essential (or at least desirable) for efficient
structural assembly and deployment, testing and
check-out, lower-cost transportation to geostationary
orbit—and eventually, perhaps, the servicing of GEO
satellites.
Satellite servicing is seen as enabling resupply and
repair of co-orbiting space vehicles, and those in other
orbits, such as polar or geostationary. In the latter case,
a Reusable Orbital Transfer Vehicle (ROTV) would be
needed to deploy or retrieve the spacecraft, as (according to several contractors) extensive servicing
would usually by done in, or in the vicinity of, a central “space station” complex.
LEO infrastructure is seen by the contractor groups
as enabling space technology development on all
fronts–developments of interest to materials processing, communications, flight controls, fluidics, large
space structures, on-orbit assembly and test, robotics,
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etc. All of these would benefit because of the sophistication of the support equipment that could be provided them, the longer time available for work in orbit than is provided by the Shuttle, and the extensive
crew involvement needed, at least for the foreseeable
future, for construction, calibration, and test.

Phased Activities (Mission Sets)
The contractor groups assembled sets of activities
and operations responding to needs and desires expressed by potential users in order to estimate the
assets and services required to support them for varying stay times in space. The preferred orbits were seen
to be a low-Earth-orbit whose plane would be at 28.50
inclination to the Equator (typical of launches from
Kennedy Space Center, FL), a 57° inclination (possible from KSC with a more northerly insertion direction) and a polar orbit (available with launch from
Vandenberg AFB, CA). In some cases, staging to
geostationary orbit or to escape velocity (for lunar,
asteroid and/or planetary flights) would be necessary.
Most of the studies identified several hundred possible uses and desires, a number well in excess of what
might be accommodated during the 1990s. When examined in the context of realistic technical progress,
the likelihood that such uses/desires would actually
develop, and the benefits made available through such
use, etc., the vast majority of those potential uses
could be supported with infrastructure located in the
low inclination orbit of 28.5°. This is exemplified by
a typical distribution of activities shown in table A-1
as recommended by one of the contractor groups. The
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activities in this baseline set are noted as being best
accommodated either by attaching them to a central,
inhabited infrastructure complex, or locating them on
free-flying platforms that would be tended only intermittently by crew members.
Inasmuch as some 70 percent or more of the potential needs/desires could be accomplished in the
28.5° orbit, it was the unanimous recommendation
of all the contractor groups that any initial inhabited
infrastructure be located in this orbital plane. Freeflying platforms, either co-orbiting or in polar orbit,
could accommodate most of the remaining missions.
One example of the number of inhabited infrastructure-attached payload elements at any time (socalled station occupancy) is shown in figure A-1, in
which the initial operational capability was assumed
to occur during 1990. The projected activities are seen
to reach a high number quite early in the development cycle.

Functional Capabilities
NASA has recently indicated that it expects proposed new space infrastructure to provide the set of
functions described in chapter 2. One contractor’s
visualization of these functions is given in figure A-2,
while table A-2 illustrates the corresponding attributes
required for space infrastructure designed to accomplish the functions. Translated into physical quantities,
the requirements for power, pressurized volume, crew
size and Shuttle launches are typified by figure A-3.
The initial power needs for the central space complex
of the infrastructure are modest, about 25 kW, but as

Table A-1 .—One Contractor Group’s Mission Set
Attached to central
infrastructure complex
in LEO
Inclination plane
Polar
28.5”

Free-f I yers
Inclination plane (LEO)
57”
Polar
GEO
28.5°

Escape

Science and applicatlons:

Astrophysics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Earth and planetary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Environmental observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Life sciences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Materials processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

6
3
4

1

3
1
7

1
7
4

1

2

1
12
3

Commercial:

Earth and ocean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Materials processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Industrial services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Technology development: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Operations: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
86

Total mission set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
SOURCE: Based on information contained in the study led by the General Dynamics Corp

1
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1
1

7

9
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2
12
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Figure A-l .—One Contractor’s Time-Phased Set of
Activities Involving Work Crews
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SOURCE Based on Informatlon contained in the study led by General
Dynamics Corp

the experiment load increases so does the power requirement. If materials processing in space takes place
on a commercial scale now visualized by some, the
power demands could then become quite large. It is
likely that, eventually, much of the materials processing production would be carried out on platforms with
their own solar array power supplies; they would coorbit with the central complex.
In the view of most contractor groups, an initial
operational crew would consist of some three persons,
with the crew size growing to as many as 8 to 10 in
the mid 1990s. Corresponding pressurized volume for
the crew and some operations might grow from about
200 m 3 to 600 m3.
Five or six Shuttle flights would be required to establish the IOC infrastructure suggested in the studies.

Figure A-2. —A Representative Set of Functional Capabilities

SOURCE Based on

in the study led by Grumman Aerospace
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Table A.2.—One Contractor’s Estimate of Required
Infrastructure Attributes
Accommodates activities with work crews:
. Micro-gravity
— Life sciences
— Materials processing
— Technology development
● Outward looking
— Astrophysics
● Earth pointing
— Earth exploration
— Environmental observation
Supports free-flyer activities:
● LEO/H EO satellites/platforms
— Emplacement
— Service
— Retrieval
● GEO satellites/platforms
— Emplacement
— Service
● Planetary satellites
— Boost
Provides resources:
● Work crew time
● Power
● Data processing
● Command and control
● Thermal control
● Stable platform
● Pressurized volume
● Exterior mounting
Provides functions:
● Assembly and construction
● Checkout
● Service
● Reconfiguration
● Maintenance and repair
● Transportation
● Storage
SOURCE: Based on Information contained In the study led by the General
Dynamics Corp

Contractors estimated that civilian projects would require six or seven flights per year (fig. A-3). While three
or four supply visits per year by the Shuttle would be
needed for ongoing operations and maintenance
(O&M), these could be partial-load deliveries combined with other loads.

Infrastructure Elements
(Architecture)
It is at the implementation stage that the contractor
groups’ reports suggest quite different approaches to
providing those in-space infrastructure elements
needed to meet the user needs/desires. One conceptual array of components is illustrated in figure A-4.
The central complex would be in communication with
other elements including free flyers, free-flying platforms, a reusable orbital transfer vehicle, the Shuttle
Orbiter, and ground stations via the Tracking and Data
Relay Satellite communications system.
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The components suggested by one of the contractor groups for the first central complex are indicated
in figure A-5. A central command/habitability module
provides overall infrastructure command and control,
data handling, communications, and accommodations for a crew of four. (Several of the contractor
groups’ studies suggest three crew members at the
outset.) Directly attached is the energy module where
solar cell arrays and batteries provide electrical power
and its conditioning and storage. (In this illustration,
the energy module is pressurized; some studies suggest that it be mounted externally.) The third, logistics,
module stores and makes available consumables and
equipment delivered by the Shuttle. With only these
three infrastructure elements, a crew could live in orbit satisfactorily for extended periods but would be
able to accomplish relatively little scientific or other
activity beyond those experiments that could be accommodated in the available internal space.
Additional elements shown in figure A-5 are the
airlocks to permit people to move in and out of the
habitability module and to conduct activities in space
(so-called extravehicular activity (EVA)), an astronomy
service pallet to enable mounting of scientific observatory equipment, and a payload service pallet to permit servicing of satellites and such auxiliary vehicles
as an orbital maneuvering vehicle. The final unit suggested for the IOC is a materials processing laboratory.
The continuous power suggested would approach
25 kW (roughly corresponding with the initial level
shown in figure A-3). Inasmuch as the crew accommodations might require about half of this amount,
the power available to users would allow for materials
processing experiments but not for some kinds of
ongoing production.
Other contractor groups would arrange the infrastructure elements differently, with a possible command module separate from an habitability module,
or an operations module combining energy generation and conditioning with a command and control
center and EVA facilities. Some designs would incorporate tunnels or passageways to connect different
modules.
Ten or more subsystems have been suggested to
enable the infrastructure elements to remain in orbit
and function satisfactorily. These are itemized in the
organizational diagram shown in figure A-6.
In accordance with the NASA study directions to
the contractor groups to envision the use of new technology where it would be beneficial, various new
materials and theoretical designs for the subsystems
have been suggested. An example of one contractor
group’s technology recommendations is given in table
A-3; while most items are considered to be currently
available in a useful form, advanced technology would
be required to achieve the improved capability and/or
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Figure A-3.— One Contractor’s Estimate of Resources and Services
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reduced weight and Iifecycle costs that it recommends. Some contractors identified standardization
as contributing to cost containment; where no advance in technology appeared necessary, they suggested use of standard available equipment if practical, with space qualification as necessary.

Evolution of the Initial Capability
All of the contractor groups provided plans for evolution from the initial operational capability (IOC) to
expanded infrastructure expected to become available
by the end of the century. One example of infrastructure located in the 28.50 orbit is shown in figures A-7
(IOC) and A-8 (Evolved). The crew would increase
from three to nine, the power would triple, the number of pressurized core modules would increase from
one to five, and the servicing facility would quadru-

ple in size. A similar evolutionary plan including
tended co-orbiting and polar platforms and an ROTV
is shown in figure A-9. A possible co-orbiting industrial platform is illustrated in figure A-1 O, and an initial tended polar platform could appear as shown in
figure A-1 1. Core module commonality was suggested
by essentially all contractor groups in order to promote production cost economy.

Role of a Human Crew
All contractor groups emphasize the importance of
having a human crew. All consider that “sophisticated
machines” (robotics, artificial intelligence, etc. ) will
not be able to provide the desired capabilities that
could be provided by a human crew through the early
1990s. The benefits of having a human crew are summarized by one contractor group in table A-4.
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Figure A-4. —infrastructure/’’Space Station”

Costs and Benefits
The cost estimates of design, development, test and
evaluation, and production, of a “space station” complex have been made by each contractor group according to parametric models following a “Work
Breakdown Structure” developed by the joint Industry Government Space System Cost Analysis Group.
Since detailed designs were not part of the study,
predominantly weight-based parameter estimates
were used to arrive at a rough order-of-magnitude estimate for the costs of designing, building and deploying a complex.
Inasmuch as individual contractor groups proposed
different combinations of modules and systems, considerable care is necessary in making comparisons of
costs among them. It will suffice here to note that a
“core” IOC space station in a 28.50 inclination orbit
(i.e., command/habitation capability for a crew of
three or four, power unit, and resupply logistics
modules) was estimated to cost $3.3 billion to $4 billion (1 984 dollars). With appropriate attached pallets
and modules to provide further observation, experi -

38-798

-

84

-

11

:

3

ment, and servicing capability, the cost would be $4.5
billion to $6 billion. With a crew of eight or nine, 6 0
kW of power to users, two or three laboratory modules
and expanded servicing facilities, plus two tended
platforms–one co-orbiting and one in polar orbit–
the estimated acquisition cost would be $7.5 billion
to $9 billion. This latter infrastructure array corresponds to the IOC suggested by the NASA Space Station Task Force (SSTF) in June 1983.
The above figures include those Shuttle launches required to place the elements in orbit, but generally
do not include NASA support and program management expenses; OTA estimates that these latter costs
would be another $1 billion to $2 billion if acquired
by NASA in its usual fashion.
An additional ROTV capability cost has been estimated at $2 billion to $3 billion, including both the
LEO basing facility and the operating vehicle. If a new
fuel tanker vehicle were to be developed, it could cost
approximately $1 billion.
The programmatic approach assumed by a number
of contractor groups is that of the use of “protoflight”
construction. One group compared the new method
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Figure A-5.—One Contractor’s Suggested IOC Central Complex Architecture

SOURCE: Based on information contained in the study led by Rockwell International.

Figure A-6.—A Suggested Central Complex Subsystem Organization
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Table A-3.—One Contractor’s Suggested List of Subsystem Enabling Technology

EPS . . . . . . . . . . . .●
●
●

Subsystem characteristics
Solar array
NiH, batteries
180V dist.

●
●
●
●

DMS . . . . . . . . . . . • Ada computer language
●
Fibre optics
●
Advanced main memory with b/u
battery
●
Bubble auxiliary memory
COMM & TRKNG • S, Ku band subsystems
●
Dish, omni-antennas
●
TDRS
●
Simultaneous operation
EC/LSS . . . . . . . . .● closed loop
GN&C . . . . . . . . . .● Attitude control
●
Velocity control
●
Stabilization
●
Sensors
a

technology and
required for

●
●
●

●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●

—
Enabling technology
Thin cell and higher efficiency
Cell manufacturing processes
Battery development
High voltage component development
Meeting existing Ada schedulea
Low loss couplersa
Develop higher densities
Space qualifications and higher densities
Modulations/cod ing/bandw idtha
Design/develop for application
Acquisition/tracking/data ratea
Radio frequency interference protection
Existing hardware with modifications
Existing hardware with modifications
Existing hardware with modifications
Existing hardware with modifications
Existing hardware with modifications

techniques adequate
technology

Key
Power Subsystem
Management Subsystem
—Communication
TRKNG—Tracking
EC/LSS—Environmental Control and Life Support Subsystem
GN&C–Guidance, Navigation, and Control
TDRS—Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
SOURCE Based on

contained

the study led by the Grumann Aerospace Corp

Figure A-7.—One Contractor’s Suggested IOC Central Complex

SOURCE Based on Information contained

the study led by Grumman Aerospace Corp
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Figure A-8. —The Same Contractor’s Suggested Evolved Central Complex
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contained
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Figure A“9.—One Contractor’s Suggested Evolution Plan; LEO, 28.5°

Key
TMS—Teleoperataor maneuvering system

ISTO—lnitial solar terrestrial observatory

MMU—Manned maneuvering unit

ASTO—Advanced solar terrestrial observatory
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Figure A-10. —One Contractor’s Suggested Free-Flying Industrial Platform

SOURCE Based on

contained

the study led by Grumman Aerospace

Figure A-11 .–One Contractor’s Suggested Tended Polar Platform (IOC)
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Table A4.—One Contractor’s Summary of Benefits of infrastructure Work Crew Presence
Benefit
Function
●
Maintenance and repair. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ● Reduced equipment cost
●
Enhanced availability and life
Real-time mission involvement. . . . . . . . ● Reacting to unexpected or transient “
events
●
Discovery, insight, and
understanding
a
Lab operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ● Difficult or impossible to automate •
●
Research progress not paced by
●
Shuttle reflight schedule
Construction, assembly, test checkout,
a
modification of large systems . . . . . . ● Difficult or impossible to automate ●
●
●
Simplify designs compared to
●
complex deployment
●
Stiffen structures
●
Final test and correction in space

Related issues
Realizing cost savings potentials
Designing activity and
instruments to take advantage
Lab equipment at “space
station”
Crew skills
Role of EVA
Design to realize benefits
Low-thrust transfer to final
destination

%VIthin the predictable future.
SOURCE: Based on information contained in the study lad by the Boeing Aerospace Co.

with that used in the Skylab project. In contrast to the
multiple qualification test, backup, and flight articles
used then, they assume that the first production unit
will be a flight article. Furthermore, they judge that
the large size of modules permitted by the space transportation system (STS) would promote economy of
scale. Finally, they judge that autonomous operation
of the infrastructure would allow significant reduction
in ground support compared to that of Skylab. These
factors lead them to conclude that a “space station”
could be acquired for significantly less cost per pound
than was Skylab. Although it is unclear which precise
spacecraft elements are included, their estimate was
$77,000/kg ($35,000/lb) for Skylab (1984), while they
projected $44,()()0/kg ($20,000/lb) for a “space station.” Their estimate of the cost of the Spacelab is
$220,000/kg ($100,0O0/lb), although this is higher than
that of European sources. (Of course, a “space station” could be many times larger and heavier than
either Skylab or Spacelab.) They estimate that it required 10 percent of the acquisition costs per year for
Skylab O&M, and estimate that a life-cycle-cost designed “space station” would require about 3 percent
per year to operate.
Estimates for operation and maintenance costs of
all the aerospace contractor groups fall within the
range from $150 million to $600 million per year
(1984); about $400 million per year represents a mean
value of these costs for a “space station” accommodating 8 to 10 crew members.
All contractor groups foresee that in-space infrastructure could provide operational performance,
sociopolitical, and economic benefits. The first two
are essentially qualitative in nature: appropriate activities would enable scientific and commercial communities to expand and improve their activities in space.

Some of the technology advances would be expected
to “spin off” to other areas.
Further, they expect that the performance benefits
would accrue from an improved ability to perform inspace tasks, resulting in both an increase of quantity
and improved quality of output. A number of these
are listed in table A-5. In the research and technology areas, the cost of development programs could
be reduced by large factors–some project it to be as
much as 50 percent. Free-flying platforms could enable and promote many commercial projects. A base
for maintenance and repair of in-space equipment on
Table A.5.—One Contractor’s Summary
of Performance Benefits
All mission operatlons:
●

Decoupled from Shuttle launch schedule, payload
priorities, and ground delays

Space based ROTV:
• 10,000 kg + useful payload into GEO
●

On-demand capability

On-orblt assembly:
Ž Work crew can inspect, work around, and
●

complement robotics and automation
Shuttle size limits surmounted

On-orbit technology and R&D:

Work crew can calibrate, operate, and modify
True space environment
● Interaction of multiple disciplines and capabilities in
a novel environment will produce synergistic
advances
● Shorter development programs
●
●

Sclentific observations:
●
●

Short lived experiments extended
Work crew can monitor, intervene, replenish, and
update

SOURCE: Based on information contained in the study led by the Grumman
Aerospace Corp.
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an as-needed basis, and scheduled activities such as
resupply and/or removal of manufactured products,
would be provided. The useful life of observation
modules would similarly be enhanced by replenishment of consumables, change of experimental equipment items and their unscheduled repair.
As scientific knowledge is gained there is greater potential to enhance the quality of life. Basic research
results provide some of the background to applied research, where economic and social benefits prospects
become more visible. Improved space-based ocean,
weather, and atmospheric research eventually could
assist in our ability to locate and manage Earth resources, and monitor and control the physical environment. New pharmaceuticals as well as semiconductors and metal products could become available
through space research and processing. Other social
benefits envisioned by one of the contractors are indicated in table A-6.
“Space station’ ’-related economic benefits are
hoped for in at least three ways: research, development, and production activities generally; satellite
servicing; and orbital transfer vehicle operations. The
contractor groups judge that the greatest benefits
should flow from the latter.
Research and development cost reduction through
use of infrastructure support is the most difficult to estimate, but most of the contractor groups concluded
it could amount to hundreds of millions of dollars per
year. One example is that of a lengthy science research project such as that involving the Shuttle Infrared Celestial Telescope Facility that anticipates
some 250 days of use in space. If done in a series of
30-day extended-duration orbiter (EDO) trips, the
associated operating expense is estimated to be about
$3.6 million/day, while if accomplished in a continuous interval in a laboratory there, the cost is expected
to decrease sharply, to $0.4 million/day. Materials
science experiments done in space using a 30-day
EDO might cost $2.9 million per experiment, com-

Table A-6.—Some Social Benefits Suggested
by One Contractor
. High-technology—a national goal
● Focus for engineering/science education
● Lunar and beyond exploration
• International cooperation
● Unique, sophisticated development facility
• New communication services
● New commercial products and industries — medical,
semiconductor
● New therapeutic, diagnostic techniques
● Enhanced national security
SOURCE: Based on information contained in the study led by the Grumman
Aerosp~e Corp.

●

153

pared with an estimated $0.6 million per experiment
if done in a long-term laboratory there. One estimate
of the cost of pharmaceutical production, where a
large portion of the expense is in the materials, is that
of some $33 million/kg ($15 million/lb) if done in an
EDO, compared to $18 million/kg ($8 million/lb) if
done at a “space station.” These kinds of cost benefits
could be expected to continue throughout the complete “space station” life of some two decades and,
if realized, could be a significant factor in encouraging the commercialization of space.
Were a Shuttle used to service an LEO satellite, the
price per flight would approach some $20 million,
which is comparable to the value of the servicing for
many such satellites. Using permanent space infrastructure services offers the possibility, in principle, of
reducing this operational cost by perhaps one half.
Benefits expected of an ROTV are related primarily
to its being based in space and its reusability. One of
the study contractor groups estimated that a fully
amortized ROTV service could be provided at a total
cost of about $60 million for a 4,500 kg (10,000-lb)
payload delivered from LEO to GEO. In contrast, a
large expendable upper stage costs some $100 million or more, delivered with its payload to LEO. Thus,
net economic benefit for the ROTV would be some
$4o million to $5o million per flight, and 20 launches
per year could provide a total savings of $1 billion/year.
Figure A-1 2 illustrates the judgment of one contractor group regarding the various kinds of benefits expected of the use of a “space station.”
Regardless of when a positive economic payoff
might commence—always assuming that it does—a
“space station” could be a powerful capability multiplier. Of course, one of the most important benefits
would arise from the conduct of activities which
would be impossible to conduct without it, and activities that we cannot conceive of now.

Conclusions
The aerospace contractor groups that studied potential needs and desires for new infrastructure identified hundreds of activities in the areas of space
science and applications, commercialization, and
technology development that could be carried out utilizing long lifetime infrastructure with accommodation
for a crew to live and work in space. The vast majority
are activities that are possible only with a crew supported by the infrastructure, or ones that would be
enhanced by their presence: they would maximize
R&D performance, especially in the life and materials
sciences, and contribute to economic benefits. No
single activity, or even a few, would be sufficient to
justify its establishment, but the large total number
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Figure A-12.– One Contractor’s Summary of Infrastructure (“Space Station”) Payoffs
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contributing in all functional areas, in the judgment
of the contractor groups, provide reasons to acquire
an extensive permanently inhabited space infrastructure.
All study participants see significant benefits—including such intangibles as national prestige, leadership in space, and economic, performance, and social
benefits connected with scientific research, commercialization, and new technology. Reflecting the broad
range of advantages projected, contractors differed as
to which aspect would be most significant. Planetary
probes, a Lunar settlement, and human exploration
of Mars are considered of great significance in terms
of longer range goals.
It was the unanimous recommendation that the first
infrastructure units should be placed in a 28.50 inclination low-Earth-orbit. All were envisioned as new technology designs and were projected as allowing evolutionary growth with increased size and capability
phased in over an initial assembly period of about 5
years. The smallest unit with adequate volume to
house a crew of three for extended stays and with min-

imum experimental and research facilities would consist of a command/habitat module connected to a
solar-array energy module, plus two logistics modules
(for resupply by Shuttle flight). They estimated such
an initial unit’s acquisition cost to be from $3.3 billion to $4 billion (1984). A later complex accommodating eight crew members, 60 kW of power to
users, two laboratory modules, several external payload attachment points and satellite service pallets,
and two tended platforms (co-orbiting and polar) were
estimated to cost $7.5 billion to $9 billion. An ROTV
capability could cost as much as $3 billion more. And
further expansion of “space station” components and
capabilities were contemplated into the 21st century.
These contractor costs accumulate to $10 billion to
$12 billion for the development of the contractorsuggested evolved complex over an approximately 9year period to the mid-1990s; NASA support and program integration expense could be another $2 billion
to $3 billion. The contractor “evolved” system is
roughly comparable to the summer 1983 NASA IOC
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but with the addition of full ROTV capability. (Further
additions that enter, generally, in NASA’s future plans
to the year 2000 would add another $6 billion.)
The contractors point out that, although quite large,
these expenditures may be compared with the approximately $60 billion (1 984) invested in the Apollo program and the estimated equivalent $56 billion spent
for the Salyut-Soyuz project (reported by Interavia for
February 1982), each over a somewhat comparable
period of time. While the study contractor groups concluded that these estimated costs could be contained
within a NASA budget projection that maintained
today’s level of appropriation over a 10-year period,
they recognize that some cost-offsetting economic return on this public investment is necessary.
While the prospects for cost containment and other
intangible benefits are considered to be promising,
two operational factors are pointed out as the main
sources of large, quantifiable economic benefits. One
is the use of an LEO-based ROTV system to transport
equipments between LEO and higher orbits, including
GEO. The other relates to the fact that appropriate infrastructure would result in maximizing the STS load
factor for each flight. The contractors project a reduction in costs for these activities of up to $10 billion
over the system lifetime. Income could result from increased commercial space development fostered by
the lower cost of space activities and faster conduct
of research activities generally.
A final comparison may be made regarding other
long-duration “space stations” of the past and present:
Skylab and Salyut. As orbiting spacecraft accommodating crews, at first glance they appear to be fundamentally similar. But, while all three could function
as space test and laboratory facilities, the contractors
note that the proposed “space station” is the only one
providing for satellite servicing. And neither Skylab nor
Salyut offered the assembly and transport harbor envisioned for a new “space station. ”

Major Findings of “Mission Analysis
Studies” of Other Countries
Related studies were also requested of potential
foreign participants in any “space station” program.
In terms similar to the eight U.S. aerospace contractor group studies, the European Space Agency (ESA),
the National Research Council of Canada, and a Japanese Space Station Task Team (representing numerous organizations in Japan interested in aerospace
activities) prepared studies. In addition, individual
companies or groups of companies from these regions
presented reports of elements or subsystems of special
interest to them. Among these were Dornier of Ger-
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many, Aerospatiale of France, Spar Aerospace of Canada, and a group of European companies consisting
of AEG, British Aerospace, Fokker, and CIR.

European Space Agency
The member nations of the European Space Agency
(ESA) authorized a study team which was directed by
MBB/ERNO and included Aeritalia, Matra, British
Aerospace, Dornier System, SABCA, BTM, and KAMPSAX. It examined European interest in providing elements and the likely consequences of utilizing a
“space station” having crew capabilities.
Especially emphasized was ESA’s desire to participate actively in the program, both in the design and
construction of components (e.g., logistics modules,
free-flying platforms, laboratory modules, and equipment and servicing pallets) and in the later operations
(e.g., access on a continuing basis for experiments,
identification of payloads and operational requirements, and provision of crew members).
The study assessed participation as offering potential benefits to European nations in scientific, technological, industrial, economic, operational, and political areas. European contributions were seen as based
upon their own set of potential user interests, on systems with clean interfaces with other infrastructure
components, and on the utilization of developed European technologies (specifically Spacelab). Perhaps ESA
could provide “dedicated modules” with preferential
conditions for European users to compensate for European investment. Participation would be particularly
cost effective to ESA if all of the infrastructure were
available to it without a major program on their part
to obtain it, so that it would be complementary with
rather than competitive with European unmanned
systems.
The study team identified about 130 activities that,
conceptually, European countries desire to carry out
in space. Similar to the projections of the U.S. contractor groups, they included materials processing, life
sciences and bioprocessing studies, space science and
applications, and technology development. An innovative use was that of entertainment, such as filming
of space movies and creation of new artistic forms in
space.
ESA recognized the possibility of free-flyers as a supplement to a “space station” for Earth observation and
space science, but noted the advantages (over an expendable booster) of the Shuttle and additional inorbit infrastructure; this combination would involve
less costly hardware, provide return transportation as
needed, and obviate the necessity of bringing a complete spacecraft back to the surface for servicing.
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The need or benefit from human involvement in
about 70 percent of the proposed activities was
stressed. Among these were life sciences experiments
and the servicing of satellites such as the EURECA
vehicles that are under design in Europe. Power needs
identified for users were in the range of 20 to 30 kW.

Canada
The National Research Council of Canada expressed
a high degree of interest. The Canadian report identified about 37 potential uses and desires, largely in
the areas of remote sensing and technology development. Most could be carried out at an orbit inclination of 28.5° with 5 kW of power. Many uses would
benefit from having a human crew, and a Canadian
astronaut as a payload specialist was proposed.
Continued development of the SPAR Remote Manipulator System is anticipated along with new work
on associated construction and servicing subsystems.
Also, Canada would develop a space vision system
to facilitate ranging and docking, and consideration
is being given to advanced remote sensing subsystems.
In a separate report, Spar Aerospace Limited outlined its capabilities in high-power solar arrays and indicated interest in building one of a modular type;
various concepts were given but no cost estimates.

Japan
The Japanese Space Station Task Team reported
long-term, across-the-board interest. While few specifics regarding individual experiments were given,
they anticipated uses for astronomy, life sciences,
materials processing, technology development, Earth
observation, space energy research, and large communications satellite assembly. The majority of these
would require or benefit from human presence, with
long time on orbit and human judgment and/or operating capability as important factors. They anticipate
that space activities would involve two general phases—
one up to the middle 1990s to develop methods to
be capitalized on thereafter.
The Japanese would be interested in developing
almost any or all elements of the space infrastructure,
from attached modules to the ROTV. They suggest
starting with simple standard modules and enlarging
the capabilities for various additional needs.

Individual Foreign Company Interests
Extensive studies were made by several European
companies or industrial groups to augment the reports
discussed in the previous sections of this chapter. A
submission of Spar Aerospace Limited has already

been discussed in the section on Canada; others are
presented here.
DORNIER
Dornier of Germany investigated several conceptual infrastructure elements for ESA which have an obvious relation to a potential later participation of Europe in a U.S. program. The conceptual elements
analyses included:
1. ‘requirements and technology aspects for space
pointing systems;
2. designs and capabilities of heat pipe radiators;
and
3. life sciences experiments and development of life
support systems.
AEROSPATIALE
Aerospatiale of France studied the following areas:
1. General infrastructure concepts, along with their
evaluation of the eight U.S. contractor group architectural designs. The contractor group studies
were noted as having numerous advantageous
design features, but in each case several difficulties are foreseen.
2. Concepts for a Reusable Orbital Transfer Vehicle were studied with special consideration of its
fuel storage arrangements.
3. Designs of a Teleoperator Maneuvering System
were-studied. It would incorporate solar arrays
to provide electrical power.
AEG, BRITISH AEROSPACE, FOKKER, CIR
This group of European companies analyzed power
sources employing solar energy arrays, comparing
planar and concentrator designs and various supporting structure arrangements. A flexible-blanket, retractable, fold-out array was favored for further study. This
approach also lends itself to stepwise growth to power
levels as great as 250 kW.
MBB/ERNO, AERITALIA, BRITISH AEROSPACE,
DORNIER SYSTEM, SABCA, BTM, KAMPSAX
MBB/ERNO, the leader of this group of companies,
was also the principal contractor for the general ESA
“space station” study. Thus, much duplication occurs
in this report of the summary appearing earlier in this
chapter.
Considerable emphasis was put upon the possibility of the Spacelab and EURECA spacecraft being used
as infrastructure elements.
Modifications of Spacelab could provide combined
habitation/laboratory functions in conjunction with an
EDO vehicle. A crew of three could be accommo-
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dated, but this would result in a decrease in laboratory space compared to the present Spacelab design.
EURECA would first be used as a Shuttle-tended unpressurized free-flying platform. Later development of
a resource/service module incorporating solar electrical power, environmental control, and life support
systems would enable an increased capability in association with the developed Spacelab and the EURECA
platform. Ultimately these elements could, with others,
become components of a larger, more permanent
space infrastructure.
Also, a Spacelab with its own solar array could be
a free-flying experiment module which could be
tended by a crew that would visit for a few hours at
a time.
They also indicated a European consortium was prepared to develop and produce an ROTV and its
hangar facility, a Teleoperator Maneuvering System
(labeled by Matra as a Teleoperated Service Vehicle),
and the satellite service and assembly infrastructure
segments.
No specific estimated costs were given. However,
six items (a free-flying, tended, experiment module,
a logistics module, a free-flying platform, an unpressurized logistics resupply carrier, a teleoperator maneuvering system, and a thermal control technology
development program) could be achieved over a 1s
year period at funding levels aggregating about $1.6
billion (1984). While direct comparison with estimates
made by U.S. aerospace companies is difficult because of numerous design and capability differences,
this cost could be lower than, but of the same order
of magnitude as, the estimate for a corresponding set
of modules by the American contractors.
The study observed that pressurized modules would
sometimes be needed for experimental reasons even
if human habitation were not a consideration, and this
would affect not only the design but also the operation of such modules.
The study team recommended that development
should proceed in phases with the initial phase using
proven existing elements. Automated processes should
be preferred for routine work, but cost effectiveness
must always be considered, inasmuch as automation
can be costly.
This study, representing companies from many
European countries, was oriented to identifying potentially produceable infrastructure elements, not
overall concepts. This emphasized Europe’s intention
to play an active role in development and operation,
not simply provide hardware. The candidate elements
would satisfy their user needs and have clean interfaces with the other elements of space infrastructure.
This would not only put Europe in a position to oper-
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ate their facilities, but also enable them to be offered
to the United States, thus allowing a sharing of resources and reducing the financial involvement of participating nations,

Summary
The universal attitude of all non-United States organizations is one of enthusiasm to participate in a space
infrastructure program, not just to develop and build
elements of it, but to be active as partners in the operation and use of its facilities, especially the elements
that they would produce. Many of them look upon
it as fundamental to their future role in space and
therefore want long-term understandings or agreements with the United States. The characteristic note
is one of desired international cooperation in which
there is true participation throughout rather than
simply shared eventual utilization.

NASA Synthesis of the “Mission
Analysis Studies”
NASA assembled the United States and foreign mission analysis reports relating to a civilian “space station” and held a workshop during May 1983, to synthesize the results. Of the hundreds of projects and
experiments proposed by potential users, the workshop of the Requirements Working Group and the
SSTF Concept Development Group established a minimum time-phased “mission set” (for the decade from
1991 to 2000) of 107 specific space activities, plus four
generic industrial service activities (e.g., satellite
servicing).
Of the 107, 48 were categorized under science and
applications, 28 under commercial, and 31 under
technology development. The four additional commercial opportunity activities would be continuously
available as needed for industrial servicing.
The NASA working groups judged the list of activities to be realistic in terms of maturity of experimental
and program planning, scientific need, and progress
of technology development. The programs identified
for the first 3 years were particularly well validated
in their view. At the end of the workshop, their recommendations of the minimum capabilities required
at IOC were as follows:
1. Space station central complex at 28.50:
● 55 kW of average
electrical power to users;
3
● Two 60 m laboratory modules (for materials
processing in space and life sciences);
● 5 person crew (4 for payload operations);
● 300 MBPS data rate; and
• 4 to 6 payload attachment mounts,
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2. Polar platform (unpressurized):
● 12.5 kW of average power;
● 300 MBPS data rate; and
• 4 payload attachment mounts.

Nonaerospace Industry Interest
in Space Use
NASA contracted with the Booz-Allen & Hamilton
and Coopers and Lybrand consultant firms to communicate with a variety of nonaerospace companies
to ascertain (and at the same time stimulate) interest
in the use of space facilities for commercial purposes.
Up to March 1984, they discussed prospects with upwards of so companies of which more than 30 expressed active interest. To most of these firms the concept of doing business in space is utterly foreign; a
great deal of exploring with them is necessary to surface possibilities of products or services that might be
compatible with their commercial activities and offer
promising opportunity of eventual financial success.
Booz-Allen & Hamilton reported to a conference in
mid-1 983 that most of the companies moving toward
negotiation of Joint Endeavor Agreements with NASA
are well-known U.S. industrial firms (one with an announced agreement is the 3M Corp.) but several are
from the small business sector or Europe. Interest is
concentrated in such fields as chemicals, metals,
glasses, communications, and crystals. Another type
of enterprise being actively pursued is a fee-for-service
laboratory in space. Among the half-dozen companies
actively investigating space experiments, most are interested in crew-tended operations rather than remote
or automated procedures.
Since the administration’s authorization of a “space
station” program, interest among several companies
has become more firm, according to those involved
in the study; the 3M Corp. has recently announced
a Memorandum of Understanding with NASA to begin
space experiments on inorganic chemical materials

and on thin films. An executive with one company
with experience in aerospace has indicated that the
Government’s funding toward eventual acquisition of
permanently inhabited space infrastructure is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition to convince industries that the United States is serious about space
commercialization. He considers that, in addition, a
long-term commitment to supporting the commercialization effort is what will suffice to bring the private
sector into full participation.
Some industry observers point out that the oftenmentioned example of how communications satellites
became a commercial success is not necessarily relevant to today’s efforts at space commercialization in
other areas. First, there was already a clear market for
the improved communications services which a private organization was created to provide, something
which is not clearly evident today is such areas as
materials processing in space or remote sensing. Second, the enabling legislation to move it forward to
reality was motivated by the need to create an international system, while today’s commercialization
issues concern primarily U.S. domestic businesses.
The barriers that Booz-Allen & Hamilton found to
wider interest in commercial space enterprises were
technical, economic, and government-related. First,
technical knowledge of the space environment by
many industries is very scanty, while in general there
are too few answers as yet to the behavior of many
kinds of materials in space. Second, economic risks
associated with timing and cost of space experiments
are looked at by private enterprise from the standpoint
of the expected long payback period (1 O or more
years). Third, the maze of government bureaucracy
to be faced to obtain approval on such things as Joint
Endeavor Agreements is deterring some, especially
small companies, from entering into space business.
Booz-Allen & Hamilton is recommending establishment of some form of permanent intermediary to assist
nonaerospace companies in contacts with NASA and
other Government agencies.

Appendix B

THE EVOLUTION OF CIVILIAN IN-SPACE
INFRASTRUCTURE, I. E., “SPACE STATION,”
CONCEPTS IN THE UNITED STATES*
Introduction
Almost from the first time humans thought about
leaving the surface of this planet, one theme has been
the creation of some form of human outpost in space.
In fiction, and during this century in increasingly specific engineering detail, the “space station” concept
has been extensively discussed. In one of the two major space-faring nations, the Soviet Union, a fairly
rudimentary but still very capable “space station” program, centered on the Salyut spacecraft, has been ongoing since 1971. In the other space power, the
United States, the development of some kind of permanent presence i n space to support space activities
i n an efficient and effective manner, is now u rider
way.
This appendix reviews those past occasions, with
particular attention to the rationales offered at various
times for space infrastructure development and to the
differing concepts which have been proposed. History can cast a useful perspective on current policy
alternatives, which, after all, reflect the continuation
of a long-running debate over the justification for infrastructure of various characteristics, size, and cost.
By sketching the earlier points in the history of the U.S.
space program at which a “space station” has come
under serious consideration as a major project, only
to be rejected in favor of some other alternative, it may
be possible to identify what is now different, and what
is not, that might now lead to a more favorable evaluation of various proposals.

Earliest Space Infrastructure
.
t
(i e.,
.
“Space Station” Concepts)
The first proposals for “space stations” conceptually
akin to modern schemes appeared in the late nineteenth century. Konstantin E. Tsiolkovsky’s Dreams of
Earth and Sky and the Effects of Universal Gravity
(1895) and Kurd Lasswitz’s On Two Planets (1897) set

the tone by picturing “space stations” as stepping
stones for trips by people to the planets, especially
Mars. Like these earliest contributions, succeeding
proposals included fiction and nonfiction, humanism
and science, practicality and fancy. They were sparked
by an unbridled enthusiasm for spaceflight and a firm
belief that exploration of the planets was human destiny. Most were informed enough to realize that direct ascent from Earth to interplanetary space was not
technical y attractive. “Space stations” were way stations, logistics depots on the way to the planets.
Tsiolkovsky in 1923 wrote of a station placed “at
a distance of 2,000 to 3,000 versts (a Russian unit of
distance equal to 0.6629 mile) from the Earth, as (an
artificial) Moon. Little by little appear colonies with
supplements, materials, machines, and structures
brought from Earth.” In his 1923 book, The Rocket
Into Interplanetary Space, space pioneer Herman
Oberth first described an orbiting manned satellite as
a “space station, ” and proposed that it could be used
as an Earth observation site, world communications
link, weather satellite, or orbital refueling station for
outward-bound space vehicles.
The early proposals resulted in more words than
hardware. The only group of “space station” advocates to make progress toward realizing their dreams
were the members of the German Rocket Society,
among whom the “space station” concept became
common currency. 2 But even they could only muddle along on rocket research with the limited private
funds at their disposal until military support prompted
by the approach of World War II brought on the financing necessary for research and development that
would lead to spaceflight. Wernher von Braun and
his associates built the v-2 rocket for the Wehrmacht
in order, they said later, to achieve their real goal—
the development of spaceflight. Whatever their motives, after the war they brought to the United States
the most advanced rocket technology in the world and
schemes for “space station” and interplanetary flight
that had been sparked and nurtured by the romantic
enthusiasm of the first half of the 20th century.

*This paper was prepared for OTA by John Logsdon, based In part on
orlglnal material by Alex Roland,
I Much of this section IS based on papers by Frederick 1. Ordway, I I 1, ‘‘The
History, Evolutlon, and Benefits of the Space StatIon Concept, ” presented
to the XIII International Congress of the History of Sctence, August 1 971;
and Leonard David, “Space StatIons of the Imaglnatlon, ” A/AA Studenf)ourna/ VOI 20, No, 4, winter 1982/1 983.

‘Barton C. Hacker, “And Rest As On a Natural Station: From Space Statton to Orbital Operations In Space-Travel Thought, 1985-1951 ,“ unpublished
paper, NASA History C)tlce ArchIves (hereafter NHOA), Washington, DC,
p 9.
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In the United States in the years immediately following World War II, both scientists and military leaders recognized that the ability to launch payloads into
orbit would have important implications for their particular fields of activity. In considering the various uses
to which space might be put, several lines of development emerged. First, to the concept of “space stations” with human crews as stepping stones to the
planets was added the less dramatic but more realizable concept of relatively small Earth satellites, not
to send men to other celestial bodies but to perform
practical, Earth-oriented tasks in orbit: communication, scientific research, reconnaissance, etc. j
Second, further consideration led some to conclude
that bases in orbit were “not necessary for most activities envisioned there: rendezvous of the rockets and
satellites themselves is sufficient to most purposes. ”4
But this perspective and its appearance in the literature
did nothing to deter a third line of development: the
elaboration of earlier concepts of “space stations, ”
perpetuated in this era most spectacularly by Wernher
von Braun’s concept of a toroidal “space station. ”
Von Braun’s ideas received wide publicity in a Collier’s magazine special titled “Man Will Conquer
Space Soon.” Von Braun claimed that “scientists and
engineers now know how to build a station in space
that would circle the Earth, 1,075 miles up . . . .If we
do it, we can not only preserve the peace but we can
take a long step toward uniting mankind.”
Von Braun’s plan called for a triple-decked, 25-ftwide, wheel-shaped station in polar orbit which would
be a “superb observation post” and from which “a
trip to the Moon itself will be just a step.” The main
element of space infrastructure would be accompanied by another: a free-flying observatory that would
be tended by a crew.
Von Braun noted that the station would not be alone
in space; “there will nearly always be one or two
rocket ships unloading supplies near to the station. ”
“Space taxis” or “shuttle-craft,” as von Braun described them, would ferry both people and materials
from the rocket ships to the station itself.
Von Braun noted a number of uses for a “space
stat ion”:
●
“a springboard for exploration of the solar
system”;

‘R. Carglll Hall, “Early US. Satellite Proposals,” Tec/rno/ogy and Cu/fure,
vol. 4, 1963, pp. 41 O-434; and Arthur Clarke, “Extraterrestrial Relays: Can
Rocket Stations Give Worldwide Coverage?” W/re/ess Wodd, October 1945,
pp 305-308.
4Harry E. Ross, “Orbital Bases, ” )ourna/ of fhe British /rrferp/anetary Society,
vol. 9,
pp. 1 -19; Kenneth W. Gatland, “Rockets in Circular Orbit, ”
)ourna/ of the British Interplanetary Society, vol. 9, 1949, pp. 52-59.
‘Wernher von Braun, “Crossing the Last Frontier, ” Co//ier’s, Mar, 22, 1952,
pp. 25-29, 72-74.

1949,

“a watchdog of the peace”;
a meteorological observation post;
● a navigation aid for ships and airplanes; and
●
“a terribly effective atomic bomb carrier. ”
This detailed description was only one of the many
concepts developed in the years after World War II
but prior to the 1957 launch of Sputnik and the formal beginning of the Space Age.6 Even before the
United States had an official civilian space program,
most of the possible uses of a “space station” had
been identified by visionaries who dreamed of space
travel,7
●

●

The Response to Sputnik, 1957-61

8

Sputnik changed the context for U.S. space activities. In spite of President Eisenhower’s attempts to
avoid it, a space race with the Russians was on. All
kinds of proposals that would have been laughed from
the stage in earlier years were put forward in deadly
earnest. Many at home and abroad perceived the
United States as having fallen behind the Soviet Union
at least in this sophisticated technology, and nothing
but a crash program would do.
Having people in space is the most complicated and
the most dramatic of space activities, and it quickly
became the focus of the competition. News that the
Soviets were considering a “space station” of the von
Braun variety fanned the enthusiasm in the United
States for a like undertaking and underlined the military overtones of the space race.9 As one observer put
it, “the rapid and timely completion of the Military
Space Station will do much to bring about space
supremacy (italics added) for America and lay the
scientific foundation for the aerospace power of the
f u t u r e . ”10
But this was not to be. In spite of all that the military had done to pioneer research in spaceflight, President Eisenhower opted for a civilian space agency, the

bThe detailed description in the von Braun article should not be confused
with a detailed design. For two early detailed designs, see: 1 ) “Assembly of
a Multl-Manned Satellite, ” Lockheed Missile and Space Division, LMSD
48347, Dec. 18, 1958 (available in the archives of the National Air and Space
Museum of the Smithsonian Institution); and 2) “A Modular Concept for a
Multi-Manned Space Station, “ in the IAS Proceedings of the Manned Space
Stat/on Symposium, Apr. 20-22, 1960, pp. 37-72.
7See, for example, the IAS report, op. cit.
8Thls history is recounted in John M. Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the
Moon Project Apollo and the Nat/onal Interest (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
197o), ch, 2; and W. David Compton and Charles D. Benson, Living and
Working in Space: The History o{ Skylab (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1983), SP-4208, ch. 1.
9“Soviet Scientist Sees Need for Manned Station in Space, ” AerO/spdCe
Engineering, vol.
September 1958, p, 27.
iOLowell B. Smith, “The Military Test Space Stat Ion,” Aero/Spdce EfWKW-

17,

/ng, vol.

19,

May 1960, p. 19.
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National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), and entrusted it with a manned mission. And
that mission would be a modest one, at least at the
start. Project Mercury would demonstrate that a person could fly in space; until then there would be no
talk of “space stations” and manned flight to the
Moon and planets. 11
However, as the new space agency began operations, NASA leadership set the development of a longrange plan for the agency’s first decade as a high-priority task. A “space station” was a leading candidate
for a post-Mercury goal. The House Space Committee in early 1959 concluded that stations were the logical follow-on to Mercury, and von Braun (then still
working for the Army) presented a similar view i n his
briefings to NASA, At this time, the German rocket
team had developed an elaborate scheme, called Project Horizon, for Army utilization of space, including
miIitary outposts on the Iunar surface.
In the first half of 1959, NASA created a Research
Steering Committee on Manned Space Flight, chaired
by Harry Goett. At the first meeting of this committee
members placed a “space station” ahead of a lunar
expedition in a list of logical post-Mercury steps. In
subsequent meetings, the debate centered on the
question of whether a “space station’s” value for
scientific research, especially in the biomedical area,
outweighed the excitement of a lunar landing goal.
While some members of the committee argued that
“the ultimate objective of space exploration is
manned travel to and from other planets, ” the representative of one center argued for an interim step,
since “in true spaceflight man and the vehicle are going to be subjected to the space environment for extended periods of time and there will undoubtedly be
space rendezvous requirements. All of these aspects
need extensive study . . . the best means would be
with a true orbiting space laboratory that is manned
and that can have a crew and equipment change. ” 12
Ultimately, the Goett committee recommended that
a lunar landing be established as NASA’s long-range
goal, on the grounds that it was a true “end-objective”
requiring no justification in terms of some larger goals
to which it contributed.
These recommendations were not immediately accepted. For example, at an August 1960 industry briefing on NASA’s future plans, George Low presented
a scheme in which a manned lunar landing and creation of a “space station” were given equal treatment
I I Loyal s Swenson, jr., james M,

G

rlmwood, and Charles C. Alexander,

This I\’eM Ocean A H/sfory of’ Prqect Mercury, NASA SP-420T (Washington, DC National Aeronautics and Space Admlnlstratlon, 1966).
I ~Bruce Lofi I n, as quoted I n the MI n utes of the Research steering Committee on Manned Fllght, meeting of May 25-26, 1959 (NHOA)

as long-range goals of the NASA program; Low told
the conference that “in this decade, therefore, our
present planning calls for the development and demonstration of an advanced manned spacecraft with sufficient flexibility to be capable of both circumlunar
flight and useful Earth orbital missions. In the long
range, this spacecraft should lead toward a permanent
manned “space station. ”13 Low also announced the
name of the advanced spacecraft program, then aimed
both at the Moon and at “space stations”; it was to
be called “Project Apollo.”

The Apollo Anomaly
Once again, however, external events intervened
to upset the orderly course of events envisioned by
those planning the country’s future in space. President
Kennedy came into office in 1961 committed to reassert America’s vitality and resolve in the war of nerves
with the Soviet Union. When, in April 1961, the Russians tested the United States once again by launching the first man into space, Kennedy ended his early
indecisiveness on the space program and in 1961
committed the country to the race to the Moon. This
decision, the most momentous in the history of the
American space program, was made for reasons of
prestige and politics. 14 It determined the future of
NASA and its programs more thoroughly than any
other decision before or since. That influence operated on two levels.
First, and perhaps most importantly in the long run,
the style and public perception of the Apollo commitment made it something of a model for all future space
proposals. President Kennedy made the decision
quickly but not precipitously. He consulted his staff
and NASA and chose the Moon landing as the most
dramatic and most feasible of the suggestions for
demonstrating U.S. ability to best the Soviet Union in
high-technology competition. He presented the idea
in a speech before an unusual joint session of Congress, in which the new President outlined his plans
for fulfilling his campaign promises of getting the
United States moving again.
“Now is the time,” said Kennedy, “to take longer
strides—time for a great new American enterprise—
time for this nation to take a clearly leading role in
space achievement, which in many ways may hold
the key to our future on Earth. ” 15 In a moving and uncompromising challenge, the President called on Con1
‘George Low, “Manned Space Fllght, ” an NASA, NASA -lrrdustry Program
P/.]ns Conference, July 1960, p. 80, (NHOA).
‘“ Logsdon, op. cit., chs. 3-5, recounts the history of the declslon to begin
the Apollo program and analyzes the motives which led to that declslon
“lbld , p. 128
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gress and the public to commit itself to a $25-billion16
undertaking in space for largely intangible goals of
prestige and competition. Congress and the public
agreed, launching NASA on its most famous and formative enterprise and creating an indelible image of
how to launch a major project in space. Only slowly,
if at all, would NASA administrators and other space
advocates come to realize that the Apollo commitment was a political anomaly defying duplication.
The Apollo decision also ensured that in accomplishing the lunar landing objective the United States
would develop a large, but specialized, space capability, and that manned spaceflight would come to
dominate all other kinds for at least a decade. And
it ensured, especially after it was complemented by
the lunar-orbital rendezvous decision, that the “space
station” concept would recede into the background
for the duration of the race to the Moon. The Moon
mission would proceed on its journey directly from
Earth orbit–simply because that was the quickest way
to go (though not necessarily the best for long-term
development) and the Saturn V launch vehicle (originally designed for other purposes) would permit it.
In this hothouse atmosphere, Project Mercury and
Project Gemini became demonstration programs for
Apollo. Many of the tasks that had to be accomplished
in order for Apollo to succeed were also on the agenda
for “space station” research. Mercury, for example,
demonstrated that a person could survive the weightlessness and radiation of space. Gemini demonstrated
that rendezvous, docking, and extravehicular activity were feasible. The last of these was always more
important to “space station” plans than to Apollo.
Both projects demonstrated, at least to some, that a
human being was a crucial component of the spacecraft’s capability, performing such functions as
piloting, observing, and photographing; and piloting
especially was contrasted with the comparatively
primitive, ground-controlled capsules of the Russians
in which the cosmonaut was simply a passenger. ’
Notwithstanding these positive steps on the road to
a total manned spaceflight capability, Apollo was to
prove a programmatic deadend for NASA. Many in
NASA understood all along that the lunar rendezvous
approach to accomplishing the objective was a technical anomaly and they never gave up their notion
of a more logical approach to human exploitation of
space, i.e., a “space station. ” For this reason, while
Apollo was at the center of public attention during the

1960s, studies of “space station” concepts proceeded
throughout the decade.

“Space Station” Plans During
the 1960s
During the 1960s, “space station” studies were conducted both within NASA and by the various aerospace contractors (particularly those without a major
role in Apollo). They resulted in examination of a wide
variety of concepts, ranging from inflatable balloonIike structures, through the use of refurbished rocket
stages, to very large stations requiring the use of Saturn
V boosters to put them in orbit. Three NASA field centers—the Manned Spacecraft Center in Texas, the Marshall Space Flight Center in Alabama, and the Langley
Research Center in Virginia—managed these in-house
and contractor studies, and they were coordinated by
the Advanced Missions Office of the Office of Manned
Space Flight at NASA headquarters in Washington.18
While the manned flight centers at Houston and
Huntsville were focusing almost their total energies
on getting Apollo started in the early 1960s,’9 the
Langley Research Center was giving substantial attention to the theoretical and engineering aspects of
“space station” design. These efforts dated from at
least mid-1959, and by 1962 enough work had been
done to form the basis for a “space station” symposium.20 Langley researchers noted that “a large manned
orbiting ‘space station’ may have many uses or objectives.” Among these objectives they listed:
1. learning to live in space;
● artificial-gravity
experiments,
. zero-gravity experiments, and
• systems research and development,
2. applications research;
● communications experiments,
● earth
observations,
3. launch platform experiments; and
4. scientific research.
With respect to launch platform experiments, Langley
suggested that:
. . . the “space station” with its crew of trained astronauts and technicians should be a suitable facility for
Iestudles durln~ the 1960s

at the Langley Research Center, the Manned

Spacecraft Center, and the Marshall Space Flight Center are summarized In
Langley Research Center, Compilation of Papers Presented at the Space Station Technology Symposium, Feb. 11-13, 1969 (N HOA).
!sEven So, both Houston and Huntsville had “space station’ study effofls

lbThen_some $6CI bi I I ton today.
I TSwenson, et al., Op. cit.; Baflon C. Hacker and James M. Grimwood, on

u n d e r w a y ; i n p a r t i c u l a r , H o u s t o n w a s s t u d y i n g a l a r g e (24person) “space station” to be launched by a Saturn V. The studies directed
by Langley have been chosen for review because they were more fully developed than those directed by the two other centers.
~t}The early Langley studies are summarized in Langley Research Center,

the Shoulders of Titans: A History of Project Gemini, NASA SP-4203 (WashI ngton, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1977).

A Reporl on the Research and Technological Problems of Manned Rotating
Spacecraft, NASA Technical Note D-1 504, August 1962 (NHOA).
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learning some of the fundamental operations necessary for launching space missions from orbit. The new
technologies required for rendezvous, assembly orbital countdown, replacement of defective parts, and
orbital launch can be determined. 21
Among various “space station” studies carried out
by Langley contractors during the first half of the
1960s, perhaps the most detailed was that of a
Manned Orbital Research Laboratory (MORL) conducted by Douglas Aircraft from 1963 to 1966. Douglas had had some prior interest in “space stations”;
in 1960 it had built a full-scale mockup of a fourperson astronomical space observatory as the central
theme of an “ideal home exhibition” held in London.
This station was to be constructed inside the fuel tank
of a second-stage booster, a Douglas idea which ultimately found use in the Skylab program over a decade later.22
In this study, a baseline technical concept for an
MORL was established first, then the “utilization potential” of such a station was examined—i,e., design
preceded requirements. When the original design was
compared to various requirements, it was inadequate,
and a larger station in a different orbit evolved as the
final result of the study effort. The study found that
the highest utilization potential came from “key engineering and scientific research studies augmented by
specific experiments directed toward potential Earthcentered applications. ” As the study proceeded, the
MORL got steadily more sophisticated and bigger, as
there were no criteria established to limit the addition
of new experimental requirements.
The MORL requirements study examined:
● Earth-centered
applications;
● national
defense;
● support of future space flights; and,
● the space sciences.
From this analysis, the study predicted the need for
“hundreds of thousands of man-hours” in orbit to
carry out all useful applications; this implied a longrange requirement for “near-permanent operations
and support of probably several space stations. ” The
study also noted, foreshadowing a future issue, that
“the limiting factor on the number of such stations,
and the crew size of each station, appears to be the
cost of logistic support. ” The final MORL concept, although basically a zero-gravity station, had an onboard centrifuge for reentry simulation, testing of phys-

ical condition, and physical therapy if zero-gravity
conditions were debilitating for the crew. 23
By early 1963, NASA Associate Administrator and
General Manager Robert Sea mans called for study of
an Earth Orbiting Laboratory (EOL) from “an overall
NASA point of view.” Such study was needed, said
Seamans, since an EOL had been studied and discussed “by several government agencies and contractors” 24 and because NASA and DOD “are now
supporting a number of additional advanced studies. ”
Seamans’ reference to DOD was significant: NASA
and DOD were locked in a controversy over control
of post-ApoIlo manned flight efforts. NASA’s management, anticipated Seamans, would “be faced with the
decision to initiate hardware development” in 1964.
Seamans ordered an agency-wide, 4 to 6 week highpriority study which would examine EOL proposals
in terms of, among other factors:
1. Defense Department interest,
2. international factors, and
3. other government agency interest. 25
Throughout this study and other attempts to define
a “space station” program in the 1963-66 period,
there was a continuing tension between those designing the station itself (primarily associated with the Office of Manned Space Flight (OMSF), its field centers
and associate contractors) and those interested in the
experiments and other uses of such a faciIity (primarily the Office of Space Science and Applications and
the Office of Advanced Research and Technology
(OART)). For example, one OART staffer complained
in 1963 that “the fact that OMSF is supplying funds
for MORL , . . does not change the fact that in doing
so they are in a supporting role to the experimental
purpose of the MORL. That experimental purpose
should carry a heavy stick in the determination of how
the research program will be accomplished. ”26
Later in 1963, the Director of OART asked field center assistance in defining “more clearly the potential
usefulness of such a laboratory as a platform for scientific and technological research in space. ” He noted
~JDouglas MISS I Ie and Space Systems Diwslon, Douglas Aircraft CO., ‘‘ Report on the Development of the Manned Orbkal Research Laboratory (MORL)
System Utilization Potential, ” Repon SM-48822, January 1966.
ZdThough It IS not discussed in detal I In this report, durl ng this period the

.

Department of Defense was exploring the potential of manned flight for national security missions. Some of this study effort was conducted jointly with
NASA, but most was not; one focus of the effort was the military potential
of a “space station. ” In 1963, the Air Force’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory
(MOL) program was approved as an initial step in examining the ways In
wh Ich human crews cou [d be used to enhance national security operations
In orbit The M O L wa5 canceled In 1969
J~Memoran~u m from NASA Associate Adml nlstrator, “Space Task Team

“ I hld
)iGeorg(, v But Ier, ‘‘space sti3t10n5, 1959 To?” in B. J, Bluth and S R.
\Ic \eal L,Iprf~te on SpJCe, vol 1 (Granada Hills, CA National Behavior Sys[t’m\, 1981 J , p 8

for ,Manned Earth Orbltlng Laboratory Study,” Mar. 28, 1963 (NHOA).
“Memorandum from Chtet, Manned Systems Integration, to Director, Ottlce of Ad\anced Research and Technology, “ SEB for the Manned Orbttal
Research Laboratory, May 16, 1963 (N HOA).
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that “a view has prevailed to date, based primarily on
intuitive judgment [emphasis added here], that this research function (exclusive of biotechnology and human factors research) constitutes one of the more important long-range justifications” for a “space station.”
It was essential, he argued, to make “a correct decision as to whether and why a MORL project should
be undertaken.”27
By 1964, the definition of uses for a “space station”
had broadened enough to lead the Director of the
OMSF Advanced Manned Mission Office to suggest
that it was “both timely and necessary to pursue
. . . broadly beneficial uses of “space stations” with
the departments and agencies that will capitalize and
exploit these broader uses” and that an interagency
“applications working group” be established for this
purpose. Such interagency involvement, he noted,
“can result in a higher level of knowledgeable support to NASA for implementation of a national multipurpose ‘space station’ program.” 28

Beginnings of Post-Apollo Planning

2g

Under pressure from the White House and Congress, NASA began looking beyond the Apollo project in 1964 and 1965. In 1964, an in-house examination of NASA’s future options had recommended that
NASA defer “large new missions for further study and
analysis. “3° However, there was concern within NASA
about maintaining an adequate workload for both
NASA centers and NASA contractors, as the development phase of Apollo neared completion, and an evolutionary approach from Apollo to more advanced activities appeared more likely to meet this need, given
the low probability of a major new start on post-Apollo
programs.
The nature of NASA’s long-range planning during
this period turned on the style and personality of the
Administrator, James E. Webb. A lawyer and businessman who had served President Harry Truman as Director of the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) and as Under
~’Memorandum

from Director, Office of Advanced Research and Tech-

nology, “Request for Assistance in Defining the Scientific and Technological
Research Potential of a Manned Orbital Laboratory, ” Oct. 31, 1963, NHOA,
This IS not a reference to the Air Force’s MOL Program.
ZaMemorandum from Director, Advanced Manned Missions Program, ‘‘1 ncreased Participation of Potential User Agencies in Development of Broadly
Beneficial Utiiizatlons of Manned Orbiting Space Station, ” July 15, 1964
(N HOA),
~gSee Arnold Levine, Managing NASA In the Apo1/o Era, NASA Sp-4012

Secretary of State, Webb combined an ebullient and
dynamic personality with a keen political sense and
long familiarity with the ways of Washington. He
believed in long-range planning, but he eschewed
long-range plans, which he felt excessively tied the
hands of the Administrator. He wanted to be prepared
for the future, but he did not want to commit himself
or NASA prematurely to another project as large as
Apollo.
Webb adopted two approaches to post-Apollo planning. First he characterized and rationalized Apollo
as the development of a capability in space, not an
end in itself. Once the Moon landing was accomplished, NASA would be able to convert the resources
and experience of the Apollo program to other purposes through a program called Apollo Applications.
Second, he used his fine political sense to ensure that
NASA adjusted its ambitions in space to suit the climate of opinion in Washington and throughout the
Nation. As the war in Vietnam and the domestic unrest
of the late 1960s compounded NASA’s problems in
getting congressional attention and appropriations,
NASA gradually modified its internal plans and proposals. The agency took more clearly the line that
Webb stressed throughout his tenure: NASA must
have a balanced program in which manned spaceflight played a role along with space science, applications, and aeronautical research.
NASA spoke more often in the mid-to-late 1960s of
practical, Earth-oriented space activities, which would
exploit the gains already made and provide taxpayers
with tangible returns on their investment in space,
And, increasingly, NASA came to look on the “space
station” as the logical next step that would at once
exploit the Apollo team and its achievements and still
respond to political pressure for a measured and pragmatic space program . 31
The public debate in the late 1960s on the future
of the space program introduced many of the concepts about the “space station” that still surround this
proposal–some inherited from the Apollo experience,
others developed to address the criticisms of that program. First, NASA sought, in conjunction with its plans
for a “space station,” to define an undertaking large
enough to focus the agency’s future activities, as Apol10 had focused them in the 1960s. Occasionally, it was
suggested that a manned Mars mission would provide
the ideal focus, 32 but the “space station” could per~1 see,

for example, Webb’s testimony i n U.S. Congress, Senate Commit-

(Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1983),
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form the same function, even while providing a logical
step toward Mars. The “space station” had the added
advantage of seeming more practical and Earthoriented. Second, NASA stressed the flexibility of the
“space station” concept and a station’s ability to perform a variety of functions ranging from Earth-oriented
applications and scientific research to staging platforms for manned missions to the planets. George E.
Mueller, NASA’s Associate Administrator for Manned
Flight, emphasized the economic benefits of “space
stations” i n such areas as applications, weather, communications, research, and national security. 33
NASA advocacy of “space stations” also argued that
the country should see that the Apollo team and hardware were held together and exploited, should maintain manned spaceflight in addition to unmanned missions, and should sustain the Nation’s preeminence
in space in flight operations, science, and technology
lest the Soviets win the long-term space race by default. 34 Occasionally, NASA invoked national security
as a rationale for the “space station, ” but in the 1960s,
at least, this brought the agency into apparent conflict with the Air Force’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory,
a conflict Webb tried to avoid, at least in public. 35
The theme that NASA employed most relentlessly
was that the “space station” was the logical next step
in the development of America’s capability in space.
George Mueller was especially emphatic. Speaking of
practical applications, he testified:
The major steps that are involved . . . are, first of
all, the development of an orbital “space station, ” and
along with that is a need for a logistics system to provide support for an orbital “space station. ” That combination then leads to the development of what might
be called an application center, and if you will, that
is probably going to turn out to be a relatively large
orbital station which will have in it the sensors that
are required .36
Continuing this hypothetical progression of Earth-

oriented, practical “space stations, ” Mueller added
that,
. . . having utilized this orbital station for a number
of years, there is another major step forward in going
to a research complex which might be the large orbiting research laboratory and coming from that research complex, then, would come the second generation of application centers, and here they would
JJM~eller’s testimony
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be more specialized and there would be more of
them.

This envisaged a time
man is really operating
space . . . . Mueller also
we can go in the

well into the future where
on a continuing basis in
proposed that:
direction of exploiting our

Iunar capability as it developed in the basic Apollo
program and will be developed further if the Apollo
Applications Program is carried out. Or we can go in
the direction of increased emphasis on Earth orbit applications . . . . We can go from Apollo applications
through the development of an orbital “space station, ” and then on to the near planet flyby systems
and follow a logical path which then goes to planetary
exploration.

For all the purposes a “space station” might serve,
from the purely practical to the widely visionary, it
was always cast in this period as the logical next step
in developing space capability. NASA instituted an
Apollo Applications Program, but this was an interim
move towards what the agency really sought: a major political commitment to make the next step another large one.
In 1967 and 1968 this campaign suffered major reversals which had permanent impact on the course
of events. The Apollo 204 fire in January 1967, which
killed three astronauts during preflight testing at Cape
Kennedy, set the Apollo landing back a number of
months, and cast the first serious doubt on NASA’s
ability to meet its Apollo goal. The accident also
focused congressional attention on NASA and consumed some of the agency’s political credit on the
Hill. Perhaps more damaging in the long run was the
resignation of James Webb in the closing weeks of the
1968 presidential election campaign. Leaving the
agency without the major commitment to a post-Apol10 program he had sought, Webb took with him an
irreplaceable sense of political pragmatism that the
agency would sorely miss.
As the first successful lunar landing mission approached, in the fall of 1968 NASA requested $60 million to initiate a “space station” effort. This request
was denied. NASA approached the beginning of 1969
in some disarray:
• James Webb had resigned in the Fall of 1968, and
the Acting Administrator, Thomas Paine, was new
to the agency.
● Richard Nixon had been elected President, and
his position on space policy was far from clear.
● NASA had settled on the “space station” as its
post-Apollo program objective, but to date had
had no success in getting Presidential or congressional support for such an initiative.
NASA took bold action in the early months of 1969
to attempt to change this situation.
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Post-Apollo Planning Under
Thomas Paine
A research engineer before joining NASA as Deputy Administrator in January 1968, Thomas O. Paine
became Acting Administrator following Webb’s resignation in October. Nominated NASA Administrator
by President Nixon in March 1969, Paine was confirmed by the Senate the same month, beginning the
shortest term—less than 20 months—of any NASA
head.
Paine was a swashbuckler,37 an out-and-out space
enthusiast, critical of the caution and circumspection
of his predecessor and determined to inaugurate the
second decade of space with a major, national, Apollo-like commitment. As he wrote to the President’s
science advisor after being confirmed as NASA Administrator:
We have been frustrated too long by a negativism
that says hold back, be cautious, take no risks, do less
than you are capable of doing. I submit that no perceptive student of the history of social progress doubts
that we will establish a large laboratory in Earth orbit, that we will provide a practical system for the frequent transfer of men and supplies to and from such
a laboratory, that we will continue to send men to
the Moon, and that eventually we will send men to
the planets. If this is true, now is the time to say
so . . . .We in NASA are fully conscious of practical
limitations . . . .In the light of these considerations,
we can be sensible and moderate about our requests
for resources—but we must know where we are
going. 38

Initial Proposals
This philosophy led Paine, at the start of the Nixon
administration, to take steps unusually bold for an acting agency head. In February 1969, Paine appealed
directly to the President in support of the manned
space flight program. He argued that “positive and
timely action must be taken by your Administration
now to prevent the Nation’s programs in manned
space flight from slowing to a halt in 1972” and suggested that:
the nation should . . . focus our manned space
flight” program for the next decade on the development and operation of a permanent “space station”-a National Research Center in Earth orbit—
accessible at reasonable cost to experts in many disciplines who can conduct investigations and opera

J7Homer Newe[ [, Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years Of

space science

NASA SP-421 1 (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Adminlstratlon, 1980), p. 288.
‘Quoted {n Levine, op. cit., pp. 258-259.

tions in space which cannot be effectively carried out
on Earth.
Paine told the President that he had “a unique op-

portunity for leadership that will clearly identify your
administration with the establishment of the Nation’s
major goals in space flight for the next decade” and
that “the case that a ‘space station’ should be a major future U.S. goal is now strong enough to justify at
least a general statement on your part that this will
be one of our goals.”3 9
Paine asked for a March 31 presidential decision on
future manned space flight issues. He did this even
though he knew that, on February 13, the President
had established an ad hoc blue-ribbon Space Task
Group (STG) and had asked that group for “definitive
recommendations on the direction which the U.S.
space program should take in the post-Apollo period,”
with a September 1 reporting date. 40 By asking the
President to decide on the future of manned space
flight in advance of the planning process which was
being established for precisely that purpose, Paine was
trying to use the success of the Apollo 8 circumlunar
mission and the desire on the part of any new administration to take some early and popular initiatives as
counters to a process which he was not sure would
be favorable to NASA.
In preparing for Space Task Group consideration of
the Paine initiative, the positions of the various participants on a large “space station, ” and the factors
influencing their positions, became evident.
The BOB objective was to “head off any play by
NASA to get a budget amendment now” since “this
is bad budget strategy, probably unworkable as far as
Congress was concerned, and impossible to obtain
without committing the President to support the longrange objectives. ”41
The President’s Science Adviser, Lee DuBridge,
asked the Space Science and Technology Panel 42 to
assist him in evaluating the Paine initiative. The Panel
met with NASA officials, and advised Dr. DuBridge
that there was “no great urgency” related to the issues
Paine had raised and, “from a programmatic standpoint, the arguments in favor of early action appear
very weak. ”43

JgMemorandum from Thomas Paine to the President, ‘‘Problems and Opportunities in Manned Space Flight,” Feb. 26, 1969.
@The STG was chaired by Vice-President Spiro T. Agnew and had as members NASA, the president’s Science Adviser, and the Department of Defense,
The Bureau of the Budget, Department of State, and Atomic Energy Commission had observer status.
41 Brlefi ng Memorandum prepared by the Bureau of the Budget, Econom ICS, Science, and Technology Division, “President’s Task Group on
S p a c e Meeting No, 1,“ Mar. 6, 1969.
41A subgroup of the president’s Science Advisory Committee (F’’MC).
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The “space station” did gain some support from the
Department of State, which saw:
. . . a close relationship between our space program
and foreign policy objectives. Thus, an ongoing, challenging and successful space program is important
from the viewpoint of these objectives–particularly
one designed and funded to afford increasing opportunities for international cooperation.
The State Department believed that there were “greater international values i n a “space station” and reusable logistics vehicle than in . . . lunar exploration, ”
and that:
our choices should not be unduly influenced
by our estimate of Soviet choices, nor do we need
to prejudice deliberate consideration of our space
goals in order to preempt Soviet activities. Our capability is now well understood both by the Soviets and
by most other countries. Foreign countries will focus
less on the competition between ourselves and the
Soviets than on the relevance of space activities to
their own interests and needs.44
The Department of Defense (DOD) position was

that DOD “does not have or anticipate projects which
require a “space station” as defined by NASA. DOD
has great interest in the development of a lower cost
transportation system suitable for their uses as well as
for NASA’ S .” 45
The report of the STG staff directors was a rejection
of that part of the Paine initiative which asked for early
“space station” commitment:
The majority of the Committee members . . . did
not support the request for additional FY70 funding
to enable more rapid progress toward the launch of
a “space station” in the mid-1970s. This view does
not represent an unfavorable judgment on the question of adopting the “space station” as a major new
goal of our space program, but rather results from a
desire not to imply prejudgment of the eventual resuIt of the STG review. The case for urgency was unconvincing, and it appears that no important options
would be foreclosed by deferring action .46
This attempt by NASA to get early commitment to

a “space station” has been reviewed in some detail
because its resolution foreshadowed much of what
happened in the following 1 ½ years as NASA struggled to gain support for a “space station” development as its major post-Apollo program objective,
Throughout the STG review and the White House
consideration of the STG report, NASA argued that
the “space station, ” and not the space shuttle concept, which was evolving from its origin solely as the
“R F Packard, “Department of State observations, ” draft, Mar. 13, 1969,
45MI Iton Rosen (NASA staffer for STG), ‘‘Memorandum for the Record, ”
Mar 13, 1969 (N HOA).
46, Report O( the space Task Group Staff DI rector’s Committee on NASA’S
Request for Amendments to the NASA fiscal year 1970 Budget,” Mar. 14,
1969, p 4
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station’s logistic vehicle, should be the Agency’s toppriority program, In the summer of 1969, NASA let
two Phase B study contracts for “space station” design, and in its 1970 congressional testimony the station was presented as the centerpiece of the agency’s
programs,
Throughout 1970, NASA continued technical studies and user-oriented activities to promote the station
concept. However, by the middle of that year, it was
clear that in the eyes of the space subgovernment outside of NASA, the shuttle program was a more attractive investment than was the station, and by the end
of the year, the station had been dropped back to conceptual study status. NASA had built up a great deal
of momentum behind the “space station” concept
through the 1960s, but when it came time for the
country to decide, through the policymaking process,
whether the station was a “good buy, ” the response
was negative. The reasons for this negative assessment
were already clear for NASA to see by March 1969,
but it took over a year for NASA’s leadership to recognize the situation and to steer the Agency away
from the station and behind the shuttle.

Detailed Station Planning
After conducting preliminary Phase A studies, primarily in-house, during 1967 and 1968, NASA was
prepared in early 1969 to involve the aerospace industry in defining the program through two Phase B
studies. NASA’s hopes were that these program definition studies would provide the technical basis for
a start on “space station” development within a year
or two. These studies were initiated in September
1969, and extended over most of the next 2 years. But
events at the policy level made it increasingly unlikely
that the “space station” program would ever proceed
beyond the Phase B stage, at least in the 1970s.
The handwriting was already on the wall by the time
the “Paine initiative” was rejected in March 1969, but
during the rest of 1969 and 1970 it became much
clearer. Finally, NASA could no longer avoid reality,
and by late 1970 the space Shuttle, not the station,
was identified as the agency’s top priority. Just as the
Apollo Applications Program had been a “better buy”
for the country in the mid-1960s, so the Shuttle was
perceived by policy makers in the early 1970s, But the
failure of the “space station” program to gain approval
was not because of a lack of effort; the Phase B study
process was the focus for that effort.
DEFINING THE PREFERRED CONCEPT
AND ITS RATIONALE
One problem, perhaps the key one, was that NASA
found it quite difficult to tell both prospective contrac-
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tors and the political leadership what kind of station,
for what purposes, it wanted to develop. This was so
even though NASA had been studying “space station”
concepts throughout the 1960s. The basic requirements which had emerged from the study effort were:
1. qualification of people and systems for long-duration Earth orbit flight;
2. demonstration of man’s ability and functional
usefulness in performing engineering and scientific experiments; and,
3. periodic rotation of the crews and resupply of the
“space station. ”
The average crew size for this station was planned to
be six to nine persons, with a 2-year orbital lifetime
design goal.47 An Apollo command and service module launched by a Saturn 1B booster was to be the logistics vehicle for the station; the station itself was to
be launched on a Saturn V booster.
When Thomas Paine was exposed in January 1969
to this staff thinking, he found it too modest. His center directors agreed. For example, Wernher von Braun
told Paine that:
NASA should now tell the contractors what we want
in the long run, what we foresee as the ultimate—the
long range–the dream–station program. NASA
should spell out the sciences, technology, applications, missions and research desired. Then NASA
should define a 1975 station as a core facility in orbit
from which the ultimate “space campus” or “space
base” can grow in an efficient orderly evolution
through 1985.

MSC Director Robert Gilruth told Paine:
We should now be looking at a step more comparable in challenge to that of Apollo after Mercury. The
“space station” size should be modular and based
on our Saturn V lift capability into 200-mile orbit.
Three launches would give us one million pounds in
orbit, including spent stages. That is the number we
should be planning for the core size. 4 8

Out of this lack of consensus within NASA came a
rapid change from the January concept of a “space
station.” In February, Aviation Week reported that “all
previous concepts have been retired from active competition in favor of a large station,” with the focus on
“a 100-man Earth-orbiting station with a multiplicity
of capabilities” and the “launch of the first module
of the large “space station, ” with perhaps as many
as 12 men, by 1975. ” Top NASA officials were reported to have rejected earlier “space station” plans
as “too conservative. ”49
4%Vllllam Normyle, “Alternatives Open on Post-Apollo, ” Awatiorr Week
and Space Techncdogy, Jan, 13, 1969, p. 16.
‘+BThomas palne’s notes from meeting on space stations, jan. 27, 1969
(N HOA).
~yWI Illam Normyle, “NASA Alms at 100-Man Station, ” Aviation Week and
Spdce Technology, Feb. 24, 1969, p, 16.

NASA issued a Statement of Work for the Phase B
Space Station Program Definition on April 19. Prospective contractors were ready; they had been following
the rapidly expanding character of the program closely
and were “already forming teams in anticipation” of
the Phase B competition. so
The Work Statement described the “space station”
as “a centralized and general purpose laboratory in
Earth orbit for the conduct and support of scientific
and technological experiments, for beneficial applications, and for the further development of space exploration capability” and noted that the work requested would include “the Space Base but will focus
on the mid-l970s Space Station as the initial but evolutionary step toward the Space Base. ” The objectives
of the “space station” program were stated as:
● Conduct beneficial space applications programs,
scientific investigation and technological engineering experiments.
●
Demonstrate the practicality of establishing, operating, and maintaining long-duration manned orbital stations.
●
Utilize Earth-orbital manned flights for test and
development of equipment and operational techniques applicable to lunar and planetary exploration.
● Extend technology and develop space systems
and subsystems required to increase useful life by
at least several orders of magnitude.
●
Develop new operational techniques and equipment which can demonstrate substantial reductions in unit operating costs.
●
Extend the present knowledge of the long-term
biomedical and behavioral characteristics of man
in space.
The initial “space station” was to have a crew of
12, and would normally operate in a zero gravity
mode, but during the early weeks of its operation there
would be an assessment of the effects of artificial gravity; a counterweight would be tethered to the station
and the configuration spun to provide the gravitational
effect, The station was to be 33 ft in diameter and was
normally to operate in a 270-nautical mile, 55° orbit,
but also be capable of operating in polar and slightly
retrograde orbits, 51
Shortly after the original proposals in response to
the statement of work were received by NASA, a new
requirement was added to the Phase B effort. Not only
was the “space station” to be designed so that it could
be the core around which a space base could be de50Wllllam Normyle, “Large StatIon May Emerge as ‘Unwritten’ U.S. Goal,”
Aviat/on Week and Space Technology, Mar, 10, 1969, p. 104.
51 NASA , ,Statement of Work, Space station Program Definition (Phase B), ”
Apr. 14, 1969,
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veloped; the station module would also be the core
of a spacecraft designed for a manned trip to Mars.
This requirement came out of the policy debates described in the section in this report, “NASA’s PostApollo Ambitions Dashed,” and was a reflection of
the high hopes for all of NASA’s future manned programs which were pervasive in the immediate aftermath of the first lunar landing.
PHASE B STUDIES
Three aerospace firms, North American Rockwell,
McDonnell Douglas, and Grumman Aircraft, submitted proposals to NASA in response to the Phase
B Statement of Work, and on July 22, 1969, NASA
awarded Phase B contracts of $2.9 million each to
North American Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas.
The studies were to run for 11 months beginning in
September; MSC would manage the North American
Rockwell effort, and MSFC, the McDonnell Douglas
study.
A continuing problem during the course of the
Phase B studies was the difficulty of integrating station design and the candidate experiments for the station. These studies were compiled into a thick document known universally as the “Blue Book. ” One
participant in the study later noted that “the candidate experiments compiled in the NASA Blue Book
are too costly to be considered as a whole, are somewhat duplicated . . . , have not been verified as the
true experiment goals . . , .“5 2
The Phase B studies were extended for 6 months
on June 30, 1970; by this time, the planning date for
the first station launch had slipped to 1977. The cost
of the program was now estimated at $8 billion to $15
billion, including both development costs and 10 years
of on-orbit operations; this estimate did not include
the cost of a space Shuttle program. It was reported
that “an overriding desire on the part of the United
States to internationalize the 12-man “space station”
. . . has eliminated any possibility of Department of
Defense participation in the program.” 53
In addition to the technical design activities, NASA
was undertaking a Phase B effort to define experiment
modules to be added to the core station and planning
a year-long study to involve potential users, both domestic and international, in the program as it was developing. A user’s symposium to kick off this effort was
scheduled for September 1970, and both study contractors were building full-scale mockups of the 33-ft

“Jack C. Heberllg, “The Management Approach to the NASA Space Station Deflnltlon Studies of the Manned Spacecraft Center, ” NASA Technical
Memorandum X-58090, June 1972, p. 30,
$~space Business Dady, July 27, 1970.

station. However, beneath this growing momentum
was an uncertain base of political support.
On July 29, 1970, Charles Mathews, NASA’s Deputy Associate Administrator of Manned Space Flight,
ordered MSC and MSFC to terminate the continuing
Phase B activity and to redefine the effort in a fundamental way. On the basis of congressional action,
NASA leadership had become convinced that the Saturn V program, which had been in terminal condition for almost 2 years, was finally dead, i.e., there
would be no booster capable of launching a 33-ft station. The only launch vehicle available for use in putting the “space station “ into orbit would now be the
space Shuttle, with its planned 15-ft by 60-ft payload
bay. What had started out as the supply vehicle for
the station was to be its key to survival.
It took some doing to skew the study effort toward
components with diameters able to fit into the Shuttle payload bay; one study contractor commented that
“people who were eager to fly in a 33-ft station found
the prospect of long stays in the 14-ft station not very
attractive. ” But NASA did issue Phase B extension
contracts for a modular “space station” study effort
to extend through most of 1971, and North American Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas went to work

on the new concept.
By the time the studies were begun, however, the
likelihood that they would lead to an early commitment to station development was already vanishingly
small. NASA had suffered a number of defeats in late
1969 and through 1970 in its attempts to get an ambitious post-Apollo program approved, and by the
summer of 1970 it was becoming quite clear to NASA
leaders that only one big program had any chance of
presidential and congressional approval, and that it
was not the “space station” program. From its start
as the “advanced logistics system” for the station and
space base, the space Shuttle had garnered the interest of the Air Force and many within NASA, and in
the summer of 1970 the agency leadership grudgingly
decided to make the Shuttle its top-priority program.
Thomas Paine had announced his resignation in mid1970, and the station thus lost a supporter at the top;
this may have made the shift to the Shuttle easier.
Station studies continued through 1970, 1971, and
1972, with the final in-house studies focused on a
single research applications module (RAM) to be carried into orbit by a Shuttle.54 This was all that remained
of what, only a few years earlier, had been plans for
truly large facilities in Earth orbit. As a final indication
of this reality, on November 29, 1972, the Space Sta-

~qThls u Itlmately became the basis for the Spacelab developed by the European Space Agency,
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tion Task Force was abolished, then immediately reincarnated as the Sortie Lab Task Force. NASA was able
to gain approval for Shuttle development in early
1972, and that task occupied the agency’s energies
throughout the decade. Until the Shuttle was ready,
the dream of permanent human facilities in space
would have to wait. However, preserving a large payload bay as an essential element of the Shuttle, NASA
was able to maintain the possibility of returning to the
station concept, thereby keeping its dream alive.

NASA’s Post-Apollo Ambitions
55
Dashed
While the “space station” Phase B effort was proceeding apace at the technical planning level, at the
policy level NASA from 1969 through the end of 1971
was trying to get White House (particularly) and congressional support for an increasingly less ambitious
post-Apollo program. The initial forum for this attempt
was the Space Task Group. After its early rejection of
NASA’s “space station “ initiative, the STG turned to
the task of preparing recommendations on future
space policy and programs for President Nixon.
The image of the Apollo commitment as a model
for future space goals colored STG discussions from
the start. At an early STG meeting, NASA’s Administrator, Thomas Paine, argued the need for a “new banner to be hoisted” around which competent and motivated engineers, scientists, and managers could rally,
as they had around the Apollo goal. Vice President
Agnew, reacting to Paine’s point, raised for the first
time in the STG context the question which would influence much of the group’s debates: Where was the
Apollo of the 1970s? Could it be, asked Agnew, that
the United States should undertake a manned mission
to Mars?
When Agnew first read the staff proposals for STG
consideration, he reportedly was disappointed because none contained the strong and dramatic theme
he thought was required for the national space effort.
On July 16, 1969, as he joined thousands at Kennedy
Space Center to watch the liftoff of the Apollo 11 mission, Agnew “went public. ” In interviews at the
launch site Agnew said that it was his “individual feeling that we should articulate a simple, ambitious, optimistic goal of a manned flight to Mars by the end
of this century. ” After liftoff, Agnew told the launch
team that he “bit the bullet . . . today as far as Mars
is concerned. ”
Agnew’s statement at Cape Kennedy was not a
spontaneous reaction to the excitement of the occa55Th is account is
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sion; it had been planned in advance. It reflected
Agnew’s willingness to lend support to an ambitious
and bold space program, if only NASA would propose
it. This willingness matched the predispositions of
NASA administrator, Paine, himself disappointed at the
lack of excitement and purpose he was getting from the
organization’s planning machinery. Spurred on by
Agnew’s private and public support, Paine decided
that NASA should also “bite the bullet” and move aggressively to identify an early manned Mars mission
as the central focus for its future plans. In order to do
this, he ordered NASA planners explicitly to incorporate a manned Mars mission during the 1980s into
NASA’s overall plans. This was the source of the early
modification to the Phase B study requirements described previously.
There were several reasons for switching to the Mars
emphasis as a central theme in NASA planning. Perhaps most influential was the early STG rejection of
a “space station” commitment based on the “logical
next step rationale. ” By justifying a “space station”
as a necessary precursor to manned Mars missions i n
the 1980s, NASA hoped to provide a convincing rationale for the station’s urgency. Not only “space stations” but the newly proposed space Shuttle, the development of nuclear rocket engines, and the
retention of the large Saturn V as a booster were required if an early manned Mars landing were to be
approved as a national goal.
Between March and August 1969, as the Apollo program and other ongoing NASA missions achieved
spectacular successes and public interest in space was
at a peak, as the Vice President continued to ask for
an “Apollo for the seventies, ” as NASA’s manned
flight organization coalesced behind an aggressive
plan of new activities for the next decade, Paine
became more and more bullish about the need for
bold new initiatives as a way of keeping the Nation’s
civilian space program vigorous and his agency’s
momentum large. As Apollo came to an end, NASA
plans had gotten increasingly ambitious.
Now, by asking for “commitment in principle” to
the most ambitious plan his advisers had conceived,
Paine presented a challenge to the other STG members and to others interested in the future of the space
program. He told the Nation that NASA was ready to
begin a program that would send people to Mars at
the earliest feasible time, and he asked the Nation’s
leadership whether they were willing to support such
a bold enterprise. The answer was not long in coming, and it was a resounding “No.”
The results of NASA’s attempt to mobilize support
behind the Mars objective, were, from the agency’s
perspective, little short of disastrous. What NASA discovered was just how limited the support for major
new space initiatives was. The final STG report, sub-
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mitted to the President i n mid-September, did suggest
that “the United States accept the long range option
or goal of manned planetary exploration with a
manned Mars mission before the end of this century
as the first target. ” This goal, said the report, would
act as “a shaping function for the post-Apollo p r o -

gram. ” Beyond its general statements, the report recommended no commitment to any particuIar program
option or even any specific project on a particular
timetable.
Even this “muted Martian manifesto” had no standing with the White House. Although the STG finished
its work with its submission to the President, more
then 6 months passed before Nixon made any formal
reaction to the Group’s recommendation, and that reaction was noncommittal. In the interim the processes
of public policymaking operated on the space program to shape it to the short- and longer-term requirements of what the White House perceived as the
budgetary and political interests of the Nation. When
NASA tried to use the STG report as the basis for justifying its 1971 budget request, it found that the report’s
recommendations carried little weight either in the Bureau of the Budget or, particularly, the White House.
While the President personally apparently remained
a space buff, his advisers were quite skeptical of the
political payoffs from major new activities in space;
their reading of public opinion was that American
society had little interest in future space spectaculars.
This skepticism, combined with stringent budgetary
constraints, resulted in a budget for NASA in fiscal
1971 that was far below NASA’s most pessimistic expectations. NASA, still not reconciled to the notion
that space had little political support, “fought a retreating action through the entire budget process, ” being
“beaten back but fighting lustily at every turn of the
road, ” according to Administrator Paine.
It was in this context that, during the first half of
1970, it became clear to NASA leadership that N A S A
would not get approval to develop simultaneously
both a “space station” and the space Shuttle. In a
March 1970 statement, President Nixon provided only
a very guarded endorsement of future space activities, and what priority was granted he gave to the
space Shuttle. During the 1970 debate over NASA’s
budget, Congress expressed a high degree of skepticism about ambitious new goals in space. The linkages
among the Shuttle program, development of a “space
stat ion,” and a manned Mars expedition came under
particular attack, and threatening but unsuccessful attempts to delete funds for station and Shuttle studies
were made in both the House and the Senate.
As the preceding section described, at the technical level NASA was still acting in mid-1970 as if “space
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station” approval were possible. However, NASA’s
policy leadership grudgingly read the handwriting
(which was in capital letters) on the wall, and in putting together the next agency budget request in September 1970 decided to make the Shuttle the top-priority NASA program for the 1970s and to give up
attempts to gain approval to develop a “space station”
until after the Shuttle program was well under way.
It took another 1 ½ years of conflict-filled negotiations
with the White House and Congress before NASA was
able to gain their endorsements of the space Shuttle
in 1972.
Using the budget process, the political leadership
of the country had applied its concept of national interest and national priorities to the space program;
through that process, the technological aspirations of
NASA were put under firm though perhaps too shortterm political control. What happened to NASA’s
“space station” plans is best viewed, not in terms of
NASA “winning” or “losing,” but in terms of what
happens when an agency’s aspirations are significantly
at variance with what political leaders judge to be both
in the long-term interests of the Nation and politically
feasible. This experience might be quite relevant to
current attempts by NASA to gain support for the kind
of “space station” program that it desires.

Skylab: An Interim “Space Station”

56

The only remainder of the Apollo Applications Program, begun with high hopes in 1966, Skylab was a
S-IVB third stage of the Saturn V launch vehicle, outfitted as a workshop to be visited by three successive
crews after being launched into low Earth orbit. The
mission could hardly have gotten off to a worse start.
During launch of the Skylab workshop in May 1973,
the meteor/thermal control shade tore loose from the
spacecraft and seriously damaged a solar cell panel
needed to produce power on the vehicle. The first
crew to visit Skylab managed to jury-rig a parasol to
replace the shade and to salvage the one solar panel
that was not lost in launch. This proved enough to save
the mission and to allow virtually the full run of experiments that had been planned for the three crews
that visited the laboratory in 1973 and 1974, turning
potential disaster into another virtuoso display of
NASA resourcefulness and skill.
Skylab provided grist for everyone’s mill. “Space station” advocates praised the demonstration of man’s
long-term survivability in space–84 days for the third
~~F~r a tull account of the Skylab project, see W. David Compton and
Charles D Benson, LI\ Ing and Work/rig In Space. the H/story of Space/ab
NASA SP-4208 (Washington, DC National Aeronautics and Space Admlnlstratlon, 1983).
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crew—and the rich variety of scientific and applications tasks of which he had proved himself capable–
ranging from Earth observation and photography to
manning the solar telescope, conducting physiological
experiments, and even carrying on space processing.
Especially did they fasten on the role of human beings as the flexible, opportunistic component in the
“space station” that had saved the mission with emergency repairs no machine could have made. Without
people, claimed the advocates, Skylab would have
failed. 5 7
Without people, claimed the critics, Skylab would
not have been necessary. Many who questioned the
wisdom of manned space flight, especially scientists,
even while they conceded the impressiveness of the
Apollo achievement and appreciated how their own
programs had ridden on its coattails, came to wonder if the whole undertaking involving people was
worth the candle. With money drying up and many
scientific missions promised for the final flights of
Apollo being canceled with those flights, the relative
economy and efficiency of unmanned, automated
missions looked more attractive in contrast. 58
Whatever the eventual evaluation of Skylab, it was
interpreted by NASA’s manned space flight managers
as legitimizing renewed study of the “space station”
concept. Those studies, carried out during the 197480 period, have laid the base for current discussions
of whether it is finally time to move ahead with the
acquisition of in-space infrastructure, of what character and magnitude, to be obtained by when, and to
be operated, used, and paid for by whom.

Recent In-Space Infrastructure
(i.e. “Space Station”) Studies
In addition to the impetus to reexamine the “space
station” concept which came from the success of the
Skylab project, other influences in the same direction
included the need to begin to identify potential “postShuttle” programs and new requirements for using
men and women in space operations emerging from
a number of study efforts being carried out by NASA
in the 1974-75 time frame.
In order to build a plausible rationale for once again
proposing a “space station” as an element of NASA’s
program, it would be necessary to identify some highpriority activities which could not be accomplished
using the space Shuttle, with its 7 to 20 day orbital
staytime, its Spacelab facility for manned experimental
Szsee, for example, John H. Disher, “Next Steps in Space Transportation,
Astronaut/es and Aeronautics, January 1978, p. 26,
JBNewell, op. cit., pp. 290-295.

activities, and its significant capability for lifting large
and/or heavy cargoes to low Earth orbit (LEO). Studies
which established requirements for large structures in
both LEO and geosynchronous orbit–structures
which could only be constructed in space—seemed
to provide the needed rationale, and space construction became a major theme in space infrastructure
studies during the 1975-80 period.
The first NASA foray into a new station study effort
was a 1975 study of a “Manned orbital Systems Concept” (MOSC) carried out by McDonnell Douglas Astronautics under the technical direction of the Marshall Space Flight Center. This study “examined the
requirements for . . . a cost-effective orbital facility
concept capable of supporting extended manned
operations in Earth orbit beyond those visualized for
the 7-to 30-day Shuttle/Spacelab system.” Study guidelines included use of available hardware developed
for the Skylab, Spacelab, and Shuttle programs, “insofar as practical, ” and an initial operational capability (IOC) in late 1984.
The context for the MOSC study included a growing concern about the Earth’s resource limitations,
population growth, and environmental stresses, driven
by the widely publicized “limits to growth” debate
of the early 1970s. The study noted that “the planning and development of future space programs cannot be done in isolation from the many critical problems facing the peoples of the world during the
coming decades” and that “there will continue to be
many conflicting and competing demands for resources in the years ahead.” This context skewed the
emphasis in establishing activities to be conducted
with the support of in-space infrastructure to “the research and applications areas that are directly related
to current world needs. ”
Though oriented more directly than past station concepts to high-priority global problems, the MOSC
study still emphasized the “science and applications
research facility” rationale; although such activities as
assembly of large structures and operating space manufacturing facilities were examined during the study,
the emphasis was on a facility which would “enable
the scientific community to pursue programs directly
related to the improvement of life on Earth.” The final
MOSC configuration called for a four-man modularized facility; the manned module would be based on
the Spacelab design, and Spacelab pallets would also
be used to support unpressurized payloads. Total program costs for development and operation of the initial MOSC facility were estimated to be $1.2 billion.59

SgMcDonnell Douglas Astronautics, Manned

Orbita/ ~YskmJ ConcePts

Study, Book l-Executive Summary, Sept. 30, 1975, pp. iii, 1-2, 30, 36.
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Rather than attempt to gain approval to take the
MOSC effort to a Phase B stage, in the Fall of 1975
NASA decided to conduct further studies in which the
emphasis was shifted from research in orbit to space
construction. In explaining its study plans, NASA
noted:
Earlier “space station” studies emphasized the
“Laboratory in Orbit” concept. Emphasis is now be-

cher set as a primary NASA goal, “accelerating the
development of economic and efficient space services for society, ” such as “resources management,
environmental understanding, and commercial returns from the unique contributions of space. ” 61
The Outlook for Space report was not directly or
strongly supportive of the need for a “space station. ”
It did conclude, however, that:

ing placed on a Space Station as an “Operational
Base” which not only involves a laboratory but also
such uses as: (a) an assembly, maintenance, and logistics base for conducting manned operations involving antennas, mirrors, solar collectors, transmitters;
(b) for conducting launch and retrieval operations for
orbit-to-orbit and Earth-departure vehicles which may
require assembly or propellant transfer in orbit; (c)
for conducting retrieval, maintenance and redeployment operations for automated satellites; (d) for managing clusters of spacecraft and space systems as a
central base for support for common services . . . .
Orbital location studies will emphasize the possible exploitation of geosynchronous orbit, as well as
low inclination and polar low Earth orbit . . . . Current planning is directed toward a “space station”
new start in fiscal year 1979.60

Most of these activities might well be supported by
the Shuttle system, together with associate space laboratories and free-flyers, There are more far-reaching
objectives, however, which will require human activities in space transcending those supportable by current Shuttle flight plans, such as the construction of
satellite power stations or the establishment of a permanent lunar base. It is difficult at this time to assert
that either of these activities, or others like them—
space manufacturing, space colonies—will be undertaken within the next 25 years. Nevertheless, as we
looked at the future of space, particularly at those
more creative programs directed toward major exploitation of the opportunities which space provides, we
inevitably found man to be an integral part of the system. If the United States is to be in a position to take
advantage of these potential benefits then it would
seem necessary that we develop the capability to
operate for extended periods of time. The space facility would be constantly available, although crews
would, of course, be periodically exchanged.
The creation of such a permanent space facility
seemed to us to be the most useful way to continue
the advancement of manned-flight technology. With
the Shuttle system giving us comparatively low-cost
access to space on the one hand, and the economies
which could be realized from the use of the permanent space facility on the other hand, the construction of a permanent “space station” appears to be
the next logical step for the manned flight program—
not as an objective in itself, but rather for its technological support of a number of other objectives which
can benefit from our growing knowledge of how humans can work in space and to provide a foundation
for the future.6 2

There were a number of reasons for NASA’s switch
i n emphasis in “space station” justification. There was
no evidence that the scientific community was any
more supportive of a manned orbital laboratory concept in 1975 than it had been in 1970; prior attempts
to justify a “space station” by its use as a space-based
R&D facility had not been successful. More positively,
the mid-70s saw a number of studies of the potentials
of space operations for addressing problems on Earth.
The most broadly conceived of these studies was
undertaken by a NASA study group which was asked
in 1974 by NASA Administrator James Fletcher (who
had become Administrator in April 1971) to provide
an Outlook for Space—”to identify and examine the
various possibilities for the civiI space program over
the next twenty-five years. ” The study group concluded that:
. . . the great challenges facing the physical needs of
humanity are principally the results of the continuing struggle to improve the quality of life. Particularly
critical is the need to improve food production and
distribution, to develop new energy sources, to meet
new challenges to the environment, and to predict
and deal with natural and manmade disasters. In each
of these areas, we found that significant contributions
can be made by a carefully developed space program.
The NASA report recognized that “future space programs must provide a service to the public.” In responding to the Outlook for Space report, James Flet-

Once again, NASA saw the justification for a “space
station” primarily as “the next logical step” in exploiting people’s ability to work in space.
In addition to the Outlook for Space study, in the
mid-1970s a number of even more visionary efforts
were identifying challenging future space goals. One
notion which received wide public attention, but had
a relatively modest influence on NASA’s internal planning activities, was the proposal by Princeton Professor
Gerard O’Neill that, primarily in response to the
Earth’s resource limitations, work begin on develop~1 outlook {of sPaCe.
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ing very large human habitats in space—space colonies. 63
A concept which was quite attractive to NASA’s
engineers was developed by Peter Glaser of Arthur
D. Little, Inc.; this was the proposal that large solar
arrays in geosynchronous orbit could provide a large
source of continuous energy on Earth. The solar power
satellite (SPS) idea was given a great deal of technical
attention by NASA during 1975 and 1976, until NASA
was forced by the Office of Management and Budget
to turn over lead responsibility for SPS to the Energy
Research and Development Administration (soon to
become part of the Department of Energy).
Developing an SPS would require extensive use of
on-orbit work crews in order to assemble and test very
large structures in space. Similar construction requirements were derived from less grand schemes involving large antennas in space for communications use
and scientific investigations.
By the end of 1975, NASA had developed an argument that space construction might be a major requirement of its programs during the 1980s, and
wanted to explore the role of in-space infrastructure
utilizing work crews in carrying out these construction efforts. In December 1975, the agency issued a
request for proposals for a “Space Station Systems
Analysis Study” (SSSAS); the study effort was to be
focused around the use of a “space station” to “serve
a wide range of operational base and space laboratory activities, ” such as using the station “as a test facility and construction base to support manufacturing, fabrication and assembly of various sizes of space
structures, ”64
One finding of the system analysis studies was that
scientific efforts could “go along for the ride” on
‘‘space stations” capable of supporting construction,
materials processing, and power generation objectives. An aerospace publication reported that:
The space base concept is one whose time seems
to be coming rather quickly. Until recently, “space
stations” have been thought of mainly as . . . ‘the
traditional laboratory in the sky. ’ Some observers were
surprised when construction, materials processing and
power were given roughly equal status with science . . . . Now, the balance has shifted further
to . . . space construction work as the ‘prime focus’
of the studies.65
When NASA began this study effort in late 1975,

its hope had been to use the Phase A study results as

6JGerard K. 0’ Nelll, ‘‘The Colonizationof SpaCe, ’ phY51c5 Today, S e p tember 1974,
b4NASA Press Release, “NASA Seeks Proposals for Space Station Studies, ”
Dec. 11, 1975.
‘>’’ Operational Base Concepts Gain In Space Station Studies, ” Aerospace
Dally, Sept. 13, 1976, p. 54.

the basis for a Phase B “space station” “new start”
in fiscal 1979—i.e., sometime after October 1978.
However, NASA was unable to get the approval of
the Office of Management and Budget to proceed on
a schedule which would have made such a new start
possible. Recognizing that NASA was not going to be
able to start on a major “space station” effort anytime
soon, by the spring of 1977 NASA officials were suggesting that “the (Shuttle) orbiter is a significant ‘space
station’ in itself, ” and were looking toward ways to
enhance Shuttle capability to perform many of the
missions that the SSSAS studies had assigned to a
“space station. ”66
Rather than being the year in which significant momentum behind a “space station” program was developed, 1978 turned out to be a year in which there
was essentially no “space station” activity per se. The
system analysis studies had identified, as important
steps in extending the capabilities of the space Shuttle, the development of an in-orbit power supply and
of Shuttle-tended unmanned orbital platforms for various science and applications payloads. Both Johnson
Space Center (JSC) and Marshall Space Flight Center
(MSFC) were studying orbital power supplies during
1978; the Johnson Space Center concept was called
a power extension platform, while Marshall Space
Flight Center was examining a 25-kW power platform.
Marshall also initiated studies of an unmanned
Science and Applications Space Platform (SASP), and
most of the MSFC study activities during the 1978-80
period were devoted to these two program concepts.
(During 1980 and 1981, MSFC contracted with
McDonnell Douglas to study an evolutionary program
through which an unmanned platform such as the one
defined in the SASP study could grow into a manned
platform, i.e., a “space station, ” perhaps along the
lines that McDonnell Douglas had earlier defined in
the 1975 Manned Orbital Systems Concept study.)
While Marshall’s emphasis was on an evolutionary
approach to space platforms, by early 1979 the leadership of JSC had decided that the Center’s efforts should
refocus on a major “space station” effort. Aviation
Week reported JSC was “concerned about this lack
of continuing assessment for permanently manned
U.S. facilities” and was “mindful of the growing Soviet capability in this area. 67’ Another factor influencing JSC thinking was “a need for a real goal to maintain the dedication of present participants in the space
program and the interest and enthusiasm of young
people in space technology in order to motivate their
pursuing engineering and science careers.” 68
6bAvja(jon week
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Based on these considerations, during 1979 JSC conducted an in-house study of a concept identified as
a Space Operations Center (SOC). This study was
based on two assumptions: “that the next 10 to 20
years will include requirements for large, complex
space systems” and “that geosynchronous orbit is
clearly a primary operational area in space in the coming decades. ” If these assumptions were valid, JSC
argued, then “the space construction and servicing
of these future systems wiI I be more effective with a
permanent, manned operations center in space. ”
The primary objectives of the SOC were identified
as:
● construction, checkout, and transfer to operational orbit of large, complex space systems;
● on-orbit assembly, launch, recovery, and servicing of manned and unmanned spacecraft; and,
● further development of the capability for permanent manned operations in space wiith reduced
dependence on Earth for control and resupply.
The SOC study noted that this list of objectives:
. . . noticeably does not include onboard science and
applications objectives, although the free-flying satellites which would be serviced would include mostly
those of this genre. The primary implication of this
mission is that experiment and applications requirements will not be design drivers; the SOC will be “optimized” to support the operational functions of these
objectives. However, experiments or applications
which can tolerate the operational parameters of the
SOC can be operated onboard, or an entire dedicated
module could be attached to an available berthing
port.

The study developed a concept of a self-contained,
continuously occupied orbital facility built from several Shuttle-launched modules. The initial SOC crew
would be 4 to 8 people. In addition to a core facility,
the full-capability SOC would require a construction
facility and flight support facility. The costs of this fully
capable SOC were estimated at $2,7 billion, with the
total facility in place 9 to 10 years after program initiation. b9
The Johnson Space Center briefed interested parties on SOC at the end of November 1979, in anticipation of initiating a contractor study of the concept during 1980. One account of this briefing suggested that
“the ‘space station’ may be ready for a comeback.”7°
The following year would see a new administration
take office and a new NASA Administrator appointed.
The concept of in-space infrastructure would be
looked at afresh.
●

W hj., pp 1.8, 1-13, 1- 1‘3, 1 ’24
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Conclusions
It should be evident that there is no obvious cutoff
point for an account of the development of the “space
station” concept. Today’s planning and proposals are
a continuation of an evolution which has roots in the
earliest years of this century and which has proceeded
i n sporadic bursts of intensity over the past quartercentury. It is possible, however, to reflect on past experience in the context of the current situation. Such
reflection reveals two levels of concrete justification
which have been offered i n support of in-space infrastructure—i. e., “space station, ” acquisition.
One set of justifications ties the need for a permanent human presence in orbit to a particular image
of the future objectives of the civiIian space program.
According to this line of reasoning, a “space station”
can be seen as:
1. a necessary way station in preparing for people
exploring the solar system; or
2. an extremely valuable “national laboratory in orbit” for carrying out many of the research and
development activities related to a balanced and
diverse civilian space program with both scientific and application objectives; or
3. a centralized operations base from which the
routine exploitation of, particularly the commercial exploitation of, both LEO and geosynchronous orbits can most effectively proceed.
In all of these justifications, in-space infrastructure
is explicitly a means to achieving or faciIitating a particular set of space policy objectives, and a decision
to develop it would be tied to the more fundamental
decision that those objectives were of sufficient
priority to justify the investments required to achieve
them, including the necessary infrastructure itself. Historically, what has happened at past occasions for
decision on the course of the American space program
is that other goals than those which would have required a “space station” were given preference:
1. In 1961, President Kennedy sought a dramatic
space achievement in which the United States
could best the Soviet Union. The choice of a lunar-landing objective and of the lunar-orbital rendezvous approach to achieving it as the response
to Kennedy’s need meant bypassing the development of Earth-orbital capabilities including
“space stations. ”
2. In 1969-71, President Nixon sought to reduce the
priority and budget allocation of the space program after Apollo while still developing some
new technology, maintaining a manned space
flight element, and creating more balance among
various program objectives. Within the scope of
what he was wiIling to approve, there was insuf-
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ficient activity to justify developing a major orbital laboratory, and the space Shuttle was selected as an alternative (and in NASA’s mind, an
interim) step until the level of space activity
would become high enough to require such a facility.
From the perspective of overall policy objectives,
then, the fact that a “space station” has been rejected
as a part of the space program in the past can be interpreted primarily as a function of the particular stage
i n the program’s evolution at the time that its acquisition was proposed. Such rejections are best understood as national leaders saying “not yet” or “not
under the current conditions, ” rather than an outright
“no.” The issue then becomes whether the overall
character and desired objectives of the Nation’s space
program for the rest of this century are now of a scope
to justify acquiring in-space infrastructure as a means
to achieve them.
Related to this point is an observation which springs
clearly from this historical record: that the concept
“space station” can be used to describe very different
hardware configurations and technical capabilities,
ranging from the von Braun toroidal concept of the
1950s, through the 50 to 100 person space base proposed by NASA in 1969 and the “construction shack”
concept of the mid-197os, to recent proposals for a
small and evolutionary station based on an unmanned
platform. Historically, then, the term “space station”
is extremely elastic, and an informed evaluation of a
particular proposal must ask “what kind of ‘space station, ’ for what purposes, at what cost?” In this sense,
the past history of the proposal is not particularly relevant to the current situation.
At another level of justification, the need for a permanent human outpost in orbit has been consistently
seen by those with a broad perspective on future
space activities as a necessary step in development
of a capability to explore and exploit outer space, if
that exploration and exploitation is to be pursued aggressively. Thomas Paine made this argument to
Richard Nixon in 1969:
We believe strongly that the justification for proceeding now with this major project as a national goal
does not, and should not be made to depend on the
specific contributions that can be foreseen today in
particular scientific fields like astronomy or high energy physics, in particular economic applications,
such as Earth resource surveys, or in specific defense
needs. Rather, the justification for the “space station”
is that it is clearly the next major evolutionary step
in man’s experimentation, conquest, and use of
space.71

Current NASA Administrator James Beggs has made
much the same point, saying that “a ‘space station’
is the logical next step in the history of our manned
space systems. It will build on the achievements of
the Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, and Shuttle programs. ”72
This argument decouples station justification from
any particular set of missions and suggests that a
“space station “ is a valuable, logical, and/or necessary step in developing the capability to pursue any
future objectives in space. The underlying assumption
is that the United States will want to pursue an active
space program and that a “space station” is required
to do so. This line of argument is frequently combined
with assertions of the need for leadership or preeminence in space as a source of national pride and prestige and as a counter to the military and/or economic
threats coming from other spacefaring nations.
This theme has consistently been put forth over the
past two decades by advocates of a “space station.”
In the past, it seems as if they were “ahead of the
curve’ ’—i.e.,., that in objective terms the U.S. space
program had not yet developed to a point where the
argument that a permanent manned outpost was indeed the logical next step in an aggressive space enterprise was plausible to those outside the space community.
The same argument is being put forth today; the
question is whether it is any more plausible in 1984,
as the U.S. space programs enters its second quartercentury, than it has been previously. Given the capability for easy access to orbit provided by the space
Shuttle, it may be that having the ability to stay in orbit for extended periods for experiments or operations
is now in fact a “next logical step.” Or it may be that
the program has not yet evolved, and is not evolving
toward the kind of active future, in which the creation of permanent human presence in orbit is justified.
This historical review suggests that space advocates
will continue to press their vision of the way to go
about opening the space frontier and that a “space
station” will continue to be an integral part of that vision. It is up to others in leadership positions to decide
whether the vision of space held by those who are
the heirs of Tsiolkovsky, Oberth, von Braun, and many
others who have worked on the space program in this
country is one which the United States will now
embrace.
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Appendix C

INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN A
CIVILIAN “SPACE STATION” PROGRAM*
Introduction
The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958,
as amended, includes the following passage: “The aeronautical and space activities of the United States shall
be conducted so as to contribute to . . . the following [objective]: . . . Cooperation by the United States
with other nations and groups of nations in work done
pursuant to this Act and in the peaceful application
of the results thereof . . . .’1 As a result of this provision, NASA has a long tradition of cooperation with
other countries in space activities.
In accordance with this tradition, there have been
extensive discussions over the past 2 years between
NASA and other friendly countries regarding a possible international in-space infrastructure acquisition
program. Then, in January of 1984, President Reagan
in his State of the Union Address called for a U.S.
“space station” with international participation. These
circumstances indicate the importance of a full consideration of various international options for development, acquisition, operation, and use of future longterm, in-orbit infrastructure. The aim of this appendix is to contribute to this consideration.
Why

International Involvement?
THE MOTIVES FOR COOPERATION

Countries engage in international cooperation in scientific and technical undertakings for a variety of
reasons. In order to assess the potential advantages
and disadvantages of international involvement by
another country in a U.S. “space station” program (or
even the advantages of fully internationalizing the program) it is first of all necessary to understand the
reasons which lead nations to engage in international
technical cooperation in general. These motivations
can then be discussed as they apply to the specific
situation of space infrastructure development, operation, and/or use in order to provide a framework for
examining various degrees and forms of potential international involvement, from no involvement at all
up to and including a space infrastructure enterprise
which is fully multinational from the start.

● Paper prepared for OTA by Hubert Bortzmeyer,
with revision by John
Logsdon.
I National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, As Amended, Section
102(b)(7).

There are both symbolic and utilitarian payoffs
which lead a country to engage in international involvement in its technical activities through formal cooperative agreements. Among the national objectives
served by such involvement are:2
1. Symbolic Objectives
a. political and policy influence–a country may
engage in international cooperation in order
to influence political attitudes and policy outcomes in cooperating countries, in particular
so that those attitudes and outcomes are compatible with its own national objectives.
b. policy legitimization–a country may invite
others to cooperate with it in order to enlist
their support for a particular course of action
that the country intends to pursue; broadening the base of involvement in a particular
undertaking may increase its legitimacy both
at home and abroad.
c. policy commitment–a country may allow
others to participate in one of its undertakings as a means of gaining their commitment
to support some of its other policies.
d. leadership–a country may invite others to
join it in a common undertaking because it
believes that such an intimate partnership will
allow it to demonstrate clearly to others a
leadership position.
e. cooperation to encourage cooperation—a
country may initiate or enter into a specific
cooperative undertaking in order to demonstrate its commitment to the general principle of international cooperation as a desirable
course of action.
2. Utilitarian Objectives
a. division of labor and sharing of costs–a country may invite others to join in an undertaking it wishes to pursue in order to achieve a
necessary or desirable sharing of the burdens,
particularly the cost, of that undertaking.
b. access to foreign resources—a country may
open one of its undertakings to foreign participation in order to engage or have access to

‘This statement of objectwes IS adapted from Stephen M. Shaffer and Lisa
Robock Shaffer, The Politics of International Cooperation: A Comparison of
U.S. Experience in Space and in Security (Graduate School of International
Relations, University of Denver, 1980).
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unique or superior resources, both physical
and human, available only in other countries.
c. economic influences-a country may invite
others to participate in an undertaking in order to increase the likelihood that they will
then purchase the products or services of that
undertaking, rather than those of potential
competitors.
This breakdown of the objectives of cooperation basically reflects the perspective of a country seeking to
involve others in its activities; however, it also can be
used to identify the reasons why others would agree
to cooperate with that country. In general, one would
expect those responding to a cooperative initiative to
give highest priority to utilitarian benefits, but the symbolic payoffs from international cooperation can accrue, though not evenly, to all partners.
The United States has made international cooperation in science and technology—in space as in numerous other sectors-a major element of its foreign policy; most observers agree that the overall benefits of
such cooperation in both symbolic and utilitarian
terms have been substantial, and that the negative impacts have been comparatively insignificant.3 Unless
it begins a technical undertaking for motivations which
are overwhelmingly nationalistic in character (e.g.,
Project Apollo or the Supersonic Transport) the United
States has welcomed the participation of its closest
allies. As international involvement in the “space station” program is assessed, this “bias” toward cooperation will be maintained.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SPACE:
THE RECORD TO DATE
In the 25 years that the United States has had a Government-funded civilian space program, international
cooperation has been one of its major themes; as mentioned above, it was an explicit objective of the NAS
Act. Armed with this legislative mandate, with Presidential and congressional support for a U.S. civilian
space program which emphasized openness and scientific objectives, and with already existing patterns
of cooperation in space science, NASA has since its
inception conducted an active program of international partnership.

JThe Nat tonal Academy of Sciences has recently undertaken a review of
sclentlflc and technolog~al cooperation among the OECD countries which
reaches this conclusion.

In space, perhaps more than in most areas of international science, it has been the policies and initiatives of the Government, rather than those of the scientific and technical community, which have
established the U.S. attitude toward cooperative
undertakings. 4 Although NASA’s international programs have involved the Soviet Union, Canada, Japan, and various developing countries, NASA’s primary cooperative partner to date has been Europe—
both individual European countries and the various
European space organizations which have existed
over the past two decades.
International cooperation in civilian space activity
is thus a longstanding tradition, especially in the field
of space science, but also to some extent in space applications and space technology programs. As the general space policies of potential international partners
in a space infrastructure acquisition program are reviewed, many examples of cooperative ventures can
be brought to light. These range in scope from modest participation in minor projects to intense involvement in major undertakings on the basis of full partnership, An extreme example of the latter is the setting
up of an intergovernmental consortium to carry out
comprehensive programs in a particular technical
field—telecommunications.
On the other hand, there are few examples of substantial involvement of foreign partners in programs
which could be characterized as the main thrust of
the national space policy of a given country, whether
it be the United States, the U. S. S. R., or any other
space-capable state. As a matter of fact, the only instance so far of such an arrangement is the involvement, since the early 1970s, of Europe and Canada
in the development of the American Space Transportation System (STS).
But even that example is not really valid, since the
hardware developments assigned to Europe (Spacelab)
and Canada (the Remote Manipulator System, RMS),
although producing valuable complements, involve
a rather minor share of the total costs involved, on
the order of 10 percent. Furthermore, what is really
central in the STS is the American-built Shuttle. The
other two items are accessory to it: the RMS could
easily have been replaced with some U.S.-designed
equivalent, and, if Spacelab did not exist, the STS

4Another area where Government I nttlatlves were crucial I n establlshi ng
patterns of international cooperation was nuclear energy.
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would still be able to carry out 90 percent of its intended activities. s
An invitation for international participation in a U.S.
“space station” program might well have the result,
as did the U.S. offer to participate in STS development,
that foreign participation would be somewhat marginal in terms of both the scope and the nature of its share
in the workload. A different outcome, however, is also
possible, resulting in what was described above as a
rather unusual circumstance: major foreign involvement in what will be the brunt of the U.S. effort in
space over the next decade or more. Since the early
seventies, space technology has been disseminating
and/or maturing throughout the world, bringing certain countries almost to par with the United States in
aspects of space technology relevant to a such an
undertaking, and thus broadening the technical base
for significant cooperation.
In order to understand which of these outcomes is
likely and/or preferable, it is first necessary to detail
the objectives which would lead both the United
States and other countries to collaborate on a space
infrastructure undertaking. As NASA’s current Director of International Affairs has observed: “International
space cooperation is not a charitable enterprise; countries cooperate because they judge it in their interest
to

do

so.

”

6

U.S. OBJECTIVES AND INTERESTS RELATED
TO INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN A U.S. SPACE
INFRASTRUCTURE ACQUISITION PROGRAM
In the first year of its existence, NASA formulated
a set of policy guidelines for international cooperation in space. Those guidelines have survived periodic
reexamination and remain in force today. They reflect
“conservative values 7” with respect to the conditions
under which cooperation is desirable.

sThe U.S. policy, as became clear I n 1972, was to ensure that foreign contributors to the STS should not have responsibility for any element which
was essential to the success of the system. The only civillan space programs
to which Europe has contributed or is contributing essential parts are the
International Ultraviolet Explorer (IUVE) and the Spxe Telescope (ST). There
IS a strong push within NASA to Iim it the foreign role in any ‘‘space station’
program to non-essential elements, but this push is being countered by an
Increasingly strong insistence, from the major ESA contributors at least, that
potential partners be allowed to develop some of the key infrastructure elements, Of course, there is a natural resistance within U.S. industry to seeing
foreign organizations provide what it could produce: witness, for instance,
the Industrial opposition to the Canadian development of the RMS. It should
be noted, however, that NATO partners are frequently gwen responsibility
for developing essential components of defense systems, with consequent
strerigthenlng of the alliance.
6Kenneth S. Pedersen, “International Aspects of Commercial Space Activities, ” speech to Princeton Conference on Space Manufacturing, May 1983.
7Arnold Frutkin, /nternationa/ Cooperation in Space (Prentice-Hall, 1965),
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The essential features of NASA guidelines are:
cooperation is to be on a project-by-project basis,
not on a program or other open-ended arrangement;
each project must be of mutual interest and have
clear scientific value;
technical agreement is necessary before political
commitment;
each side bears full financial responsibility for its
share of the project;
each side must have the technical and managerial
capabilities to carry out its share of the project;
NASA does not provide substantial technical assistance to its partners, and little or no U.S. technology is transferred; and
scientific results are made publicly available.8
These guidelines have occasionally been bent, as
in the case of the 1975 U.S.-U.S.S.R. Apollo-Soyuz
Program. In general, however, they have provided an
effective framework within which NASA has pursued
a mixed set of objectives, including:
● Scientific/Technical
Increasing the number of qualified people
working on problems of space research and
space technology by broadening the base of
involvement in space activities;
Shaping the development of the space programs in other countries by offering attractive
opportunities to join with the United States i n
“doing things our way”; and
Channeling the funds and technical capabilities dedicated to space in other countries
away from activities which are competitive or
not compatible with U.S. interests, but involving them in a program dominated by and largely defined by the United States.
● Economic
– NASA estimates that it has achieved over $2
billion in cost savings and effective contributions from its cooperative programs over the
past 25 years; cost-sharing has been an influential, though not top-priority, element of NASA’s
cooperative programs.
– Involving other countries in expanded space
activities may create new markets for U.S. aerospace products.
● Political
— NASA’s international cooperative programs
have been designed to present a positive image of the United States to our cooperating
partners; in particular, the contrast between

8Shatier and Shaffer, op. CIt,, p. 18

p. 32.
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U.S. openness and Soviet secrecy with respect
to space has been exploited by the United
States.
— International cooperation in space has been
undertaken by the United States in order to
advance other U.S. foreign policy objectives.
While the priority given to these various objectives
has varied over time and mission opportunity, at the
core has been a policy that permitted this country’s
closest allies to become involved in the U.S. space
effort. Indeed, some have criticized NASA for making possible such participation, at minimal cost, in an
effort paid for almost entirely by U.S. taxpayers; “benefit, know-how and opportunity were shared to an extent which was totally unprecedented where an advanced technology was involved . . . .“9 Since the
start of its civilian space program, the United States
has used international cooperation in space as a
means of creating a sense of togetherness and common achievement among, particularly, the industrial
democracies which are this country’s most significant
partners in maintaining world order.
The benefits to the United States of international
space cooperation do not come without costs, of
course. Among the potential negative impacts of involving others in the U.S. space program are:
1. increased technical risk and management complexity;
sensitive or valuable U.S.
.2. Significant O Ut-fl OWS of
technology, employment opportunities, and/or
hard currency, as the United States purchases
space-related goods or services from other
countries;
3. in particular, the development, through their involvement in U.S. space activities, of effective
competitors to U.S. firms in commercial space efforts; and
4. possible disputes among the United States and
its cooperating partners-which, if not resolved,
could lead to broader foreign policy conflicts.
To date, NASA has managed its affairs so as to have
minimized these potential negative impacts. For instance, many of the cooperative programs involved
NASA’s launching of foreign satellites, in which the
technical risk to NASA was virtually non-existent and
which often led to foreign purchase of additional
launches.

FOREIGN OBJECTIVES AND INTERESTS
RELATED TO INVOLVEMENT IN A U.S.
“SPACE STATION” PROGRAM
Success in cooperative undertakings requires that
each side perceives the cooperation as being beneficial to itself; such undertakings are even more likely
to be successful if there is at least some commonality
of objectives. All partners must believe that cooperation is a useful means for advancing some of their national objectives without undue costs related to others.
It is somewhat more difficult to generalize with respect
to the motivations which might lead specific countries
or groupings of countries to decide to join the United
States in development, operation, and/or use of space
infrastructure, but the following seems most germane:
● Scientific/Technical
In most areas of space technology, the United
States is still a leader. Other countries may
hope that close partnership with the United
States will give them increased access to these
technologies and help upgrade their own technical capabilities.
The “space station” contains elements of
space infrastructure which, used in connection
with the space transportation system, will
“modernize” space operations; other countries may decide they must be part of the most
advanced way of operating in space,
● Economic
— If the commercial potential of many areas of
space activity is as large as some forecast, use
of in-space infrastructure will be an essential
or at least extremely useful means for achieving that potential. Other countries wanting to
participate in the commercial exploitation of
space may view sharing the costs of a “space
station” program as the best way to be major
partners in such commercial exploitation.
— Cooperation with the United States may be the
only way that other countries can afford to develop capabilities in particular areas of space
technology. Division of labor and costs is a
necessary approach for those without the resources to develop a total system of space infrastructure on their own. While the United
States could probably afford to develop it on
its own, as could the ESA countries in collaboration with Japan,10 probably no other coun-

IOAS noted later in this appemfix,

gArnold Frutkin, “U.S. Policy: a Drama in N Acts,” Spectrum, September
1983, p. 74.

there is a considerable difference bet-

ween the amount of taxpayers’ money the United States on the one hand
and Europe and Japan on the other are prepared to spend on space. But
there is little doubt that Europe alone cou/d make a comparable investment
if the political will existed.
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try or region except the Soviet Union and its
allies could make a comparable investment in
space.
— Other countries may anticipate that such a program will provide marketing opportunities for
their industries and want to participate in the
program in order to maximize those opportunities.
. Political
— Participation in the “space station,” like participation in the space transportation system,
may provide other countries a way of sharing
in the political and prestige benefits of manned
space flight activities without bearing the total
cost of manned systems.
— The United States is the military and economic
leader of the non-Communist world; cooperation with the United States in such an effort
may provide a way for other countries to maintain or increase their commitment to a political
and military alliance with the United States.
THE POTENTIAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL
“SPACE STATION” PROGRAM
Some have suggested that any major new undertaking in space be from the start “truly” international—
i.e., designed, funded, and managed by an international consortium or an equivalent organization .11 Although the current momentum behind “space station” plans is leading away from this option, it is worth
identifying it here and assessing it later as a possible
way of approaching its development or operation.
Such an approach would, of course, be the ultimate
in the way of internationalizing a program; in this
mode of cooperation, the United States would merely
be a shareholder among many others within a consortium of participants. There are precedents in this
respect; an instance which comes readily to mind is
that of the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT).
In 1962, the U.S. Congress passed the Communications Satellite Act, creating the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) and charging it with developing a global system for international satellite
communications. The United States could not achieve
such an ambitious goal without the active participation of other nations; therefore negotiations were
started which led (after substantial conflict) in 1964
to an “interim agreement” under which a global network was successfully established. In 1969, a Plenipotentiary Conference was convened, with 67
1 I See,

for example, RcJ&rt Salkeld, “Toward Men Permanently in Space, ’

Astronautics and Aeronautics, October 1979.
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member countries in attendance: it resulted in a
Definitive Agreement which entered into force in 1973
and made INTELSAT a working international organization, with a present membership of more than 100
countries.
The U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries never
joined INTELSAT, both because it was initiated by the
United States and actually run by Americans during
the first years of its existence and because they would
have had very little influence on the organization
under the weighted system of voting which was
employed.
The International Maritime Satellite Organization
(lNMARSAT) has a number of features that are distinctly different from those of INTELSAT. It provides
global coverage, whereas INTELSAT does not. Another
difference is that among its member states, INMARSAT
counts the Soviet Union (with a 14 percent ownership share, second only to the United States’ 23 percent) and several other socialist countries.
INMARSAT’S statute obliges it to provide free access
to members and nonmembers.
INMARSAT was created pursuant to the initiative of
a United Nations agency, the Inter-governmental
Maritime Consultative Organization, which, from
1973 to 1976, convened a series of international conferences to establish a global maritime satellite communications system. In 1979, the INMARSAT Convention and Operating Agreement entered into force, and
operations started early in 1982. With the exception
of the above-mentioned differences, INTELSAT and
INMARSAT are similar in structure.
Could a similar international organization be
created, in order to develop, operate, and use in-space
infrastructure? In principle there is no obstacle to this,
although the parallel with INTELSAT can be very misleading. In particular, it is not clear that the provision
of orbital infrastructure to accomplish a variety of objectives could ever be the kind of profitable enterprise
that space-based communications has been. Communications is a well-established business, yielding a return on investment of about 14 percent within
INTELSAT. Also, the capability upon which INTELSAT
was originally based (communications satellites and
launch capabilities) had been developed by the
United States at its own expense.
There are no such credible economic prospects for
space infrastructure, which would have many different
uses, some for pure government-funded research,
others in the nature of a public service, and still others
for commercial applications. Also, in a satellite communications system, there lies more cash-flow in the
procurement of the ground segment than in the
building of the satellites. This has made it possible for

182

●

Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

American firms to be the exclusive manufacturers of
INTELSAT satellites for years without stirring too much
resentment within the international consortium,
because other member countries have found adequate compensation in the manufacturing of ground
stations for themselves and for sale abroad.
Also, Europe, with its Ariane series of boosters, is
now competing for INTELSAT launch contracts. In addition, some form of international cooperation was absolutely essential, almost by definition, for an international communications network to be feasible. No
such cooperative imperative is attached to space infrastructure.
A more adequate precedent for an international
“space station” enterprise might be that of an international organization created to conduct a number
of jointly coordinated space programs for the benefit
of its member states. Such a “limited partnership” may
be a realistic approach to space infrastructure development and/or operation. To a large extent, the European Space Agency (ESA) does provide such a parallel. 12 Since its inception, ESA has performed very
successfully in spite of the difficulties associated with
almost all international organizations.13 In ESA’s case,
the two major problem areas have been, and still are:
1 ) the time and burdensome negotiations required to
settle differences about general policies to follow and
what programs to support; 2) the framing of an “industrial policy” designed to improve the worldwide
competitiveness of European industry while ensuring
a “fair return” to individual members states (the “return” is the value of the contracts let by ESA to any
member state, and it is “fair” when proportionate to
that member’s financial contribution to the agency’s
budget).
The Convention governing ESA provides some clues
as to how these difficulties are dealt with in the long
run:
1. The formal structure of ESA is designed to accommodate laborious negotiations and compromises.
The legislative power, so to speak, rests with a
Council where all states are represented; the
Council meets regularly, usually for 2-day sessions.14 There is also an Executive responsible for
day-to-day operations and long-range planning.

I ZESA is described i n more detail below.
IJI ndeed, if one takes a long view of past European coopf?ration, saY, over
100 years, ESA’S record is strikingly good. Although its operations have been
on a much smaller scale than have those of NASA, ESA’S record of technical
successes is perhaps as good as that of any other organization.
141n general, exh Member State has one vote in the Council. However,
a Member State does not have the right to vote on matters concerning an
optional program in which it does not take part. Except where the ESA Convention provides otherwise, decisions of the Council are taken by a simple
majority of Member States represented and voting.

2. ESA’s overall activity is subdivided into two cat-

egories:
mandatory activities, which include chiefly
scientific programs and basic organizational
expenditures; mandatory contributions are
based on each state’s GNP;
optional activities, which are specific programs
like Ariane, Spacelab, Marecs, and so on; contributions to these programs are negotiated
between the participants at the inception of
the program.
This system provides ESA with a considerable flexibility: although unanimous consent of all Member
States is needed formally to permit ESA to undertake
an optional program, a vote in favor of the program
does not carry any obligation to participate. Member
States may decide, after a program has been
authorized, whether—and, if so, to what extent—they
wiII participate. Thus, Member states can adjust their
financial effort to the degree of interest they see in a
program and/or to the “return” their industry will obtain from it (one of the solutions to the irksome “fair
return” problem). Also, member states can support
another partner’s favorite project by a token participation which can be traded against others, resulting
i n “package deals” which settle seemingly unreconcilable differences.
A further degree of flexibility is provided by the fact
that the agency is not obligated to manage all of its
programs through its own staff. ESA can delegate to
a national agency the responsibilities for a program’s
management, if this appears to be preferable from a
political, economic, or technical point of view (CNES,
the French space agency, is thus entrusted with technical management of the Ariane development
program).
3. ESA early recognized that a multinational agency
is better off letting contracts to multinational industrial firms rather than attempting to balance
contracts among national companies according
to its “fair return” principle. This balancing act
is often performed better and more quickly inside multinational consortia of European aerospace and electronics firms, the creation of which
ESA has encouraged.
As a last parallel which might be drawn from ESA,
it should be noted that this agency’s role is generally
limited to development and demonstration of space
systems. Utilization, in the sense of operational or
commercial exploitation, is usually entrusted to other
intergovernmental organization, like EUTELSAT for regional European communications or EUMETSAT for
meteorological satellites. Commercial operation can
even be entrusted to private multinational corporations like ARIANESPACE, which has been established
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to produce, market, launch, and finance Ariane
launch vehicles. This arrangement could be paralleled
in an international “space station” program: different
international entities, with possibly different membership and operating procedures, could take care of its
development and operation.
As far as development and operation are concerned,
one might question whether the creation of international entities in charge of these activities would entail creation of new technical agencies duplicating the
know-how and resources of existing space agencies,
most notably NASA. Clearly, this would not be an advisable course. However, the international body in
charge of the program could confine itself to overall
management, and rely on existing agencies in the participating countries for technical management, supervision, and day-to-day activity, a procedure similar to
that sometimes followed by ESA. Given that the
United States would undoubtedly be the largest shareholder in such a joint venture, it should be possible
to have the leading role assigned to NASA and/or the
U.S. private sector in this context. Other major agencies like ESA (Europe), NASDA (Japan), CNES (France),
or DFVLR (West Germany) would as a matter of
course have to be entrusted with tasks commensurate
with their country’s or region’s financial commitment.
THE POSSIBILITY OF A U.S. DECISION TO
“GO IT ALONE” WITH RESPECT TO THE
“SPACE STATION” 15
Of course, there is the possibility that no other country will reach agreement with the United States to cooperate in the acquisition and use of in-space infrastructure. In this unlikely situation, the United States
would “go it alone. ” Would such a step deal a fatal
blow to all future prospects of international cooperation in space? There seems to be no reason to fear
such a drastic outcome: what would probably happen is merely an extension into the future of the present situation, characterized by a large amount of duplication, with most countries striving to acquire more
or less the same capabilities so as to be able to compete, especially where commercial applications are
concerned.
The same countries, however, are now willing to
participate in quite a large number of cooperative

.
I SThe circumstances adduced at the beginning of this appendix provide
reason to believe that a U .S, -only program is the least I ikely alternative, However, since no final Congressional decision on international participation in
any U.S. “space station” program has been made—and since the Congress
may wish to reconsider this matter de rrovo-the U.S.-only option IS Included
here
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schemes, not only in the field of space science (reputedly free of competition), but also in general public
service types of applications (e.g., meteorology or
search-and-rescue), and even in commercial applications (e.g., communication via INTELSAT, INMARSAT,
or INTERSPUTNIK). Cooperation, in other words,
seems to be a widely recognized way of performing
space activities, provided a certain amount of autonomous assets have been secured to safeguard national
independence and ability to compete, so that if this
U.S. offer to cooperate is not taken up on a program
as central even as the “space station, ” this situation
is unlikely to be reversed,
That such duplication does not make optimal use
of the global resources of the international community is obvious, but by no means new. If one accepts
it, the next question, from a U.S. perspective, is
whether other spacefaring countries, not being involved in the U.S. program, would thus be motivated
to challenge U.S. supremacy in space and to compete
commercially with it even more effectively and better than they do now. In other words, what are the
implications if other countries strive to acquire more
or less the same capabilities as the United States is
seeking by developing space infrastructure, but on
their own and not in partnership with the United
States?
It should be noted first that acquisition of similar capabilities does not necessarily require development
of similar technology. The capability to launch satellites, for instance, can be provided by a very sophisticated reusable craft like the Shuttle, or by less inexpensive expendable rockets. Similarly, it could turn
out that most or all functions of space infrastructure
that utilize a human crew could eventually be performed by one or several automated systems. This certainly seems to be true whenever a single specific activity is under examination: materials processing in
space, for instance, could perhaps be adequately performed in an operational production mode by an unmanned platform along the lines of the French
SOLARIS concept.
Therefore, when specific activities are considered
in isolation, there appear to be ways for other countries to remain competitive in space applications without joining a U.S. “space station” program. However,
when looked at from a global perspective, a comprehensive space program is more than the sum of a few
specific application projects. U.S. development of
long-term space infrastructure would mark the inception of a new way of performing activities in space;
the hoped-for result would be enhanced flexibility and
economies of operation in many areas of space science and applications, whether already recognized
or presently unforeseen.
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Any country wishing to gain access to this new way
of doing business in space would have to acquire an
extensive set of technologies and systems:
1. Orbital communication relays. (The United States
is developing such relays in the form of the Tracking and Data Relay Satellites; similarly, ESA’s LSAT will have orbital capabilities and will be used
in this role for the control of EURECA).
2. In-orbit servicing (and probably retrieval) systems.
(The United States has flown a short-range system
of that kind, the manned maneuvering unit
(M M U), which enables people to tend satellites
in the vicinity of the Shuttle, To go further along
this line, NASA will have to develop the so-called
Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV)).
3. The capability of returning space hardware from
orbit to the surface of the Earth via unmanned
vehicles. (This is a capability which the United
States has bypassed through development of the
Shuttle) and/or;
4. Ultimately, man-rated launch and reentry vehicles (unless automated systems or systems remotely controlled from the ground suffice. to perform all the space tasks for which the need for
human beings is currently foreseen–a possibility which is debatable at best).
Even if one takes into account that such capabilities
need not rest on facilities identical (in terms of size,
sophistication, etc.) to those deployed by the United
States, the cost of their creation is nevertheless likely
to be several times higher than the cost of creating
and maintaining independent “traditional” satellite
building and launching capabilities.
Consider, for instance, the total development and
flight testing cost of Ariane 1: roughly $1 billion (1984).
The corresponding cost for the Shuttle exceeds $10
billion. The Shuttle’s payload capability is much
greater than that of Ariane 1, especially in LEO. But
the important point is that Ariane suffices to endow
European countries with the capability to launch all
the applications satellites they need, and even further,
to market launch services abroad, competing commercially with NASA and the U.S. private sector in
that field. (One might state more accurately that the
real competition will come from the Ariane 2, 3 and
4 versions, which together will cost about an additional $400 million beyond the initial development expenditures: the argument, however, still holds true.)
Suppose now that Europe decides to acquire a
manned flight capability of its own. A typical way to
do that (as explored in ESA’s “long-term preparatory
program”) would be to develop an even larger version of Ariane, with a LEO capability around one-half
that of the Shuttle: under the name Ariane S, various

preliminary designs for such a vehicle have been publicized. These designs are compatible with a winged
reentry vehicle, looking somewhat like a down-scaled
Shuttle, which under the name HERMES has also been
through early design stages in France. Both craft could
operate automatically but could also transport people.
No cost estimates have been officially quoted yet,
but independent experts, by extrapolating from other
European and U.S. program costs, predict $2 billion
to $4 billion as the price for acquiring such a minimal
capability. This is much less than what it took to develop the Shuttle, but 2 to 3 times what it cost to
develop Ariane. Of course, in order to exploit such
a staffed flight capability properly, if it is not to remain
only a prestige enterprise, all space activities must be
adapted to the “new way of doing business in space.”
Today’s European satellites, for instance, do not lend
themselves to servicing in orbit; all sorts of new techniques would have to be adopted for that purpose,
such as modules easy to plug out or in; built-in, readily
accessible and readable check-out circuits; safety devices destined to protect the astronauts’ lives, and so
on.
In turn, even if this proves to be economical in the
long run, it would call for increased investment at the
start. Added to the higher operating costs of manned
space flight, the overall consequence of all these considerations amounts to this: in order to acquire the
capabilities which go with the new way of conducting space activities, medium space powers like Europe or Japan would probably have to multiply their
space budgets by at least 2 to 3 times. However, the
ratio of civilian space expenditures to gross national
product (GNP) in Europe and Japan is much smaller
than the corresponding ratio in the United States—
i.e., roughly 4 times less. There is therefore room for
expansion, but such a major shifting of gears would
require a reassessment of national priorities in all the
countries involved, and there is no sign that such a
reassessment is imminent.
A last question to address is whether another alternative is open to these countries: again assuming that
the United States goes ahead alone with the development of a “space station” and all the attendant new
technologies, must countries wishing to enter into or
stay in the space business of necessity develop similar
capabilities? In other words, could “doing business
in the old way” be competitive when faced with the
“new way, ” just as expendable launch vehicles from
Europe, Japan, and the United States seem to be managing to stay in competition with a very new and different craft, the Shuttle?
Two factors will have a deciding influence on this
question:
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1. Economics
— The relative importance of captive markets;
— charges applied to users: the very sophistication of new systems may, at least in the initial
phase, lead to high operational costs; this argument is further complicated by the fact that
user’s charges do not necessarily reflect actual
costs. If the United States decided to go ahead
for reasons of its own, not all of which were
economic ones, it probably would not fully
amortize costs through user’s charges; other
suppliers of space services might do the same,
to facilitate export sales, for instance;
— the fact that the key area of commercial competition in space utilizes the geostationary orbit, whereas the “space station” and its related
new capabilities will at the start focus on LEO
activities, and will extend their sphere of
operations to geostationary orbit much later;
meanwhile, business can go on as usual in that
orbit.
2. Political and Technical Trends
— One of the major impacts of “space station”
technology will be in the field of construction
and assembly of large structures or platforms
in orbit. Presently, however, there seems to
be a trend in favor of small or medium-sized
satellites which fit the needs of one given
country or group of countries eager to possess
its own independent system. Small to medium-sized satellites would probably also appeal
to commercial operators (in the United States
and elsewhere) who might find it of advantage
to own a system built along their specifications
rather than to lease a segment of a larger
system.
— However, even small/medium satellites might
benefit from new methods of operating in
space. The capability to check a satellite in
low orbit before transferring it to its final orbit to start operation there, or the capability
to repair it when it fails, may be a significant
commercial advantage which no prospective
customer is likely to overlook. However, the
economic attractiveness of satellite servicing
is still a very controversial matter; lb anyway,
from a strictly financial point of view, a customer could be presented with the same advantages by an adequate system of warranty.
But the psychological appeal would clearly be
in favor of the servicing capability.
lbThe reluctance of those concerned to meet the relatively low costs of
retrieving and refurbishing WESTSTAR 6 and PALAPA B-2 indicate that inorbit retrieval ad repair are not yet economically attractive.
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At the present stage, it would seem that neither economic factors nor political and technical trends yield
a clear answer to the question of whether there is an
alternative way open to countries unable or unwilling to acquire in-space infrastructure. This is a major
reason to believe that the U.S. offer to cooperate with
other countries will be accepted by other spacefaring nations, at least to the minimum extent necessary
to see what happens. Whether such minimal participation is in the U.S. interest will be discussed later in
this paper. But the conclusion of the reasoning and
analysis just presented is inescapable—as the United
States begins a space infrastructure program, others will
want to be part of it, provided the cost (in all senses
of the term) is not too great.

Possible Modes of International
Involvement in a U.S. “Space
Station” Program
There is a wide variety of possible forms that international cooperation in a space infrastructure program
might take. This section describes two general categories of involvement, each with several variations:
1. international cooperation during “space station”
development, then separate deployment of
operational systems; and
2. international cooperation throughout the deployment, operation, and use of the “space station .“
JOINT DEVELOPMENT, SEPARATE DEPLOYMENT
If the United States and/or its potential international
partners believe that free and open competition in utilizing space is preferable (or unavoidable), and if these
countries nevertheless want to save on development
costs and prevent all-out duplication of efforts, then
this option will be attractive. joint development of a
total system or a piece of hardware, followed by separate or independent deployment, operation, exploitation and/or sale is a commonplace arrangement in,
among others, aerospace programs. Many military and
civilian aircraft have been or are being born that way,
at least in Europe. The United States seems to favor
separate development followed by licensing
agreements, but there are examples to the contrary
(e.g., the joint development of the CFM 56 jet engine
by General Electric and the French SNECMA).
Among the reasons that other countries might want
to commit only to joint development, reserving the
right of separate deployment of constituent elements,
are:
1. Going along to see what happens. This would
typically be the attitude of countries or agencies
feeling rather skeptical about the benefits to be

186 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

derived from use of in-space infrastructure, but
which deem it necessary to be at least symbolically present in the game, just in case it turns out
that their skepticism was ill-founded. Such partners may not be of the most active sort, but they
also will not be troublesome, since the very
reason of their being present is “to follow the
leader.” Presumably they would not be interested
enough in the joint undertaking to fund cost increases if the program should meet with difficulties, and would therefore attempt to settle for a
fixed amount rather than a fixed percentage type
of participation.
2. Going along to acquire some of the know-how
and of the technologies to be derived from the
program. This would be the attitude of countries
or agencies with a positive attitude towards new
systems, but which are not in a hurry to deploy
and use them, so that they only want to acquire
knowledge to be implemented in a much later
perspective. Along with other, more “political”
motivations, this seems to be what prompted Europe to join the post-Apollo program. There was
also a more immediate industrial motivation; Europe hoped to sell to NASA more units of the hardware developed by European firms, and NASA
has indeed purchased a second Spacelab flight
unit in Europe. This type of motivation is apt to
create problems, insofar as it raises the issue of
technology transfer or dissemination.
3. Going along in order to & able to deploy a separate system at about the time that the primary
partner deploys its own. This is a sign of real interest to the program, insofar as it means that all
parties truly believe in it. However, it might well
generate more problems than would the preceding ones. It is indeed unlikely that all parties concerned will aim, through their joint development
efforts, towards development of strictly identical
infrastructure elements. As a consequence, a
number of compromises would have to be accepted by all (or some of) the participants to reconciIe differing specifications. Any given participant will tend to specify the work assigned to it
so that it serves directly (or with the smallest
possible amount of modification or adaptation)
its own national interests. However, the end
product of the same work, if the joint endeavor
is to make any sense, must also be readily adaptable to what other participants plan to construct.
In a rather grossly exaggerated way, this is a situation akin to ESA and NASA trying to agree on a
definition of Spacelab which would enable it to
be launched either by the Shuttle or by Ariane.

Such compromises are by no means impossible, but
must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to make
sure that the overall cost of the compromise design
and of its adaptations to specific needs does not exceed the added costs of separate developments. Furthermore, such a compromise design is inevitably difficult to agree on, for all parties tend to believe that
it is to them that will fall the largest amount of modifications to be made later to adapt the common development of their specific needs. These, however, are
problems inherent in all cooperative development
programs, and past experience, notably in the field
of aeronautics and armaments, proves that they can
be settled whenever a strong sense of common purpose prevails.
While, for one or more of the reasons sketched
above, joint development without a commitment to
joint operation or utilization may be attractive to a potential cooperating partner, it would appear that the
United States might prefer a more comprehensive
cooperative approach, as described below. However,
there may be reasons for the United States to avoid
commitment to international involvement beyond the
development stage. Among such possible motivations
are:
1. A feeling that national security applications in
space might evolve in such a way that the United
States would prefer to deploy its own infrastructure so that it could control access to it; this is
not necessarily a problem since provisions for
such restriction could be part of an international
agreement.
2. A similar argument could be made if, particularly,
materials processing activities appear quite promising commercially and U.S. firms prefer a U. S.only “industrial park” in space.
3 The United States may prefer a safety valve freeing it from the need to continue a joint effort if
there is a likelihood that the cooperative experience during the development phase is not satisfactory on technical, economic, and/or political
grounds.
In addition to all of the above, dissatisfaction with
joint development programs sometimes crops up, not
from problems directly related to the development
phase of the undertaking, but from an apparent or real
lack of benefits deriving from the joint effort once it
has carried through. This leads one to examine what
benefits can be expected, and what sort of framework
is needed to ensure that they can be reaped.
1. Each party deploys and uses for its own purposes
one or several units of the jointly developed hardware. (Construction would presumably be shared
among industrial firms which built the proto-
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types.) This approach is feasible if integrated
systems have in fact been jointly developed; however, as stated earlier, this may not necessarily
be the usual case, as agencies and administrations
involved wiII tend to prefer clear-cut interfaces
rather than closely integrated systems.
2. Assuming then that each participant has developed a self-contained system (e.g., the United
States develops a core element and country X a
teleoperator maneuvering system (TMS) compatible both with the U.S. element and country X’s
own spacecraft and launch vehicles), several options are possible:
— Participants in joint development efforts make
no provisions for the post-development phase,
and leave it to evolving circumstances and
economics to ensure a successful career for the
developed items. (For example, if the U.S. elements are sound ones, country X will purchase
one or more, and vice versa, provided no legal
obstacles or perceived national security concerns regarding these sales arise).
— Make it an obligation for all par-ties to purchase
(and agree to sell) one or several units of the
hardware developed by each. 17
— And, of course, all possible intermediate arrangements between these two extremes. (To
use a simplified example: the United States
could be obligated to use country X’s teleoperator maneuvering system, not by purchasing
it but by offering as a compensation a given
amount of “utilization time” on elements of
its infrastructure; reciprocally, country X’s obligations would be to provide and maintain a
given number of these TMS vehicles.)
A “closed-end” international partnership appears
to make the most sense if the infrastructure is a“ necessary, but not sufficient, part of the capabilities required for effective and efficient operations in space.
All partners will want to ensure that whatever is developed will be compatible with their longer range,
but separate, plans for space. However, this kind of
limited international involvement is less likely in most
situations to be attractive either to the United States
or to its potential partners than more substantial involvement in the operation and utilization phases as
well as the development phase. The following section
examines such an approach.

I @ch an expl~it obligation WOUld circumvent the possible unwillingness
of one party to purchase elements from another. From the European point
of view, U.S. unwillingness to purchase additional Spacelab modules has
been something of a problem.

JOINT DEVELOPMENT, OPERATION AND USE
The essential features of this option are:
— operation and maintenance costs of the infrastructure, as well as development costs, would
be shared;
— ownership of most or all of its elements would
stay most probably with the United States; however, all participants’ rights of access and use for
common and/or national purposes, including
mutual commercial competition, would be guaranteed by an adequate legal framework.
Implementation of this approach is essentially a
three-step process, where each step has to be considered separately before an overall conclusion is
made:
1. Joint Development
Most considerations just set forth in the section
above are applicable here. In a way, however,
there are fewer problems; the ultimate purpose
of joint development being the deployment of
elements to be used jointly, there is less need for
involved legal rules concerning mutual purchasing obligation, second source development, and
so on. Nor does one have to be concerned about
compatibility of certain sub-elements with individual countries’ nationally developed launch
vehicles and the like. (Unless of course some participants wish to be able to break the partnership
and go their own ways, but this would not be set
as a primary objective of the arrangement.)
Needless to say, though, “rules of the game”
are still indispensable, especially in three areas:
Settling the ownership of technology acquired
while carrying out the joint development, and
transfer of technology, where required, for accomplishing the work;
Assuming a dominant position of the United
States in the undertaking, how much potential leverage will be left to its partners in order
to give them a feeling of being able to protect
their rights?
Conversely, one has to retain for the United
States the possibility to work out substitute arrangements, in the event that one or another
of the partners defaults, so as to ensure the
ultimate integrity of the program,
2. Joint Operation
jointly developed infrastructure can be used
jointly while being operated by a single country—presumably the United States. joint operation would, however, lend a more international
flavor and help international participants to feel
more secure by giving them added leverage—
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with, of course, potential problems for the United
States.
International involvement in operating the infrastructure could range from very little (opening
a few positions to foreign nationals on the ground
control team and possibly in the orbital crew, as
a token gesture) to full-fledged internationalization of both ground team and crew. The latter
would imply including citizens of other countries
in various key positions in numbers proportionate
with the overall level of participation of their
country in the program.
The latter case, even if likely to create problems for the United States by the leverage and
the visibility it gives to its partners, might, however, also pave the way towards solution of one
issue raised by this approach—the question of
“equitable costs.” Assuming that the United
States develops, say, 95 percent of a “space station” system, and that country X develops and
builds 5 percent of it, it seems fair to reserve 5
percent of the station’s effective working time for
country X’s purposes. If, however, the United
States is alone in bearing all the maintenance and
operating costs, X cannot enjoy its 5 percent
“space station time” free of charge. Some equitable reimbursement scheme has to be devised
for maintenance and operating costs incurred by
the United States—a scheme that would resolve
attendant problems of fair and accurate accounting, opening U.S. accounts to X’s comptrollers,
devising rules for taking into account all the fringe
benefits built in the system (like the replenishment of propellant tanks with unused fuel from
the Shuttle, and so on). However, if country X
actually carries out 5 percent of the maintenance
and operations in kind, it may be possible to end
up with an almost no-exchange-of-funds
situation.
3. Joint Utilization
The problem here is that there will be not only
utilization in common for common purposes, but
also an individual participant’s use of the infrastructure for its own benefit, including commercially competitive types of usages.
International partners will want to be provided
with adequate safeguards to protect their legitimate rights. This, in turn, raises the question of
what are “legitimate rights.” An effort should be
made to define this concept as precisely as possible. Listed below are what appear to be major
issues involved:
— Is thereto be unrestricted use of a given fraction of the “space station’s” effective work

time, for the user’s own benefit, for whatever
purposes, provided it complies with international law and a preset series of explicit rules?
These rules must not be open to unilateral interpretation. Sensitive aspects, such as safety
and national security requirements, must be
exhaustively and accurately dealt with in advance, so as not to allow, later on, the impression of arbitrarily imposed requirements.
This right-to-use may not necessarily be free
of charge, but if a price has to be charged for
it, it must be equitable (no preference with respect to the U.S. Government or private users,
no hidden overheads, etc.). As stated above,
the ideal situation would probably be one
where very little or no exchange of funds occurs. The setting of utilization priorities is
equally important in this connection; the present NASA-DOD arrangement for giving absolute priority to national security payloads in
Shuttle manifesting would not be likely to generate much international enthusiasm if it were
paralleled.
Cancellation clauses must be very explicit and
provide for adequate prior warning and compensation; unilateral recanting should not be
allowed. Needless to say, the purpose of such
clauses would not be limited to protection of
U.S. partners; the latter would have to consent
as a counterpart to a perdurable involvement
system, in order to allow not only for the infrastructure’s initial deployment, but also for
the continuous evolution and growth which
is going to be one of its main features.
There seems to be no reason why all the abovementioned issues could not be settled in the terms of
a cooperative agreement among the United States and
its partners. Legal terms, however, would probably not
be sufficient to enable all parties to the undertaking
to feel safe and secure: safeguards embedded in the
very fabric of the joint effort, providing mutual leverage and affording room for the inevitable compromises, may have to be accepted.
On the surface at least, such a situation might appear unbalanced in the eyes of the U.S. public and
Government: the United States will probably be carrying most of the burden of the joint undertaking, and
would seem required to provide to others guarantees
and safeguards and to accept dependence on them
in excess of what would be commensurate with its
partners’ share of the burden. To most of these partners, however, being involved substantially in a U.S.
“space station” program would mean forfeiting their
ability to develop not only a similar, but even a re-
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duced, capacity of their own, at least in the near term.
Therefore, they will be staking the whole of their initial asset commitment in the joint venture, whereas
the United States would always be in a position, with
some added funds and efforts, to make up for the failure of one of its partners to keep the deal—a recourse
that, under the circumstances, would be more costly
to the partners.
From the U.S. point of view, of course, accepting
international participants in its “space station” program makes sense only if this apparent–and, to some
extent, real—imbalance does not jeopardize fundamental national interests. The more guarantees and
safeguards the United States can afford to offer to its
potential partners, the more those countries are likely
to participate substantially and to pay accordingly.
This working out of mutual stakes in a common undertaking is likely to be a delicate and complicated
process,

Potential International Partners
Now that potential modes of cooperation have been
discussed, the potential partners for the United States
in a “space station” effort will be described in some
detail.
Advances in space technology over the last decade
throughout the world provide many prospective candidates for bilateral or multilateral cooperation on a
space station project. One should, however, keep in
mind that taking a meaningful share in a program of
such scope, cost and technical sophistication, will be
no trivial undertaking for most of these candidates.
What is meant by “meaningful share” depends, of
course, very much upon the circumstances. In a bilateral arrangement between the United States and
another country, the latter’s supplying less than 1 percent of the infrastructure’s value in hardware or commonplace electronic components can hardly be
termed meaningful. On the other hand, in the case
of a broad multilateral organization comprising many
countries, large and small, with shares ranging from
a fraction of 1 percent to several 10s of percent, a participation similar in level and kind to what has just
been described might well be meaningful to the participating country.
Another factor to be taken into account when considering joint ventures in advanced technological developments is, obviously, the relative level of industrial development of the participating countries.
Countries with more or less comparable industrial
backgrounds, similar technical outlook and mutually
compatible management practices will find it easier
to pool their resources.
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This description of potential international partners
will focus first and foremost on those industrialized
countries which at present are displaying a certain
amount of interest, or at any rate curiosity, toward
“space stations.” This list includes Europe–as a whole
through the European Space Agency and as exemplified by countries like France, the Federal Republic of
Germany and Italy–and Japan and Canada.
Among the industrialized countries, the Soviet
Union also deserves some mention, though hardly as
a likely participant in a U.S.-sponsored program. Rather, as a major space power already engaged in its own
program of developing, emplacing, and using in-space
infrastructure, the Soviet Union is a potential competitor to the United States in offering opportunities for
international involvement in such activity.
Among the developing countries, some have acquired enough space technology capability to design
and build indigenous satellites and launch vehicles
(China, India), and others have ambitious plans to do
so in the future (Brazil). These and others deserve
some attention, especially as possible participants in
a broad multilateral effort.
EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY
Although joint European endeavors in space date
back to the early 1960s, the present European Space
Agency (ESA) was founded in May 1975. ESA was the
successor to two earlier organizations, the European
Launcher Development Organization (ELDO) and the
European Space Research Organization (ESRO). It is
of interest to recall briefly the history of these organizations, insofar as it sheds some light on U. S.European relationships in space endeavors as well as
on how international space organizations perform.
In 1960-1961 a number of European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and
the United Kingdom) became aware of the political
and scientific benefits to be drawn from space activities (awareness of potential economic benefits
emerged some years later). They understood also that
a pooling of their resources and efforts was necessary
to compete with the United States and the U.S.S.R.
i n at least certain key areas—leaving out the development of staffed capabilities in which the superpowers
were competing strongly for what appeared to be essentially national prestige reasons. These countries
also recognized the importance of a comprehensive
program including satellite as well as launch vehicle
development.
ESRO was created to deal with satellite development, and it did so successfully. From 1967 to 1975,
ESRO launched (with U.S.-built rockets) nine satellites,
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conducted a large number of experiments in space,
engaged in successful cooperative projects with
NASA, and managed to have its mandate enlarged to
encompass applications satellites. The organization
built up a competent and well-organized executive
and technical staff which ran three technical field
centers and a network of tracking stations.
ELDO, meanwhile, kept running into trouble, although it had only one project to deal with, the development of Europa, a medium-size rocket, roughly
equivalent to the U.S.-built Atlas-Agena. Poor management structure was the main source of trouble;
ELDO had almost no authority of its own, but acted
as a sort of coordinating agency for separate national
projects (a British first stage, a French second stage,
a German third stage, Italian payload fairings, etc.).
Additional problems arose from the fact that system
and subsystem development had to proceed in parallel. The first stage was virtually completely developed at the start of the program and suffered only one
minor failure in nine flights. Each of the remaining
stages experienced failures on its first operational flight
as an element of the complete vehicle: as a result,
there was a string of six failures in which, in turn, each
major element became successful.
The program was further marred by a formidable
escalation of costs, and, when its eleventh test flight
ended in failure at the end of 1971, it was finally canceled after $700 million had been spent.
At about the same time, the United States had stimulated ELDO, ESRO, and their member states to consider whether Europe should build a major segment
of NASA’s proposed space transportation system (STS),
then referred to as the “post-Apollo program.” By
1972, agreement seemed to be within reach; the task
allocated to Europe was development of a “space
tug,” an advanced rocket-stage to be used to transfer
payloads from the Shuttle’s low orbit to higher ones,
including the commercially essential geostationary orbit, The tug appeared to be a good candidate for cooperation, insofar as it was indeed an important segment
of the STS—almost a key one—and because in developing it, Europe could draw from its unhappy but extensive experience in rocketry. Furthermore, it would
enable Europeans to keep working and making progress in what they felt was an essential area–i.e.,
launch vehicle development.
In mid-1 972, however, the United States decided
to withdraw the space tug proposal, “partly because
the entire post-Apollo program was being scaled back,
because of doubts about European technical capabilities, and also because the Air Force thought the mili-

tary potential of the tug was too great to permit dependence on outside sources.” 18-19
Also, during the same period, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) were negotiating with
the United States for the launching of their jointly built
Symphonic telecommunications satellite, which the
cancellation of the Europa project left without a
launch vehicle. The United States agreed initially to
launch Symphonic, but required that the satellite be
declared experimental rather than operational. The
United States thus complied with its policy of assisting
with launchings provided they were for peaceful purposes and in compliance with “relevant international
arrangements.” This was a reference to the INTELSAT
Agreement which required signatories to avoid “significant economic harm” to the organization caused
by regional competition, To France especially, and
perhaps to a lesser degree to the FRG, these conditions were construed as an attempt by the United
States (and other INTELSAT partners who shared in
this position) to keep them out of the expanding satellite telecommunications business.
These events acted as catalysts in the setting up (in
1973) of the principles which were to govern the future ESA as well as in the drafting of its program. Based
on unsatisfactory European experience in obtaining
U.S. launch assurances, the French found excellent
grounds for advocating development of an autonomous European launch capability, and succeeded in
obtaining from its partners a 40-percent participation
in the previously French-only program to develop the
Ariane launcher. The FRG, though disappointed by
the withdrawal of the tug proposal, nevertheless
sought out European participation in the U.S. space
transportation system through development of a “sortie laboratory,” later named Spacelab.
The United Kingdom agreed to go along with a
“package deal” which was worked out in July 1973,
whereby France funded 60 percent of Ariane, the FRG
about the same percentage of Spacelab, and the U.K.
56 percent of a European maritime communications
satellite, later called MARECS. Each of the three countries also agreed to take a minor share of the two
others’ favorite projects. With this “package deal” accepted, the creation of ESA could proceed, and the
agency began operation in May 1975. The stated objectives of the ESA include:

IKivilian Space Policy and Applications (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress,
Office of Technology Assessment OTA-STI-1 77, 1982), p. 363.
19A more detailed discussion of European involvement in NASA’S pOstApollo efforts is provided below.
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— developing and implementing a long-term space
policy;
— carrying out space activities;
— coordinating the European space program and
the space programs of its member states; and
— developing and implementing an industrial policy appropriate for its programs.
The agency, in addition to carrying out major but
optional projects such as Ariane and Spacelab, carries out a space science program planned on a 5-year
basis. This science program and ESA’s operating budget call for mandatory financial contributions from its
member states. Table C-1 lists the current distribution
of such contributions for the ESA science program. I n
constant-dollar terms, the ESA budget for mandatory
programs has remained virtually constant since the organization’s inception.
ESA runs a comprehensive set of space programs.
1. Communications Satellites-a broad and vigorous
program, with several satellites in orbit (OTS, an
experimental spacecraft, and MARECS, leased to
INMARSAT to provide operational maritime communications); with more to be launched (ECS-1
and -2, for the purpose of setting up a regional
satcom system); and with a large communications
satellite (L-SAT) under development. The first LSAT payload includes four different experiments,
one of which is to test direct-to-the-home TV
broadcasting.
2. Remote Sensing–as a contribution to a global
program set up under the auspices of the World
Meteorological Organization, ESA launched two
METEOSAT geostationary weather satellites similar to the U.S. GMS. The second of these satellites was carried in orbit by ESA’s own launcher
(Ariane), and ESA’s member states have agreed
to keep the METEOSAT system in operational
condition for at least 10 years (by replacing the
satellites when they fail in orbit). The Agency also

Table C-1 .—ESA Science Budget
Percent contribution to ESA’s
science program
Member States
4.49
Belgium. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.51
Denmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
21.40
France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Federal Republic
25.57
of Germany. . . . . . . . . . . .
0.54
Ireland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12.46
Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.00
Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.04
Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.25
Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.99
Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
13.75
United Kingdom. . . . . . . . . .

has under development an advanced coastal and
oceanic monitoring satellite (ERS-1) equipped
with a radar and other microwave instruments.
Other remote-sensing activities are also underway
(data reception and dissemination, Spacelabborne high-resolution camera).
3. Space Sciences-ESA has pursued ESRO’s tradition of ambitious scientific satellite projects. Four
of these are presently operating successfully while
several more are in the development phase. Most
notable is GIOITO, a spacecraft to fly by Halley’s
Comet in 1986. Science also is an area where
cooperation with NASA has been and is extensive; ESA is contributing several major subsystems
on the Space Telescope. The two agencies also
had a joint program called the International Solar
Power Mission (ISPM). This was a rather sophisticated plan to send two spacecraft (one U.S.-built
and the other European-built) over the two poles
of the Sun. In 1981, because of budget cutbacks,
NASA chose to withdraw its spacecraft from this
enterprise, creating frustrations and resentment
not only within the scientific community but also
within political circles in Europe. The ISPM has
gone ahead but now includes only a European
spacecraft launched by NASA. The impact of this
withdrawal is discussed later in this appendix.
4. Launch Vehicles–this is an area where the dual
nature of ESA’s policy is best shown. On one
hand, the Agency actively pursues its Ariane
autonomous launcher program, aimed in part at
competing commercially with U.S. launch vehicles; on the other hand, it is locked in, through
the Spacelab program, to the use of the U.S. Shuttle. Concerning Ariane, in spite of two setbacks
(failure of one development flight out of four and
of the first operational flight attempted late in
1982), there were (as of July 1984) 7 successful
launches out of 9 attempts, and it is definitely a
technical success. The more powerful Ariane 2,
3, and 4 versions have already been approved
and funded by ESA. Commercial success also is
expected during the next several years as a result of several external factors: delays in the Shuttle development schedule, high cost of U.S. expendable vehicles such as Delta or Atlas-Centaur
(resulting, in turn, from low production volume),
and an insufficient number of Shuttle flights. A
private corporation (Arianespace) has been established to finance and market Ariane through active salesmanship and promotion.
Spacelab was successfully launched aboard the
Shuttle in November 1983. Slippages in the
launch schedule, cost overruns, and technical interface problems—which each party tended to at-
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tribute to the other—have at times caused a certain amount of strain between NASA and ESA,
but probably nothing more than is to be expected
in such an ambitious cooperative effort. zo T h e
question remains, however, of the scope which
will be given to Spacelab’s utilization, and of who
is willing to pay for the exploitation of its capabilities. How this question is resolved will have
an influence on European attitudes toward participation in a U.S. “space station” program.
5. Future Plans–These are still in the process of being drawn up, but it is worthwhile to point out
that ESA has allocated funds not only to evaluate
those options which are natural follow-ons of present programs (like an advanced heavy version
of Ariane beyond the planned version 4) but also
to study explicitly the prospects of “transatlantic” cooperation. Within the next 2 years, ESA
must decide which of the major options identified
by its long-term space transportation plan to
follow: cooperation with the United States in developing space infrastructure, and/or pursuing
European-only development of modern capabilities for space operations. The timing of U.S. and
ESA decisions on future programs is now compatible, but will not remain so indefinitely.
ESA also has an active program of basic research
in materials processing, one of the most promising
candidates for widescale applications aboard a “space
station.” This research program is carried out at present on a variety of vehicles, among which Spacelab
is prominent. ESA’s Council has already approved and
funded the development of another in-space infrastructure element for this purpose; a space “platform,”
it is named EURECA (European Retrievable Carrier).
EURECA is designed to carry experiments that require longer times on orbit than are available on the
Shuttle. It will include materials processing facilities
(furnaces and the like), and will be launched and retrieved by the Shuttle. Its design will provide enough
maneuvering and power supply capability to sustain
a prolonged (i.e., 6 months) orbital life of its own.
These features give to EURECA all the appearances
of a “free-flyer” which could be tended by other,
future infrastructure elements and actually make it
look like a first step toward ESA participation in a
“space station.”
All of the above points clearly toward an ESA willingness to consider seriously the possibility of a European participation in a space infrastructure program.

Past history, however, also points strongly toward a
European tendency to balance its commitments carefully between the acquisition of autonomous capabilities (as exemplified by Ariane) and the involvement
with U.S. projects (e.g., Spacelab).
To sum up, it appears that, notwithstanding its policy of retaining capabilities of its own, especially in
those areas where commercial competition may take
place, ESA is a likely candidate for a substantial cooperative effort with NASA because:
a. ESA and its individual member-states have a
longstanding tradition of cooperation with
NASA.
b. Although much smaller, total European space expenditures are commensurate with NASA’s
(about one fourth). Given that the consolidated
gross national product (GNP) of ESA’s memberstates is somewhat larger than the GNP of the
United States, there seems to be room for a substantial increase in these expenditures. However,
present trends do not seem to point in that
direction.
c. The ESA Executive (headquarters and technical
centers) is driven by internal motivations which
are somewhat similar to NASA’s, and ESA is striving to define and get authorization for an ambitious long-range program which would give size,
focus and purpose to its activity.
d. Most member-states of ESA are at least willing
to take a look at a possible U.S. offer to cooperate on a “space station,” and generally believe
that the very scope of such a program makes it
necessary to approach it jointly in order to
achieve a meaningful level of participation.
In spite of what has just been said, some major
member-states of the European Space Agency do not
want at the present juncture to preclude bilateral cooperation with the United States (if they deem it worthwhile and no satisfactory joint European arrangement with the United States can be devised.) These
countries appear at present to be France, the FRG, and
Italy, which together account for over so percent of
ESA’s resources. In any case, even though these countries would be likely to end up participating in a U.S.
space infrastructure program through ESA if such a
program is instituted, they will assess their interests
and decide upon their course irrespective of the joint
European assessment, and it is therefore worthwhile
to take a closer look at each one.
FRANCE

ZOMany modifications had to be made to Spacelab as a result of changes
in the Shuttle interface. This situation was somewhat reminiscent of the operations of ELDO, for it arose, and inevitably so, from the parallel development
of a system and one of its major subsystems.

France has always aimed at being the “third space
power” after the United States and the Soviet Union,
and has indeed managed to build up the largest and
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most comprehensive space program in Europe and the
third-largest in the world. Budgetary appropriations
are an indication of this; in 1983 (approximate figures)
France’s space expenses will be $545 million (as compared with the FRG’s $325 million, or Japan’s $450
million). French ambitions date back to the de Gaulle
era, and it was as early as 1966 that France orbited
its first satellite with a French-built rocket, a few days
before its second satellite was launched by NASA.
Since then, the French program has substantially
shifted its emphasis away from national prestige towards economic competitiveness, especially for export purposes.
Therefore, while maintaining a fair-sized space science program, CNES (the French space agency) has
been active mostly in launch vehicle development
(Ariane, under ESA’s supervision), communication satellites construction (participation in joint European
programs; national TELECOM 1 satellites to be launched in 1984; a bilateral program with the FRG to
launch direct TV broadcasting satellites in 1985), land
remote-sensing systems (the first satellite of which,
named SPOT 1, is to be launched in 1986 and will
incorporate two high-resolution instruments and
stereoscopic imaging capability), and a variety of other
programs.
French industry, meanwhile, does not content itself
with implementing national programs and its share of
European ones, but also strives very hard to compete
for space-related export sales. Ariane launch services
have been sold to several organizations or countries–
including private firms in the United States—and communications satellites to ARABSAT (a consortium of
Arab countries).
CNES also runs a research program to evaluate materials processing applications, and has laid out plans
and preliminary designs for a specialized automated
“manufacturing-in-space system” named SOLARIS.
This concept features a platform (without crew facilities) equipped with furnaces, adequate power supply,
and other ancillary subsystems including a robot manipulator arm; a transfer and raw material supply stage
to be launched by Ariane 4; and a ballistic reentry capsule to bring processed items back to Earth. An effort
to promote interest in this concept among other ESA
member-states has not met with success up to now,
perhaps because it was felt to be premature.
In sum, France’s space policy places a strong emphasis on “autonomy” (on a European level at least,
if not in the strictly national sense). This is due in part
to a frame of mind inherited from the de Gaulle era,
but now even more so to economic considerations;
commercial competition requires that a country be
able to play its own hand independently. Furthermore,
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France and the FRG are now discussing plans for a
military reconnaissance satellite: this makes autonomy
all the more important to French decision makers.
Hence the staunch support (and high financial contribution) given to the Ariane program, and the carefully balanced bilateral cooperation with many different countries: the United States, the FRG, Sweden,
and the U.S.S.R. particularly. In ESA’s policymaking
bodies, France has been and will probably remain in
the future one of the staunchest advocates of the dual
approach of balancing cooperation with the United
States with an equally strong commitment to autonomous capabilities.
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Just like France and other members of ESA, the FRG
conducts the largest share of its space efforts through
that agency’s joint programs. In particular, the FRG
government strongly supported the Spacelab program
at its inception in the early 1970s, and since then has
provided more than 50 percent of its funding. The FRG
also provides the largest single contribution to ESA’s
remote-sensing programs (METEOSAT, ERS), and land
communications programs (OTS, ETS). More recently,
when trying to shape ESA’s future programs, the FRG
has acted as a promoter of the EURECA project described earlier, while France was promoting Ariane 4.
The FRG, however, is also engaged in a number of
bilateral cooperative undertakings. Along with France,
the FRG is developing TV-SAT, a direct television
broadcasting satellite: experience thus gained will
enable its electronics and aerospace firms to compete
for export sales in what is expected to become one
of the fastest growing markets, that of DBS (direct
broadcasting satellites). Another important area of
bilateral endeavor is space science, not only with the
United States (several FRG scientific satellites have
been launched by the United States), but also with
France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
Strong emphasis on materials science and processing is a characteristic feature of the FRG’s space program. This includes suborbital flights on sounding
rockets, which provide a few minutes of “near zero
gravity”; small payload packages to be carried by the
Shuttle (referred to by NASA as “Getaway Specials”)
and of course utilization of Spacelab. The FRG has
conducted major experiments on the first Spacelab
mission in 1983 (which was a joint U.S.-European
flight). It has also purchased and will manage a wholly
FRG Spacelab mission called D-1, to be flown in October 1985.
The FRG materials processing program is not purely
scientific in orientation. It aims at involving the industrial sector early in exploring potential applications of
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space-processed metals, composite metals, crystals,
and chemicals. This close association of government
support with industry’s initiative seems to work well,
all the more so because the FRG’s major aerospace
and electronics firms play a much larger role in initiating and funding research and development efforts
than do their counterparts in other European
countries.
Generally speaking, this fits in well with what appears to be the overall goal of the FRG’s space policy: to encourage its national aerospace industry, to
promote scientific and industrial/technological research, and to rely on ESA’S programs to stay in the
applications business. The keyword seems to be
“competition through technological capability” rather
than “competition through nationally proven systems.” (This latter could well be the French motto.)
All this supports the views expressed in many quarters that among ESA’s member-states the FRG is the
most “transatlantic-rein ded,” and that its attitude
towards cooperative ventures with the United States
is likely to be more positive than that of the French.
There is no doubt that in ESA’s councils, and even
more freely so when drafting its national program, the
FRG would consider very seriously a possible invitation from the United States to participate in “space
station” development. Also, the FRG has been less
outspoken than France in its reactions to the frustrations which have resulted from some of the past U. S.Europe joint ventures. But the frustrations were there
all the same, and like most of its European partners,
the FRG will weigh closely the pros and cons of the
possible modes of cooperation.

and has taken a leading position in advanced communications technology (20-30 gigahertz) through the
SIRIO-2 meteorological data dissemination satellite,
which was destroyed in 1982 when the first Ariane
operational flight failed to achieve orbit.
Besides its marked interest in communications-related space activities, Italy has undertaken several
bilateral cooperative ventures with NASA, particularly
in areas not covered by European programs. In the
past, these have included an imaginative concept
called San Marco, involving several launchings of
small scientific satellites by U.S.-made SCOUT rockets
from an off-shore platform located on the equator off
the coast of Kenya. More recently, Italy started developing IRIS, a small booster stage for Shuttle payloads.
Remote sensing is another theme for U.S.-Italian cooperation, if only because Italy runs the main European
Landsat data receiving station located at Fucino near
Rome.
The latest scheme considered for a joint U.S.-Italian
venture is worth mentioning because of its obvious
relation to in-space activities. It is the so called
“tethered satellite” concept, in which a scientific satellite is to be attached by a long umbilical cord to the
Shuttle or another infrastructure element in orbit. Italy
now has a Memorandum of Understanding with
NASA regarding this matter, and joint studies are
under way to develop the concept, Perhaps because
of this, Italy up to now has been one of the most eager
of ESA’s member-states to participate in informal discussions on U.S.-European cooperation in a “space
station” development program.

ITALY

THE UNITED KINGDOM

With a 1983 budget for space activities in the range
of$150 million, of which slightly more than one-half
makes up its contribution to ESA programs, Italy is
clearly demonstrating a willingness to implement a
space policy of its own. The framing of such a policy
seems to be hindered by lack of central coordination
among the several interested government agencies:
Defense, Communications, and the National Research
Council (CNR). The last, however, seems to be in the
process of taking the lead.
In 1979, CNR managed to secure government approval for an overall plan calling for a sharp increase
in funding; this has been partly implemented. Most
of the increase is to fund national programs, especially
in the field of communications satellites: a system
named ITALSAT is being considered, as well as a direct broadcasting TV system. Meanwhile, Italy has
strongly supported ESA’s experimental L-SAT program

Although the United Kingdom initially showed little inclination to share in NASA’s “space station”
aspirations, this situation has changed over the past
year, with U.K. interest coming to focus on platforms.
Great Britain is, after France and the FRG, the third
largest contributor to ESA’s budget, but the lion’s share
of its attention over the past several years has been
given to satellite communications, within ESA as well
as nationally. As it happens, a “space station” has
been thought, until recently, to be of relatively little
value to satellite communications (except in the very
long term). Britain’s developing interest in long-term
in-orbit infrastructure, coupled with its intention of
maintaining its vigorous space science program (pursued both through ESA and bilaterally with NASA) and
its rapidly growing interest in remote sensing, may signal a move toward a more comprehensive and diversified space program.
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OTHER ESA MEMBER-STATES
This paper has dwelt at some length on those members of ESA which deem it preferable to participate
directly, as well as through ESA, in talks with NASA
on “space station” matters, This does by no means
imply a lack of interest on other member countries’
parts. However, it does make it more difficult to assess
their positions with respect to possible U.S. overtures
since those positions are not debated publicly. 21 One
fact remains, however: all ESA’s members have entrusted to the Agency a long-term program planning
mandate, and have provided funds therefore. And this
mandate explicitly encompasses consideration of
“transatlantic” cooperation on a space station.
CANADA
There is a General Agreement on Cooperation between Canada and ESA, which makes Canadian participation in an ESA contribution to a space infrastructure program at least a possibility. Its longstanding
tradition of bilateral cooperation with the United
States, however, prompts Canada, through its National
Research Council, to evaluate its interest in a “space
station” independently.
Canada’s expenditures in space in 1983 were about
$100 million. Apart from a pioneering effort to operate
domestic satellite communications systems (the ANIK
spacecraft family built by Hughes) and a number of
joint scientific projects with the United States, Canada’s major bilateral program with NASA is the development of the remote manipulator arm for the
Shuttle. In return for a NASA commitment to purchase
additional arms from Toronto-based Spar Aerospace
Ltd., Canada has funded the $100 million development of the first flight unit, which has been successfully tested on Shuttle flights. Manipulator systems
could be important features of space infrastructure and
thus are candidates for Canadian contribution.
JAPAN
With the exception of bilateral cooperation with the
United States, Japan has, to date, carried the burden
of its space activities alone.22 Fairly constant in the last
few years, Japan’s space expenditures per annum
amount to approximately $45O million, a budget nearly one half the size of the European Space Agency’s.

ZIThe ~sitlon of the smaller states In ESA is somewhat simi far to that of
those in the European Economic Community. At the Economic Summit, the
big four European nations attend in their own right; the remaining six are
represented by the President of the Commission.
Zz)apan may nw be expanding its sphere of space cooperation. it has recently opened a liaison office in Paris, for example.
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Space development in Japan is executed under the
leadership of the Space Activities Commission (SAC),
an advisory organ to the Prime Minister. The main executive agency is the National Space Development
Agency (NASDA), established in 1969 to undertake
the development of applications satellites and related
launch vehicles, and to conduct launching and tracking operations. Another agency, the Institute of Space
and Astronautical Science (ISAS), is in charge of scientific space programs carried out on balloons, sounding
rockets, and satellites. ISAS builds its own family of
launch vehicles and runs its own launch center at Kagoshima, independently of NASDA’s launch facilities
which are located at Tanegashima.
Japan is the only country where large-scale space
science and space applications programs are carried
out by two completely separate entities, reporting to
different departments of government; while ISAS is an
“independent national institute” under the Ministry
of Education, NASDA reports to the Prime Minister’s
Office through the Science and Technology Agency.
But NASDA also carries out programs on behalf of,
and draws funds from, other ministries: Transport
(meteorology), Posts and Telecommunications,
From 1970 to 1981, Japan successfully launched 21
satellites, developed two families of launch vehicles,
undertook the development of several more satellites
and of a third type of launcher, and readied a number
of experiments to be carried by the Shuttle and
Spacelab. For the time being, this effort has been
directed exclusively towards meeting domestic needs
(communications, remote sensing) and the acquisition
of technology and expertise through a wide range of
scientific and experimental programs. Consequently,
there has been, to date, little effort by Japan to compete with other space powers in offering commercial
services abroad. (An exception is the sale of ground
stations for setting up communications networks or
remote-sensing data reception; in these areas, Japanese industry has captured a good share of the world
market.)
Until very recently, Japan has cooperated closely
with NASA as well as with U.S. industry. In the field
of space science, there have been a number of scientific exchanges, and this will continue as Japan plans
to use flight opportunities on the Shuttle and Spacelab.
Many of Japan’s applications satellites, whether experimental or operational, have been developed within the framework of joint ventures among Japanese
and U.S. companies. As far as launch vehicles are concerned, the “Mu” series of small launchers has been
an indigenous development from the start, but the
larger “N” family to be used to launch applications
satellites has relied on technology transfers from the
United States.
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The first stage of the “N1” version is in effect a ThorDelta first stage built under license, and the third stage
is a U.S. (Thiokol) production. The improved “N2”
version goes even further in this direction, as it also
includes a U.S. (Aerojet) second stage. All told, Japanese industry builds barely more than half of the “N2”
vehicle. It should be pointed out that the U. S.-Japanese Agreement on Space Activities (signed in 1969)
imposes restrictions on the use of these U.S. technologies and hardware by curbing transfer to third parties.
The new launcher design, named Hi-A (roughly
equivalent to ESA’s Ariane 1 ) will alter this situation
significantly, for the second stage (which will burn advanced liquid hydrogen/oxygen propellants) and the
third stage, as well as the guidance system, will be of
indigenous design and manufacture. When the H1 -A
becomes operational, Japan will be only one step
removed from an autonomous launch capability,
namely the development of a new first stage (for which
preliminary designs have already been proposed).
In addition to the obvious desire to increase Japanese industry’s share of the construction of space
hardware, this trend towards autonomy could be
based on two grounds. First, there may be dissatisfaction with U.S.-supplied hardware; indeed, in 1979 and
1980 two costly launch failures were traced to probable malfunction of U.S.-supplied subsystems, and in
the aftermath of these events it was decided to accelerate indigenous development.23 Second, an autonomous launch capability clearly would enable Japan
to offer full-scale commercial services in space applacations. 24
Another aspect of Japan’s space policy is that little
has been done to diversify its sources for technology
procurement and partnerships beyond the United
States. Regular consultations are held, for instance,
with ESA, but amount to little beyond some coordination or satellite tracking stations. France was approached in the early 1970s and at several points later
on for possible cooperation on liquid hydrogen-fueled
rocket engines, but to no avail; the parties did not
reach even a conceptual definition of a cooperative
venture.

zqhe japane5e reaction to the recent failure of transponders on their direct broadcast satdlite suggests that the drive toward self-sufficiency will prob
ably be further intensified.
q has ~n ~nt~ out that Japan’s launch capabilities are severely limited
by agreements with the fishing industry, whereby the Tanegashima launch
center can be used only four months per year. But this restriction clearly
would not be sufficient to deter Japan frcwr its traditional policy of entering
the world market after a technology has been mastered and tried out on domestic markets.

In May 1984, Japan announced a plan for its participation in the U.S. “space station” program. The
plan calls for Japan’s development of an experimental
module to carry out life science and materials science
experiments, to be performed by one Japanese worker. The module will be connected with the U.S. infrastructure. It will include a manipulator arm, experimental devices for studies related to pharmaceuticals,
crystals, compound materials, and a self-sufficiency
food system. The development expenses to be paid
by Japan are estimated to be 200-300 billion yen [$0.91.4 billion (1984)].
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Some developing countries can operate in space on
their own, as is exemplified by India and the People’s
Republic of China. Both countries have launched several satellites using indigenous launchers. Both countries are engaged in efforts to use existing systems to
acquire expertise in important applications areas like
meteorology, remote sensing, communications, and
educational broadcasting. Details of programs and
technology are not always very well known outside
of these countries; most Western observers who have
visited space facilities in India and China have been
impressed by their potential, if not always by their
present condition. In both countries, an adequate substratum of advanced industries is missing—especially
in the areas of electronic components, high-grade materials, and chemicals—and strains are caused by conflicting priorities and by lack of foreign exchange.
Shortages of trained technicians add further difficulties, but the foundation has been laid for further activities in space.
Other developing countries are striving to reach the
stage already attained by China and India. A few years
ago, it seemed that Brazil was on the verge of getting
a comprehensive program started, including its own
satellites and launchers, developed in part indigenously and in part with foreign help. (France and the
FRG had actually almost concluded agreements with
Brazil to that effect.) Political developments, growing
economic difficulties, and diplomatic pressures from
some countries that were, perhaps, wary of Brazil’s
access to missile technology have lowered these prospects considerably. Although Brazil has not managed
to become a builder of space systems, it is an active
user of existing systems (INTELSAT for communications, LANDSAT for remote sensing), and still plans
to operate a satellite communications system of its
own, which would be procured abroad.
Utilization of space technology, in contrast to its development, is almost worldwide. In particular, more
than 100 participating countries are members in
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INTELSAT, and each of them operates at least one
ground station. In addition, there are more than half
a dozen LANDSAT and/or SPOT remote-sensing data
reception stations i n existence or u rider construction
throughout the so-called Third World .25
Are there potential partners in a joint “space station” venture to be found among these countries, especially among those which have some sort of aerospace industry of their own? There is no basic reason
why the answer should be no, but it must be pointed
out that:
— to some of these countries, cooperation with the
United States would pose a tricky, if not insurmountable, political challenge, unless the mode
of cooperation approached a “genuinely international” one;
— financial participation of these countries could
probably not exceed a very small percentage of
the total cost; and
— such a program exceeds by far the ambitions that
these countries set at present for their endeavors
in space, and going along with it in an international context would not satisfy the fundamental
craving for autonomy and self-assertion which
often, to some extent, underlies their space
policies.
Concerning the second point, it might be argued
that a large number of small percentages can amount
to a sizable sum. To give one example: 82 out of 102
signatures of INTELSAT own each less than 1 percent
of the shares, but their combined participation
amounts to more than 20 percent. As to the third
point, a genuinely international structure could be
acceptable to countries who see space activities as a
means of self-assertion; for, even if the system were
built and operated by industrialized countries, it
would at least be jointly owned/managed by all. These
considerations all point to the same conclusions: a significant level of participation by developing countries
is unlikely to occur, except possibly within some
broad international framework and unless aggressively
pursued by the United States.
THE SOVIET UNION
Under present and foreseeable political circumstances, the Soviet Union would be unlikely to participate in in a space venture initiated and led by the
United States. Even the prospects of its participating
in a genuinely international system seem very remote.
One need only remember that the Soviet Union, and
the other Eastern-bloc countries, have never joined

25Each of these stations usually serves several Countria.
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the INTELSAT organization. These countries decided
instead to create their own international satellite communications system, named INTERSPUTNIK; since the
two systems have to be linked somehow, there are
INTELSAT ground stations in the U. S. S. R., Cuba, and
Romania, but these countries are users of and not parties to INTELSAT. It is true that the Soviet Union is
party to several international satellite systems, notably
INMARSAT (which is, roughly speaking, to maritime
communications, what INTELSAT is to ground communications) and SARSAT-CORPAS (an experimental
satellite assisted search and rescue system). But these
were created in a context where the United States did
not play a dominant role.
However, it is not possible to discuss international
prospects for international involvement in a “space
station” without mentioning the Soviet Union, for that
country does operate its own in-space infrastructure:
Sal yut-Soyuz-Progress .26 Furthermore, the Soviet
Union has provided opportunities to several other
countries to have one or more of their citizens visit
this infrastructure.
The Soviets have never concealed their ultimate intention to have some of their people in space
operating permanent facilities there, and Salyut is
clearly a major step towards that goal. The pace of
its future evolution is, however, open to conjecture.
The Salyut-Soyuz-Progress infrastructure, as developed
to date, does not exhibit all the features to which
NASA aspires for U.S. in-space infrastructure.
For instance, the Salyut’s crew can perform work
only inside the station, or, when spacewalking, only
very close to it, by remaining tethered. The Soviets
apparently have no such thing as manned maneuvering units, teleoperated maneuvering systems, and the
like. As a result, the crew cannot tend other spacecraft which might co-orbit or rendezvous with their
complex, in order to maintain, service, or repair them.
This reflects adversely on all material processing research: Salyut, because of perturbations caused by

NThe name SALYUT designates a series of manned

Ohitd laboratories,

launched and operated one at a time since 1971. The system presently active, SALYU1 7, is likely to stay several years in orbit, as did its predecessor
SALYUT 6, both because of design improvements and because a fair amount
of in-orbit maintenance can now be carried out by visiting crews. The spacecraft, weighing about 40,000 Ibs, is launched unmanned, and later on rendezvous with SOYUZ capsules carrying a crew of 2 or 3. SALYUT 6 and 7 have
also been visited by larger (30,000 Ibs) unmanned craft. The usual pattern
of activity is to send abroad first a “semi-permanent” crew of two for a duration now exceeding 6 months. While this crew stays on board, visiting crews
of three join them (usually for a week). These visits alternate with unmanned
resupply trips by PROGRESS. To date, the station has been left unoccupied
for some time after the semipermanent crew has accomplished its long-duration stay, after which the cycle starts again. For a more complete discussion, see the OTA Technical Memorandum Sa/yut: Soviet Steps Toward Permanent Human Presence in Space, December 1982.
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crew members’ movements and the lack of a free-flying platform in its vicinity, does not provide the very
low level of residual “gravity” necessary for the implementation of finely tuned experiments.
In spite of this, and other present limitations, the Salyut has been used extensively for military and civilian activities. In the latter case, where some results
are known, cosmonauts have performed useful work
in life sciences, Earth observation, astronomy, materials processing, and technology development. Furthermore, SaIyut has enabled the Soviet Union to gain
the prestige associated with having some of its people in orbit.
Cooperation with the Soviet Union in space is a
complex matter. 27 Planning is difficult when future
plans are, by definition, to be kept secret. Communication with authoritative Soviet representatives tends
to be scant, slow, and often “beside the point.” Standards, methods and even terminology are very different
from those in use outside the Soviet Union. Consequently, project managers and teams from these countries who have been involved in bilateral programs
with the U.S.S.R. have usually experienced great difficulties in keeping cost and schedule under control.
However, Soviet teams have proven their ability to
be flexible and imaginative when they feel the need
for it. For example, West German scientists whose instruments are to be flown on the upcoming Soviet
VEGA mission to Halley’s Comet have found the cooperative arrangements quite satisfactory.
Whatever the difficulties inherent in international
cooperation with the U.S.S.R. in space activities, there
are countries which have no other choice, and there
are countries which find advantage in balancing cooperation with the United States with joint ventures with
the Soviet Union. It seems unlikely, however, that
these latter countries would go so far as to bypass cooperation with the United States on a “space station”
by exclusive recourse to analogous Soviet flight opportunities.

Factors Influencing Assessment
of International Involvement in
U.S. “Space Station” Program
PAST EXPERIENCE
Both the United States and its potential partners will
have a substantial historical record in mind when it
comes time to decide whether, and how, to proceed
in a cooperative “space station” endeavor.

The debate over European participation in NASA’s
post-Apollo program is by far the most important past
experience, since it was the only time that the United
States invited its major allies–Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan—to participate in an effort which was
at the core of NASA’s plans for the future. While there
had been significant scientific cooperation prior to
1969, particularly with Europe, there was a deliberate
decision as NASA’s post-Apollo efforts were being
planned in 1969 and 1970 to make international involvement in those efforts, particularly of U.S. allies,
a major theme.
Armed with what he thought was a mandate from
President Richard Nixon to seek such involvement,
NASA Administrator Thomas Paine toured Europe and
the Far East inviting other countries to consider
substantial involvement in the emerging U.S. postApollo plans, which at the time included a “space station,” Shuttle, reusable orbital transfer vehicle (“space
tug”), and, ultimately, having people visit Mars. European nations, through ELDO and ESRO, were particularly responsive to Paine’s initiative, and began to
study in some detail various forms of participation; neither Japan nor Australia made an active response to
the U.S. initiative.
A primary NASA objective in initiating the
post-Apollo dialogue was “to stimulate Europeans to
rethink their present limited space objectives, to help
them avoid wasting resources on obsolescent developments, and eventually to establish more considerable prospects for future international collaboration
on major space projects. ”28 In particular, NASA was
eager to steer Europe away from developing an autonomous launch capability. Plans for an expendable
European launcher were the “obsolescent developments” to which Paine was referring.
At the time NASA was offering to involve other
countries in an ambitious post-Apollo enterprise; it did
not have White House or congressional approval for
the programs it was promoting overseas. Indeed, one
tactic NASA may have been using to gain program approval at home was to point out the problems involved
in withdrawing from incipient agreements with Europe to cooperate in those programs. Potential U.S.
partners were aware of the NASA approach; in September 1970, for example, “American space officials
were asked for assurance that, if West European nations scrapped their space programs in favor of a joint
effort with the United States, the latter would not, in
an economy move, back down. ” 29

ZBLetter from Thomas Paine, NASA Administrator, to the President, NOV .
ZTU ,s, /u .s, s, R. Coowation in space will be examined by OTA in detail
in a technical memorandum to be published late In 1984.

7, 1969.
ZqNew York Times, Sept. 24, 1970, P. 64.
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By 1971, only the Shuttle and orbital transfer vehicle remained as part of NASA’s post-Apollo plans; the
“space station” had been shelved for the indefinite
future. NASA was suggesting to Europe that its participation involve developing some portion of the airframe of the Shuttle orbiter and total responsibility for
developing the space tug. However, others within the
Executive Branch were skeptical that Europe had the
technical capability to develop the tug on its own, and
were concerned that the United States might, in the
process of assisting Europe in the tug development,
transfer sensitive and/or economically valuable U.S.
technology.
Throughout 1970 and 1971, negotiations on European involvement in post-Apollo development efforts
were Iinked to a European request for U.S. assurance
that it would launch European communication satellites. The United States had for some time resisted providing such assurances on terms acceptable to Europe because of its own economic interests, both
INTELSAT and in U.S. industry’s domination of the
market for communications satellites, but i n September 1971 a compromise on the issue acceptable to
both sides was reached and this obstacle to the postApollo negotiations was removed.
President Nixon approved development of the Shuttle on January 5, 1972. Shortly afterwards, a joint
NASA/European “experts group” met and reported
that “NASA . . . continued to encourage European
participation in development and use of the postApollo program. . . . NASA’s expectation [was] that
European participation in development of the Shuttle would be within the context of a broader program
which included multilateral European responsibility
for development of a major element such as reusable
space tugs . . , or Shuttle-borne orbital laboratories . . , .“3°
The suggestion that there was an alternative to European development of the space tug had emerged within the United States during 1971; the so-called “sortie can” laboratory (also called a research and
applications module) was seen as clearly within European capabilities, offering no risks of unwanted technology transfer, having no military implications, and
providing clean technical and managerial interfaces
with development of the Shuttle orbiter itself. On the
other hand, two factors militated against Europe’s developing the tug: 1 ) recognition that the Shuttle and
its associated orbital transfer vehicle would be used
by the United States for military, as well as civilian,
purposes, and 2) NASA’s concern over housing the
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tug, with its planned cryogenic fuel, in the Shuttle
payload bay.
In June 1972, the United States withdrew (without
warning) the option of Europe’s participation being
development of the tug, and told Europe that the only
choice left for substantial participation was development of the sortie laboratory. Europe was also excluded from direct involvement in developing any element of the Shuttle orbiter itself. This decision came
as a blow to Europe, which had already spent substantial sums both on tug development and, particularly
in the United Kingdom and Italy, on orbiter design
work in collaboration with U.S. industry. In terms of
stimulus to European technical and industrial capability and eventual sales potential, Europe viewed the
sortie laboratory as a distinctly less desirable option.
Nevertheless, Europe (and in particular the FRG)
found the opportunity to become involved with the
U.S. mainstream program for the 1970s attractive
enough that it continued negotiations in a situation
where the United States was clearly playing a dominant role. After a further year of negotiations, in mid1973 Europe agreed to proceed with development of
the sortie laboratory (by now named Spacelab) as part
of a “package deal” which also included development
of a French launcher (which became the Ariane project) and of an experimental maritime communications
satellite and which called for the creation of a single
European Space Agency to carry out these projects.
It was the difference in cost between the expensive
tug development program and the less expensive (at
the time) Spacelab program which freed up the funding needed to initiate joint European support of
Ariane.
The Memorandum of Understanding which governed NASA/European cooperation on Spacelab was
signed in September 1973.31 At the time of the U. S.European agreement on Spacelab development, it was
anticipated that the facility would be used extensively
in conjunction with the Shuttle and that the United
States would buy several Spacelabs beyond the one
engineering model and one flight model which Europe agreed to develop and build at its own cost and
then to deliver to NASA. This has not yet happened.

31

The Mou b~ween NASA

and E’jA was a subo~l “ate document ~hlch

drew its authority from the Intergowxnmental Agreement between the United
States on the one hand and each of the individual governments of the ESRO
Member States on the other. This Agreement was thus binding on the whole
of the U.S. Government not just on NASA. Although ratified by the parliaments of several ESRO countries, it was not submitted to the U.S. Senate
for ratification. As a consequence, its status was that of an “International
Executive Agreement” and, as such, subordinate to U.S. domestic law. This
point, which the ESRO states did not appreciate at the time, became important in 1979 in connection with a U.S. Air Force plan (later cancelled) to
develop a system similar to Spacelab.

200

●

Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

The costs of both Shuttle and Spacelab utilization have
escalated to the point where extensive utilization of
the full Spacelab capabilities is questionable, and the
United States has bought only the minimum single additional Spacelab to which it was committed.
The Europeans knew that, under the circumstances,
they would have to accept the status of a junior partner. Now that they have demonstrated their competence, they will look to agreements on a much more
equitable basis as Europe considers cooperation with
the United States in “space station” development. For
example, the current head of CNES has questioned
whether Spacelab has “fulfilled German expectations”
(the FRG was the major European advocate of the program) and has suggested that “there is some question
as to whether Spacelab . . . is really appreciated by
the U.S. . . . In any event, Europe does not really feel
at home in Spacelab, whose operation is now out of
European hands.” 32
European acceptance of what some now perceive
to be unfavorable terms in the Spacelab agreement
stemmed in large part from lack of confidence in European capabilities and from a belief that only through
cooperation with the United States could those capabilities be improved. Now, having brought both
Spacelab and Ariane to success, Europe has much
more confidence in its ability to chart its own future
in space and it is likely to be a more demanding participant in negotiations with the United States over
cooperative ventures.
European confidence in the United States as a cooperative partner was shaken in the spring of 1981 when
the United States announced, without prior consultation with its European partners, that it was canceling
a U.S. spacecraft which was part of a two-spacecraft
International Solar Polar Mission (ISPM).33 This withdrawal caused vigorous protests from not only European space officials but also representatives of foreign
ministries.34 There is general agreement that the ISPM
affair was not handled well by the United States.35 Although both the United States and Europe have managed to put ISPM in perspective, European officials
are not beyond using U.S. remorse over the incident

z

‘ Herbert Curien, “The Pride of France: a National Commitment, ” Spectrum, September 1983, p. 75.
JJlndeed, European confidence had been shaken earlier when the United

as a bargaining chip in U.S.-European negotiations on
future collaboration. For a time, though, it seemed as
if “aberrations such as the unilateral pullout by the
United States” from the ISPM could “set back progress for years.”36 It is perhaps an indication of the
basically favorable climate for U.S.-European collaboration in space activities that the ISPM incident and
the Spacelab experience are viewed as lessons of what
is to be avoided in future negotiations rather than
reasons for not cooperating in the future.
NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS
Military and national intelligence space activities
provide the United States and its allies with major national security advantages, and all indications point
towards reliance on them in the future. A major program like the “space station” is therefore bound to
have national security implications. If a decision is
made to develop a single set of infrastructure elements
to satisfy all interests, civilian and military, then the
prospect of international involvement in such a program raises critical questions. This is all the more true
since new security implications may emerge as the
program matures. If the future unveils unforeseen potentialities, international participation in the program
may inhibit, perhaps even prevent. the United States
from taking full advantage of them.
To an extent, major international involvement will
obviously restrict U.S. freedom of choice in the future:
it would be more difficult, for instance, for the United
States to preserve the option of integrating all its efforts in space (military as well as civilian) and having
a single Government agency responsible for them
(though the U.S. Army and its Corps of Engineers may
exemplify a possible approach). Such a drastic step
has been debated and rejected in the past, but, in principle, it remains an option which international participation might foreclose. Conversely, any form o f
U.S. military activity would raise major problems for
ESA as a partner, since the ESA charter precludes any
involvement in military projects o37
A more likely future, however, is that any national
security uses would rely on elements operationally
separate from the civilian one, but built with similar
or identical technology and perhaps making joint use
of basic utilities. Dependence of any military segment(s) on parts and/or subsystems procured from foreign sources could ensue, This is a situation which will

States cancel led its share in the AEROSAT program, In this instance, the U.S.
withdrawal was total, and the program was stopped.
3zFor a ru n n i ng accoun t of the International Solar Polar Mission COfItrOVerSy,

see articles in Aviation Week and Space Technology, Mar, 2, Mar. 30, Aug.
3, Sept. 28, and Dec. 28, 1981.
JSlt is ~rhaps ~rth noting that the situation was aggravated because NASA
was not permitted to consult or even warn ESA of the impending cancellation until the President’s budget had been delivered to the Congress.

36Noel Hinners, “Space Science and Humanistic Concerns,” in Jerry Grey
and Lawrence Levy, eds., Global Implications of Space Activities (American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1982), p. 43.
‘Three of ESA’S members (Sweden, Switzerland, and Ireland) are neutral
countries.
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never please the military (which, like France, prefers
“autonomy”), but which can probably be met with
adequate licensing arrangements (e.g., those under
which the A V-8 Harrier aircraft was produced). For
instance, if the U.S. military were to envision using
elements of any civilian space infrastructure under
such circumstances, a foreign supplier could be required to entrust a U.S. official agency with all drawings and documents needed to transfer the manufacturing of the item under consideration to a U.S.
supplier if such a course eventually proved to be necessary. An intergovernmental arrangement would specify those situations where the U.S. agency is authorized to implement the transfer to a national supplier,
so as to protect the foreign firm’s commercial interests in all other cases.
Such a device works best when the back-up supplier in the U.S. is pre-identified, so that a minimum
amount of transfer of know-how, consistent with the
preservation of the foreign source’s interests, can be
carried out in advance, thus shortening the inevitable lead time inherent in a manufacturing restart. Of
course, there is always the possibility that the U.S. military could procure systems directly from non-U. S.
suppliers; this has happened for a few military systems
in the past.
Another security-related consequence of international participation could be that foreign participants
would be exposed to the operating characteristics of
the technology used by U.S. national security agencies. This could involve those parts or subsystems provided by foreign sources, and can be assessed only
on a case-by-case basis. But the matter could extend
beyond foreign-supplied hardware, since foreign participants will of necessity have access to a certain level
of technological detail, especially those interfacing
with what they supply. This, however, is not necessarily critical: in a similar instance, the Shuttle, although it can be used to carry on U.S. national security activities, is itself not a classified item. However,
many aspects of Shuttle operations, such as access to
the Orbiter itself, are carried out under strict security,
and the military has developed separate control facilities for its use of the Shuttle.
Similarly, as the presumed leader in a space infrastructure program, the United States is bound to be
i n a dominant position regarding transfer of sensitive
technology and industrial information. As was the case
with Spacelab, all data and drawings pertaining to any
foreign contribution would have to be made available
to the United States in order to allow operation, maintenance, and repairs to be carried out. The United
States, on the other hand, would have to provide only
essential interface data to its partners. Such considera-
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tions, therefore, should not discourage the United
States from seeking foreign participation, if it so
desires.
Perhaps more important to national security considerations are the restrictions which might be imposed on certain national security uses of internationally developed infrastructure. While some, perhaps
many, potential international partners might not oppose so-called “peaceful” military applications (e.g.,
military R&D, or activities in support areas such as
communications, navigation, surveillance), some of
them are unlikely to agree to the installation of any
“battle station” on an element derived from a development program to which they are party. There is
clearly no way to bypass such an issue: it would of
necessity have to be settled beforehand, as explicitly
as possible, in the agreement instituting the international program.
A last issue relating to national security considerations is that of the transfer of technology from the
United States to foreign participants, or vice versa.
There are generally two ways in which such technology transfers
occur:
“
1. In the course of an international development
program, a certain amount of know-how is inevitably transferred among the parties to the project.
This is more in the nature of general knowledge
(management, organizational methodology and
procedures) than of specific technological skills.
The character of technical interaction between
NASA and ESA in conjunction with Spacelab,
even though it includes some technical assistance
provided by NASA, is evidence of this.
2. If a foreign participant in charge of a given subsystem were to appear unable; at a late stage of
the program, to produce a product conforming
to required performance standards, it then would
become necessary to assist the concerned party
in meeting the specifications, a process which
might involve the transfer of valuable and sensitive know-how. This can only be assessed on a
case-by-case basis, but a number of safeguards
can be built into the program at the start. These
would include careful selection of subsystems entrusted to foreign participants and provision for
midcourse assessment of performance. Of
course, the reverse possibility now exists as well:
that the United States could gain access to valuable technological know-how from other
countries.
POTENTIAL PRIVATE-SECTOR INVOLVEMENT
In principle, private business and international
cooperation are perfectly compatible; successful
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“multinationals” are proof of this. It is true that until
recently there were no multinational firms involved
in space developments (unless INTELSAT is seen as
a business). Actually, space activities in practically all
countries constitute an area where governmental setting of policy, financing, and implementation of programs are the rule, although the private sector can be
expected to play an increasingly important role in future space activities.
There is a clear trend towards increased private-sector involvement in those applications of space expected to generate profit, and the matter of “space
commercialization” is now being actively debated in
the United States. In Europe, precedents have been
set with firms like ARIANESPACE (for the sale of launch
services) and SPOT-IMAGE (for the commercial exploitation of the French SPOT Earth-resources-sensing
satellite). In Japan, space programs rely on close government-industry interaction.
Hence, if it appears that activities conducted using
space infrastructure can be economically profitable,
the fact that it was developed internationally should
not present an insurmountable obstacle to private-sector involvement in its use. However, all other things
being equal, it is likely that U.S. industry would prefer to deal with infrastructure owned and operated by
U.S. interests, Government or private.
THE ECONOMICS OF COMMERCIAL APPLICATIONS
The greater the prospects of commercial use of
space infrastructure, the better the prospects for returns from investments made to develop it. The economic prospects can only gain from its large and wideencompassing utilization. Such utilization, including
foreign users, may exist even if the United States develops all or nearly all of the infrastructure. Many
foreign customers would be attracted to any opportunities provided by its use. The extent of commercialization would then depend mainly on the conditions set by the owner(s) and operator(s): first and
foremost, pricing policy, but also any commercial restrictions (e.g., will the infrastructure be made available to foreign firms competing directly with U.S. firms
in a given field of application?) and technical factors
(e.g., such stringent safety requirements that disclosure
of proprietary knowledge would have to be made by
the user). However, NASA’s experience with accommodating commercial interests (including R&D efforts)
on the Shuttle, through such mechanisms as Joint Endeavor Agreements and trips purchased in whole or
in part by commercial interests under proprietary conditions, provides precedents which suggest that even
U.S.-only elements could accommodate non-U.S.
commercial users successfully.

It appears likely that international involvement in
space infrastructure development, operation, and
ownership would enhance the prospects for an economically efficient and broadly based utilization program. Common interest in its future capabilities and
use will stimulate creativity and innovation among a
much wider international community of potential users, including non-profit-seeking ones (governmental
agencies, research institutions and the like). Also, any
competition from the Soviet Union will be lessened
if spacefaring countries feel secure in their participation in a U.S./international complex.
THE TECHNICAL ADEQUACY OF POTENTIAL
FOREIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
What components of space infrastructure would
each of the potential partners reviewed earlier be most
likely to contribute by virtue of the current tendencies of its own programs, of the existence of technological domains where its industry is known to excel,
or of other factors? Answers to this question are important. For if any foreign partners enter such a cooperative effort, the United States must ensure that their
technical contributions are feasible, compatible, and
complementary. Or, from another perspective: to
what extent would the desired infrastructure have to
be modified in order to accommodate contributions
by a given set of participants?
It is impossible now to suggest more than a few generalities, inasmuch as NASA has not yet specified what
the overall performance specifications are going to be.
Too, the level of technical sophistication for a given
subsystem cannot yet be articulated. As just one example, consider electric power conditioning and distribution. On all spacecraft developed until now, electric power is distributed at low voltage, and all
spacefaring countries possess the relevant technology.
Many experts, however, judge that, for long-term inspace infrastructure, this technology should be supplanted by an alternative, high-voltage technology. In
anticipation of just such a development, ESA and
NASA have been discussing for some time the generation of a set of standards to be employed in spacecraft high-voltage power systems; but the matter is still
outstanding,
Lastly, potential participants may wish to make their
contribution, not in the areas where their industry is
best endowed with existing capabilities, but rather in
areas where they want it to acquire new capabilities.
Nothing should prevent them from doing so if they
are ready to commit themselves to meet the costs of
such new and (to them) risky developments. This matter could become “sticky,” however, if they were to
wish to make a “key” contribution in such an area,
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Thus, no useful projection of task allocation can be
made now. Perhaps the division of work will have to
be negotiated on a case-by-case basis, before the program actually starts, but after its shape and definition
have been outlined in more detail. Some countries are
already suggesting ways in which they might prefer
to contribute, and it would be wise for the United
States to give careful consideration to including prospective partners in the infrastructure design phase in
some sensible fashion.

Assessment: Pros and Cons
of International Involvement
A “U.S. ONLY” PROGRAM
At first glance, since almost certainly the United
States is likely to bear the largest part of the financial
burden of a “space station” development program,
and since international cooperation is fraught with
many well-known difficulties, it would seem that there
would be much merit in the prospect of an independent, strictly U. S., undertaking. In addition, many of
the reasons which have led the United States to consider a “space station” program in the first place—
national pride and a sense of accomplishment, national prestige, national security, or supporting U.S. firms
in commercial space activities—might best be served
by a program carried out under exclusive U.S. control.
Similarly, it could be argued that potential international partners might find it to their advantage to be
left to their own devices in planning and implementing their respective space programs, rather than having to weigh the pros and cons of associating themselves with what will in essence be an American
program, unlikely to be perfectly suited to their goals
and/or technical and financial resources and likely to
limit their ability to pursue independent actions.
The arguments in favor of a strictly national U.S. program can be summarized as follows:
1, There is no substantial reason why the United
States would not be able to go it alone: the country has all the technical and industrial resources
necessary.
2. Generating and maintaining international interest in a “space station” program and enlisting
participants is in itself a difficult process, leading
to many concessions on the part of the United
States and other participating countries, the return from which could be rather disappointing.
Participation of Europe in major U.S. space
undertakings, such as the Space Transportation
System or the Space Telescope, seems always to
stay in the 10 to 15 percent range, which is consistent with European space budgets. Even if one
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other major partner, say Japan, joins the “space
station” program at a similar level, this still leaves
the U.S. to bear 60 to 70 percent of the expense.
3. International cooperative programs, especially
where advanced technology is concerned, have
the reputation of being beleaguered by complex
diplomatic and managerial interfaces, as well as
by difficult compromises needed to tailor the
overall undertaking to each participant’s particular requirements.
4. Past experience points to the fact that the U.S.
civilian space pro-gram is difficult enough to coordinate with the U.S. national security program on
a purely national basis. This could be even more
difficult in the case of an international “space station” program.
These considerations must however be carefully
weighed against a number of arguments in favor of
international involvement:
As stated repeatedly, international cooperation
is a long-standing tradition in civilian space programs, and pursuing it has had a very positive political impact. Traditional partners of the United
States in the industrialized world consistently list
cooperation with this country among the objectives of their space policy statements; for example, the head of the French space program, who
also chairs the ESA Council and the European Science Foundation, has recently noted that “cooperation with the United States is of fundamental
importance. ” 38 The United States has given a
strong impression already that it anticipates significant international utilization of a “space station” and that, in order to assure such utilization,
it wilI be receptive to foreign participation i n the
development phase of the program. A decision
to forego such participation would certainly have
major (though probably not yet very major) political costs.
2. As discussed earlier, if the United States chooses
to go ahead alone with its space infrastructure acquisition program, several countries or groups of
countries among the industrialized Western-type
democracies are likely to follow suit, even if on
a smaller scale and after some time. Such duplication of efforts might well result in a net loss to
the Western world. The very cost of these investments is bound to generate an extremely harsh
level of competition for their commercial utilization, to the point where it may not be economically sound any more and the benefits of space
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commercialization could be lost or significantly
delayed.
3. Even if the prospects that Europe and Japan may
associate in a joint “space station” program without the United States seem remote, there is no
doubt that this possibility becomes more likely
if the United States chooses to go it alone. As
argued earlier, there are virtually no circumstances in which Europe or Japan would
refuse a U.S. offer of involvement in the “space
station, ” and thus it is up to the United States to
decide whether to make that offer.
As argued earlier and briefly again above, a likely
impact of U.S. decision to proceed alone would be
the eventual development by other space-oriented
countries of capabilities which will be, at least in part,
similar to those offered by a U.S. “space station.” This
could result in increased downstream economic competition between the United States and other industrial countries in commercial exploitation of space. By
involving potential competitors in the U.S. ‘program,
this situation might be avoided or minimized. There
is a certain parallel with the situation regarding European involvement in U.S. post-Apollo activities. By
withdrawing the offer of European development of a
space tug (with an estimated cost to Europe of $500
million—$1 billion) and substituting the Spacelab (then
estimated to cost $100 million-$200 million), the
United States made possible a European financial
commitment to develop its own launcher, which is
now competing with the Shuttle for launch contracts.
The United States needs to evaluate carefully whether
it wants to create a similar situation as its “space station” program begins.
As mentioned earlier in this paper, from the U.S.
perspective international involvement is an option, not
a requirement. However, not only are there strong
reasons for the United States to pursue this option,
but, at least from NASA’s perspective, internationalizing the “space station” program to some meaningful
degree eventually may bean important means of gathering political support in this country for the size
and kind of program that it wishes to have. If the nationalistic objectives which might be served by NASA’s
present “space station” program aspirations are not
sufficient to gain White House and congressional support of a “go it alone” approach, then an approach
mixing nationalistic and cooperative elements seems
essential to mobilize political support for it.
AN INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM
This approach to space infrastructure development,
operation, and use would be preferred by the United
States and/or other space-capable countries only if it

was the best available means of maximizing all of the
national objectives which have led to beginning the
program in the first place. As mentioned earlier, the
INTELSAT and INMARSAT analogy is rather misleading here. The objectives of those systems are inherently international in character and could not be successfully pursued without broad international
participation, while space infrastructure can be developed and operated as a purely national enterprise.
Even the parallel to ESA is somewhat artificial: European countries created ESA because such a joint endeavor was the only way that they could marshal the
resources required to carry out a comprehensive
space program, albeit on a regional rather than a national basis. The United States, should it chose to do
so, has the resources required for unilateral “space
station” development.
A decision to create an international acquisition arrangement is highly unlikely, given the specific character of the support mobilized behind the “space station” concept in the United States, Europe and Japan
to date. One fundamental motivation which could
lead to such a decision–that it was the only way to
mobilize the needed financial or technical resources—is missing, and there seems to be no other
compelling reason, from a U.S. perspective, to pursue this option. Only if it were seen by the United
States and, to a lesser degree, other spacefaring states
as a particularly attractive way of symbolizing their
commitment to broadly based international cooperation would a “fully international” option be preferred; no such vision has been persuasively advanced.
Making international operational arrangements
once the infrastructure is acquired appears a somewhat more realistic prospect, though still unlikely to
be preferred by its developers. The United States (and
its partners) could recoup at least some costs of the
acquisition by selling shares in it, and this form of
broadened international involvement may be an attractive way of giving newly industrializing and developing countries a useful sense of involvement on
the space frontier. Broader international involvement
could also be accomplished by internationalizing (to
some extent) the operating crew—or by leasing facilities to the rest of the world.
A U.S. PROGRAM WITH INTERNATIONAL
INVOLVEMENT
Since the United States has given strong indication
that it will open its space infrastructure program to
foreign participation, it is useful to estimate what form
of involvement is most likely to be successful, where
success is defined as a mixture of costs and benefits
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which is acceptable to all involved. Reaching an agreement is likely to involve difficult bargaining and significant compromise at the political, managerial, and
technical levels. This process is already beginning, and
both the United States and its potential partners (particularly Europe) are approaching the issue in a rather
different manner than was the case during the 1969-73
negotiations over post-Apollo participation.
Those objectives which are likely to be of most interest to the United States perhaps would be best
served by a cooperative approach which would commit the United States and its partners to share important parts of the overall acquisition program, to remain
involved beyond its acquisition (i. e., during its operational phase as well), and to seek broadly based infrastructure utilization once established: that is, overall
joint acquisition, operation, and use. Certainly the
United States would prefer to be the world leader in
space development and use over the next few decades. A U.S.-led, freely arrived at, major in-space infrastructure collaboration program–one involving
many, perhaps all, countries, especially the major
spacefaring ones—would go a long way toward
achieving this goal.
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But it seems as if the objectives, primarily utilitarian,
which would motivate other countries to join in such

a U.S. program would be best served if they could do
so with minimal loss of their future freedom of action—i.e., participation in the acquisition, including
development, phase only, with no a priori commitment to system utilization or to sharing in overall
system management.
Potential U.S. partners are, of course, fully aware
that a U.S. offer to share in the acquisition of in-space
infrastructure is fundamentally political in character,
and that decisions on issues such as cost-sharing and
division of labor are as much political as technical or
economic. However, as the earlier review of the space
programs of potential partners has suggested, Europe
(both ESA and individual countries) Canada and Japan will bring some very real assets to the negotiating process. The outcome of that process is certainly
not going to reflect U.S. interests alone. Indeed, Europe, Canada and Japan may consider their participation in the operation of the infrastructure and their
guaranteed access to it as preconditions to their contributing to its development.

Appendix D

SYNOPSIS OF THE OTA WORKSHOP ON
COST CONTAINMENT OF CIVILIAN
SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE (CIVILIAN
1
“SPACE STATION”) ELEMENTS
PREFACE
This appendix summarizes information presented at
an OTA workshop on cost containment and cost minimization in NASA’s projected civilian “space station”
program. This program is expected to result in the
Government’s acquisition of elements of an overall
in-space infrastructure support system. The 2-day
workshop was held on October 18 and 19, 1983, and
was attended by more than a dozen senior professional representatives from (non-NASA) high-technology Government organizations, Government-related
aerospace industry organizations, and non-space industry organizations. Most of those attending were
either former senior NASA professionals or had
worked often on large NASA contracts. The views of
invitees unable to attend are also contained in this appendix. A Glossary of Terms appears at the end of the
document.
The workshop discussions were limited to a NASA
program that would develop infrastructure elements
without significant participation by foreign governments or the private sector in either funding or overall management. Such involvement would bring with
it additional considerations that would have to be addressed early in the planning stages of the project in
order to avoid serious, cost-increasing program
changes.
Moreover, the workshop discussions assumed that
NASA staffing for the project would remain at the minimum levels required to obtain the infrastructure at
the earliest date and in the most cost-effective manner.
Workshop participants did not attempt to quantify,
in either absolute or percentage terms, the estimates
of possible cost reductions expected to result from
using the management and technical approaches suggested here.
The first section summarizes the results of the 2 days
of discussion; it is divided into the two areas on which
the discussion centered: management considerations

1 Workshop conducted for OTA by Computer Sciences Corp.
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and technical considerations. A synthesis of the discussions in these two areas is presented in the next two
sections. The last section is a set of tentative
conclusions for the consideration of NASA and
Congress.

Summary
Recent history indicates that only about one-third
of the cost of acquiring a space system is directly
related to hardware. Management, engineering, integration, test, software, documentation, and other acquisition support activities use up the remaining twothirds. Although many ways that promise to cut costs
in a civilian space infrastructure (“space station”) program were discussed at the workshop, program philosophy and management were emphasized.
Some of the cost issues have already been recognized by NASA and may indeed be incorporated into
NASA’s current cost-control activities. These issues are
nonetheless included here in order to bolster the argument that NASA will have to change the way it acquires high-technology space assets if acquisition unit
costs are to be sharply reduced.
The major cost issues are summarized below:
COST-CONTAINMENT

CONSIDERATIONS

New technology: In general, the cost of in-space
infrastructure elements is directly related to the
amount of new-technology research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) invested in
the program. To minimize cost, NASA should
adopt an approach that would minimize the
amount of new technology necessary to meet
performance objectives. Because NASA Centers
have their own continuing agendas and tend to
incorporate their own RDT&E interests into large,
popular, long-term development programs, the
extent of involvement of the Centers in the management of large space programs affects the cost
of those programs.
Sufficient management authority: NASA’s current plan to designate a separate Associate Ad-
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ministrator for the program is both necessary and
appropriate. The structure, responsibilities, and
authorities of the management organization reporting to this Associate Administrator are also
vital for controlling costs.
● Careful definition: An extensive definition phase
(e.g., the present NASA Phase A/B) could help
minimize costs by determining precisely what capabilities are required to meet specific objectives;
technology development should be limited to
those requirements.
These issues, discussed in terms of management and
technical considerations, are summarized below.

●

MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
Centralized management: A centralized, highlevel NASA organization to manage development
and procurement could lower cost by reducing
layers of management, minimizing the number
of organizational and design interfaces, and coordinating parallel development efforts. It could
also simplify coordination of technical and management efforts.
System engineering and integration: Strong system engineering and system integration efforts
(see Glossary) both by contractors and by NASA
could reduce the number of technical interfaces,
allow most design conflicts to be resolved inhouse, and help ensure that the overall system
is engineered for optimal performance.
Bounded program: Defining a bound, or end
point, to the initial acquisition, including development, activities could contain costs by eliminating the possibility of prolonged RDT&E so as
to reach an early initial operational capability

(lOC).

Separation of NASA’s general RDT&E costs from
infrastructure acquisition costs: The initial development should be based as much as possible
on available technology. And only those RDT&E
costs that directly contribute to development
should be charged to this program.
Development of new cost models: Current cost
models will not provide accurate estimates of the
funding needs of the future civilian “space station” program. These models were developed for
efforts that had requirements fundamentally different from the needs of the proposed “space station. ”
TECHNICAL AND PROCUREMENT
CONSIDERATIONS
Current technology: Based on the requirements
defined to date for an operational civilian “space

●
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station, ” extensive technological development
does not appear to be necessary to obtain its necessary elements. Elements based on current technology would be less expensive to produce, with
some exceptions would appear to have reasonable long-term operation and maintenance costs,
would permit later improvements, would not require as extensive a management effort, and
would cost the taxpayer less,
Performance objectives requirements: The
strong Phase A/B effort that NASA currently performs is required. However, if NASA develops
detailed design specifications and procures hardware on the basis of their use, contractors’ initiatives to meet or better schedules and costs
would be inhibited. Performance objectives (with
specified minimums) based wherever possible on
current technology would allow contractors to
meet the program requirements in the most costeffective and timely manner.
Contract incentives: By specifying performance
objectives that could be met with minimal advances in technology, NASA would encourage
contractors to propose the most efficient cost and
schedule approaches. Incentive contracts that
both reward and penalize would help to ensure
that these objectives are met.
Design issues: Adopting standards, defining and
maintaining simple” interfaces, replicating ‘basic
elements, and specifying common hardware
would simplify design and development, reduce
change-migration across the interfaces, and reduce the impact of nonrecurring costs.

Management Considerations
Both the management philosophy and practice
under which any space program is conducted are usually dominant factors in determining the cost of the
various program elements. Sound management practices must include cost avoidance, cost minimization,
and cost containment. The following management
practices should keep space system acquisition costs
low:
centralize the development program management organization and have it report directly to
the NASA Associate Administrator;
use proven industry contractors for acquiring the
major program elements;
set specific endpoints for the initial development
phase; and
develop and implement management practices
that emphasize, and wherever possible reward,
cost reduction and cost containment.
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CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT
A centralized organization to manage the acquisition program could reduce costs by concentrating the
control and integration of all technical, cost, and
scheduling activities. Clear lines of responsibility; centralized direction; strong control over budgets, funds,
and technical decisions; and control over such factors as interface and communality would be enhanced
under such an approach. Splitting program management among different NASA centers, as has sometimes
been the practice in the past, could make it difficult
to develop a fully integrated “space station.” However, the centers should be used, as necessary, to provide specific expertise or technical support.
The management organization, which would be responsible for contracting for the various program elements, should be given a large measure of authority.
The organization could be located at a Center in order to have access to technical and administrative support. Such an organization must have an experienced
technical arm; to achieve that, expert personnel from
NASA Centers could be assigned to the program management office.
This centralized approach would enable a program
manager to more easily assess risks and make costreducing decisions, primarily because he or she would
be freed from conflicting pressures from other parts
of the organization. (This reasoning supports the argument that individual NASA Centers should not be given management control over elements of the program,) Under this approach the central program
management team would have the best chance to
evaluate costs, scheduling, and performance objectively, and to produce balanced emphases and
decisions.
When a Center does manage the development of
technology or hardware for the program, it should be
on a subcontract basis from the program management
office. It should have a specific development time and
cost. Inasmuch as current technology would be used
wherever feasible, long-term RDT&E programs at the
NASA Centers would not burden the acquisition program with their associated costs and management demands. While new-technology RDT&E is an important
continuing function of the NASA Centers, it should
be funded separately unless it uniquely meets the performance or cost objectives of the space infrastructure program.
SYSTEM ENGINEERING AND INTEGRATION
In any complex system, each component or subsystem should be designed with the objective of
enhancing the performance of the entire system. Thus,
compromises must be made among the various sub-

systems so that the complete system—not just each
component of it—performs as well as the technological state-of-the-art and the funds available for its acquisition will allow. This activity is known as system
engineering. System integration is the term used to describe activities aimed at ensuring that the individual
subsystems work together to create a well-functioning
whole. Both of these concepts involve much more
than just technical performance. In the case of NASAprocured systems, acquisition costs and operating and
maintenance costs also should be important considerations. Usefulness to system users, such as simplicity
of access, is another, and long life and easy evolution
to the next step may be others. More detailed factors
might include ease of flight preparation, in-orbit maintenance, and updating, for example.
Many past system engineering and integration efforts at NASA have emphasized the technical or mission performance. Certain changes that have occurred
during the past 25 years of space effort should now
allow NASA to broaden its view of system engineering and integration.
Until very recently, the civilian space program has
been (it had to be) characterized as a very high-technology program that has had to bootstrap itself: that
is, the technology often had to be developed during
the same time interval that it would have to be incorporated into the spaceflight hardware. Thus, NASA’s
responsibility was not only to manage the aerospace
contractors that build the mission hardware but also
to establish both internal and external RDT&E capabilities to carry out the necessary parallel technology development. In discharging these dual roles, NASA, of
necessity, has been intimately involved in design and
development of the systems it was procuring. Indeed,
doing so was the only practical way by which NASA
could effectively communicate its requirements to its
contractors. As a consequence of these circumstances,
NASA has tended to concentrate on the hardware design and performance aspects of system engineering
and integration— sometimes at the expense of cost
containment.
Two factors present today should allow NASA to
broaden its emphasis from hardware design considerations of system engineering and integration to
other, equally important matters: 1 ) the relatively advanced state of the technology—especialIy that available for this program—and 2) the evolving sophistication of U.S. industrial capability. After 25 years of
space technology development and operational experience in its use, essentially all of the technology
is in hand to build a sophisticated, long-life, reasonably priced civilian “space station” for operation in
LEO. Also, the aerospace industry has changed significantly. Part of NASA’s original charter was to fos-

App. D—Synopsis of the OTA Workshop on Cost Containment of Civilian Space Infrastructure Elements . 209

ter and enhance the space technology know-how of
U.S. industry. To a considerable extent, NASA has
achieved this objective: many senior personnel in industry have devoted their entire careers to space-related activities, and many have come to the industry
from NASA–in various fashions NASA gave many of
these and other individuals their professional “start.”
Because of these factors, several cost-reduction possibilities now exist. Inasmuch as space systems should
be built using current technology unless new technology would lower life-cycle costs, in many cases NASA
should be able to specify the use of already existing
hardware. Using this technology, together with current industry sophistication, should enable NASA to
transfer more of the system engineering and integration associated with hardware design to industry, freeing NASA system engineers to concentrate on cost
minimization and avoidance, operability, and other
important matters. Of course, NASA must continue
to ensure that all of the space infrastructure elements
work together efficiently; that the major interfaces are
defined, controlled, and integrated; and that the end
use objectives are met. A NASA centralized project
management organization would be responsible for
these efforts. In particular, the organization could ensure that appropriate tradeoffs are made that result in
reduced development and O&M costs.
BOUNDED ACQUISITION PROGRAM
NASA’s present emphasis on the “evolutionary
character” of the “space station” program, while embodying many good programmatic features, gives rise
to a very real concern —that is, the pace at which initial elements of the integrated system become available for early operational use. Program delays often
are associated with over-sophistication built in during the definition phase or with unrealistically stringent
specifications. In addition, many engineers and scientists have a tendency to keep improving the design
at all levels—improvements which also can result in
delays in advancing to operational status.
This concern could be allayed by the very practical
approach of establishing a program consisting of a
bounded acquisition phase, including development,
for the procurement, launch, in-orbit assembly, and
acceptance of the infrastructure elements defined as
providing initial IOC. The centralized program management office would carry out this phase. All other
related or supporting activities would have separate
budgets and would be subcontracted to other NASA
offices after negotiation of performance specifications,
costs, and schedules. Even the bounded program
should have identified elements that could be eliminated or moved off-line in event of cost, schedule, or

performance problems in order to meet the IOC date.
This approach provides considerable flexibility should
unforeseen program difficulties occur—as they almost
always do.
The program’s initial operational phase would be
initiated on the IOC date, but the operational planning would be begun earlier by a parallel program organization. A well-thought-out transition plan to move
from the acquisition to the operational phase should
be developed as a part of Phase A/B and acted upon
throughout the acquisition phase so that effective and
comprehensive operating procedures exist at the outset of operations. Thus, the program organization
needed to conduct the operational phase should be
established by NASA during Phase B. This organization would work with the acquisition program office
and with other operations organizations within NASA.
In particular, it would become familiar with the operations of the Shuttle, Spacelab and other space infrastructure elements in order to gain experience in their
use.
The two program organizations–acquisition and
operations—should work together to obtain low lifecycle costs. Cost estimates should be keyed first to the
two program phases and then to schedules, in order
to foster sound decisionmaking regarding the program’s ongoing budget. During the operations phase,
the overall concept of a civilian “space station” should
be reviewed periodically, in close concert with the private sector, to determine whether the Government
should continue, expand, or reduce operations based
on considerations of life-cycle costs and national
benefits.
COST AWARENESS AND CONTROL
Establishing and maintaining cost awareness among
aerospace engineering personnel in both Government
and industry should be a major part of any program
activity and should begin at the definition phase. At
that phase, it is important that the definition be complete within the scope of the bounded program. This
activity should include an estimate of costs of all elements of the work to be done. System designers
should participate in this process and be responsible
for any budget alterations assigned to them. Contractor costs and schedules must be realistic and contractors should be made aware of the need to estimate
them accurately.
Cost awareness can be promoted through motivational programs. One useful approach involves contract incentive fees for cost, schedule, and performance. However, when this arrangement is used, the
contractor must not be overly constrained in his
problem-solving efforts. The incentive contract is a
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motivational technique that could be used effectively
at all levels of the organization. It could be augmented
at the lower levels by direct awards for cost-saving suggestions, underbudget performance, rapid problemsolving, and similar efforts that reduce the costs of a
particular facet of the program.
Key to any effective cost control activity are accurate
cost estimates. Estimates that are too low break down
the cost control process. Estimates that are too high
create a “vacuum” that will surely be filled. Moreover,
cost models based on previous programs will not give
satisfactory results for this program because those
models use weight, volume, safety, and complexity
factors that are significantly different. A quantitative
analysis is needed to correct existing cost models. In
the meantime, bottom-to-top estimates may prove instructive, particularly when applied to already existing
technology or subsystems.
Life-cycle costing may dictate design decisions that
are more costly initially but that provide savings over
the long term. Program operating environments must
also be considered for their effects on costs: designing for a fail-operational, as compared to a fail-safe,
working environment is costly. The concept of acceptable risk, particularly human risk, as it affects costs
should be analyzed anew, because the in-orbit “space
station” operating environment is inherently much
more tolerant of operating difficulties than has been
the case in previous space programs. The ability to
repair equipment and rescue personnel also should
be taken into account.
Finally, to be effective, cost estimates, whether derived from cost models or otherwise, must assume a
reasonably small development effort for solving unexpected problems. Additional funds should be set aside
to handle such problems, but access to this money
should be very carefully controlled.

Technical and Procurement
Considerations
The kind of technology to be used, and the division
of tasks between private contractors and NASA Centers during the acquisition process must be considered
in order to achieve the lowest unit cost. The following factors should also be kept clearly in mind:
● The United States, the European Space Agency
countries, Canada and other countries have already invested enormous amounts of money and
effort to develop, test, and use sophisticated
space technology.
. The aerospace industry has “come of age, ” and
now can be expected to exercise ingenuity in
containing costs and meeting performance and

time schedules without the detailed NASA management oversight required in the past.
Conflicts of interest often exist between RDT&Eoriented NASA Centers and the system acquisition management office responsible for overall capability optimization, cost containment, and
meeting of schedules.
USE OF CURRENT TECHNOLOGY
Together with various ground and space transportation infrastructure, appropriate in-space infrastructure should provide NASA and other users with costeffective capabilities to pursue many important spacerelated objectives. It is quite appropriate that NASA
consider the program in this larger context while making plans for its development. And, the character and
magnitude of the NASA Centers’ involvement in this
planning activity must bean important part of this consideration.
The various NASA Centers are developing preliminary concepts for individual infrastructure elements
and associated subsystems. These design concepts are
technologically sophisticated and are being developed
on an individual subsystem basis. It appears that these
subsystems are to be packaged in modules that are
as independent as possible from each other, and that
the infrastructure central complex will bean aggregate
of these modules.
Proceeding with the acquisition of such individual
subsystems in this fashion could be evidence of inadequate system engineering capability, or inadequate
management strength, or both. Both are needed to
enforce those top-down tradeoffs and compromises
necessary to ensure that the overall system—and not
just the individual subsystems or modules—functions
as well as possible, Experience has shown that early
hesitation regarding system engineering can often result in increasing difficulty later in the enforcement
of such compromises; measures taken to integrate subsystems that, by then, do not inherently fit together
can be a very costly experience.
It appears that NASA may now be planning to
employ a substantial amount of new and sophisticated
technology in the program, and to have a parallel program for the development of this technology. it is very
important that NASA first analyze, based on performance requirements and cost reduction/avoidance objectives alone, whether developing this new technology is necessary. In particular, it should seek sound
professional advice from outside NASA in order to balance any internal tendency to favor new technology
development. It must be repeated that, for the most
part, a functional “space station” could be built using
current technology. It could be cost effective in ad-

App. D—Synopsis of the OTA Workshop on Cost Containment of Civilian Space Infrastructure Elements

dressing important, long-term, civilian space program
goals and objectives. And it should be designed so that
it could be modified during its operating life as new,
more cost-effective, technologies are developed “offline.”
INCENTIVE CONTRACTING VIA
PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATIONS
To date, most NASA spaceflight activities have involved planning for and procuring hardware that has
been at the leading edge of the technology. Accordingly, because it has had to issue detailed engineering specifications to contractors, NASA has been
heavily involved in the technical aspects of such procurements. It is NASA’s present intention to issue engineering specifications for procurement after the
detailed definition is determined in a combined Phase
A/B study. This process would tend to over-constrain
potential private-sector contractors: the detailed design, budget, schedule, and expected performance
would be predetermined. However, design changes
are usually necessary to resolve unanticipated problems that occur as the design is developed. The need
for such changes in turn may adversely affect the
budget, schedule, and performance. Design changes
have been the chief reason that spaceflight hardware
has been so costly.
However, if the overall infrastructure was engineered first as a whole, then NASA could procure it
on the basis of performance specifications rather than
detailed engineering specifications. A detailed Phase
A/B preparation would still be required, but its purpose should be to determine the performance objectives and minimum requirements of the overall infrastructure, and then of the specific elements,
ensuring that all specifications are necessary and
achievable. Such an approach provides contractors
with incentives for achieving the performance objectives within cost and on schedule.
Specifying the desired performance, and providing
contract incentives for achieving performance and for
bettering costs and schedules, could minimize unit
costs, Further, with negative incentives—i.e., penalties
for failure to meet the costs and schedules–agreedto unit costs could also be minimized. NASA should
carefully define an acceptable incentive fee structure
that relates to a predetermined level of risk acceptance for the program. Contractors would be responsible for any trade-offs to meet the performance specified. NASA’s system engineering and integration role
would be to define the areas where the elements meet
and to ensure that the elements do in fact work together. This procedure is used by COMSAT to procure hardware for satellite communication systems
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from the aerospace industry, and has been highly successful and cost effective.
DESIGN ISSUES
For-profit companies understand the importance of
good design practices in minimizing the cost of manufactured products. These practices include using
standard components or subsystems when appropriate, minimizing and simplifying interfaces, and
replicating basic elements as often as possible. It is expected that space hardware contractors will use such
design practices if NASA encourages them to do so.
As noted earlier, however, NASA seemingly now
plans to procure the infrastructure elements by means
of detailed engineering specifications. Such a plan
could prevent contractors, when the seemingly inevitable design changes crop up, from calling on the most
cost-effective design options to remedy the problem.
Moreover, detailed design specifications are rarely
developed with overall cost effectiveness in mind.
Reflecting their past experience, NASA Centers often
emphasize technical excellence and complete elimination of risks, even when the safety of people is not
a concern, almost regardless of the costs.
But if performance specifications were written to require minimal use of new technology, design practices would not be an issue. Contractors could do
what they do best—design cost-effective equipment
that meets the Government’s specified performance
needs.
Acceptable risks should be assessed during NASA’s
Phase A/B definition to determine where performance
specifications and, ultimately, design specifications
could be relaxed to contain and minimize costs.

Conclusions
The primary conclusions of the OTA workshop
follow.
CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OF
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
Effective and efficient management of the proposed
program could be achieved by establishing an organization with a single point of authority and control
at a high level within NASA. To ensure complete integration of all management interfaces, this organization should control all prime contractors directly and
involve only those Centers necessary for the technical execution of the program. This central NASA management organization should be responsible for establishing performance specifications and for defining and
managing interfaces between major elements. The
prime contractors for these major elements should be
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fully responsible for the system engineering and integration of their respective elements.

costs, including development costs, and to provide a
fixed framework for operations planning,

MINIMIZATION OF THE USE OF
NEW TECHNOLOGY

RISK MANAGEMENT

It is almost axiomatic that cost and risk will be minimized if the IOC infrastructure is built using proven,
state-of-the-art technology to the extent feasible. Space
technology has now developed to the point that future
RDT&E and associated facilities should be funded
separately from this program; they should not be dependent on justification by any one large space program for their inauguration or continuation. RDT&E
performed at NASA Centers should be funded solely
on the basis of need to support long-range space
science, applications, or technology development.
NASA should seek outside advice as to what new technology is needed in order to offset any possible inhouse bias in favor of costly, and perhaps unnecessary, development.
PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATIONS AND
INCENTIVE CONTRACTS
Significant cost savings could be realized if NASA
were to procure major elements of the “space station”
based on performance specifications, rather than on
detailed design specifications, Contracting should include incentives and penalties based on performance
objectives so that the contractors would be prompted
to apply initiative and ingenuity in minimizing costs
while meeting schedules and performance.
CONTRACTOR SYSTEM ENGINEERING
AND INTEGRATION
If infrastructure elements were procured on the basis
of incentive contracts defined by performance speci-”
fications, design details would be the responsibility of
the contractors, not NASA. By implication, contractors for major infrastructure elements would also perform the system engineering and integration for their
elements. The centralized NASA program office would
be responsible for defining, controlling, and integrating the interfaces.
FINITE, BOUNDED ACQUISITION PROGRAM
Costs could be contained if the program were
planned as a finite, bounded acquisition program specifically designed to achieve an early IOC. The acquisition phase would include the procurement, launches,
on-orbit construction, and acceptance testing of the
flight systems. The later, separately managed, operations phase would then be initiated and reviewed periodically. The effect would be to bound all acquisition

With the program based, insofar as possible, upon
proven current technology, operational risk could be
examined rationally as a cost factor. Alternative approaches to quantifying risk acceptance should be explored; complete risk avoidance at any cost is not
always required and is very costly.

Glossary of Terms
Available technology-space technology, including
hardware, software, techniques, and capabilities
that need no further development for inclusion as
part of the infrastructure (“space station”).
Bounded program
–
Predetermined
end point of any
research, development, test and e v a l u a t i o n
(RDT&E) program, in terms of time and costs based
on realistically achievable objectives.
Cost models–Formal methodologies for estimating
the cost of planned future spacecraft subsystems/systems based on extrapolations of the cost
of previously developed similar subsystems/systems, with appropriate weighting factors for differences in weight, volume, safety, complexity, past
and/or anticipated cost increases, etc.
Components–The lowest level of decomposition of
the parts that comprise a subsystem.
Configuration control–Formally established project
control procedures for proposing and approving
changes to a developing system by assessing the
effects of possible changes on the other components/subsystems within the system, on the system
performance, and on the interfaces with other
systems.
Current technology-(See available technology.)
Design specifications- Detailed engineering specifications for the procurement and manufacture of elements of the infrastructure,
Definition phase–The initial phase of any proposed
NASA high-technology development and/or acquisition program. (NASA proposes to spend more effort than usual on the definition phase of a space
infrastructure—civilian “space station’ ’—program,
corresponding to its more conventional Phases A
and B so as to permit better estimates of infrastructure use, technology, and costs to be made, thereby
enabling NASA to go directly into Phase C contracting following procurement funding approval.)
Elements–The highest level of decomposition of the
modules, free flyers, platforms, and transportation
vehicles that comprise any infrastructure.
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Engineering specifications–( See design specifications.)
Incentive contracts-Contracts that reward the contractor for meeting or bettering performance,
schedule and/or cost estimates while complying
with all minimum specifications. Penalties are imposed for not meeting schedules, costs, or specifications.
Infrastructure-The totality of surface and in-space
components, subsystems, modules, elements, and,
perhaps, in-space human crew that are to be used
to support various space activities efficiently and
effectively. (See “Space Station.”)
Interfaces-The point or points at which adjacent subsystems, systems, modules, or elements of any infrastructure come together in a structural, mechanical, electrical, or functional sense.
Life cycle cost–Total cost from start of concept
through development, production, deployment,
and operation throughout the useful life of the infrastructure. Includes all maintenance, operational,
and peripheral costs.
New technology—Technology that either is nonexistent and must be developed or does not exist in
fully usable form, and which must at least be
changed and perhaps be developed further before
it becomes “avail able.” This implies that additional
costs must be incurred to bring the technology to
a useful stage.

Open-ended program–A program without a defined
end point in time and/or cost and which, in many
cases, tends to be self-perpetuating.
Performance requirements-Quantitatively stated
functional requirements; they must precede engineering or design specifications.
Phases A, B, C, D–Fundamental elements of NASA’s
usual approach to the development and acquisition of large, high-technology systems:
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Phase A–Study of conceptual design options and
alternatives for accomplishing the desired objectives.
Phase B—Trade-offs to select one or more generally acceptable approaches as most cost effective.
Usually provides first-order cost estimates based on
past experience with analogous systems.
Phase C–Detailed design, which begins to provide
information for a more accurate bottom-to-top cost
estimate.
Phase D–Actual system development. Usually
done on a cost basis, with an incentive fee; rarely
procured at a fixed price. There is continuous management by NASA and, at times, negotiation regarding performance, costs and/or schedules.
(In phases A and B, suggestions regarding appropriate technologies are usually heavily influenced
by NASA.)
RDT&E– Research, development, test, and evaluation
(or engineering.)
Space Station–Infrastructure elements located in the
Earth’s space, perhaps containing a human crew,
used to support space activities efficiently and effectively. (See “Infrastructure.”)
System engineering-System design methodology that
adjusts components and subsystems in order to
achieve the best possible performance from the system as a whole in addressing specified objectives;
system initial and life cycle cost is usually an important consideration; acquisition time can also be
an important consideration.
System integration-The engineering necessary to ensure that all of the individual subsystems interface
properly so that the complete system performs as
it should.
Test bed (RDT&E)–A facility for simulating the environment and/or external interfaces so that systems
and subsystems can be tested realistically.

Appendix E

TITLE II—NATIONAL COMMISSION ON SPACE
(PUBLIC LAW 98-361)
Purpose
Sec. 201. It is the purpose of this title to establish
a National Commission on Space that will assist the
United States–
(1) to define the long-range needs of the Nation that
may be fulfilled through the peaceful uses of outer
space;
(2) to maintain the Nation’s preeminence in space
science, technology, and applications;
(3) to promote the peaceful exploration and utilization of the space environment; and
(4) to articulate goals and develop options for the
future direction of the Nation’s civilian space program.

(6) the Nation is committed to a permanently
manned space station in low Earth orbit, and future
national efforts in space will benefit from the presence
of such a station;
(7) the separation of the civilian and military space
programs is essential to ensure the continued health
and vitality of both; and
(8) the identification of long range goals and policy
options for the United States civilian space program
through a high level, representational public forum
will assist the President and Congress in formulating
future policies for the United States civilian space
program.

Findings

National Commission on Space

Sec. 202. The Congress finds and declares that–
(1) the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the lead civilian space agency, as established in
the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as
amended, has conducted a space program that has
been an unparalleled success, providing significant
economic, social, scientific, and national security
benefits, and helping to maintain international stability
and good will;
(2) the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958,
as amended (42 U.S.C. 2451 et seq.), has provided
the policy framework for achieving this success, and
continues to be a sound statutory basis for national
efforts in space;
(3) the United States is entering a new era of international competition and cooperation in space, and
therefore this Nation must strengthen the commitment
of its public and private technical, financial, and institutional resources, so that the United States will not
lose its leadership position during this decade;
(4) while there continues to be a crucial Government role in space science, advanced research and
development, provision of public goods and services
and coordination of national and international efforts,
advances in applications of space technology have
raised many issues regarding public and private sector roles and relationships in technology development,
applications, and marketing;
(s) the private sector will continue to evolve as a
major participant in the utilization of the space environment;

Sec. 203. (a)(l) The President shall within ninety
days of the enactmert of this Act establish a National
Commission on Space (hereinafter in this title referred
to as the “Commission”), which shall be composed
of 15 members appointed by the President. The members appointed under this subsection shall be selected
from among individuals from Federal, State, and local
governments, industry, business, labor, academia, and
the general population who, by reason of their background, education, training, or experience, possess
expertise in scientific and technological pursuits, as
well as the use and implications of the use of such
pursuits. Of the fifteen members appointed, not more
than three members may be employees of the Federal Government. The President shall designate one of
the members of the Comission appointed under this
subsection to serve as Chairman, and one of the members to serve as Vice Chairman. The Vice Chairman
shall perform the functions of the Chairman in the
Chairman’s absence.
(2) Members appointed by the President under paragraph (1) of this subsection may be paid at a rate not
to exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of
basic pay in effect under section 5332 of title 5, United
States Code, for grade GS-18 of the General Schedule
for each day, including traveltime, during which such
members are engaged in the actual performance of
the duties of the Commission. While away from their
homes or regular places of business, such members
may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem
in lieu of subsistence, in the same manner as persons
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employed intermittently in the Government service
are allowed under section 5703 of title 5, United States
Code. Individuals who are not officers or employees
of the United States and who are members of the
Commission shall not be considered officers or
employees of the United States by reason of receiving payments under this paragraph.
(b)(l) The President shall appoint one individual
from each of the following Federal departments and
agencies to serve as ex officio, advisory, non-voting
members of the Commission (if such department or
agency does not already have a member appointed
to the Commission pursuant to subsection (a)(l):
(A) National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
(B) Department of State.
(C) Department of Defense.
(D) Department of Transportation.
(E) Department of Commerce.
(F) Department of Agriculture.
(G) Department of the interior.
(H) National Science Foundation.
(1) Office of Science and Technology Policy.
(2) The President of the Senate shall appoint two advisory members of the Commission from among the
Members of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives shall appoint two advisory members of the Commission from among the Members of
the House of Representatives. Such members shall not
participate, except in an advisory capacity, in the formulation of the findings and recommendations of the
Commission.
(3) Members of the Commission appointed under
this subsection shall not be entitled to receive compensation for service relating to the performance of
the duties of the Commission, but shall be entitled to
reimbursement for travel expenses incurred while in
the actual performance of the duties of the Commission.
(c) The Commission shall appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as it deems advisable. The
Chairman of the Commission shall be responsible
for–
(1) the assignment of duties and responsibilities
among such personnel and their continuing supervision; and
(2) the use and expenditures of funds available to
the Commission. In carrying out the provisions of this
subsection, the Chairman shall act in accordance with
the general policies of the Commission.
(d) To the extent permitted by law, the Commission
may secure directly from any executive department,
agency, or independent instrumentality of the Federal
Government any information it deems necessary to
carry out its functions under this Act. Each such de-

partment, agency, and instrumentality shall cooperate with the Commission and, to the extent permitted
by law and upon request of the Chairman of the Commission, furnish such information to the Commission.
(e) The Commission may hold hearings, receive
public comment and testimony, initiate surveys, and
undertake other appropriate activities to gather the information necessary to carry out its activities under
section 204 of this title.
(f) The Commission shall cease to exist sixty days
after it has submitted the plan required by section
204(c) of this title.

Functions of the Commission
Sec. 204. (a) The Commission shall study existing
and proposed space activities and formulate an agenda for the United States civilian space program. The
Commission shall identify long range goals, opportunities, and policy options for United States civilian
space activity for the next twenty years. In carrying
out this responsibility, the Commission shall take into
consideration—
(1) the commitment by the Nation to a permanently
manned space station in low Earth orbit;
(2) present and future scientific, economic, social,
environmental, and foreign policy needs of the United
States, and methods by which space science, technology, and applications initiatives might address those
needs;
(3) the adequacy of the Nation’s public and private
capability in fulfilling the needs identified in paragraph
(2);
(4) how a cooperative interchange between Federal
agencies on research and technology development
programs can benefit the civilian space program;
(5) opportunities for, and constraints on, the use of
outer space toward the achievement of Federal program objectives or national needs;
(6) current and emerging issues and concerns that
may arise through the utilization of space research,
technology development, and applications;
(7) the Commission shall analyze the findings of the
reviews specified in paragraphs (1) through (6) of this
subsection, and develop options and recommendations for a long range national civilian space policy
plan.
(b) Options and recommendations submitted in a ccordance with subsection (a)(7) of this section shall
include, to the extent appropriate, an estimate of costs
and time schedules, institutional requirements, and
statutory modifications necessary for implementation
of such options and recommendations.
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(c) Within twelve months after the date of the estabIishment of the Commission, the Commission shall
submit to the President and to the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation of the Senate and
the Committee on Science and Technology of the

House of Representatives, a long range plan for United
States civilian space activity incorporating the results
of the studies conducted under this section, together
with recommendations for such legislation as the
Commission determines to be appropriate.

Appendix F

FINANCING CONSIDERATIONS AND
FEDERAL BUDGET IMPACTS
With respect to the conceptual objectives proposed
for discussion in chapter 6 of this report, it is important to ask not only the question of “what would their
attainment cost?,” but the next most important questions as well: “who would pay these costs?” and
“under what circumstances?” This appendix addresses these questions, and then turns to an examination of how novel answers thereto could affect the
Federal space budget.

Financing Considerations
International Considerations
Note that what is being discussed here are not
NASA 1 goals and objectives, but national goals and
objectives and, at least for the most part, goals and
objectives for the benefit of all mankind. Therefore,
for instance, when other countries can reasonably be
expected to have an active interest in cooperating with
the United States as parties in multinational activities,
this also should be taken into explicit consideration
when considering their cost to us.
John Logsdon has recently observed that: “There
is now the possibility of a global division of labor and
cost in space science [and exploration] . . .“.2 Officials of the European Space Agency (ESA), for instance,
are reported to be of the view that ESA: “ . . . anticipates contributing . . . perhaps up to 30 percent of the
estimated cost [of any] space station . . .“.3 And OTA
has been told, informally, by a well-informed foreign
official that, if Japan and Canada also were to be included in a full partnership arrangement, “in the limit”
this fraction could be appreciably larger. And recently
fractions of 35 to 40 percent overall have been publicized. 4 (This 35 to 40 percent, i.e., some $3 billion
[1984$] apparently is now seen by NASA as in addition to the $8 billion [1 984$] now estimated by NASA
as the cost of the IOC infrastructure to the United
States.)
Simply for purposes of illustration, an assumption
of one-third foreign government cost-sharing is taken
here as a reasonable expectation regarding at least ob-

I Other Government agencies, primarily the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admtnlstration (NOAA), have Important space interests and respons} bllitles as well.
‘Science, Jan. 6, 1984, p. 11 et. seq.; see esp. p. 13.
3Science, Dec. 9, 1983, pp. 1099-1100.
4Nature, Mar. 15, 1984, p. 216.

jectives (1), (2), (3), and (4). A further assumption is
made: that the U.S. Government will view its civilian
space leadership role as one of orchestrating the interests, abilities, and activities of any and all of those
countries of the world who wish to participate in space
research, exploration and development, and that it
will play this role in the vigorous, sensitive and innovative fashion that competitive space circumstances
and the high political and financial stakes require.
Indeed, if the United States does not lead the world
in this fashion, there is growing indication that, perhaps sooner than we imagine (especially with the successful Spacelab experience behind them), several
European countries themselves would be prepared to
“go it alone.” And the U. S. S. R., as well, may be beginning to exhibit an “outreach” toward cooperation
with countries outside of the Communist bloc.
The Solar System Exploration Committee of NASA’s
senior Advisory Committee has taken specific and positive recognition of this opportunity in its recent report: Planetary Exploration through Year 2000. Under
the general heading of “International Cooperation, ”
the Committee observes that: “In the 1960s and
1970s, planetary science was clearly dominated by the
United States, with major contributions by the U.S.S.R.
The trend in recent years has been an increase, relative to the United States and the U. S. S. R,, in the capability and interest of other nations to participate in
planetary science and exploration missions. This increasing interest has occurred against a backdrop of
budgetary constraints in all nations, together with increasing sophistication and cost of planetary missions.
Combined, these factors suggest that more planetary
science can be accomplished in a given period if interested nations coordinate their planning and, occasionally, undertake joint missions.”
But no allowance is made in the NASA budget projections–projections that average some $400 million/
year (1 983$) throughout the rest of this centuryG–for
the important financial contributions that other countries could be expected to make to space science and
exploration programs.
One very long-term, very successful example of multinational cooperation in the space field was developed under the enlightened leadership, and with the
important assistance of, the United States: the lnter5

S1 983, see esp. pp. 25-26.
%ee NASA’s report, p. 27.
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national Telecommunications Satellite Organization
(I NTELSAT). Some 20 years ago, the only countries involved in civilian satellite communications were the
United States, the United Kingdom, and France.
Today, INTELSAT counts 109 countries as members;
the countries conduct a useful, profitable, and rapidly
growing space-related business–long-haul trunk communications—which grossed some $400 million in
1983, and in which the required U.S. investment share
is now down to less than 25 percent. (The business
is now so profitable that, last year, potential competitors came forward.) And INTELSAT has been
joined by INMARSAT in the maritime communications
area; INMARSAT counts even the U.S.S.R. among its
members. ’
Finally, the President has taken steps to see that the
matter of international cooperation—indeed, perhaps
international collaboration—in the civilian space area
will receive direct and important attention by the executive branch. In his radio address during the week
of his 1984 State of the Union message, the President
observed that: “international cooperation . . . has
long been a guiding principle of the United States
space program [and that] just as our friends were asked
to join us in the Shuttle program, our friends and allies
will be invited to join with us in the space station project.” In response to this Presidential directive, NASA’s
Administrator has recently visited several other countries to explore the matter of their working on any
“space station” program with the United States.

Private-Sector Considerations
Also, when our private sector can reasonably be expected to assume the cost (in anticipation of commercial-industrial sales and profits), or at least an important fraction thereof, this should be taken into
consideration. This should be the case for at least objectives (2), (5), (6), (7), and (10) (see ch. 6).
For much of 1983, and still continuing, NASA has
had a task force studying what it might do to speed
and enlarge the “commercialization” of space. And
the Department of Transportation (DOT) has recently
been charged by the President with assisting an expendable launch services industry.
Now the President has given a powerful general
thrust to the matter of much greater economic participation by our private sector in space-related activities, In his 1984 State of the Union address he expressed himself of the judgment that: “ . . . space
holds enormous promise for commerce today,” and

was quite specific in justifying his decision to start
work on the development of space infrastructure in
terms of its eventually allowing for “ . . . living and
working in space for . . . economic . . . gains. ” In his
later radio address he stated that he expects: “ . . . a
space station will open up new opportunities for expanding human commerce . . . .“
The legislative branch too, perhaps smarting because of the seemingly endless Landsat commercialization difficulties, and responding to the continuing
hesitancy within NASA concerning their space applications responsibilities, has moved to strengthen the
law quite specifically regarding “space commercializat i o n . ” NASA’S fiscal year 1985 authorization bill,
which became Public Law 98-361 with the President’s
signature on July 16, 1984, makes a basic change in
the “National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958.”
It amends section 102 of the act by including a new
paragraph (c) as follows: “The Congress declares that
the general welfare of the United States requires that
[NASA] seek and encourage, to the maximum extent
possible, the fullest commercial use of space.” This
is strong, unambiguous and “revolutionary” language
for our publicly funded civilian space program’s
“char ter.”
It would seem reasonable, therefore, to imagine that
the kind of private sector participation suggested here
in addressing certain of the 10 conceptual objectives
will, in fact, be realized.

International Plus Private-Sector
Cost Sharing Considerations
Thus, when the financial support of both other
countries and our own private sector are taken into
consideration, the net U.S. public cost of meeting
these 10 conceptual objectives is estimated to be some
$25 billion to $40 billion (1984$), i.e., some 70 percent of their estimated $40 billion to $60 billion total
cost. 8 (See table F-l). The average net public cost for
the first 5 years considered here would be some $2.0
billion/year (1984$); during the last 5 of the 25 years
the average net public cost could decrease to about
one-half this rate. (See table F-2.)
These expenditure rates suggest that, with the completion of the initial modest Moon settlement, the projected NASA budget could allow a major program of
human exploration of Mars (and of one or more asteroids) to begin in earnest.

7

For a thorough discussion of the satellite communications area, see the
OTA report International Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activities (now in press).

‘Norman R. Augustine, “The Aerospace Professional . . . and High-Tech
Management,” Aerospace America, March 1984,
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Table F-l .—USA Net Public Cost (billions of 1984 dollars)
Private
sector

USA net
public cost

0.7

0

1

7

1

13

2

0.3

0

2

6

2

0

4

0.5

0

0.4

0.1

2

0

2

0.2

0

0

0

0

0.5

0

0

0.5

0
0
=10

0

Total
cost
1. Establish a global information system/service
regarding natural hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Establish lower cost reusable transportation service
with the Moon, and establish human presence there . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Use space probes to obtain information regarding Mars
and some asteroids prior to early human exploration . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Conduct medical research of direct interest
to the general public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Bring at least hundreds of the general public
into space for short visits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. Establish a global, direct, audio broadcasting,
common-user system/service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7. Make essentially all data generated by civilian satellites
and spacecraft directly available to the general public . . . . . . . . . . .
8. Exploit radio/optical free-space electromagnetic propagation
for long distance energy distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9. Reduce the unit cost of space transportation
and space activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10. Increase space-related private salesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Other
countries

2

20

5

0.5
= 40b

0.5
=4

5
0
= 26C

aThi~ would advance the pr~~pect~ of successfully a& JresSing all goals and all other objectives.
bThe actual total cost including a ~percent incre=e could be $60 billion; the same inCreaSe could affect all other cost ‘Stimates’
cwith a 50.percent cost increase, this cost could be $40 billion
NOTE: Some rows do not sum due to rounding.

Table F-2.—First Rough Estimate of the Total Cost/Year and the Net Public Cost/Year
(in billions, 1984 dollars) for the First 5 Years, of Attaining the 10 Conceptual Objectives

1.

Total cost (and the
years) to attain each
“objective
2 (lo)

2.
3.
4.

20 (15)
2 (15)
6 ( 5)
0.5 ( 5)
2 (lo)
0 (25)
0.5 (lo)
5 (15)
0.5 (25)
=40

6
7.
8.
9.
10.

Net public cost
(and the years) to attain
each objective

first 5 years

0.20
1.33
0.13
0.40
0.10
0.20
0.00
0.05
0.33
0.02
=3

1 (lo)
13 (15)
2 (15)
4 ( 5)
0.1 ( 5)
0.2 (lo)
0.0 (25)
0.5 (lo)
5 (15)
0 (25)
=26

0.10
0.87
0.13
0.28
0.02
0.02
0.00
0.05
0.33
0.00
==2

Economic-Growth Considerations
PROJECTED GROWTH IN PRIVATE SECTOR
SALES AND RELATED TAX REVENUES
Beyond the cost-offsetting financial participation of
other cooperating countries and our own private sector, it is important to obtain some useful sense of the
present, and future, marginal net cost to the U.S. general public of its civilian space activities—i e., setting
aside further consideration of the over $200 billion
(1984 adjusted) “sunk cost” of our investments in the

38-798

0

-

84

-

16

:

QL

3

Net public

Total
cost/year,
first 5 years

cost/year,

civilian space area to date, and considering only expenditures from now on.
To date, except for the satellite communications
area, the United States’ publicly supported civilian
space program has been essentially one of basic research, exploration, and development of technology
required to support both. Economic returns have been
expected to result from general “spin off” to the private sector from these otherwise-directed R&D activities. The general sense is that to some important extent that has apparently happened, even though the
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evidence on the macroeconomic level is admittedly
difficult to come by.
Let us start, therefore, probably conservatively but
objectively and reasonably quantitatively, by noting
that the present (1 983 year-end) U.S. commercial-industrial space-related annual sales of capital equipment (essentially all in the satellite communications
business, for satellites, their launching, and their associated ground equipments) are some $1.6 billion/
years If satellite insurance sales, operations and maintenance (O&M) charges related to surface equipments,
end-to-end circuit lease charges and lease charges for
in-space microwave transponders (there are now
some 400 in orbit which are owned by U.S. companies) are added, total U.S. private-sector space-related
sales are now probably $2 billion to $3 billion per
year.
This sales figure, at least in the satellite communications long-haul circuit leasing area where records
have been kept since the outset of private sector operations (see INTELSAT’s annual reports) is a consequence of an average annual growth rate of some 15
percent/year, compounded, for nearly the past 20
years. 10
If it is assumed that the total of all Federal, State,
and local tax rates on these sales averages 20 to 30
percent, 11 then, roughly, $0. 5 billion/year in Government tax revenues are now being derived from these
sales. Thus, while the gross civilian space-related Government expenditures are some $7 billion/year today,
in fact the net Government expenditures could be
considered to be significantly Iess—i.e,, effectively
some $6.5 billion/year (or some 7 percent) less.
Now, assume for the purpose of illustration that the
total sales generated in the satellite communications
area, enlarged in time by space-related navigation,
position fixing, remote sensing, materials processing,
tourism, private launch and transportation services,
space platform leasing, etc., continues to grow at the
current rate, i.e., some 15 percent/year, compounded–a doubling about every 5 years. The projection for this rate of growth has been made by NASA
and others and may prove to be conservative. The

gThis figure was provided to OTA by Janet Martinusen ot the Aerospace
Industries Association of America, Inc.)
IOln what follows, note that no attention is given either to the influence
of inflation or to any decrease in nonspace-related sales as a consequence
of the growth of space-related sales; i.e., this discussion must be considered—
particularly by economists–as illustrative and qualitative, not methodologically exhaustive and quantitative.
llfconomjc RepOr-f of the President, transmitted to the Congress, February
1984 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984); Study of
1982 Effective Tax Rates of Selected Large U.S. Corporations, prepared by
the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1983).

most recent projection, by Jerry Grey12 is that: “Satellite communications demand is still growing rapidly
at between 20 and 30 percent per year and is projected to continue at this rate to the end of the century, despite potential inroads by optical fibre cables.
projections for turn-of-the-century annual volume
(spacecraft, launch and integration services, and communications services themselves) range from $30 billion to$100 billion.” A 15 percent/year, compounded,
sales growth throughout 1984-2000 on a 1983 base
of $2 billion would produce sales of some $20 billion
in 2000; on a $3 billion base, some $3o billion.
Of course, the rate of 15 percent/year, compounded, may prove to be optimistic. If, instead, a
10 percent figure is used, the year 2000 sales projection would exceed $10 billion on a present $2 billion
base, and $15 billion on a present $3 billion base.
Further, assume either that Government civilian
space-related expenditures remain at about $7.o billion (1983) per year or that they grow, in real terms,
at 1 percent per year, compounded, as is NASA’s desire and this administration’s expressed intention.
(No attention is given here as yet to the reimbursements made to the Government for the provision of
space-related Government services—now almost
wholly the reimbursement for the provision of Shuttle flights.)
Under such circumstances and with such assumptions, over time, the effective net Government cost
of supporting the civilian space program (in billions
of 1983 dollars) could be considered as decreasing rapidly. (See tables F-3 and F-4.)
Under either assumption regarding future NASA appropriations, and a projected 15 percent/year tax revenue increase, the “break-even” point would be
reached in some 20 years; i.e., in one generation the
effective net public investment required to underwrite
our entire Government civilian space program—either
a program of today’s magnitude or, by then, some 20
percent larger–would be reduced to zero. Even with
the lower 10 percent/year tax revenue growth projection, the effective net public cost would then be a
great deal less than today’s. And, over the next 20
years, a total of tens of billions of dollars (1 984) in tax
revenues would have been generated.
This is such an important observation and prospect
that it bears further elaboration. For the prospect that
such extraordinary private-sector space-related sales
and tax revenue projections might well be attained
suggests that the Government could commit itself to
promoting, vigorously and innovatively, the growth

!Z’’lnvesting In Space . . . ,“ Aerospace America, April 1984, p. 90.
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Table F-3.—Growth in Tax Revenues From Private Sector Space. Related Sales,
and Their Influence on the Net Cost of the Federal Civilian Space Program
(billions of 1983 dollars per year– assuming a 15°/0 sales growth rate)

Years
O (1983)
5 (1988)
10 (1993)
15 (1998)
20 (2003)

Tax revenues
growth @ 150A/year
0.5
1,0
2.0
4.1
8.2

25 (2008)

16.0

Government space expenditure net cost
A constant $7 billion/
$7 billion (1983) increasing
at 1‘\Olyear
year (1983)
6.5
6.5
6.4
6.0
5.7
5.0
4.0
0.3
(1.2)
(7.5)

(9.5)

Table F-4.—Growth in Tax Revenues From Private Sector Space-Related Sales,
and Their Influence on the Net Cost of the Government Civilian Space Program
(billions of 1983 dollars per year– assuming a 10% sales growth rate)
Government space expenditure net cost
Years
O (1983)
5 (1988)
10 (1993)
15(1 998)
20 (2003)
25 (2008)

Tax revenues
growth @ 10%/year
0.5
0.8
1.3
2.1
3.4
5.4

A constant $7 billion/
year (1983)
6.5
6.2
5.7
4.9
3.6
1.6

of commercial and industrial space-related sales. That
is, the Federal Government, working in close concert
with the private sector, would work to see, over time,
a great increase in such high-technology sales, thereby
generating proportionally much greater tax revenues
which could be looked upon as “offsets” to the public R&D expenditures on space. Also, if successful,
such an initiative would result in an effective transfer
of much of the responsibility for the health and growth
of space-related economic activities from the public
to the private sector.
The President has just taken particular note of this
possibility: the July 20, 1984, White House “Fact
Sheet” entitled “National Policy on the Commercial
Use of Space” states that “In partnership with industry and academia, Government will expand basic research and development which may have implications
for investors aiming to develop commercial space
products and services.”
Of course, private-sector gross revenues also can be
expected to support space-related commercial-industrial R&D. Again, assuming that sales grow at the average annual rate of 10 to 15 percent, compounded, and
assuming as well that about 5 percent of these sales
is spent by the private sector on space-related R&D
(probably a conservative assumption; C. Paul Christ-

$7 billion (1983) increasing
at 1‘/Olyear
6.5
6.5
6.4
6.0
5.1
3.6

ensen recently observed that: “ . . . a successful hightechnology company normally must spend 5 to 10
percent of its gross sales on R&D’’ 13) then, 20 years
from now, a private-sector R&D investment rate of
some $1 billion to $2 billion (1 984) per year would
have been reached.
The total Government investment (again, assuming
that NASA appropriations increase at 1 percent “real
growth” per year, compounded) plus the commercialindustrial investment in space-related R&D would be
expected to increase substantially overtime. (See table
F-5, which assumes a 15 percent projected growth rate
for the private sector.) By the end of the next quarter
of a century, the country’s overall space-related R&D
activities could reach a level that would be nearly
twice the size of today’s Government program and
that, by then, would be increasing at some 5 percent/year, compounded.
These are extraordinary projections, and they could
well turn out to be conservative ones.
To put such numbers into a space R&D and exploration perspective, note that a U.S. public expenditure
of an average of some $1 billion/year over, say, 15

I Jsclence,

Apr. 13, 1984, P. 117
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Table F-5.—Growth in Yeariy U.S. Space investment,
Federal (increasing at 1°/0 annually) Pius Private
(increasing at 150/0 annually)

Years
O (1983)
5 (1988)
10 (1993)
15 (1998)
20 (2003)
25 i2008)

Investment (billions of 1983 dollars per Year)
Private
Total
Government
7.0
7.4
7.7
8.1
8.5
9.0

0.1
0.3
0.5
1.0
2.0
4.1

7.1
7.7
8.2
9.1
11.0
13.0

to 20 years could allow us, along with other cooperating countries, to place a modest settlement on the
Moon. In similar fashion, an additional some $2 billion/year, over 20 to 30 years, could allow a first
human landing on the planet Mars. And each of these
sums would include paying for that kind and amount
of LEO infrastructure specifically required to assure
the efficient operational conduct of these ventures,
HISTORICAL BASES FOR A PROJECTION OF
SALES GROWTH IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
While, of course, no brief can be held with complete confidence, either for the absolute rates of increase of space-related sales, or for such a long-term
continuation thereof as is outlined here—and other
countries have also already clearly perceived the great
longer-term economic prospects in the space area14–
it must be remembered that the U.S. investment in
the publicly supported civilian space area has provided an enormous base of assets, understanding and
experience for so doing; that the active interest of our
private commercial-industrial sector in investing in
space assets and activities, already non-trivial, is
quickening; and that we have other high-technology
growth “stories” as useful references: air transportation, computers, radio, television, medical technology, communications, etc.
For instance, President Karl G, Harr of the Aerospace Industries Association observed, in his report
of December 1983, that “ . . . there has been a considerable acceleration in the building of commercial
communications satellites . , . that’s just the beginning
of an indicated boom; worldwide projections show
enormous increases in demand for satellite communications services between now and the end of the
century.” And Secretary of Transportation Elizabeth
Dole is recently quoted as saying, with reference to
14See the OTA rew~ on /nternatjona/
Civilian Space Activities, 1984.

Cooperation and Competition in

that Department’s new responsibilities for the commercialization of expendable launch vehicles: “ . . .
this involves ‘a whole new industry’ with growth prospects estimated at up to $10 billion over the next decade. ”15
A recently published OTA report, International
Competition in Electronics, notes that: “Sales of the
more than 6,000 electronics manufacturers in the
United States exceeded $125 billion in 1982 and are
growing rapidly . . . the growth rate over the past decade reached nearly 15 percent [per year, compounded].” 16-17
As one general example: Forbes magazine has
recently 18 surveyed the sales growth of 25 leading
companies in the electronics area, comparing the
average of such sales for the most recent 5 years with
the average of the preceding 5 years. The annual
sales growth of the top one-half of the companies averaged 23 percent, compounded.
The early days of commercial radio provide another
example of how the growth rate of a newly introduced
service supported by new technology can attain phenomenal values. “[In] the spring of 1922 . . . the sale
of radio sets, parts, and accessories amounted to more
than $60 million annually. By the end of 1929, sales
had climbed to a remarkable $843 million.”19 This is
an annual growth rate of greater than 40 percent/year,
compounded. More recently, lasers and their applications have become at least as big a high-technology
business as has satellite communications, “In the past
2 decades . . . the market for laser-related systems that
solve practical problems has grown to over $3 billion
per year , . . “ 2°
As an individual company example, over the past
7 years the International Business Machines Corp.
(IBM) has seen its sales grow at an average annual rate
of 14 percent, compounded, and its top financial officer was quoted late last year as venturing the prediction that “ . . . sales growth in the next several years
will surpass the 14 percent rate . . . “; 21 in fact, sales
grew 17 percent in 1983.22 Seven years ago IBM’s sales

J~Aerospace Daily, Jan. 19, 1984, pp. 97-98.
lcNovember 1983, p. 108.
17N4B. Neither this figure, nor any that follow which reference sales growth
in either absolute numbers or annual rates, have been adjusted to reflect
the unusually high inflation rates that held during the late 1970s and early
1980s. Consequently, they are inherently “optimistic” if taken as an augury
of future sales growth. But, at the same time, this was an epoch during which
business expansion was abnormally repressed by the same inflationa~ pressures—pressures that, one hopes, will not soon be repeated.
Iajan. 2, 1984, p. 176.
IsSteven L. ~1 Sesto, “Technology and Social Change, ” in Technological
Forecasting and Social Change, vol. 24, pp. 183-196; see esp. p. 183.
Zoscience, Apr. 13, 1984, P. 117.
I} Wa// Street Journal, Dec. 9, 1983, P. 5.
llwall Street Journal, Dec. 19, 1984, p. 2.
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were some $15 billion; today they are some $40 billion, and 3 years from now could approximate $55
billion. It is clear that the absolute size of sales is not
necessarily an impediment to further sales growth
when desired new assets and services are being introduced and adopted—not even at the $30 billion to
$50 billion/year level.
Other, more recent, high-technology commercialindustrial examples abound. Over approximately the
past decade (ending in 1982) the average annual compound growth rate in sales (taken from Moody’s or
individual company reports) for the Communications
Satellite Cooperation was 15 percent; for INTELSAT
and Texas Instruments: 16 percent; for Hewlett-Packard: 23 percent; and for MCI: 68 percent.
Thus, it does seem reasonable to expect that, with
energetic and innovative consideration explicitly given
to cooperative Government-private sector promotion
of United States commercial-industrial space investments and initiatives—initiatives directed both to
opening up new uses related to space and to reducing the unit cost of producing space assets and conducting space operations–the next quarter of a century could see truly important, perhaps outstanding,
growth in our civilian space-related sales, with all that
this should imply for employment, tax revenues, international trade, etc. As the earlier referenced OTA
report succinctly states: “ . . . the United States needs
to search for new engines of growth to drive the economy into the 21st century . . . “23 and “ . . . special
stress should be laid on . . . R&D and technology plus
measures aimed at stimulating investment in new and
innovative firms . . . “24 And, as a recent Washington
Post article emphasized: “America’s strength in exporting is not in standardized, commodity products,
but in high-technology specialized products that draw
on the huge pool of American know-how and expertise;] specialized, higher technology products . . . are
America’s bread and butter.” 2 5 - 2 6
LEGAL AND EXPERIENTIAL BASES FOR
FEDERAL/PRIVATE-SECTOR COOPERATION IN
ECONOMICALLY DIRECTED R&D
It is important to note that there is some precedent
in Federal law for exploring Government-private sector initiatives in stimulating sales in a high-technology
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domain such as space. The “Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980”27 states: “(a) Policy.
It is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to ensure the full use of the result of the Nation’s Federal investment in research and development. To this end, the Federal Government shall strive
. . . to transfer federally . . . originated technology . . . to the private sector. ” Also, for instance, the
Department of Defense (DOD), using the 1982 authority incorporated into formal law by inclusion of appropriate language in Title 10 of the United States Code,
Section 22394, employs very long-term contracting for
utility services in its “Venture Capital Energy Procurement Program by the Military Services. ” 28 DOD uses
this program to excite the private sector to develop
and use new technology to provide DOD with energy
services at lower cost than otherwise; this approach
is now being replicated by certain States and municipalities.
And the features of the “Small Business Innovation
Development Act of 1982,” 29 which was enacted to
(among other things) “ . . . utilize Federal research
and development as a base for technological innovation [so as] to contribute to the growth and strength
of the Nation’s economy, ” also could be utilized by
NASA, NOAA, DOT and other space-related executive branch offices. This act requires that as much as
1 1/4 percent of the “annual extramural” R&D appropriations of most major Federal agencies be spent with
smaller and, presumably, more aggressive, more entrepreneurial, business organizations.
Perhaps, say, a small fraction of 1 percent of the total
annual NASA and Commerce/NOAA/DOT appropriations could be spent directly and specifically to prompt
activities that offer reasonable promise of furthering
the growth of space-related sales in our private sector. In close concert with our private space-related
business sector, the Government, in order to realize
a more effective linkage of its R&D to the private marketplace, could use these funds to help “focus” the
scientific, exploration, and technological results of the
other 99.5 percent on the task of increasing business
sales.
Such a requirement would be somewhat analogous
to that holding for the nine national laboratories that
operate under the aegis of the Department of Energy.
Under the terms of the Stevenson-Wydler Act (sec.
11 (b)) these laboratories are obligated to spend not
less than 1/2 percent of their funds on activities that

13/nternatjona/ com~titfon in Electronics, p. 466.
Z41bld., p. 502.
~sjan, 8, 1984, P, G l/G8
26 Notably, in the

private

ITpub[lc Law 96-480, Sec. 11. Utilization of Federal Technology, Oct. 21,
commercial-industrial world, the sPace area is

not yet even considered to be important in terms of “high technology”see U.S. News and World Report, Jan. 16, 1984, p. 38 where, in de fintng
“High Technology: What Is It?,” space assets and activities go unmentioned.

1980.
Zasee an article by this title in the 10th Energy Technology Conference Report, p. 230 et seq.
‘ qPublic Law 97-219.
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would see the technology that they develop, using
Federal funds, “transferred” to our private sector. The
potential power of such an approach is a matter of
public record. One of these laboratories, Sandia,
spends more than 1 percent of its budget in this fashion, and has had a long list of successful transfers. 30
In one area alone, that of clean-room technology used
by hospitals and electronics companies, Sandia estimates that sales have now reached $200-million/year
by 70 companies. Much as in the case of satellite communications and NASA (but scaled down by just an
order of magnitude), the total tax revenues provided
by such sales, probably some $50 million, is some 8
percent of Sandia’s $7oO million annual budget.
In an article entitled “The Making of a Conservative Science Policy,” Wil Lepkowski observes that:
. . . from 1982 onward [the present] Administration . . . drew back from its original insistence that the
government had no business developing new technologies for the private sector. ” He suggests that: “In
fact, there is nothing wrong with the government’s developing ideas, concepts, and hardware for the private sector to exploit for the good of the public.” And
he concludes: “What the administration will notice
in 1984, and try to stimulate, is evidence from research
agencies that their programs are contributing to the
economy, innovation, and productivity. We can expect to see growing evidence of the major contribution of the conservative revolution: closer and closer
integration of economics with science and technology. After many decades, policymakers are doing a better job of bringing the two together. That, by itself,
is an achievement.” 31 The President’s 1984 State of
the Union address and his subsequent radio address
both bear out Lepkowski’s expectation in the civilian
space area,
The Congressional Research Service recently observed that: “ . . . many analysts believe that Federal
policy to harmonize governmental and private sector support of private science and technology probably could be improved significantly without [an excessive] degree of government-private sector
32
collusion . . . “ And it prepared a report for the use
of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the United States Senate that notes that:33
“With increasing [prospects] of space commercialization . . . the Government may have to provide fund-

jOTechno/ogy Transfer at Sandia National Laboratories: First Annual Report, SAND83-0345, March 1983.
31 Technology Review, January 1984, p. 39 et SW.
j?jee the CRS Review, January 1984, p. 14.
3Wongressional Research Service, “Policy and Legal Issues Involved in the
Commercialization of Space” published as a Committee Print (No. 98-102),
Sept. 23, 1983, pp. 17-18.

ing if the private-sector [at the outset] is unwilling or
unable to fund the R&D [and it] may be necessary to
increase support for initial R&D funded by the Government if commercial activity is deemed important.”
The report raises serious questions as to “. . . the effectiveness of [the] mechanisms [now used by NASA]
for promoting [space] commercialization,” But the
heretofore-mentioned example of Sandia and, for instance, the pressure for AT&T’s Bell Labs, with its $2
billion/year budget, to become consumer- and marketoriented, 34 suggests that the executive branch, and
especially NASA and Commerce/NOAA/DOT, if properly prompted by the President and Congress and led
by imaginative, experienced, and tough-minded leaders, could make the required transition. For instance,
NASA’s recent request for proposals for a Shuttle marketing support contract is an important step in that
direction. 35 So is Executive Order #12465 (February
24, 1984), designating the Department of Transportation as the lead agency “for encouraging and facilitating commercial ELV activities by the United States
private sector.”

THE SPACE-RELATED PRIVATE SECTOR GROWS UP
Slowly, the private sector is learning more about
space, more about the prospects of doing business
there, and more about how to deal with the Government in so doing.
For instance, NASA and the 3M Co., St. Paul, MN,
signed a memorandum of understanding earlier this
year that will enable the company to fly aboard the
Shuttle several experiments related to the growth of
organic crystals and the development of thin films.
NASA has signed one major joint endeavor agreement
with McDonnell Douglas and Johnson & Johnson for
the production of pharmaceuticals in space, and currently is in discussions with approximately 20 companies contemplating future space endeavors.
Other firms have been involved in discussing a wide
range of experimental activities such as electroplating
enhancement, improvement in catalytic materials, formation of glass alloys, research in long-term blood
storage, development of remote-sensing techniques,
development of smaller space vehicles and components of a “space station,” etc. The firms include: Fairchild, Micro-Gravity Research Associates, John Deere,
Space Industries Inc., DuPont, Honeywell, A.D. Little, Orbital Sciences Corp., American Science and
Technology Corp., Ball Aerospace, C2Spaceline,
Sparx, Spaceco Ltd., and Astrotech.
Jtsee /formation Technology Research and Development, OTA, in Press.

MNASA tndust~ Briefing for STS Marketing, May 1, 1%4.
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Of greatest importance in considering the matter of
the Government’s working to promote growing private-sector sales i n the civilian space-related area are,
of course, the views and policies of the leaders of both
the legislative branch and the executive branch, particularly the President himself. President Reagan has
made his views and desires clearly known. In his radio
address of January 28, 1984, he stated: “We expect
space-related investments to grow quickly in future
years . . . .NASA, along with other departments and
agencies, will . . . promote private investment
. . . we’re going to bring into play . . . the vitality of
our free enterprise system. ”
So, whatever views the administration has in regard
to close cooperation between the Government and
the U.S. private sector in general, and however much
attention such cooperation receives in other areas, it
is now clearly, indeed forcefully, on record as supporting it between civilian space-related offices such
as NASA and the commercial-i ndustrial-financial institutions that can be expected to profit from such cooperation. To repeat: “ . . . NASA . . . will promote
private investment , . . ,“
And, of course, to the extent that the private sector
provides space assets and operational services that
technology, the marketplace, and its growing freeenterprise capabilities allow, and conducts RDT&E activities at the multibillion-dollar/year level, NASA
would be able to concentrate on the more basic research, the more demanding space exploration, and

the more exotic “cutting edge” technology required
to support both.36 First hints of the potential of such
a private sector move are beginning to appear: Rockwell International is studying the commercial construction, launch, and maintenance of a private-sector
in-orbit “electric utility, ” costing more than a billion
dollars, that would be prepared to offer electrical power as a service to a host of space operations; J’ Space
Industries is readying itself to develop, produce, and
deploy a sophisticated space platform by 1988; the
Astrotech Corp. is holding discussions about their purchasing a Shuttle Orbiter at a price of some $2 billion
(1984); etc.

Impacts on the Federal (NASA)
Space Budget
What can be concluded from simply studying and
projecting the Federal civilian space program budget
itself?
jbsee the article by George

Mueller in Aerospace America, January 1984,

p. 84 et seq.
ITsee the International Section of Renewable Energy News, December
1983.
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As an initial reference point, the NASA fiscal year
1984 budget authorized by Congress is adopted. It is
usually presented in the general form of table F-6. (The
data source is the Congressional Record. In all that
follows, rounding can influence the last figure in sums.
All other Government civilian space expenditures are
small relative to NASA’s, and their inclusion would
unnecessarily complicate this discussion.) Inasmuch
as only the space R&D elements of this budget are of
concern here, this table presents just these.
Table F-6 shows that $2 billion will be spent on Shuttle production (Space Transportation Capabilities Development) in fiscal year 1984. The Shuttle production and development program is nearly complete;
when it ends, there will be about $2 billion that is
unspoken for in the NASA budget, if current funding
levels continue.
Two other financial matters must be taken into consideration: the reimbursement to the Government for
Shuttle transportation services when the Shuttle is used
by the private sector and other countries; and the 1
percent/year real growth in funds that would be made
available to NASA if the present administration’s expressed budget views in this regard for future fiscal
years are accepted by Congress and continue indefinitely.
That the payments for use of Shuttle launch services are already reimbursing the Government for 4
percent of the publicly funded civilian space program,
and that these payments are now expected to grow
to truly important dimensions soon (perhaps 14 percent by 1989), should be appreciated by all with a serious interest in the cost of this program. The NASA Ad-

Table F-6.—NASA Overall Authorization for
Fiscal Year 1984 (billions of dollars)
A. R&D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Construction and facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Program management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5.88
0.13
1.24

D. Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
=$7.30
The R&D element (A, above) consists of external
contract funds for:
1. Space transportation capabilities
development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.01
2. Space transportation operations . . . . . . . .
1.55
3. Physics and astronomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0.56
4. Planetary exploration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0.22
5. Life sciences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0.06
6. Space applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0.31
7. Technology utilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0.01
8. Aeronautical research and technology . . .
0.32
9. Space research and technology. . . . . . . . .
0.14
10. Tracking and data acquisition . . . . . . . . . .
0.70
=$5.90
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ministrator has reported at a press briefing 36 that the
reimbursements—primarily for Shuttle flight services—approached $300 million in fiscal year 1984, and
that he expects that they will approximate some $7OO
million in fiscal year 1985. Further, he stated that: “1
still anticipate reaching the break-even point in 1988
or 1989. ”
Thus (even without considering the cost-offsetting
importance of tax revenues generated by private-sector space business) the net cost to the public of our
publicly funded civilian space program even now is
significantly less than the gross cost because of this
Shuttle cost reimbursement: it is $6.6 billion net out
of $6.9 billion gross. Next year the expected reimbursement income would more than offset a 4 percent inflation rate. (Considering the tax revenues as
an additional effective “offset” would reduce the $6.6
billion to $6.1 billion. That is, the net cost could be
considered to be some 11 percent less than the gross
cost, and falling.)
And, finally, NASA now has some reason to expect
that funds for its program would increase by 1 percent/year plus any inflationary increase. If inflation
compensation plus 1 percent real growth becomes
emplaced in NASA’s annual appropriations, it would
have important influence on the pace at which spacerelated objectives, such as those suggested here, could
be pursued. A 1 percent “real growth” on a base of
$7 billion/year would provide a total addition of some
$10 billion by the end of this century, and a total approaching $25 billion in the next 25 years—i.e., an
average of some $1 billion per year (1984$) over this
latter interval.
Under the assumptions made here, three conclusions may be reached concerning cost and financing
considerations:
1. In the absence of any private-sector or othercountry financial participation-i .e., under circumstances whereby the full cost of addressing
the ten conceptual objectives would be defrayed
by U.S. public funds, and assuming that the funds
continuing to become available year-to-year
would be in the same amount as those now available under NASA’s “budget envelope,” then,
starting 2-3 years hence, the essential completion
of Shuttle-related development could provide
some $2 billion (1984) /year—i,e., some $50 billion (1984$) over the next quarter of a century,
2. If, to this RDT&E “wedge” is added the anticipated 1 percent/year “real growth” in appropriations, in addition to an indexing of appropriations
to neutralize the influence of inflation, the next
aaThe Washinflon

Post, Feb. 6, 1984, page A-9.

25 years could see a total of some $25 billion
(1984$) added to the $50 billion made available
through the Shuttle RDT&E completion—i.e., a
total of some $75 billion (1984$). Thus, just these
two measures alone would suffice to see (from
the financial viewpoint alone) that the ten conceptual objectives could be satisfactorily addressed within the next quarter of a century.
3. If the two preceding assumptions are retained,
and if, in addition, the full cost were to be shared
by other countries and our private sector, in the
fashions and to the degrees outlined earlier, this
measure (again, speaking just of financial, not political or technological circumstances) would allow the ten conceptual objectives to be attained
in, say, 20 years since this would allow some $15
billion (1984$) of public funds to be used to accelerate the schedule. Alternatively, the 1 percent
per year “real growth” and/or the “base” figure
of $2 billion could be reduced.
4. Whether or not such public and other funds are
indeed made available could be influenced, positively and importantly, by two other circumstances:
● If the incorne from other countries and the private sector for the use of the Shuttle increases
as is now hoped/expected, then, in a half-dozen
years or so, this would amount to NASA appropriations being, in effect, “offset” by as much
as some $2 billion (1984$) per year;
. If our private space-related sector could be stimulated to maintain its present rate of sales
growth, it could begin to make significant additional space R&D investments itself—investments that could grow to billions of dollars/year
in the next two decades or so; and
. If the tax revenues “thrown off” by our private
sector’s commercial-industrial sales continue to
increase in the future as they have in the past,
i.e., if a 10 to 15 percent per year, compounded,
growth rate were to continue over the next quarter of a century, they could, at least to some extent, be looked upon also as an important “offset” to the gross public cost of our publicly
supported space program, inasmuch as they
would amount to scores of billions of dollars
(1984$).
Clearly, under such generaI circumstances as these,
funding limitations would not prevent the United
States from undertaking an ambitious publicly supported civilian space program throughout the next
quarter century.

Appendix G

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS
AND TERMS
Glossary of Acronyms and
Abbreviations
ACC
AEM
ASO
ASTO

–
–
–
–

Aft Cargo Carrier
Applications Explorer Module
Advanced Solar Observatory
Advanced Solar Terrestrial Observatory
ASEB
– Aeronautics and Space Engineering
Board (of the NRC)
AXAF
– Advanced X-Ray Astrophysics Facility
— Billion
B
BOB
– Bureau of the Budget
CDG
– Concept Development Group
CNES
– Centre National D’Etudes Spatiales
(France)
CNR
– National Research Council (Italy)
COM
– Center of Mass
COMM
— Communications
COMSAT – Communications Satellite Corporation
DBS
– Direct Broadcast Satellite
DDT&E
– Design, Development, Test, and
Evaluation
DMS
– Data Management Subsystem
DOC
– Department of Commerce
DOD
– Department of Defense
DOT
– Department of Transportation
ECLSS
– Environmental Control and Life SupEDO
ELV
EOL
EOS

–
–
–
–

port Subsystem

Extended Duration Orbiter
Expendable Launch Vehicle
Earth-Orbiting Laboratory
Electrophoresis Operations in Space

EPS
– Electrical Power Subsystem
ESA
– European Space Agency
— External Tank
ET
EUMETSAT – European Meteorological Satellite
Organization
E U R E C A – European Retrievable Carrier
EUTELSAT – European Telecommunications Satellite Organization
EVA
– Extravehicular Activity (“walking in
Space”)
— Free Flyer
FF

g

– Gravity

GEO

– Geostationary Earth Orbit (sometimes, less precisely, geosynchronous)
GN&C
– Guidance, Navigation, and Control
GPS
– Global Positioning [Space] System
(see NAVSTAR)
HEO
– High Earth Orbit
IMS
– Information Management Subsystem
INMARSAT – International! Maritime Satellite Corporation
INTELSAT — International Telecommunication
Satellite Corporation
— Initial Operational Capability
IOC
— Institute of Space and Astronautical
ISAS
Science (Japan)
— Industrial Space Facility
ISF
— Initial Solar Terrestrial Observatory
ISTO
— Intravehicular Activity
IVA
– Joint Endeavor Agreement
JEA
– Johnson Space Center
JSC
— Kilobits per second (of data
Kbps
handling)
— Kennedy Space Center
KSC
— kilogram (2.2 pounds)
kg
– kilowatt
kW
— Long Duration Exposure Facility
LDEF
— Large Deployable Reflector
LDR
— Low-Earth-Orbit (usually 200-600
LEO
km)
— Light Detection and Ranging
LIDAR
– Large Space System
LSS
— Million
M
— meter (3.3 feet)
— Modular Attitude Control
MAC
— Mission Analysis Study
MAS
— Messerschmitt-Boelkow-BIohm
MBB
— Megabits per second (of data
Mbps
handling)
— Multiple Docking Adaptor
MDA
— Modular Experimental Platform for
MESA
Science and Applications
— Multimission Modular Spacecraft
MMS
— Manned Maneuvering Unit
MMU
— Manned Orbiting Laboratory
MOL
— Manned Orbital Research LabMORL
oratory
— Manned Orbital Systems Concept
MOSC
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MPS
MSC
MSFC
NAC
NAE
NAS
NASA

— Materials Processing in Space
—
—
—
—
—
—

Manned Spacecraft Center
Marshall Space Flight Center
NASA Advisory Council
National Academy of Engineering
National Academy of Sciences
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
— National Space Development
NASDA
Agency (Japan)
NAVSTAR — DOD Satellite Navigation System
(see GPS)
— National Oceanic and Atmospheric
NOAA
Administration (within DOC)
— National Research Council (of the
NRC
NAS-NAE)
— Operations and Maintenance
O&M
— Office of Advanced Research and
OART
Technology (within NASA)
— Office of Aeronautics and Space
OAST
Technology (within NASA)
— Office of Management and Budget
OMB
— Orbital Maneuvering System
OMS
—
Office of Manned Space Flight
OMSF
(within NASA)
— Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (forOMV
merly designated TMS)
— Orbital Service Module
OSM
— Office of Technology Assessment
OTA
— orbital Transfer Vehicle
OTV
— Orbital Workshop
OWS
— Power Extension Package
PEP
— Payload
P/L
— proximity Operation Vehicle
POV
— Research and Development
R&D
— Reaction Control System
RCS
— Research, Development, and ProRD&P
duction
— Research, Development, Test, and
RDT&E
Evaluation (or Engineering)
— Radio Frequency
r.f.
— Remote Manipulator System
RMS
— Reusable Orbital Transfer Vehicle
ROTV
— Requirements Working Group
RWG
— Space Applications Board (of the
SAB
NRC)
— Shuttle Developed Vehicle
SDV
– Space Operations Center
SOC
S O L A R I S – European Space Platform Concept
SPAS
– Space Pallet Satellite
SPS
– Solar Power Satellite
SPSS
– Shuttle Payload Support Structure
– Space Station
SS
SSB
– Space Science Board (of the NRC)

SSEC
SSSAS
SSTF
STG
STS
TDRS
TDRSS
TMS
TMV
TRKNG
TRS
TSV
TUSK
VAFB
WBS

— Solar System Exploration Committee
— Space Station Systems Analysis
Study
— Space Station Task Force (within
NASA)
— Space Task Group (of the National
Security Council)
– Space Transportation System
– Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
– Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
System
— Teleoperator Maneuvering System
(former designation for OMV)
— Transport Modular Vehicle
— Tracking
— Teleoperator Retrieval System
— Teleoperator Service System
— Tethered Upper Stage Knob
— Vandenberg Air Force Base
— Work Breakdown Structure

Glossary of Terms
Base–the central or core set of interrelated, and perhaps interconnected, 28.5° LEO infrastructure
(“space station”) modules including facilities for
power, docking, control, and human habitation.
Cargo bay–the Space Shuttle’s central fuselage section (openable to space) in which cargo, equipment, and experiment modules are carried.
Core–(see base.)
Cosmos 1443-a Soviet resupply vehicle for Salyut orbiting spacecraft.
Element–any module, platform, free flyer, or vehicle which is an integral part of the in-space infrastructure, and dependent on one or more other element(s) for its long-term operation.
Free flyer–an unattached or free-flying uninhabitable
satellite (usually dedicated to one purpose or activity) which is serviced by or otherwise dependent
on other infrastructure elements.
Geostationary satellite–a geosynchronous satellite
whose circular orbit lies in the plane of the Earth’s
equator and which thus remains fixed relative to
the Earth; by extension, a satellite whose position
remains approximately fixed relative to the Earth;
its altitude is necessarily approximately 35,000 km
above the Earth’s surface.
Geosynchronous satellite–an Earth satellite whose
period of revolution is equal to the period of rotation of the Earth about its axis.
Infrastructure-a generic term referring to all the elements constituting an interdependent space sup-
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port system, consisting of surface and in-space
elements.
Leasecraft-proposed commercial, long-term, unpressurized platform that could be used for Earth observation, materials processing in space, etc.
Low-Earth-Orbit (LEO)–an orbit around the Earth at
altitudes usually ranging from 200 to 600 km and
located at any of various inclinations to the Equator.
Megabit-a data communications rate of 1 million bits
(or units) per second.
Module—an element of the infrastructure base or core
which provides a unique function for infrastructure
operations.
Orbiter–the Shuttle vehicle of the NASA Space Transportation System.
Orbit transfer–change of orbit, usually to one of significantly different altititude or inclination.
order of Magnitude–factor of 10.
Pallet–an open structure attached to an element of
infrastructure that provides mounting for equipment, vehicles, or experiments.
Platform–an orbiting multi-use structure capable of
supplying limited utilities to changeable payloads
and dependent on other infrastructure elements;
usually uninhabitable except, perhaps for some, for
servicing.
Polar orbit–an orbit whose plane intersects the
Earth’s axis of rotation.
Salyut–a Soviet inhabited “space station” in LEO, the
first model of which was launched in 1971.

Satellite–a body that revolves around another body
of preponderant mass and that has a motion primarily and permanently determined by the gravitational forces of attraction between them; generally
applied here to an object revolving about the Earth.
Shuttle-the reusable passenger- and cargo-carrying
surface-LEO vehicle of the NASA Space Transportation System; sometimes referred to as the Space
Shuttle Orbiter.
Skylab–an independent orbiting laboratory composed principally of hardware remaining from the
Apollo program; inhabited by crews of astronauts
during 1973-1974.
Spacelab–a laboratory module, designed and produced by ESA, carried into and out of orbit in the
Shuttle cargo bay and supported by the Shuttle
power and life support systems.
Space probe–a spacecraft designed to travel out of
the gravitational field of the Earth to explore other
parts of the solar system.
Space station–a totality of habitable and uninhabitable Earth-orbiting interdependent infrastructure
elements constituting a long term in-space support
system.
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS)–a
communications system used to relay data directly
between orbiting vehicles and a single U.S. ground
station at White Sands, NM.
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